



ARMENIAN

TERRORISM

THE PAST,

THE PRESENT,

THE PROSPECTS

FRANCIS P. HYLAND

WESTVIEW PRESS

Miscellaneous phrases and quotations are reprinted with permission from: Heath W. Lowry, Bonnie Cordes, and Michael M. Gunter, *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection* (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984); Yves Ternon, *The Armenian Cause* (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1985); Kerop Bedoukian, *Some of Us Survived* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1978); Michael M. Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), copyright © 1986 by Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT; Louise Nalbandian, *Armenian Revolutionary Movement* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1963), copyright © 1963 by The Regents of the University of California; and Gerard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance* (London: Zed Press, 1983).

This Westview softcover edition is printed on acid-free paper and bound in library-quality, coated covers that carry the highest rating of the National Association of State Textbook Administrators, in consultation with the Association of American Publishers and the Book Manufacturers' Institute.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Copyright © 1991 by Westview Press, Inc.

Published in 1991 in the United States of America by Westview Press, Inc., 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 36 Lonsdale Road, Summertown, Oxford OX2 7EW

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hyland, Francis P.

Armenian terrorism : the past, the present, the prospects /
Francis P. Hyland.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8133-8124-X

1. Terrorism. 2. Armenians—Politics and government. I. Title.

HV6431.H95 1991

303.6'25'08991992—dc20

91-16076
CIP

Printed and bound in the United States of America



The paper used in this publication meets the requirements
of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper
for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

More than a million of us died! What's the difference if twenty-five of you die?

—Zohrab Sarkissian and Levon Ekmekjian,
as they carried out the 7 August 1982 massacre
at Ankara's Esenboga Airport

It wasn't enough.

—Levon Ekmekjian,
when told that seven persons, including an
American woman, had died and seventy-two others
had been wounded in the attack

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xi
1 The Cultural/Historical Context	1
2 World War I: Ottoman Turkey	7
3 The 1915 Massacres	15
4 Post-World War I Retribution (Nemesis)	21
5 Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia	23
6 "Hagop Hagopian"	57
7 The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide/ Armenian Revolutionary Army	61
8 The New Armenian Resistance	77
9 The Prospects	87
Appendix A: Attacks	91
Appendix B: Quantitative Aspects	227
<i>Bibliography</i>	241
<i>Index</i>	245

Preface

Seemingly out of nowhere and apparently without warning, Armenian terrorist groups arose in the mid-1970s to join the ranks of the numerous other groups around the world at that time carrying out attacks on their professed adversaries. One after another, explosive devices fashioned by members of Armenian groups were detonated, killing and maiming innocent bystanders to gain attention for "Hay Tahd," "the Armenian Cause." Time after time, a gunman stepped up to an automobile and fired round after round into his Turkish target, until over two dozen Turkish diplomats, family members, and associates had died.

In addition to the attacks themselves, communiqués issued after each attack, favorable newspaper articles in the Armenian ethnic press, other media coverage, press conferences, and even an Armenian-language radio program in Beirut all served to portray a widespread, deeply rooted anti-Turkish movement with thousands upon thousands of members. In the name of that self-professed "movement," well in excess of 200 attacks were carried out in 23 countries on four continents.

When the groups' stated aims had not been achieved within several years, the internal pressures inherent in all group settings intensified. Some of the pressures were relieved through schisms, as happened also in the case of the Palestinian movement. Widening the number of countries attacked, in some cases to force the release of imprisoned commandos, was another tactical outlet. In other cases, more indiscriminate attacks designed specifically to cause large numbers of injuries and deaths were the method chosen to "prove" to the world that the groups had lost none of their revolutionary fervor and remained a viable force with which Turkey and the West still had to contend.

Despite the secrecy inherent in the conduct of terrorist activities, and oftentimes in the pursuit of publicity, a number of individuals emerged from the shadowy background of the Armenian terrorist movement. Preeminent among those was the individual who used the name "Hagop Hagopian" when conducting press conferences, but who preferred the *nom de guerre* "Mujahed" (Warrior) when dealing with associates in ASALA, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.¹

Finally, the methods used so often by Armenian terrorists began to be turned inward on members of the groups and even on the leadership itself. On 28 April 1988, the man who had personally participated in a number of attacks and ordered hundreds of others was gunned down on an Athens street.²

While contemporary Armenian terrorism appeared at first to spring up without warning, a closer look at Armenian history, especially at the more recent past, brings the realization that we have experienced merely one wave in a series. Because the traditional homeland of Armenia lay astride territory and trade routes coveted by many others, Armenians have suffered invasion, oppression, and worse for hundreds of years; the pattern has continued up into this century, in the case of Ottoman Turkey.

Given the right conditions—a catalytic event, an organization, a model group—all was in readiness for the next wave of Armenian terrorism. The conditions were satisfied in the 1970s, and the events detailed herein unfolded.

The author's objective in producing this book has been to gather into a single document the most comprehensive treatment of the subject of Armenian terrorism. A number of writers have focused on one or another aspect of the Armenian dynamic—history, language, religion, politics, terrorism. To fully comprehend the phenomenon that brings a young man to the point that he labors into the night to fashion an explosive device that will spray nails into a crowd of complete strangers, or fires a weapon repeatedly at his human target, has required the researcher to digest a large number of works. Some of them contributed large amounts of data; others, because of the nature of the topic of terrorism, only a single piece. It is this author's hope that if the researcher with a need to understand Armenian terrorism reads this book, that need will be filled.

In addition to an overview of the Armenian people, their culture, and the historical events that led up to the 1970s, subsequent sections will focus in the greatest detail on Armenian terrorism—the groups, leaders, members, tactics, attacks, weapons, infrastructure, funding, alliances—the essence of what differentiates a terrorist group from other organizations.

Francis P. Hyland

Notes

1. "The Reality" (Preface), *Armenian Reporter*, 10 January 1985, 3.

2. "Murdered Arab Reportedly Commercial Attache," Athens Domestic Greek, 0080 GMT (28 April 1988). "ASALA Leader with PDRY Papers Killed in Athens 28 April," Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, 0500 GMT (29 April 1988).

Acknowledgments

I long ago lost count of the number of books I've read. Virtually all of them had an "Acknowledgments" page, ranging from one person to close to a hundred. I skimmed many of those acknowledgments. You may skim this one if you wish, but the names (some abbreviated for the sake of anonymity) that follow are here because, without them, you would not be sitting with this book in your lap. If you think that when you read the author's name you've seen all the names in the publishing process that count, write a book and see.

- To: My parents, because of whom I am constitutionally unable to walk by a bookstore or library without going in;
My wife, Susan, because of her patience with my continued asking, "Are you sure I want to go through with this?"
Thank God you went to library school;
My daughters, Deborah and Margaret, who think it's "neat" that Dad is a published author. Not bad for a guy who prefers "elevator music";
The Armenian and Turkish people, two good peoples I have known, locked in a largely senseless struggle that no one alive began—please stop;
Jim Stinson and Ed Heyman, two great teachers because they're still students;
My Armenian mentors—Armen, Casey, Mihran, and Ed—four of the best testimonials to the character of the Armenian people;
Mr. Thomas Katz, whose thoroughness in research is a model for all;
A very supportive library crew—Pat W., Willamae T., Pam L., Leslie S., Harriet S., Lucille C., and Dick B.;
Dean Stevens and my thesis committee: Dr. Mark Kauppi, Dr. Max Gross, and Dr. Hagel Ingersoll.

These people all are responsible for the things about this book that you like. On the other side of the coin, I, and I alone, am responsible for any inaccuracies that may have crept in.

F.P.H.

1

The Cultural/Historical Context

The recent wave of Armenian terrorist attacks, notwithstanding the language used in communiqués or the political leanings of one group or another, is, at its heart, ethnic violence. The fundamental basis for the anger felt by its adherents is, by declaration, hundreds of years of injustice at the hands of many conquerors. This chapter, in portraying the history of the Armenian people, presents a number of the events considered by chroniclers of "Armenia" to be salient ones.

Violence and anguish are not recent acquaintances of those who call themselves "Hayem"—Armenians. Waves of military and civil strife have recurred since the forebears of today's Armenians moved into and settled in what is now eastern Turkey. A prime reason for the recurring violence is the strategic location of the land claimed by Armenians, astride one of the key trade routes between Asia and Europe. The borders claimed by Armenian nationalist parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries encompassed all the territories that had been part of any Armenian state since the seventh century B.C. Thus, the nationalists arrived at a territory of some 620,000 square kilometers, from Kayseri to the Caspian Sea, and from Tiflis to Lake Urmia. The dimensions of the territory, and the delineation of borders, however, are belied by the history of the area. The "nation" of Armenia was unified only infrequently, and never controlled the entire claimed area at any one time. Although Armenians and their cultural ancestors are said to have inhabited the area of eastern Anatolia possibly as early as 3000 B.C.,¹ with the exception of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries A.D., the only independent Armenian nation-state was the short-lived one in the twentieth century. As a result of political and/or military actions, the borders of Armenia were frequently redrawn to account for the gains and losses in size resulting from annexations during more powerful periods, or the partitions and divisions imposed by conquerors. For most of its history, during which it maintained jurisdiction over land,

Armenia was, in reality, a buffer state between the rival empires surrounding it.

Between the seventh and second centuries B.C., Armenia existed, for the most part, as a satrapy of the Persian Empire, paying tribute in the form of horses and warriors. Most Armenians engaged in agricultural pursuits, farming and raising animals.

In the second century B.C., two kingdoms, rivals to each other, declared their independence from the Persian Empire. In the reign of King Tigranes the Great, and without the domination of the Persians, Armenia opened itself to outside influences, chiefly ancient Greek. It is in this era that Armenia achieved its largest land area, becoming an empire that ruled from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Ocean.

At the end of the era, the armies of the Roman Empire transformed Armenia into a Roman protectorate. The Parthian Dynasty of the Arsacids, with the right to receive tribute paid by Armenians, transformed Armenian society into a feudal model. The Arsacids introduced a new social class into Armenia, the *nakharars*—dependent upon the Arsacids for its existence—as the group through which the Armenian people were controlled.²

Three events that occurred between the fourth and sixth centuries saved Armenia from being dismembered yet again by Persia and Byzantium: the conversion of the nation to Christianity, reportedly in 301 A.D.; the invention and promulgation of an alphabet; and nonparticipation in the Council of Chalcedon. The outcome of the conversion was a more politically homogeneous population more amenable to hewing to a central government's program. The invention of the alphabet by Mesrob Mashtots had a very similar outcome. The translation into the Armenian language of not only the Bible, but also cultural and political tracts resulted in a heightened homogeneity of views of Armenians toward others; Armenians simply did not integrate themselves into the surrounding Muslim societies. Finally, the absence of Armenian representatives from the Council of Chalcedon, while Armenian forces were preoccupied with battles against Persian forces, resulted in increased isolation of the Armenian people—considered schismatics by the remainder of the Christian world—resulting in an increased sense of a separate Armenian national identity.

Between the year 636 and the mid seventh century, control of the lands of the Armenians was assumed by Arabs. Armenians accepted this as a means toward ending the political tug of war between Byzantium and Persia played out again and again over the heads of the Armenian people. Further, the Arab Caliphate offered the former Armenian nation the possibility of remaining whole, as a province.

Infighting among various Armenian groups, in repeated attempts to achieve greater power, was a hallmark of the period. This infighting was a precursor of the internecine strife of the twentieth century. Another hallmark of the era, and also one that continues to today, was the continual formation of alliances in an attempt to play off one powerful nation against another in order to remain free.

The period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is considered to be the "Dark Ages" in Armenian history. Armenia fell to the Turkomans in the fifteenth century. From the sixteenth century until the mid-seventeenth century, the Ottomans and Persians fought each other for control of the strategic area that had been the Armenian nation. The treaty signed by the two in 1639 again partitioned the Armenian homeland, and people, into an Ottoman (western) part and a Persian (eastern) part. Eastern Armenia had already been depopulated by the Persian Shah in 1605 to reduce the supplies made available to Ottoman forces by Armenians, an irony in view of the events that would be perpetrated upon Armenians by Ottomans in three centuries. A severe recession, an outright economic collapse, befell the Armenian peoples in the Western, Ottoman portion of Armenia. What had been agricultural surpluses disappeared in the feeding of Ottoman armies. The effect of the loss of the surpluses was compounded by the near-total collapse of agricultural production, and by the appropriation of Armenian grazing lands by Turks and Kurds. Legally and culturally, the status of Armenians was reduced under the Ottomans to that of just another group of "infidels." This period was one of ever-increasing exploitation of Armenians, of an onerous tax burden, and the outright deprivation of civil rights. From a healthy, prosperous nation, the Armenian people were reduced to poverty and famine, confined to their villages by marauding tribes of nomads. Again, however, the character of the Armenian people served to carry them through a trying time, concentrating energy and attention on the family and the church. Among the various facets of the Armenian culture, it was the Armenian Church that took the lead during this period in preserving what was uniquely "Armenian."³

Emigration of Armenians into the diaspora accelerated as a result of the continuing struggle over Armenian lands between Persia and the Ottomans. The talent of the Armenian people was evidenced even in an out-migration; a network of centers sprang up to help in resettlement, and to welcome Armenian refugees into communities of Armenians. These communities grew to such an extent that other nations actually competed for Armenians, especially those nations serving as financial centers.⁴

As bad as living conditions had been for Armenians, the situation

began to worsen beginning in the seventeenth century, a microcosm of the decline in the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of the European powers. When the Ottoman Empire ceased to expand, when its forces' western movement ended in defeat in Vienna in 1683, a decline began that was aided in its acceleration by the European powers, primarily England, France, and Russia. Internally, the Ottomans turned on their minorities, including the Armenians, to take out their frustration and their mistrust, as well as to extract ever greater amounts of money in "taxes." By the nineteenth century, Turkey had become the proverbial "Sick Man of Europe," beset by external creditors and fearful of revenge by internal groups.

Ottoman concern over the loyalties of Armenians was not without foundation. Armenians took the Russian side in the Russian wars with Persia, providing scouts and volunteers for the Czarist armies. Persia surrendered eastern Armenia to Russia in 1828 as a result of the Treaty of Turkmanchai; Russia granted Armenians in Persia the right to return. A year later, Russia invaded western Armenia. The Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 brought an end to that conflict; however, 40,000 more Armenians emigrated to Russia. Following that, Russia annexed Persian Armenia. In all three of the conflicts, the propensity of Armenians to side with Russia became clearer. Whereas the outflow of Armenians and the consequent loss to the Ottoman Empire of Armenian acumen and industriousness had begun as a source of concern, by the nineteenth century the Ottoman government set about ridding itself of all Armenians.

Compounding the existing enmity between Turks and Armenians was the introduction into the Ottoman Empire of Western European thought. As early as 1853, Armenians organized and met in Paris with the goal of an Armenian nation removed from Turkey, Persia, and Russia. In one of the many ironies in Armenian history, Russia was the principal supporter of this effort. Armenian separatists' efforts in conjunction with Russia resulted, in 1878, in the Treaty of San Stefano; the treaty required the Ottoman government to agree to Russian protection of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Russia was ceded much of the border region of eastern Anatolia.⁵

Young Armenians, returned from attending European universities and filled with concern for social issues, drafted an Armenian national constitution which, oddly enough, was actually ratified by the Sultan in 1863. The constitution guaranteed Turkish Armenians cultural and religious autonomy, including the election of a Patriarch. After almost 500 years, Armenians again had a sense of identity as a "nation" when the Patriarch became the recognized representative of Turkish Armenians to the Ottoman Government. The accomplishments were to

be short-lived, and culminated in a prolonged campaign of violence against Armenians at the end of the nineteenth century, carried out as an official act to systematically rid Ottoman Turkey of a perceived disloyal minority.

Despite centuries of oppression and subjugation by one nation after another, the hopes of the Armenian people for a better life had endured. Those hopes were not to be realized, however, in the near future. The factors that had given rise to the past problems—being astride a key East-West trade route; being Christians in a Moslem area; living in an area desired by other, more numerous peoples—continued to be factors in the mid nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whereas in the past it had been Persians and Romans who had been the conquerors and overseers, it now became Ottoman Turks. To the preexisting factors, however, was added a significant new one: the migration of Western political philosophy and ideals into Turkey in the nineteenth century concerned the Ottoman Turkish Government to the point that it increased its repressive measures considerably.

Notes

1. A. Gregorian, T. Boghosian, and A. Mooradkhanian, *Hayots Patmootyoon* (Tehran: Modern Press, 1966) as reported in Rouben Manouel Torossian, *The Contemporary Armenian Nationalist Movement* (San Diego: United States International University, 1980), 9.

2. Yves Ternon, *The Armenian Cause* (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1985), 15.

3. Ternon, 19.

4. Ternon, 19.

5. Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1985), 8.

2

World War I: Ottoman Turkey

The stage for the large-scale, Ottoman-directed massacres of Armenians in 1915 was set over 50 years earlier in three areas of Eastern Turkey and in Armenian-populated areas of Tsarist Russia. A series of anti-Ottoman uprisings was carried out by Armenians in the areas of Zeitun, Van, and Erzerum. The Armenian armed response to atrocities perpetrated by the Ottomans and their surrogates was carried out, quite logically, by members of secret societies. This modus operandi provided confirmation to the Ottoman Government, already concerned over the allegiance of its Armenian minority, that the Armenian residents of Turkey could not be trusted. In addition to the natural restiveness of a people subjected to repeated atrocities over an extended period of time, the influences of Tsarist Russia and the introduction of Western thought also played prominent roles.¹

What evolved into a series of rebellions in Turkey began in the district of Zeitun in 1860. Zeitun, a mountainous area barely accessible to any outsider, retained a measure of independence long after other Armenian-populated areas had completely lost self rule. After living for centuries under the rule of non-Armenians, paying an annual tax, and enduring repeated depredation, the resurgent nationalism of the largely Armenian population clashed with Ottoman desires to settle Moslems on land confiscated from Armenians. On 8 June 1860, local Armenians countered the attempted entry of a Turkish force into the district to collect still higher taxes. The initial resistance grew, in only two years, to full-scale armed conflict. A strong political network of Armenians, probably headquartered in Constantinople, manifested itself in the Zeitun area beginning in the mid-1850s. The 1854 hanging by Turks of the key Armenian political figure in Zeitun, Melikian Hovagim, as he began a trip to Russia seeking funds to further enhance the military defenses of Zeitun, served only to strengthen the resolve

of the Armenians. A successor to Hovagim, Levon, angered the Ottoman Government by petitioning The Emperor Napoleon to apply pressure for the creation of an independent Zeitun. Levon's claim of 70,000 Armenian men who could bear arms was a further irritant.²

Concerned to the point of action over the perceived Armenian threat, the Ottoman Government sent 40,000 men to the Zeitun region in 1862. Under the command of Aziz Pasha, the Turkish force reduced village after village to ruin, until they reached the town of Zeitun. An Armenian force of 5,000, aided by local Moslems, defeated the much larger Turkish force, a victory that greatly energized the Armenian resistance movement. News of the victory served also to heighten the awareness of the European Powers.³ Only a combination of negotiation with the Ottoman Government and French pressure prevented the Turks from avenging the loss at Zeitun. The Armenian revolutionary movement in Turkey continued and spread, however, into a series of insurrections.

The creation of Armenian cultural, political, educational, and religious societies continued apace, as influential Armenians set about forming the infrastructure of a hoped-for independent nation of Armenia. Examples of such organizations in Turkey include The Benevolent Union (a forerunner of today's Armenian General Benevolent Union), the Haik Lodge, the Ser (Love) Society, the Nupar-Shahnazarian College, and a Masonic lodge with links to the Grand Orient Lodge in France. Across the border in Tsarist Russia, Armenian activists formed the rather ironically named "Goodwill Society." The society's expressed goals were in the areas of cultural, educational, and philanthropic projects, in order to receive governmental approval. The society's actual paramount objective was to foment opposition to the Ottoman Government of Turkey. Toward that end, it concentrated its efforts in the province of Van.⁴

The Protestant missionary movement among the Armenians in Turkey also played a prominent role. From its rather tenuous beginning in the early 1800s,⁵ and despite later hostility on the part of the Armenian Church, the movement grew to the point that Protestant missionaries were referred to as "the midwives of the birth of nationalism among the Armenians in Turkey." Through schools and churches, the Protestant missionaries introduced, then spread through Moslem Turkey, concepts and principles then extant in Western Europe and the United States.⁶

Companion uprisings to those in Zeitun against the Turkish Government took place in Van in early 1862, and in Erzerum in 1863. In both of the regions, Armenians appealed repeatedly for protection from marauding bands of Kurds. The Kurds often operated with the

encouragement of Turkish officials. The response of the Turkish Government ranged from "inviting" an Armenian exodus, so that the areas could be repopulated with non-Armenians, to the imprisonment of whole delegations.⁷

Ten years after the initial uprisings in Van and Zeitun, and having experienced another decade of fruitless appeals to the Turkish Government, Armenians in Van province formed the Union of Salvation in 1872.⁸ Village after village joined the union, as feelings of desperation spread. The proximity of the province of Van to the Russian border, and the long-standing influence of Armenian activists originally from Russia, served to assure a continued role for Russian Armenians and for the Russian Government. The organization maintained direct and continuing contacts with not only Armenian organizations in Russia, but also with the Russian Government. The Union of Salvation also served well as a role model when Armenians later formed their first political party, in Van in 1885—The Armenakan Party.

Disappointment in negotiations, and continued desperation at attacks by marauding bands, led to the formation of The Black Cross Society in 1878.⁹ Like many of its predecessors, The Black Cross Society had a secret membership, and its purpose was defense against Turkish and Turkish-inspired attacks; unlike its predecessors, however, it put its members to death for breaking their oath.¹⁰

When the promises of the European Powers were not backed up with anything stronger than repeated statements, the formation of secret societies continued. The decade of the 1880s represented a watershed in terms of increased radicalism, when Armenian revolutionaries turned away from attempted reforms in education and began active measures aimed at ending Turkish domination.¹¹ In Erzerum, the third area to experience anti-Turkish uprisings, The Protectors of the Fatherland was formed in 1881 to arm its members against the Turks and their surrogates, the Kurds and Circassians. The organizational structure within The Protectors of the Fatherland was designed to limit insofar as possible the knowledge any member had of other members. Each cell had ten members, and no individual member would know the identities of all the Central Committee incumbents. It is likely that the dividing of the organization into cells resulted from contacts with Russian revolutionary groups. This design would reappear later in Armenian groups carrying out anti-Turkish attacks. As in previous incidents, the Turkish Government learned of the existence of this secret society, received reports of the involvement of Russia in aiding its members, and carried out mass arrests in Erzerum in 1882-1883.¹² The reports of Armenian activism in Russia, and of

Russian-Armenian activists' activities in Turkey, were again well-founded. The Tiflis chapter of the Russian revolutionary group Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), for example, had six members, three of whom were Armenians.

Perhaps emboldened by the unexpectedly lenient sentences handed down to members of The Protectors of the Fatherland in 1883, and the subsequent pardon and release of most of the jailed members in 1884, Turkish Armenians formed their first political party in 1885.¹³ The Armenakan Party, significantly, announced in Part One of its "Program" that its purpose was to "win for the Armenian people the right to rule over themselves through revolution." Further, the "Program" specified in the portion devoted to methods, that Armenakan Party members were to be trained "in the use of arms and military discipline," and were to be supplied with arms and money in the process of organizing "guerrilla forces." An armed encounter between Armenakan Party members and Turkish forces in 1889 resulted in additional documentary evidence of Armenian revolutionary activity falling into Turkish hands, further fueling Turkish suspicions. Those suspicions certainly were not eased by the fact that Armenakan Party-directed military actions included offensive actions.¹⁴ Armenakans sought out and attacked Kurds, also assassinated Turks, and are known to have targeted at least one Turkish Police agent.¹⁵

The foregoing chronology represented an upwardly spiralling cycle of anti-Armenian violence, Armenian defensive measures, followed by heightened levels of anti-Armenian violence. By the mid-1890s, Turkish intentions toward Armenians, in the context of official Turkish plans for Islamic revival, can be interpreted as mass extermination. Thousands of Armenians were killed in a series of massacres between 1894 and 1896. Estimates of the dead range from 50,000 to 300,000.

As if any more fuel needed to be added to Turkish suspicions, another Armenian political party, the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party, added its voice to the collective outcry. The Hunchak Party was founded in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1887.¹⁶ The Hunchaks are the only Armenian revolutionary group known to have called for complete independence from Turkey from the inception of the group through its demise, as opposed to disguising itself as a cultural or educational organization.¹⁷ Self-described Marxists, the Hunchaks preached that agitation and terror were required to "elevate the spirit of the people."¹⁸ All of the founders of the Hunchak Party were either born in Russia or educated there. The sole female member of the founding group had worked with Russian revolutionaries in St. Petersburg. This background resulted in clear parallels in Hunchak use of terrorism and

that of, for one example, the *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will). Those parallels were expressed in a number of facets of the Hunchak program. The use of terror, as an example, was to be focused on the Turkish Government and its spies and informers; the Hunchak Party was to be a centralized one, with a central executive committee; the membership was to be drawn from the peasants and from the workers, who, following the hoped-for victory over the Turks, would form the basis for the society that would come into being; the nation was to be a socialist one; the details of the plan for governing that hoped-for society were to be published at a later date.

The efforts of the Hunchaks produced the predictable spiral of agitation, suppression, increased guerrilla activity, and the introduction of Turkish military force such as had occurred earlier in Zeitun, Van, and Erzerum. The most famous of the Hunchak-inspired rebellions, one that was probably the height of Hunchak power, occurred in the region of Sassun in 1894.¹⁹ The Sassun rebellion was the culmination of what had become predictable factors: An Armenian population that had been paying an annual tribute to local Kurds; violent Kurdish reprisals for refusal to pay the tribute immediately; agitation among the Armenians by Hunchak Party members; and an increase in Turkish-directed Kurdish violence. When the Turkish Government sent in troops to quell the insurrection, the Armenian residents of Sassun held out for over a month. Although ultimately overcome by the Turkish force, the rebellion did draw the attention of Great Britain, France, and Russia. A Commission of Inquiry sent by the European Powers found no justification for the Turkish actions.²⁰

The Sassun Rebellion in 1894, when Hunchak Party activists convinced the Armenians in Sassun not to pay the annual "tax" to the Kurds, triggered a series of massacres. Feeling trapped between the Armenians' call for independence and the fear of the European Powers, the Sultan commissioned regiments of Kurds, beginning in 1891,²¹ whose "salary" was to be taken from Armenians.²² The Sassun Rebellion appears to have convinced the Sultan that additional repressive measures were required, and on a wider scale. Between 1894 and 1896, at least 200,000 Armenians throughout the so-called Armenian provinces were killed.²³ Other estimates range to a quarter of a million and up to 300,000.

In February 1896, the Ottoman Government completed a second military operation in the Van area, which had again become a center of Armenian revolutionary activity.²⁴ Negotiations involving six European countries were a major factor in ending the revolt.²⁵ In addition, however, the waning of the power of the Hunchak Party, due to an internal split over tactics, was the deciding factor.

One of the most famous incidents of the time, especially in terms of the publicity it produced and the political results it achieved, was the barricade-and-hostage-type assault on the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Twenty six members of the Dashnak Party seized the bank's Constantinople offices on 24 August 1896, threatening to blow up themselves and their hostages unless their demands were met within 48 hours. A special delegation of ambassadors, led by the Russian Ambassador, were told the Dashnaks' demand for fundamental political reforms in Armenian-populated areas.²⁶ After four of the Dashnaks were killed and five more wounded in exchanges with the surrounding Turkish forces, the seventeen remaining Dashnaks accepted the promises of the Russian Ambassador, and left not only the bank but left Turkey for France on a French vessel.²⁷ Neither political reform nor peace ensued, however. In fact, evidence indicates that the government had known of the plans for the bank takeover and, rather than prevent it, had prepared retaliatory measures to follow the end of the incident. Almost immediately after the departure of the surviving seventeen Dashnaks for France, mobs of Turks carried out the massacre of more than 6,000 Armenians in Constantinople.²⁸

The 19th century ended on a bloody note, and the upward spiral of violence continued. The 20th century was to see no slowing of the spiral.

The most famous of the Armenian groups formed during this period, and that remains probably the most powerful and influential, is the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF). Because of its association with the two waves of Armenian terrorism in the twentieth century, the details of the ARF are treated in the chapter on the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide.

Notes

1. Robert Mirak, *Torn Between Two Lands* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 23.
2. Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), 67-70.
3. Rouben Manouel Torossian, *The Contemporary Armenian Nationalist Movement* (San Diego: United States International University, 1980), 63.
4. Nalbandian, 133.
5. Kamuran Gurun, *The Armenian File* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 32.
6. Mirak, 27.
7. Nalbandian, 78-79.
8. Torossian, 64.

9. Torossian, 67.
10. Nalbandian, 84.
11. Mirak, 28–29.
12. Nalbandian, 85–89.
13. Torossian, 67.
14. Torossian, 67.
15. Nalbandian, 89–101.
16. Torossian, 68.
17. Mirak, 31.
18. Nalbandian, 110.
19. Torossian, 70.
20. Nalbandian, 122.
21. Torossian, 70.
22. Gerard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance* (London: Zed Press, 1983), 27–28.
23. Michael M. Gunter, "The Historical Origins of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* IX, No. 1 (Fall 1985): 78–79.
24. Torossian, 71.
25. Nalbandian, 127–131.
26. Torossian, 72.
27. Nalbandian, 177.
28. Nalbandian, 178.

3

The 1915 Massacres

The 24th of April is commemorated with great sadness each year by Armenians worldwide in memory of the events of 1915. It was on that date in 1915 that the Ottoman Government gave the order that the leaders of the Armenian Revolutionary Committees should be "arrested and tried in the military courts for the crime of treason."¹ The Ottoman Government reportedly did so in the belief that the Armenians had committed themselves to the service of Russia against the Ottomans.

Much has been written over the years about the horrors visited on the Armenian people at the turn of the century; the memories of those horrors are the "fuel" of the subsequent waves of Armenian terrorism, as is stated in every post-attack communique. The position of the present Turkish state regarding the events and circumstances of the early Twentieth Century has varied. Turkey initially entered the "debate" with an outright and vigorous denial that the atrocities even occurred, citing "gross distortions" and a "vindictive propaganda campaign." More recently, its position has softened somewhat, to an admission that, while a number of Armenians did die, their deaths were the result of general wartime conditions rather than an extermination campaign aimed at Armenians.²

As opposed to simply recounting events, the purpose of this chapter is to present selected, specific materials pertinent to the culpability of the Ottoman Government. Toward that end, the focus is on official documentation, supplemented by other accounts, either those of eyewitnesses or that are corroborated by multiple sources.

One of the most poignant accounts of the time is that of Kerop Bedoukian, nine years old in 1915, and then a resident of Sivas, Turkey. Bedoukian's story, written in the style of a diary, is his recollections of his family's journey in 1915 out of Turkey, through present-day Syria, Europe, and to the United States. It is an account of a series of atrocities committed against Armenians by Turks and Kurds.

Bedoukian begins with a description of his home village in 1915. In quick succession: the family hides an Armenian man in the attic, a deserter from the Turkish Army; Turks kill the Bedoukian family's dog; the first hanging of an Armenian by Turks takes place; Bedoukian's father, along with the other adult Armenian men of the village, is imprisoned; and the notification of deportation is presented. As terrible as it must have been for a nine-year-old to witness those events, they are, it turns out, merely a prelude; the real horror was daily and day-long, involving every facet of life. Turkish guards used whips to get people moving in the mornings as if they were nothing more than cattle; Turkish inhabitants of villages actually selling food and water to groups of Armenians being driven like animals; no provisions made for use as a bathroom; a crazed woman cooking her infant child; Turks slitting open the bellies of dead Armenians looking for swallowed gold. An atmosphere of unending despair hung over everything, a feeling that death was inevitable, to the extent that Bedoukian characterizes the marchers as being immune to shock.³ Bedoukian's account goes far toward providing an understanding of how deeply felt are the anti-Turkish enmities of Armenians. Historical accuracy, however, imposes a requirement on the researcher for more than poignancy alone. The issue is whether or not accounts such as Bedoukian's can be corroborated.

Documentation sufficient to prove both premeditation by the Ottoman Government as well as its complicity exists. The evidence is in the form of official documents of the Ottoman Government and eyewitness accounts. The following represents a selected chronology of such evidence:

The earliest document of note is a communique of 26 May 1915, from Talaat Pasha⁴ to the Grand Vizier. The communique sets forth the bases for deportation of Armenians: impeding the Ottoman war effort; collaboration with the enemy; attacks on Ottoman forces; and killing and plundering of innocent Turks. The edict then directs that the Armenian population is to be removed, and moved away from the border areas of Turkey.

The Ottoman Council of Ministers adopted specific measures to be employed by Turkish forces, measures that went into effect on 1 June 1915. Specifically, Turkish commanders who encountered any armed resistance were ordered to suppress the resistance immediately and vigorously, and to "ruthlessly" squelch the resistance. Further, the Turkish military was authorized to remove to other locations anyone suspected of treason or espionage.

Although the Ottoman Council of Ministers ostensibly placed into

effect on 30 May 1915 official, written safeguards concerning the persons and property of Armenians to be deported, they were widely ignored. The 1 June charge to "ruthlessly" suppress resistance, for example, appears to have had a more receptive Turkish audience. The German Ambassador, an ally it should be remembered, wrote his Foreign Office that the "massive and brutal deportations . . . are not based on military considerations alone." The German Ambassador informed his Chancellor in a 17 June 1915 letter, quoting the Turkish Minister of the Interior, Talaat Bey, that "the Turkish Government intended to make use of the World War and deal thoroughly with its internal enemies, the Christians in Turkey, and that it meant not to be disturbed in this by diplomatic intervention from abroad."

The American Consul, Leslie Davis, corroborates much of the type of events in Bedoukian's tale, in his eyewitness account of 1 July 1915, telling of "ragged, filthy, hungry, and sick" Armenians in convoys with "no shelter and little to eat." Davis related how, when food was brought by guards, the Armenians were so starved that they rushed upon the guards, who "beat them back with clubs, hitting hard enough to kill them sometimes." Further, Davis recounted stories of convoys being attacked again and again; of having among them very few men (most having been killed along the way); of a "system" in which bands of Kurds awaited the Armenians along the roads. Finally, Davis characterizes the deportations as "the most thoroughly organized and effective massacre this country has ever seen."

As to the question of knowledge of the events on the part of Ottoman leadership, the Interior Minister, Talaat Pasha, personally told the U.S. Ambassador on 3 August that, "The Union and Progress Committee had carefully considered the matter in all its details and that the policy which was being pursued was that which they had officially adopted." The Ambassador should not, Talaat continued, get the idea that the deportations had been decided upon hastily, for they were the result of "prolonged and careful deliberation." That the Minister's words to the Ambassador did not differ from his orders to other Ottoman officials is evidenced in Talaat's 16 September communique: "It has been previously communicated to you that the Government . . . has decided to destroy completely all the indicated persons living in Turkey. Those who oppose this order and decision cannot remain on the official staff of the empire. An end must be put to their existence, however tragic the measures taken may be, and no regard must be paid to either age or sex, or to conscientious scruples."

Events identical to many specific portions of Bedoukian's foregoing account were also corroborated by a German employee of the Baghdad

Railway: Although the marchers began the journey on mules, the Turkish guards forced them to dismount and walk; even at the beginning, the bread ration was only one kilo per month for each person; cattle were either seized by force or "bought" for absurdly low prices; marchers forced to leave the main road for mountain paths, with no food; countless corpses, many those of children, littering the marchers' path, floating down the Euphrates river tied to each other in groups, eaten by dogs.

On the question of the overall quality of the existing evidence, the historian Arnold Toynbee judged it to be of the highest quality:

"The largest part of the testimony was drawn from neutral witnesses . . . ; particularly significant . . . were German documents;

1. Nearly all of the evidence comes from eye-witnesses who wrote it immediately after the events while their memory was still fresh;
2. Facts of the same or of a very similar nature occurring in different places are deposed to by different and independent witnesses;
3. Broad groups of events or detailed facts are reported independently and consistently;
4. The volume of consistent evidence from different areas is so large as to establish the main facts beyond all question, and the general character of the events rests on foundations too broad to be shaken;
5. Examination of neutral reports generally confirms the depositions of Armenians and Nestorians and reveals that they are less exaggerated than might have been feared, given traditions of exaggerated language and the emotions of the victims.⁵

As might be expected, Turkish interpretation of the same events differs considerably from the foregoing. Most set the stage with accounts of 19th Century Armenian "terrorist" activities and of Armenian relations with Russia that threatened Turkey. With a focus on the perceived threat of an Armenian fifth column at its back as Turkey entered World War I, Turkish historians allege not just a continuation, but an intensification of Armenian revolutionary acts in 1914–1915. The allegations range from receiving arms from Russia, through desertion from the Turkish Army, the production of bombs, attacks on a "mail coach," to armed attacks and killings of Turkish soldiers. The refusal of Tashnak Party representatives to open a second front against the Russian Army in the Caucasus appeared to be particularly troubling to the Ottoman Government. The Tashnaks assured the Turks that the loyalties of the Armenians in any Russian-

Turkish conflict were with the Turks, but that they could not be held responsible for Russian Armenians. The aforementioned May 1915 edict of Talaat Pasha, accusing Armenians of impeding the war effort and collaboration with the enemy, directing the Armenian "removal" from the Russian border area, indicates strongly that the Ottoman Government did not believe the Tashnak assurances. Indeed, Talaat Pasha stated explicitly to U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau in 1915, "the Armenians are not to be trusted."

The Turkish perception, therefore, of the situation facing them in 1915 was: a Russian advance in eastern Anatolia; a threat to the Dardanelles from Britain and France; Armenian "rebellions" in the cities of Van, Zeitun, and Mush; Russian occupation of Van; large numbers of Armenian deserters from the Turkish Army; in general, being forced to fight a war from abroad while having to deal with widespread insurrection and treason within.

So far apart are the Turkish and Armenian views on the events of 1915 that it is not likely they can be resolved in modern times; eyewitnesses' memories dim; many pass away, leaving only verbal accounts with their descendants; even translations of identical documents by Armenians and Turks differ. On key points, however, there is little doubt—hundreds of thousands of Armenians perished in 1915. Adult men were systematically rounded up, marched off, and murdered. The elderly, women, and children were dispatched away from the Russian border, with "care" that ranged from, at best, neglect, to the commission of outright atrocities. The combined weight of the foregoing documentation leaves no doubt as to the relative roles of Ottoman Turks and Armenians as the events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were played out. What matters more in an undertaking such as retributive terrorist attacks, in any event, is the perception of truth.

Mention should be made at this point of another author, one who will reappear almost six decades later. Another who lived through and chronicled the events of 1915, as Kerop Bedoukian did, was Gourgen Yanikian. Unlike Bedoukian, however, Yanikian translated his words into a deed in January 1973, a deed that set in motion a series of assassinations of Turks.

Notes

1. Erol Ozkoray, "Armenian Terrorism from Yesterday to Today," *Istanbul Hurriyet* (20 May 1988).

2. Michael M. Gunter, "The Historical Origins of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, IX, No 1 (Fall

1985): 89-90.

3. Excerpts from Kerop Bedoukian, *Some of Us Survived—The Story of an Armenian Boy* (New York: Farrer, Straus and Giroux, 1978), 5–168. Copyright © 1978 by Kerop Bedoukian. Reprinted by permission of Farrer, Straus and Giroux, Inc.

4. Talaat Pasha was the first member of the Ottoman Government assassinated by the post-World-War-I NEMESIS network of the Dashnak Party.

5. Gerard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance* (London: Zed Press, 1983), 56–57.

4

Post-World War I Retribution (Nemesis)

The fresh memories of recent attacks obscure the fact that terrorist attacks by Armenians have come in waves, and that the attacks since 20 January 1975 are not the first wave. Revenge for the events of 1915 was also the force behind the first wave of Armenian attacks against Turks in this century. Agents of the Dashnak Party tracked, located, and surveilled several high-ranking members of the Ottoman Government who had fled Turkey after World War I. The clandestine group, known as Nemesis, is known to have assassinated six former Ottoman officials in the 1920's. The group name "Nemesis" was a reference to the Greek goddess of retributive justice or vengeance.

The Dashnak Party assigned an Armenian-American originally from Turkey, known as Shahan Natali, to run the Nemesis operation. In a bit of irony, Natali's real name was Hagop Der Hagopian; the name Hagop Hagopian later was used as a *nom de guerre* by the leader of ASALA, a decidedly leftist group in conflict not infrequently with the more rightist Dashnak Party.

The first attack by Nemesis occurred on 15 March 1921 when Soghomon Tehlirian, a survivor of the 1915 massacres, shot to death the former Ottoman Minister of Interior, Talaat Pasha. Talaat, author of the infamous 1915 cable directing that Armenians be moved away from border areas and deported, had been living in Berlin under the assumed name of Ali Sayi Bey.¹ Tehlirian, who had had Talaat under surveillance for two weeks before assassinating him, was arrested at the scene on Berlin's Hardenbergstrasse. At the conclusion of his two-day trial in the Berlin City Court in June of 1921, Tehlirian was acquitted.² The result of Tehlirian's trial became a rallying point in later years, as when the Turkish Ambassador was assassinated in Yugoslavia in 1983. Supporters of the defendants asserted that Tehlirian's case should be considered a precedent.³ Tehlirian himself

emigrated to the U.S., enjoying the status of "Armenian National Hero" until his death in 1960 in San Francisco.⁴

Nemesis attempted to strike next on 19 July 1921, in Constantinople, when a Nemesis commando was directed to assassinate the Azerbaijani leader Khan Jihanshir. The two-man commando comprised Missak Torlakian and Hovanes Amadouni.⁵

In the third Nemesis operation, on 5 December 1921, Nemesis operative Arshavir Shirakian assassinated former Ottoman minister Said Halim Pasha in Rome.⁶ Shirakian carried out another Nemesis assassination operation in Berlin on 17 April 1922, when he shot to death Behaeddin Shakir and Shakir's bodyguard Djemal Azmi, a former official in the Trebizond area of Turkey. Shirakian was aided on this occasion by Aram Yerganian.⁷

Former Ottoman minister Cemal Pasha was assassinated on 25 July 1922, in front of Cheka (Secret Police) Headquarters in Tiflis, Georgia, USSR. In a continuation of a previously noted *modus operandi*, two commandos carried out this attack: Bedros DerBoghossian and Artashes Gevorgian.⁸ A combination of Dashnak Party surveillance efforts and the Soviet Army hunted down and killed Ottoman General Enver Pasha on 4 August 1922 in the mountains near Afghanistan.

The final name on the Nemesis list was a "Dr. Nazim," who was charged with complicity in a plot against the post-Ottoman Government, and hanged by the Turks in 1926. The concept of not merely vengeance, but retributive justice would reappear in 1975 when the Dashnak Party joined the battle begun by ASALA.

Notes

1. Gerard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance* (London: Zed Press, 1983), 39.

2. Chaliand and Ternon, 93-94.

3. Michael M. Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 29. Copyright © 1986 by Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT.

4. Heath W. Lowry, "Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Armenian Terrorism: 'Threads of Continuity'" in *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection* (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984), 77.

5. Yves Ternon, *The Armenian Cause* (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1985), 101.

6. Anat Kurz & Ariel Merari, *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1985), 15.

7. Lowry, 77.

8. Chaliand and Ternon, 94.

9. Ternon, 101.

5

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia

In January of 1973, an Armenian resident of California shot and killed two Turkish diplomats.¹ In April, 1988, two men shot and killed an Armenian resident of Greece.² Between those two events, Armenian terrorists carried out a campaign that ranks as one of the bloodiest in modern times, killing dozens of people and wounding hundreds of others—not only their primary target of Turks, but also Americans, Canadians, and Western Europeans.³ Ironically, the Armenian killed in April, 1988, was reported to be the infamous "Hagop Hagopian," leader of The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia—ASALA. Reportedly, it was Hagopian who, in January 1973 on hearing the news of the killing of the two Turkish diplomats, founded ASALA and used the act as a rallying point.⁴

During the evening of 28 January 1973, the elderly Armenian, Gourgen Yanikian, sat in his rented room in the Biltmore Hotel in Santa Barbara, California. Yanikian, still nursing his memories of when Turkish soldiers decapitated his brother and reportedly slaughtered 25 other members of his extended family in 1915, waited for two members of the diplomatic staff of the Turkish Consulate in Los Angeles.⁵ The two Turks were responding to Yanikian's offer to repatriate priceless Turkish artifacts. When they entered his room, Yanikian shot to death Turkish Consul General Mehmet Baydar and Vice Consul Bahadır Demir, called the police to report the shootings, then waited calmly for his arrest.⁶ Coming just two years before the 60th anniversary of the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Armenians by the Ottoman Turkish Government, the incident served as a catalyst. Yanikian's act set in motion a series of events, the repercussions of which are still felt today, by the families and friends of the dead and wounded.

"The Reality"

Unlike many other terrorist groups, much is known of the inner workings of ASALA. The philosophy and the management methods of ASALA's leader, known inside the group as Mujahed, ultimately produced a violently schismatic series of events. One of those events constitutes one of the more remarkable terrorist-related documents in existence, remarkable for its candor and detail. The document, entitled "The Reality," quoted extensively herein, was authored by someone with an insider's intimate knowledge of ASALA from a high-ranking perspective. In the opinion of the editor of the New York newspaper "The Armenian Reporter," the author was Monte Melkonian,⁷ a former high-ranking member of ASALA and suspected of complicity in at least one attempted assassination by ASALA of a Turkish diplomat.⁸

For eight years, according to "The Reality," ASALA hid another "face" from the world. Internally, ASALA's practices differed greatly from the public pronouncements, a manifestation of a long-standing dichotomy or "duality."⁹ As described in greater detail in this chapter, members used terms such as fascist, dictator, and reign of terror in their portrayals of life inside ASALA.

Pre-ASALA Formative Activities

While the January 1973 assassination of two Turkish diplomats unquestionably was a catalytic event, ASALA was not, in fact, created on the spur of the moment. The formation of ASALA was the final act in a series of interrelated factors. Paramount among the factors was the long-simmering dissatisfaction of Armenians, especially younger Armenians, with the efforts of traditional Armenian organizations such as political parties in bringing about a resolution of "The Armenian Question." Simultaneously, the proximity to Palestinians, particularly the more radical factions, provided a "success" story to Armenians in search of a model. Finally, the convergence of the first two factors in a time of widespread social upheaval—wars of national liberation, hijackings, assassinations—proved to be a favorable climate for the emergence of another wave of Armenian terrorism.

As the fiftieth anniversary of 24 April 1915 approached, the widely held perception of Armenians in Lebanon was that virtually nothing had been accomplished. Members of traditional Armenian social, fraternal, and political organizations began to compare their success in achieving Armenian goals with the accomplishments of others, chiefly the Palestinians.¹⁰ Within the Tashnak Party, for example, a subset known as the Zavarian Group was formed. Another,

The Youth for Vengeance, first seen in 1968, advocated a combination of armed struggle and the more traditional political efforts. The Tashnak Party, for its part, attempted to infiltrate the dissident groups and to persuade the groups to carry out their activities in a less overt, more clandestine manner.¹¹ Many such groups came into being between 1965 and 1975, in a form of experimentation aimed at deriving the "correct" path to the liberation of Turkish-held Armenian lands.¹² Rather surprisingly, considering that the setting for the discussions was Lebanon, the prevailing philosophy was that a period of preparation was needed before anti-Turkish attacks could begin. The time was needed, the proponents said, for training and for the development of a political program. Even the assassination of the two Turkish diplomats in California by Gourgen Yanikian was termed premature.¹³

Many Armenians at the time, in their search for a model, saw in the Palestinians another displaced and homeless people like themselves. Of great importance to the dissatisfied Armenian youth was the success of the Palestinian Movement in gaining widespread public attention for its cause. "Many" Armenians, ASALA's leader admitted in an interview, had joined in the Palestinian "struggle" and had "learned many things."¹⁴

At the same time, and also in Lebanon, but distinct from the aforementioned events, an individual who would become arguably the single most influential person in Armenian terrorist circles was gaining his revolutionary credentials. Known as "Mujahed" (Warrior), he joined the Palestinian Movement, probably in 1967,¹⁵ and gravitated to the radical PLO splinter group of George Habash and Wadi Haddad—The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). During this period, Mujahed formed a number of close relationships within the Palestinian Movement and adopted the organizational style and tactics of Wadi Haddad.¹⁶ Haddad, known as a stickler for the centralization of authority, was one of the most international of the international terrorists.

Following the January 1973 killing of the two Turkish diplomats in California by Gourgen Yanikian, a two-year hiatus ensued before the first attack claimed under the ASALA name. During that two-year period, Mujahed reportedly continued active in Palestinian circles, filling in the gap in his "organizational, military and political experience."¹⁷ One of the events in which Mujahed later claimed to have participated was the 6 February 1974 takeover of the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait.¹⁸ The claim is lent some credence by the name of one of the groups that claimed responsibility at the time: In addition to the more highly publicized Japanese Red Army and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Patrick Arguello Group), the takeover

also was claimed by "The Sons of the Occupied Land."¹⁹ Turkey represents an obvious candidate for the "occupied land."

Also in 1974, Mujahed, as a member of the PFLP, became embroiled in the worsening internecine strife of the Palestinian Movement. Because he perceived that his future was tied closely to the future of the PFLP, and believing that the group's future was somewhat tenuous, Mujahed began to consider alternatives to the Palestinian Resistance. A "marriage" of convenience soon occurred: Mujahed settled on the discontented Armenian youth as a vehicle for furthering his revolutionary and organizational aims; dissatisfied Armenians settled on Mujahed as a leader for his connections to a proven revolutionary movement—the Palestinians. With the stage thus set for him, Mujahed and three others formed, probably in 1974, The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia—ASALA.²⁰

The Beginning of ASALA

The signal year in the most recent wave of Armenian terrorism, including ASALA, was 1975: sixty years since the 1915 massacres; the commencement of a sustained campaign of attacks; the first attack claimed under the name "ASALA;" and the first appearance of the competing group, The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG). On 20 January 1975, an explosive device damaged the Beirut, Lebanon, headquarters of the World Council of Churches. A later ASALA statement asserted that the attack had been carried out because the center was used for "promoting the emigration of Armenians to the United States."²¹ Another bombing followed soon thereafter, on 20 February, when the Turkish Airlines office in Beirut was the object of an ASALA attack;²² Turkish Airlines offices in a number of countries, because of their symbolism and relative accessibility, would be frequent targets of ASALA.

Political Program

Contrary to its public image and much of the propaganda that it promulgated, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia was an organizational "hybrid." Publicly, ASALA pronounced itself to be part of the leftist revolutionary movement, to be fighting oppression, and to be aiming at establishing a "democratic" organization. In addition, the other groups and states with which ASALA aligned itself—Palestinians, Libya—typically were from the leftist portion of the spectrum. Thus, ASALA made a clear distinction between Turkey, and its allies, and the Soviet Union, characterizing

the USSR as a "friendly country." ASALA maintained this distinction despite the fact that the population of the Armenian S.S.R., as shown in 1988-1989 ethnic strife, is no freer to form a separate state than is the Armenian population of Turkey. Indeed, ASALA has specifically declared that the Armenian S.S.R. is "liberated territory governed by the Armenian people" to which Armenian-claimed lands in present-day eastern Turkey should be joined.²³ Similar praise has been reserved for other leftist groups—the Palestinian group headed by Abu Nidhal, and the Islamic Jihad Organization.

ASALA was equally explicit on its policy toward its declared enemies, labeling the U.S., the U.K., France, and West Germany as "imperialist" nations.²⁴ Even the life of the Pope was threatened because of Vatican support to an affiliate of the World Council of Churches aiding Armenian emigration.²⁵

In its first pronouncement of policy publicly available, ASALA declared on 10 July 1978:

1. The only enemy of ASALA is the Turkish Government, occupying nine tenths of the Armenian territory;
2. The allies of the Turkish State are the enemies of ASALA; they will be hit when and where ASALA decides;
3. The revolutionary movements fighting against Turkey and American imperialism are ASALA's friends; the revolutionary parties of the Turkish and Kurdish peoples, both of them oppressed by the State, are the only official allies of ASALA;
4. The Armenians' friends are those who have recognized the genocide: their enemies are those who are obstinately resolved at denying it;
5. The leaders of the Armenian political parties have not obtained any result in sixty years; the time of the ARF [the politically rightist, and powerful, Tashnak Party] is long gone;
6. All Armenians look up to ASALA, as it fulfills their needs perfectly; ASALA . . . aims at bringing together all political currents, at drawing closer the bonds among all Armenians . . . ;
7. The Armenian Church . . . must again assume the role it played the past by becoming a torch illuminating the path of the Armenian people and its revolution;
8. The ASALA fighter is not a terrorist but a pure revolutionary;
9. ASALA is alone, independent, . . . It does not compromise. . . . It does not owe something to anyone;
10. Soviet Armenia is the unique and irreplaceable basis of the Armenian people; it is a free Armenian land; the USSR is a friendly country, but not an allied country.²⁶

In October 1983, ASALA provided to the Cypriot newspaper *Al Nashara* another public expression of its political and military programs. Despite some differences in wording, the fundamental message was the same:

1. ASALA is a political organization whose purpose is to mobilize the Armenian people for the struggle to liberate the Armenian territories from the colonialist oppression of the Turks and their imperialist and international reactionary henchmen, by every means of struggle.
2. The Army is guided by the theory of world revolution.
3. The Army represents the ambitions of the Armenian people in its opposition to the national and class servitude imposed upon it by the ruling clique in Turkey.
4. The Army believes in revolutionary violence as a fundamental principle, and as the proper weapon for fighting exploitation and oppression, and eliminating Turkish colonialism—even though the organization does not rule out other methods of conducting its struggle.
5. The Army forms a part of the world-revolutionary movement, for which reason it makes every effort to strengthen its ties with the revolutionary movement, in the belief that world-wide unity of all revolutionaries is one of the requirements for overcoming the problem of the oppressed and persecuted peoples and classes.
6. The liberation of the Armenian territories from Turkish domination will result in their unification with the adjoining parts of Armenia and the establishment of a single democratic revolutionary organization.
7. The Army will conduct its struggle everywhere in the world where the Armenian people live and where the Turkish enemy maintains its interests and legations.
8. [ASALA's goal is] convincing the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to support the Armenian cause and assist the Armenian people in Soviet Armenia, in order to create a revolutionary spearhead for a long-term people's war, aimed at the destruction of Turkish colonialism.

The presence in the program of such elements as: "the struggle to liberate;" "colonialist oppression;" "imperialist and international reactionary henchmen;" "the theory of world revolution;" "fighting exploitation;" "world-wide unity of all revolutionaries;" "oppressed and persecuted peoples;" appears to leave little doubt

concerning to which end of the political spectrum ASALA belonged.

The distinction ASALA made between friend and foe is not unimportant because, unlike its more rightist Armenian counterparts such as the JCAG, ASALA regularly and frequently carried out attacks against states associated in various ways with Turkey. ASALA made its position clear in a communique of 2 August 1978 that warned, "All states should take it (sic) upon themselves the responsibility and expect our severe blow should they cooperate with the Turkish powers and its allies."²⁷ The words were not empty: Of 171 attacks attributed to ASALA, seventy (42%) were directed against Turkey; the remainder, as shown in the chapter on attacks, were directed against states as diverse as the Philippines and the Netherlands, internally against the group's members, and against other Armenians. In contrast, of 36 attacks attributed to JCAG/ARA, 30 (83%) were directed solely against Turkey.

Organizational Structure

Differing views, more or less informed, exist as to the structure within ASALA; that is the way that the ASALA leadership, or any other secretive group for that matter, would prefer it.

The view that ASALA presented to outsiders was of a tightly knit group, but one that had a Central Committee comprising several members, possibly the four men said to have formed the group in 1974-75.²⁸ The style of leadership was said to be "collegial."²⁹ One of the Central Committee's members, identified by the name Hagop Hagopian, and said to probably have the deciding voice, actually denied being the leader of ASALA.³⁰ As late as 2 March 1988, using the name "Mahranean," the ASALA leader used language such as, "I and most of the leadership were in Europe. . . . It was decided that I should return," clearly implying a decision-making body larger than one in number.³¹ The view was maintained even after the death of Hagop Hagopian in Athens on 28 April 1988. A typed communique delivered in Beirut identified the deceased by yet another name, Minas Ohanessian, and said that the "former member of the group's Central Committee" had been "excluded from ASALA in 1987," implying again that he had been only one of a number of decision-makers.³²

Structurally, ASALA was said to be divided into two branches, a political one with the responsibility for recruitment and indoctrination, and a military branch to carry out operations.³³ Like most of the secretive organizations of the era, ASALA was said to be

organized in the classic terrorist cell structure much like the Irish Republican Army.³⁴

Beyond the inner circle of leadership and the full-time commandos were the associated "ASALA-Popular Movement" (ASALA-PM) organizations in a number of countries. Among them were France, Great Britain, Canada, Italy, Cyprus, Iran, India, The United States, and Greece.³⁵ The implementation of a more formal relationship between ASALA and the ASALA-PM groups, beginning at an ASALA-hosted meeting in Lebanon in the summer of 1981, was said to have widened ASALA's base within the Armenian diaspora considerably.³⁶

It would be difficult to exaggerate the amount of contrast in the view of ASALA held by former members with that presented above. "The Reality" presents that contrasting view. As opposed to a multi-member Central Committee, the 1984 expose states, "From 1975 until the beginning of 1980, ASALA was no more than a group dominated by Mujahed's authority all "policies" were the products of Mujahed's impulses and whims.³⁷ Mujahed, "The Reality" continued, succeeded in turning his total authority into a rigid dictatorship, instituting a "system of terror within the organization through the execution of members."³⁸

As for the widening of ASALA's political base through the association with ASALA-PM groups, it didn't last. By late November 1982, Mujahed had expelled all of the French-Armenian comrades; by January 1983, the only ASALA-PM still espousing the ASALA line was the small group in Athens, Greece.³⁹

Locations

From the inception of ASALA in 1975 until shortly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, ASALA was headquartered in West Beirut, Lebanon.⁴⁰ The significance of *West Beirut*, of course, is that it was away from the traditional Armenian Quarter of Beirut—Bourj Hammoud—and in the midst of the friendlier Palestinians.

ASALA's intermediate headquarters and/or operational cells were located in as many Armenian communities throughout the diaspora as was possible, given the operational security concerns. France, because of its large and, early on, hospitable Armenian community, served as ASALA's center for the coordination of attacks throughout Western Europe. A secret agreement with France in 1980 that provided sanctuary for ASALA members in return for not carrying out attacks inside France resulted in the formation of the largest ASALA network outside Lebanon.⁴¹ A small organization, more political than military, was established in Greece. The Middle Eastern sites served more as

training bases, safe havens, and command centers than as political arms, although their presence was one means of maintaining a steady flow of new recruits. Lebanon, particularly the Bekaa Valley, played a prominent role throughout the life of ASALA.

Command and Control

The widespread locations associated with ASALA in various ways no doubt presented some measure of difficulty to Mujahed in maintaining communications with his associates. Those difficulties, however, appear to have been relatively minor, and to have been overcome through a combination of personal visits and the international telephone system.

The high quality of ASALA's command & control communications system can be assessed in the quickness of the group's response to the arrest on 11 November 1981 in France of one of ASALA's highest-ranking members—Monte Melkonian. The very next day, the "Orly Group" bombed the Air France office and the French Cultural Center in Beirut. Following a short-term release, Melkonian was rearrested on 14 November. Beginning that *same day*, attacks were perpetrated on harbor facilities in Paris; a McDonald's restaurant in Paris was destroyed on the 15th; Air France offices and two French banks in Beirut were bombed on the 16th; on the 21st, a Paris train station and the Air France offices in Tehran were both bombed.⁴² A number of similar bombing campaigns were conducted, all within days, indicating the ability of ASALA's leadership to deliver its operational orders with dispatch.⁴³ As to the means, on some occasions Mujahed deemed it necessary to visit the scene and personally deliver the orders, review plans and/or participate in the planning of operations. Such a situation occurred in France in 1983, when Mujahed sought to rebuild his military network and to resume attacks in France and elsewhere in Europe.⁴⁴

On other occasions, the international telephone system proved itself more than adequate to the task. In July 1982, a member of the Orly Group arrested in Paris testified that operational instructions for the group were received by telephone from Beirut.⁴⁵ The ASALA commandos who took over the Turkish Consulate in Paris on 24 September 1981 spoke on the phone to ASALA's leader in Beirut, receiving their orders to end the barricade situation and release their hostages. Trial transcripts revealed that it was a telephone call from ASALA in Beirut to California in 1982, directing members to "Put it on the Canadians," that led to the attempt to bomb Air Canada at Los Angeles International Airport in May of that year.⁴⁶

ASALA personnel have also used the telephone intranationally, and in the more "tactical" situations, such as on the eve of an attack. One known instance, an extremely unfortunate one, happened on 14 July 1983. Because that date is celebrated as the "Bastille Day" holiday, no one from French Internal Security (DST) was attending the phone tap and recorder placed on the telephone of a suspected ASALA member. Had there been a DST translator available, the French would have been privy to a conversation, in Armenian, between Varoujan Garbidian, later convicted of placing a bomb at Orly Airport on 15 July 1983, and Soner Nayir, the bomb's designer. The key piece of missed information in the conversation was the directive, "You have to get ten more cylinders of gas for the picnic." Investigators at Orly the next afternoon, viewing the dead and wounded, discovered that the explosive power of the device had been enhanced with a number of gas cylinders.⁴⁷

Financial Support

The key word with regard to ASALA's funding is "variety." At various times, according to a number of sources, ASALA employed diverse tactics, receiving support in various forms from various sources. ASALA received support from Armenians, non-Armenians, groups, and states. The support was sometimes given freely, sometimes grudgingly, sometimes fearfully. The support was both financial and "in kind"—weapons, explosives, training facilities.

As do other Armenian organizations of differing types, including non-terrorist groups, ASALA solicited funds from the Armenian communities throughout the diaspora. Hagop Hagopian himself declared publicly, "Our strength is the Armenian people; that is where we get our support from; and from robberies."⁴⁸ After the relocation of ASALA headquarters to Damascus, Syria, in 1982, for example, "The Reality" disclosed, "Work within the Armenian community there was *almost totally* limited to the collection of money."⁴⁹ The ASALA leadership's "only" interest in the Armenian community, "The Reality" continued, was as a source of a few inexperienced recruits, and "that of a source of money to supplement what he already collects from his allies."⁵⁰ That the "collections" were not always synonymous with "donations" were shown, for example, in the United States and Canada in 1982. Vicken Charkhugian, who was charged with two others in the attempted bombing of Air Canada's Los Angeles terminal in May of 1982, was also charged with attempting to extort \$150,000 from the Armenian-American owners of a chain of carpet stores in California. Ironically,

Charkhutian's attempt to bomb Air Canada was in retaliation for the arrests in Canada of four Canadian-Armenians on charges of attempting to extort funds from wealthy Canadians in the Toronto area.⁵¹

Even extortion, however, could not produce and sustain funds on the scale needed to accomplish the aims of a group such as ASALA. The expenses associated with such an organization simply are too great to be financed solely by gifts from fervent young Armenians within Lebanon, or even by extortion throughout the Armenian diaspora. Numerous examples of "in kind" support to ASALA by, for example, Palestinian groups are cited elsewhere in this chapter—lodging, training, food, office space, printing supplies, weapons and explosives. One of the most important and longest enduring was the relationship with the Abu Nidhal Organization, also cited in this chapter. States such as Libya, Syria, and Iran also contributed, directly or indirectly, funds and/or supplies, to ASALA. In one unusually frank admission, an Armenian "leader" (not further identified) is quoted as telling an Iranian opponent of Khomeini in Paris that, "Khomeini may be a Judas to you, but he is the spirit of holiness to us, for *he gives us money and arms.*"⁵²

Reports that ASALA engaged in the trafficking of illicit narcotics to raise funds are less credible than the foregoing accounts of contributions, extortion, "robberies," and the non-monetary support from groups and states. For one thing, the most strident and frequent accuser on this score has been Turkey, a not very dispassionate or objective observer. One Turkish author stated without qualification that, "The available facts verify that the Armenian terrorist organizations are engaged in illegal narcotic traffic. . . ." The same account, and others, even provide names of Armenians accused or convicted of involvement in illicit narcotics. The most famous of the cases, and the one most often cited, is the "Shoemaker's Gang" in Sweden and Denmark. The twenty four people arrested in October 1981 for narcotics smuggling included nineteen individuals of Armenian heritage; names such as Vartanian, Zamazanian, Kasapian, and Keshishian tend to stand out in Scandinavia. Although firearms, ASALA publications, and documents said to "prove" membership in Armenian terrorist organizations were found in the homes of two of those arrested, Swedish authorities were unable to establish a link between the Shoemaker's Gang and an Armenian terrorist group. Turkish authorities most often cite the demand by ASALA in August 1982 that the Swedes release their Armenian detainees as proof of membership in ASALA. Mitigating against that charge, in the author's opinion, is the contrast with the retributive bombing

campaigns undertaken immediately following the arrest of even a single ASALA operative. To suffer the arrest, trial, sentencing, and imprisonment of nineteen members and follow it with only a "demand" is decidedly disproportionate to say the least.

Recruitment

ASALA, like most other organizations of many types, used a variety of recruitment methods, some more active than others.

Simply bringing together numbers of like-minded individuals to consider a topic of common concern, whether they are academicians, volunteer firefighters, or budding revolutionaries, is an extremely effective recruiting tool. In the case of ASALA, such an opportunity occurred in 1979, when the First Armenian Congress was held in Paris. The gathering served as an opportunity for French-Armenians to contact the organization. Alek Yenikomshian, later to be wounded in the preparation of an ASALA attack, was a key nexus in the development of such contacts even though not yet a full-fledged member himself.⁵³ The result of such efforts produced an upsurge in ASALA membership the following year. Yenikomshian continued in his role of a recruiter, assuming full-time membership status in the process. In 1980, this time at the request of Mujahed, Yenikomshian brought in seven more members.⁵⁴ Active recruitment of individuals for a specific operation by high-ranking, full-time ASALA members was another method. Khatchig Havarian, himself recruited by Alek Yenikomshian in 1980, was used by Mujahed in a similar role. Havarian chose Zaven Bedros to go to London in September 1982, and recruited Mgo Magarian for the June 1983 Istanbul attack. Referral by selected, key members of the Armenian community was another route to ASALA membership. Levon Ekmekjian, the surviving commando from the August 1982 Ankara attack, told his Turkish interrogators that he joined ASALA because of "pressures" put on him by two men he identified as Mahram Arabian and Minnas Simonian.⁵⁵

"Walk-ins" were not received well by ASALA, probably because of the fear of penetration by, among others, the Tashnak Party. Garlen Ananian, literally a "walk-in" from Iran in 1983, arrived in Syria, only to be locked in a small room for two months, refused permission to return to Iran, beaten, and finally shot to death.⁵⁶

Probably the single most effective "recruiter" for ASALA was favorable publicity in the form of media accounts of the group's actions, particularly those in ASALA's own publicity organs. Such publicity, referred to in the revolutionary vernacular of the day as "armed propaganda" by the author of "The Reality," was extremely

important to the ASALA leadership. Following the September 1981 takeover of the Turkish Consulate in Paris, for example, "The Reality" relates that "Armenians throughout the world began showing much more sympathy for the armed struggle, and solidarity with ASALA was expressed by Armenian elements that previously had been reluctant to accept what had frequently been portrayed as 'terrorism'."⁵⁷

Use of Other Names

Perhaps the only concession made by ASALA toward the preservation of its public image is evident in the listing of the groups that took responsibility for the aforementioned retributive bombing campaigns. It is also a significant difference in *modus operandi* from that of the JCAG/ARA. ASALA used names in two distinct ways. The first, not intended to provide plausible denial of ASALA involvement, was to name operations in a commemorative manner. The four ASALA members who carried out the "Van" Operation of 24 September 1981, for example, were proclaimed as the "Yeghia Keshishian Suicide Commandos," in reference to an ASALA commando executed by Iran for firing on a policeman guarding the Turkish Embassy in Tehran on 24 April 1981. Names such as the "Orly" Group, however, played a different role. If a series of attacks, carried out by the "Swiss 15" Group or the "9 June" Group, were to result in a particularly virulent backlash in the Armenian diaspora, somewhat of a concern for ASALA, the bombings could be disavowed and blamed on a radical element over which ASALA was unable to exert influence. Simultaneously, the different names served to confuse and slow, at least somewhat, the police and security authorities attempting to investigate the organization of Armenian terrorism. Counting the total number of operations carried out by JCAG/ARA as well as by ASALA, at least nineteen different names are known to have been used.⁵⁸ The name given to each ASALA attack, when known, is included in individual records in the appendix on operations.

Publicity

The ASALA leadership used a combination of media, including a magazine ("Hayastan"-*"Armenia"*), a daily radio broadcast, interviews granted to journalists, and communiqués issued following attacks, to portray to the outside world a picture of an organization almost diametrically opposite to what actually existed. Contrary to ASALA statements, contrary to even Turkish statements, ASALA

never represented a military threat to Turkey. As opposed to the photos of smiling ASALA members shown in "Armenia" Magazine, their daily lives approximated that of prisoners more than "comrades," with their identity documents and money confiscated, their mail censored, and their movements severely restricted. Given that degree of "success" demonstrated by Mujahed in the areas of military prowess and leadership/management, the publicity facet of the group demonstrated brilliance.

The first issue of "Armenia" Magazine, Issue 0, was in October 1980. The best measure of the importance placed on the publication was that, during the time that ASALA published "Hayastan," Mujahed maintained the tightest control over its content. He personally authored many of its articles and reviewed the remainder. Similar "editorial" control was exerted over the daily radio broadcast from Beirut, begun on 24 April (Martyrs' Day) in 1981.⁵⁹ The broadcasts were brought to an end by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982.

A number of other publications existed in the Armenian diaspora that expressed varying degrees of solidarity with ASALA's activities. The publishers, in many cases, were the ASALA-Popular Movement (ASALA-PM) groups that served as above-ground apologists for ASALA in the way that Sinn Fein serves the Irish Republican Army. "Hay Baykar" (Armenian Struggle) was published in France beginning in 1976 by young Armenians at odds with traditional organizations. The Canadian group published "Azad Hay" (Free Armenia). "Nor Seround" (New Generation) carried the message of Armenian "armed struggle" to those in the U.S., although it was more closely affiliated with the Tashnak Party than to ASALA. "Gaydzer" (Spark) was issued from the Armenian community in Great Britain, while Italian-Armenians produced "Zeitun" (named for the region in Turkey), and those on Cyprus published "Haydook" (Armenian Revolutionary Fighter).⁶⁰

The ASALA publications, and those of its allies, and the radio broadcasts were effective because they often served as the only source of news on Armenian issues to those in isolated communities. For example, despite the fact that neither ASALA nor the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) placed any long-range significance in the April 1980 Declaration of solidarity and joint operations, Iranian-Armenians rallied to the side of ASALA following the joint news conference in Sidon, Lebanon.⁶¹

The ultimate tribute to Mujahed's propaganda campaign was the grudging acknowledgement by "The Reality," even after the 1983 schism, that, "The only element left in Mujahed's ASALA which is in

any way connected with the struggle is the abundant slogans which adorn 'Armenia' and the communiqués."⁶²

Operations

The "duality" pointed out in "The Reality" with respect to management style and political program extended as well to ASALA's capability as an armed force. On the one hand, the post-attack communiqués, the radio broadcasts, the press conferences, and the issues of "Armenia" were effusive in their praise of ASALA's skills and abilities. Attack after attack was claimed and added to a list like so many notches on a gun; much was made of numbers claimed to have been killed and wounded; the effect of each attack on ASALA's enemies was said to be devastating. The common thread in the claims, of course, was that the media were sources of information totally under the control of Mujahed.

In contrast to the claims, a closer analysis shows clearly that ASALA's forte was not in the field of military/paramilitary operations. The appropriate measures of ASALA's effectiveness, as any organization's, are internal (Did ASALA accomplish what it said were its goals?) and external (How did ASALA compare with, for example, the JCAG/ARA?). Notwithstanding the fact that ASALA carried out more international attacks during 1981 than any other terrorist organization (seventy-seven), the eight-year campaign ASALA waged never represented any serious threat to Turkey.⁶³

ASALA's operations, consisting mainly of assassinations and bomb attacks, are carried out by small squads, typically comprising two to four ASALA members.⁶⁴ The consensus of a number of counterterrorism specialists was that those tactics made ASALA only marginally effective in the military sphere. A U.S. State Department analysis termed ASALA "unsophisticated" in comparison with other groups, citing the fact that ASALA had never demonstrated the ability to hit a "hard" target. The only exceptions cited were the takeover of the Turkish Consulate in Paris on 24 September 1981—the so-called "Van" operation—and the attempted assassination of the Turkish Consul General in Rotterdam on 21 July 1982. The Paris operation, considered by members to be the high point of ASALA's military accomplishments, ended with the surrender and imprisonment of the commandos. Even if the Rotterdam attack is counted as one by ASALA, and this author does not believe that the *modus operandi* supports that conclusion, the commandos directed ineffective small arms fire at an armored vehicle, and lost one of their number to capture.⁶⁵ A 1985 study by counter-terrorist authorities characterized ASALA overall as less

effective than JCAG/ARA.⁶⁶ Specifically on assassinations, ASALA was judged to be neither as likely to attempt them nor as proficient as JCAG/ARA. ASALA, the study concluded, was more likely to use explosive devices than was JCAG/ARA; however, ASALA's bombs were not as reliable nor were they as powerful. On a number of occasions enumerated in this chapter, the devices malfunctioned. The unreliability, according to the 1985 study, was traceable to the variety of timing mechanisms ASALA employed. ASALA was also more likely than JCAG to use a large car bomb, according to the study, a result of the training provided by Palestinian and other Arab groups.

Although the judgment of authoritative non-members has undeniable credibility, it is the insider's assessment that is more telling. The opinion of a former ASALA member committed to "armed struggle," a participant in the planning and carrying out of attacks, carries the greater weight. Such an assessment is contained in "The Reality." The aptly named expose is laden with scorn for ASALA's military prowess. For the most part, the responsibility for ASALA's poor showing is laid at the feet of Mujahed.

"The Reality" divides the overall history of ASALA into three phases. the first phase, from 1975 until early 1980, was characterized by "an outpouring of lies, fabrications, and slogans intended to mislead the Armenian people." The second phase, from early 1980 until the fall of 1981, was a high point in operations due to the influx of new members. In the third phase, from the end of 1981 until the dissolution of ASALA on 15 July 1983, an "anti-people militarism and a viciousness" were prevalent.⁶⁷

The First Phase

During the first phase, the individual who accomplished probably the most in terms of ASALA's operations was Hagop Darakjian. "The Reality" refers to Darakjian as one of the founders of ASALA. More importantly, Darakjian was responsible for raising the level of ASALA's operations qualitatively, as when he carried out the group's first assassination. On 16 February 1976, as the Turkish Embassy's First Secretary, Oktay Cirit, waited in an amusement arcade in Beirut's Hamra district, Darakjian, armed with a silenced pistol, assassinated him.⁶⁸ Darakjian's major accomplishment, however, was holding ASALA together and continuing the series of anti-Turkish attacks in the absence of Mujahed. In 1976, Mujahed was wounded in an assassination attempt related to his previous membership in the Palestinian Resistance. Mujahed left Lebanon recover from his wounds, and Hagop Darakjian took over sole responsibility for planning and

carrying out attacks until Mujahed's return in 1977. Even after that, according to "The Reality," Darakjian remained the primary ASALA leader involved in attacks on Western facilities in Europe. Among those attacks were the relatively few carried out by ASALA inside Turkey. By 1979, Darakjian's organizational involvement and operational effectiveness had lessened considerably due to leukemia.

The Second Phase

An influx of new members in 1980 compensated for the gap left when Hagop Darakjian's Leukemia worsened and incapacitated him. Some who joined during this period were Suzy Mahseredjian, Monte Melkonian, Pierre Gulumian, Mardiros Jamgotchian, and Khatchig Havarian. All, in one way or another, would play prominent parts. Due in large part to the new members, ASALA took on more of the trappings of an organization—real estate, office space, a publication and radio broadcast, a sustained personnel recruitment effort. As a result, the organization's efforts were more goal-oriented and effective than when the true ASALA behind the facade had been primarily Mujahed, Hagop Darakjian, and a telephone from which to claim responsibility for another bombing. Additional personnel provided the numbers necessary to man a Beirut operations center twenty four hours per day. ASALA began publication of "Armenia" magazine in 1980, although the content-selection process was still dominated by Mujahed.

During 1980, ASALA established its first permanent contingent in a training camp in Lebanon. With an infrastructure thus established—headquarters cadre, communications, publicity, and training facilities—the numbers of recruits began to increase. Recruits from France's Armenian National Movement joined ASALA during 1980, among them probably Pierre Gulumian. An organizational relationship was established between ASALA and Armenian activists in Iran, due largely to the efforts of California-born Monte Melkonian. Other Armenian groups in the diaspora, Canada and Great Britain among them, began to openly express their support for ASALA.

The result of the foregoing internal organizational improvements was that the level of anti-Turkish attacks increased both quantitatively and qualitatively. Among the incidents that evidenced an improvement in ASALA's capability were the assassination of the Turkish Administrative Attache and his daughter, and the wounding of his wife and two sons, on 31 July 1980 in Athens; the 5 August 1980 attack on the Turkish Consulate in Lyon, France; the wounding of the Turkish Press Attache on 26 September 1980 in Paris; the attempted

assassination of a Turkish diplomat in Rome on 11 December 1980; and the 4 March 1981 assassination of the Turkish Labor Attache and a Religious Affairs Official in Paris. All of the attacks, according to "The Reality," were the work of the new members recruited in 1979-1980.

Several factors contributed to the end of this phase in the Fall of 1981; all were related, directly or indirectly, to Mujahed. The "duality," the tug of war mentioned earlier continued, with Mujahed and a small group of like-minded followers on one side and the majority of members on the other side. A factor to which not enough importance has been accorded was the 17 March 1981 death of Hagop Darakjian, who finally succumbed to leukemia. The loss of a founder of ASALA, with all of the authority attendant to that distinction, would have been enough in itself. To have also lost the man who almost singlehandedly kept ASALA's attacks going in the absence of Mujahed was too much of a loss in the attempt to counterbalance Mujahed. Two like-minded members, Khatchig Havarian and Vicken Aivazian, were also employed by Mujahed to extend his influence within and control over ASALA. The physical isolation of opposing members by Havarian and Aivazian exerted great influence over those so isolated. A shift away from the focus on anti-Turkish attacks was another factor. Externally, attacks were directed against states that arrested ASALA commandos in connection with anti-Turkish attacks. The 3 October 1980 accidental detonation of a bomb in a Geneva hotel by Alek Yenikomshian and Suzy Mahseredjian, for example, was followed by a frenzied series of anti-Swiss attacks directed by Mujahed. Internal to the Armenian diaspora, Mujahed began ordering attacks against members of the traditional Armenian organizations, such as the Tasknak Party, engendering even stronger negative feelings about ASALA. In some cases, the newer members were able to carry out their concept of the "correct" type of attack. The most famous, and the most respected within ASALA, was the 24 September 1981 takeover of the Turkish Consulate in Paris, the "Van" Operation, which produced an enormous amount of publicity for "The Armenian Question." In the end, however, Mujahed's access to and control of the group's resources, including the membership, was the deciding factor. The era effectively ended with the "Van" Operation.

The Third Class

The third, and final, phase in the existence of ASALA, from the end of 1981 until the violent schism in July of 1983, was marked internally by an upward spiral of mistrust of members, and acts of vengeance

carried out against ASALA's own commandos. Externally, an increasingly inept series of attacks was accompanied by an increasingly strident series of pronouncements and threats. As had been the case in the first two phases, the prime cause in the last phase was Mujahed's personality and methods. As the author of "The Reality" put it: "The period of the ASALA duality in which Mujahed dominated but the patriotic side existed as an actively creative force was now coming to an end, and a new era, in which Mujahed would rule over ASALA with an iron fist was beginning."

A key reason for the character of the final phase was the adoption of Mujahed's style and methods by others in the ASALA leadership, specifically Khatchig Havarian, Vicken Aivazian, and Varoujan Garbidian. Havarian, following the evacuation of the ASALA leadership from Beirut to the safety of Damascus after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, became an extension of Mujahed. ASALA members' personal correspondence was censored, often destroyed; funds were severely limited; members were denied the freedom to leave their rooms; food, money, and identity documents were taken away.

Internally Directed Violence

Vicken Aivazian and Garbidian carried out a number of executions of members at the direction of Mujahed, for a variety of reasons. The first instance, that of Arsen Vartanian on 21 October 1981, was for allegedly absconding with funds and weapons. As time went on, the toll of attempts and killings mounted, and less and less of a justification was required. In February 1982, Mujahed ordered the execution of Hamo Moskovian for cooperating with police and security forces and, when it had not been accomplished by May of that year, attempted the act himself. The result was a leg wound to Moskovian, the death of another Armenian youth at the scene, Kevork Ananian, and an increasingly bitter Moskovian who cooperated even more with authorities against ASALA. The next member to be killed, a blind man named Nishan, had been imprisoned by Mujahed on suspicion of conspiring with Hamo Moskovian. "The Reality" describes his execution by Vicken Aivazian and, probably, Varoujan Garbidian as particularly vicious, with 35 rounds of pistol fire directed at Nishan's head, neck, and chest. Soon after, in June or July 1982, Sarkis Kiulkhandjian, known as "Khomeini," was murdered at Mujahed's direction with a single 9mm round to the back of the head for expressing the desire to leave ASALA. Sarkis had done a great deal of work for Mujahed on "Hayastan" Magazine and the Beirut radio

show. Mujahed also attempted the executions of Armenians who were not full-time, active members of ASALA in the Middle East for either some actual or perceived offense of some kind. For example, Ara Toranian, the leader of the Armenian National Movement and former ally, had two attempts made on his life. In the first, on 21 March 83, the detonator mechanism on a bomb attached to his car malfunctioned. Less than two weeks later, a package bomb was intercepted by Canadian authorities on its way to Haroutiun Kevork, leader of a formerly sympathetic group of Canadian-Armenians. Toranian was slightly wounded in December of 1983 in the second attempt on his life.

Retributive Bombing Campaigns

The killings of members contrasted starkly with the public face put on by ASALA. Repeatedly, predictably, the arrest of one or more ASALA commandos was followed by a bombing campaign to secure their freedom. Such a campaign seemingly would be mounted only in an effort to free a valued comrade.

The first major retributive bombing campaign of this sort was carried out against the Swiss Government for the arrest of Alek Yenikomshian and Suzy Mahseredjian on 3 October 1980. The two had been assembling an explosive device in a Geneva hotel room when a malfunction occurred. In the British vernacular, Alek and Suzy "scored an own goal," with Alek losing his left hand and his sight. Their arrest and imprisonment was followed by a series of eighteen bombings by the "3 October" group, the ASALA *nom de guerre* of the moment. The bombings were personally ordered by Mujahed.

A two-stage series of bombings even greater in number ensued following the 9 June 1981 assassination of Turkish Consulate Secretary Mehmet-Savas Yerguz in Geneva by Mardiros Jamgotchian. Jamgotchian's arrest produced a series of fifteen bombings by the "9 June Group" on a geographic scale that reached even into the United States. Five more bombings, for a total of twenty, followed Jamgotchian's sentencing in December of 1981, these by the "Swiss 15 Group."

At times, because of police successes and/or legal proceedings, more than one retributive ASALA bombing was in progress at a time. In the fall of 1981, for example, one series of bombings, by the "September France Group," was underway in response to the arrests of the four ASALA commandos who took over the Turkish Consulate in Paris on 24 September 1981 in the "Van" Operation; the bombings to avenge the arrest of Mardiros Jamgotchian continued. On 11 November 1981,

French authorities arrested an individual at Orly Airport whose documents identified him as "Dimitriu Giorgiu." Subsequent investigation revealed that he was Monte Melkonian, a ranking member of ASALA, and suspected of the attempted assassination on 25 October 1981 of the Second Secretary of the Turkish Embassy in Rome, Gokberk Ergenekon. Mujahed ordered not only a bombing campaign, but specifically mass bombings of public places, in an obvious attempt to cause large numbers of injuries and deaths. The campaign, undertaken under the name of the "Orly Group," produced no deaths and few injuries, but did effect Melkonian's release. Because the tactic of the retributive bombing campaign had had some success, Mujahed continued to employ it in 1982.

On the morning of 8 April 1982 as he left for work, the Trade & Commercial Counselor of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa, Kemaletten "Kani" Gungor, was seriously wounded by three rounds of pistol fire. The arrests in Toronto on 18 and 20 May of Haroutiun Kevork, Haig Balian, Haig Karakhanian, and Melkon Karakhanian resulted in orders by Mujahed for yet another bombing campaign. The attempt to begin that campaign, at Los Angeles International Airport on 30 May 1982, turned into a disaster for ASALA when police and FBI investigators found and defused an explosive device at the Air Canada terminal at the airport. Three members of a Los Angeles-area ASALA cell—Hratch Kozibioukian, his wife, Siranouche, and Varant Chirinian—were arrested. An Iraqi-Armenian nearing naturalization as a U.S. citizen, Vicken Charkhutian, fled the U.S. to avoid arrest for his involvement. The consequence of the loss of Charkhutian, possibly the key ASALA bomb-maker in North America, according to "The Reality," was that "the military potential in North America was almost completely stifled."⁶⁹

The disastrous turn of events for ASALA was not over, but actually worsened. When Charkhutian subsequently was arrested by French authorities, Mujahed ordered his chief bomb-maker in France, Pierre Gulumian, to begin yet another bombing campaign under the revived name of the "Orly Group." Gulumian's first attack, on 20 July 1982, did not cause the number of casualties desired by Mujahed, who ordered measures that would produce greater numbers of killed and wounded. Gulumian's second attack, on 24 July, resulted in only two persons wounded, another failure in Mujahed's eyes. While constructing a third device on 30 July, Gulumian died in its premature detonation. French police, responding to the explosion, discovered that Gulumian's villa also was used as an arms depot for Palestinians. Arrested were Pierre's brother, Katchadur, and another resident, Charles Sansonetti, a Corsican whose wife was of Armenian heritage.⁷⁰ The arrests

severely crippled ASALA's infrastructure in France, as well as hurting the extremist Palestinian infrastructure to some extent.

Organizational Effects

According to "The Reality," this time period (Summer of 1982) marked one of the most vicious periods of ASALA's history: internally, an atmosphere of terror reigned; the vast majority of the attacks were against non-Turkish targets, engendering increasing enmity in Armenian communities throughout the diaspora as well as in non-Armenian communities; members were arrested with increasing regularity; the ASALA-Popular Movement groups, courted so assiduously in an effort to enlarge ASALA's sphere of influence, became outraged and finally were all expelled by January 1983. The downward slide begun in 1981 accelerated in 1982.

Declining Military Effectiveness

As starkly as the internal "reign of terror" against members contrasted with the public image of concern for its commandos, so did the truth about ASALA's attacks on Turkey during this period contrast with its claims. "The Reality" ridiculed the majority of the attacks, criticizing them for their lack of preparation and effectiveness, for being indiscriminate and directed against "innocents" rather than Turkish interests, and for sacrificing ASALA commandos' lives to arrest and death.

Mujahed was mindful of the need to counterbalance the attacks against non-Turkish targets with anti-Turkish operations.⁷¹ In addition to serving to continue to publicize ASALA's existence, anti-Turkish attacks would somewhat rebuild ASALA's damaged morale.⁷² For the most part, however, ASALA's anti-Turkish attacks in 1982 were bombings, the exceptions being the wounding of the Turkish attache in Ottawa in April, and one of the relatively few ASALA forays inside Turkey. A two-man commando team led by Zohrab Sarkissian and assisted by Levon Ekmekjian, traveling on false Egyptian passports, managed to pull off a grenade and submachinegun attack on Ankara's Esenboga Airport on 7 August 1982, leaving 10 dead and 71 wounded. Sarkissian died in the Turkish counterattack and Ekmekjian was hanged on 29 January 1983 after an extended interrogation and trial. "The Reality," in commenting on the attack, stated that its occurrence inside Turkey overshadowed for a time its negative aspects: The choice of a civilian airport; the consequent loss of innocent lives; the loss of both commandos; and the increased bad

feelings toward the Turkish-Armenian community made the attack a "crime" and an "atrocious" rather than a triumph for ASALA.

Another attempt on 9 September was a testament to its lack of preparation. Zaven Bedros, a Syrian-Armenian with no training or experience, recruited by Khatchig Havarian immediately before his departure, was arrested by British authorities in his London hotel room with a pistol and grenades before he could pull off his attack. Bedros revealed that his target was the Turkish Ambassador, whom he was to take hostage to effect the release of Levon Ekmekjian from a Turkish prison.

If anything, 1983 was even more of a testament to a low level of training, preparation, and capability on the part of ASALA. The level of sophistication of attacks dropped dramatically. On 22 January, Apraham Tomasian entered the Turkish Airlines office in Paris and hurled two grenades. Fortunately for those in the office, Tomasian had been supplied by ASALA with offensive, stun-type grenades rather than the anti-personnel, fragmentation-type, and they did little damage beyond frightening those in the office. One French secretary was killed, however, in a bombing at the Marmara Travel Agency in Paris on 28 February. An attack labeled "absurd" by "The Reality" was carried out on 16 June 1983 in the bazaar in Istanbul, Turkey. After keeping an Armenian youth named Megerditch "Mgo" Magarian in isolation from February until June, Mujahed sent him to Istanbul equipped with a submachinegun and grenades, one of which again was the wrong type. After throwing one grenade and emptying the weapon's clip, Magarian committed suicide with his remaining grenade. The death toll was two civilians, one a 13-year-old boy, and another dead ASALA commando.

The final assault-type "attack" by ASALA scarcely merited the term, according to "The Reality." In October, following the pattern, a recent recruit named Nishan Tanielian was dropped off near the location to which the Turkish Embassy had been moved in the Beirut suburb of Baabda. Tanielian, equipped with a Kalashnikov assault rifle and grenades, but without any other preparation, was instructed by Mujahed to try to enter the embassy and kill as many people as possible before killing himself. The outcome was no Turks killed, and Tanielian's arrest and subsequent sentencing to life imprisonment.

Alliances with States and Other Groups

One reason for the confusing and confused series of ill-prepared attacks, aside from the loss of Hagop Darakjian and the non-participation of newer members in the planning of attacks, may have

been competing organizational agendas. One characteristic of ASALA that distinguishes it markedly from JCAG/ARA is that of relationships with states and other groups. Probably to compensate for the lack of sponsorship by a prominent organization within the Armenian diaspora, ASALA formed a series of alliances over the years. These were not only for logistics purposes; the allies provided political help as well, including safe havens.

The Palestinian Connection

Early on, in fact even before the creation of ASALA, various factions of the Palestinian Movement, including the mainstream PLO, were prominent in the support apparatus. Yasser Arafat's opening of negotiations with Turkey served to move Mujahed to the more hospitable climate of a radical PLO offshoot; the PLO had opened an office in Ankara by October 1979. Much evidence in the forms of hearsay, of admissions by various ASALA members, and results of investigations, exists to refute the ASALA assertions on occasion that its relationship to the Palestinians was one of "comradeship, not organizational."

Beginning with the aforementioned revelation in "The Reality" that Mujahed had, in fact, been an active member of the Palestinian Resistance and had served with Wadi Haddad, the Operations Chief of George Habash's PFLP, the evidence accumulates. Israeli forces reported discovering PLO documents in abandoned training camps that confirmed a connection between ASALA and the PLO. *The Wall Street Journal* claimed in an August 1983 article that ASALA "trained with the PFLP and PDFLP and sent more than 100 members through Fatah's school for foreign terrorists in Hamouriah, south of Damascus."⁷³ Claire Sterling alleged in her work, "The Terror Network," that Habash had been training his Armenian "wards" in Lebanon and South Yemen for years.⁷⁴ Corroboration for that claim is found in a statement by ASALA. Members of the ASALA leadership stated in a 1982 interview, "An observer would notice the similarity in the tactics of the Armenian Secret Army and the Popular Front . . . with which it has close ties."⁷⁵

Logistic support also reportedly was supplied by another Palestinian faction, the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA), a group supported by Libya. An ASALA press conference of 9 November 1978, reportedly was convened in the LAA-connected building housing the "Voice of the Arab Revolution" radio station and the "Workers' News Agency." The journalists present were told that future contacts with ASALA would be conducted via the "Al Shaghyla" news agency that

had been established by Libya. ASALA received logistical help from a Lebanese militia founded by Zahir Al Khatib and his brother, Thaker. In addition to daily airtime on the militia's radio station for an Armenian-language broadcast, ASALA commandos reportedly trained in the Khatibs' camp alongside the militia's fighters.⁷⁶

Somewhat "harder" evidence of the Palestinian connection also exists. When ASALA member Alek Yenikomshian returned to Beirut in January 1981 following his release by Swiss authorities, he was welcomed by a delegation of the PFLP.⁷⁷ The ASALA commandos who seized the Turkish Consulate in Paris in September 1981 told the police they were trained in Palestinian camps.⁷⁸ Similarly, Mardiros Jamgotchian, the ASALA assassin captured by Swiss authorities on 9 June 1981, admitted to an eighteen-month stint in a Palestinian training camp.⁷⁹ Levon Ekmekjian, the surviving commando of the ASALA attack on Ankara's Esenboga Airport on 7 August 1982, revealed to his Turkish interrogators that the submachineguns and grenades for the attack had been supplied by a Palestinian.⁸⁰

Physical evidence of the relationship also exists, although it is always the most difficult to obtain. In one instance, police authorities were able to establish a link when ballistics tests found that same weapon had been used in attacks by Palestinians and ASALA.⁸¹ In another, when the plane carrying ranking ASALA member Monte Melkonian had to make an unscheduled landing at Orly Airport in Paris, French officials discovered his false passport.⁸² The passport, in the name of Dimitriu Giorgiu, bore a number in the same series as one used by a commando involved in the late 1980 bombing of a synagogue on the Rue Copernic.⁸³

In September of 1982, following ASALA's forced departure from Beirut, Mujahed began a working, organizational relationship with the Palestinian terrorist group headed by Sabri Al Banna (Abu Nidhal). The arrangement was more of an enhancement than a beginning, since, according to "The Reality," Mujahed and Abu Nidhal had long been personal friends.⁸⁴ The friendship between the two likely was born in the 1974 time period when, at the same time that Mujahed began feeling nervous about infighting among Palestinian groups, Abu Nidhal was in the process of being expelled from the PLO and sentenced to death by Yasser Arafat. After all, one of the most frequently operative philosophical expressions in the Middle East states, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." In return for espousing a philosophy similar to Abu Nidhal's, ASALA members were sheltered and trained in ANO facilities in the Bekaa Valley, living side by side with ANO commandos. ASALA, for its part, reportedly provided safehouse-type facilities in Paris in August 1982 to the commandos

who attacked the Goldenberg Restaurant. The incident was attributed to the ANO.⁸⁵

The Kurdish Ally

In some cases, of course, ASALA and its Palestinian ally chose not to hide the relationship. The 8 April 1980 press conference hosted by the PFLP in Sidon, Lebanon, was one such occasion. Fourteen hooded representatives of ASALA and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) were presented by the PFLP to invited members of the press. The two groups announced their plans to mount military operations against the Turkish authorities "until the regime falls and Armenian and Kurdish aspirations are fulfilled."⁸⁶ Both ASALA and the PKK, according to "The Reality," considered the relationship a tactical ploy more than a start of a long-term alliance.⁸⁷ Armenians had no territorial base within Turkey, hence needed the Kurds in order to mount more operations inside Turkey; the Kurds needed assistance from ASALA in the form of training. A number of joint operations against Turkish interests apparently were conducted with the PKK. Early on 10 November 1980, an explosive device detonated at the Turkish Consulate in Strasbourg, France.⁸⁸ The following day, in Rome, another device detonated at a Turkish tourist office.⁸⁹ Both attacks were claimed in the name of the PKK-ASALA alliance. Nothing more was heard of a PKK-ASALA alliance until 14 January 1982, when a bomb exploded at the Turkish Consulate in Toronto, Canada.⁹⁰ Finally, in the March 1982 issue of "Hay Baykar," ASALA spokesman Hagop Hagopian announced, "We are fighting side by side with Kurdish revolutionaries."⁹¹

Alliances with States

In addition to alliances with groups, in later years when ASALA had established more of a "track record" as a member of the so-called "Revolutionary Movement," Mujahed was able to forge a number of relationships with states. The relationships served Mujahed's interests well, providing various forms of support, and, also importantly, safehaven when needed.

Libya

According to "The Reality," in the spring of 1982 Mujahed began approaching "certain" governments, including serious overtures toward Libya.⁹² The move was made possible by a shift in Libyan policy

toward Turkey. ASALA had earlier accused Libya of buying weapons from Turkey, of supporting Turkey in the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, and of investing Libyan oil-derived revenues in Turkey. The media coverage attendant to the public declaration on 12 April 1981 by Colonel Qadhafi, calling for the resolution of the Kurdish and Armenian questions, apparently served to smooth over previous differences with Mujahed and permit an alliance with ASALA.⁹³

Syria

Because little happens in Lebanon without at least the knowledge of the Syrian Government, Mujahed established connections with Damascus, too, probably in the late 1970's. The relationship paid urgently needed dividends in 1982, when ASALA was forced by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to relocate its members to a Damascus headquarters and to facilities in the Syrian-controlled area of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.⁹⁴ The Armenian community in Syria served as a source of both funds and recruits.⁹⁵ Syria became an even more important sanctuary for Mujahed in 1983, when the Orly Airport bombing of 15 July divided ASALA irreparably. At that point, Mujahed reportedly was operating under the direction of Rifaat Al-Assad, brother of Syria's President. ASALA received training, arms, and forged documents from Syria, accepting in return Syrian participation in the planning of ASALA attacks. At least some of those attacks may have been undertaken jointly with Iraqi-based Kurdish revolutionaries carrying out operations inside Turkey. Syria and Turkey have long been at odds over a variety of regional issues, including access to the waters of the Euphrates River. The aforementioned ASALA declaration of March 1982 that ASALA and the Kurds were fighting side by side is lent credence by two Turkish military incursions into Iraq.⁹⁶ Turkish forces, with Iraqi permission, entered Iraq in June 1983 and again in October 1984, engaging Kurdish and Armenian units that had been conducting forays across the border into eastern Turkey.⁹⁷

Iran

Even prior to ASALA's relocation from Beirut ahead of advancing Israeli forces, Iran reportedly had made overtures to Mujahed about setting up operations in Iran. Bases and barracks near the Iranian border with Turkey were provided to the ASALA elements that relocated to Iran. After ASALA's forced departure from Beirut, additional elements were sent to Iran. Tehran also became a site from

which ASALA could continue its verbal war with Turkey. In July and August 1983, ASALA communiqués began to be issued from Tehran.⁹⁸ Reinforcing the operative principle that "The enemy of my enemy is my friend," the ASALA cooperation with the Iranian regime represented a reversal of a long-standing enmity. Ancient Persia had, more than once, reduced the Armenian people to the status of vassals. More recently, in 1981, Iran had executed two ASALA commandos who had fired at the Turkish Embassy in Tehran. Even as it wooed ASALA to relocate to Iran, reports were emerging from the indigenous Armenian community of persecution at the hands of the Tehran Government. Nevertheless, an alliance served the immediate needs of both ASALA and Iran. Iran, in return for facilities, arms, and training provided to ASALA, exacted the type of quid pro quo given by ASALA to Syria; that is, ASALA carried out attacks against Iranian enemies. ASALA commandos, along with Iraqi and Kurdish exiles, are reported to have been part of an Iranian military assault on Iraq in August 1983.⁹⁹ In July and August 1983, ASALA allegedly carried out a series of bombings of French interests in Tehran. France, at the time, was providing military supplies to Iran's enemy, Iraq. ASALA apparently felt it had enough freedom in Iran to carry out anti-Turkish attacks in March and April 1984. Although a number of incidents were prevented by Iranian authorities, the assistant Turkish Military Attaché, Ismail Pambukcu, was assassinated by ASALA on 27 March. A Turkish businessman, Isik Yonder, the husband of a Turkish Embassy secretary, was shot to death on the eve of a visit by the Turkish Prime Minister in April.

ASALA Assumes "Mercenary" Status

ASALA, according to "The Reality," had degenerated to the status of a pure mercenary. The attacks done as "favors" to other states or groups also declined in effectiveness. One such "favor" was done on 8 December 1982 in Athens against Kuwait Airlines. The results were typical of the ASALA attacks perpetrated during the 1982-83 time frame. If the commandos' purpose, and the outcome, had not been so serious, the attack would have provided a measure of comic relief. As Vahe Khutaverdian drove his motorcycle toward the Kuwaiti Airlines Office in Athens, with Karnik Vahradian behind him on the seat and holding an explosive device, Vahradian threw the bomb. The device struck a telephone pole rather than the airlines office, bounced back, and killed Vahradian. Khutaverdian, arrested later, was tried, convicted, and sentenced to fourteen years in prison.

At times the favors done by ASALA were returned. A prime

example, according to "The Reality," was the bombing of the French Cultural Center in Berlin on 25 August 1983, resulting in "one innocent civilian killed and twenty more wounded." Several factors, the expose continued, indicate that the bombing was done as a favor for Mujahed by a non-Armenian force. The second attempt in 1983 to kill the former French-based ally, Ara Toranian, was carried out in December. According to "The Reality," the attempt, like the August bombing, was also "most probably" the work of a non-Armenian ally of Mujahed's.¹⁰⁰ The net effect of all the foregoing—the killings of members; attacks against non-Turkish targets; the loss of comrades to arrest and death; the "selling" of ASALA to states and groups as mercenaries—combined to produce a drastic drop in morale, an exodus of members, and a great slowdown in recruitment. Morale reached a significant low in the spring of 1982. Rather than committed, indoctrinated, trained commandos such as Monte Melkonian, abortive ASALA "attacks" were undertaken by such as Zaven Bedros in London and by Mgo Magarian in Istanbul. From November 1981 to January 1982, many ASALA members who had played roles on various levels of varying importance began leaving the organization despite the danger of doing so.

The Schism

The culmination, when the membership of ASALA could stand no more, finally occurred in 1983. In January of 1983, Mujahed posted one of his trusted close aides, Varoujan Garbidian, to France to rebuild the military wing of ASALA there. That infrastructure had been badly damaged by the death of Pierre Gulumian and the arrests of Pierre's associates the previous summer. Mujahed himself visited France in February 1983 to survey Garbidian's progress and to participate in the planning of attacks. Early in the campaign, of course, the "attacks" barely merited the term. The 22 January attack in the Turkish Airlines office and the 28 February attack on the travel agency were prime examples. Another attack on a former colleague, Jean-Marc "Ara" Toranian, the head of the Armenian National Movement in France, was similarly unsuccessful when the explosive device planted in Toranian's car failed to detonate.

When Mujahed visited France again in April 1983, his past played a role in another blow struck at ASALA. Mujahed's close friendship and association with the Abu Nidhal organization since 1982, a primary opponent of Yasser Arafat's PLO, had so irked the PLO that its Intelligence Chief, Abu Iyad, provided French authorities with pictures of ASALA activists, including Mujahed. Instead of arresting

Mujahed during the April inspection trip, the French merely followed him, uncovering the identities of many of the key members of the reconstituted ASALA network in France.¹⁰¹ This information was to be crucial in the aftermath of the soon-to-occur watershed attack in ASALA history.

On 15 July 1983, the usual long, slow line of passengers at Paris' Orly Airport waited to board a Turkish Airline flight to Istanbul. As a favor to a stranger, and for a small fee, one of the passengers agreed to carry on board a small bag, a mistake that would be his last. The timing device, intended to activate after the aircraft's departure, detonated prematurely in the terminal area, killing eight people and wounding fifty four more. While the public position of ASALA, Mujahed that is, was that the bombing was a victory, the sound of the bomb detonating was, simultaneously, the death knell of ASALA as it had existed since 1975.

Before the end of 15 July, when the news of the Orly Airport bombing reached the ASALA membership, the deadly repercussions began. The first victim within ASALA of the Orly bombing was Mujahed's trusted lieutenant, Vicken Aivazian. As Aivazian arrived at the ASALA training camp in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, he was confronted by ASALA members including Tavit Tavitian, and shot to death. The following day, Mujahed's other trusted lieutenant, Khatchig Havarian, arrived at the camp to investigate Aivazian's death and met the same fate. Within days of the Orly attack, French Police and Internal Security officials arrested a significant number of members of ASALA's "military" wing in France. The identification of the ASALA members was done during the French surveillance of Mujahed during his visits to France earlier in 1983. Varoujan Garbidian was arrested and convicted. Soner Nayir, the electronics specialist who had designed the bomb's firing circuits, was arrested as he attempted to flee, and later convicted. The ASALA "money man" in France, Ohannes Semerci, was also convicted of complicity in the attack. Other activists arrested included Rubik Havanessian, Avedis Catanassian, Bedros Halebian, Nerses Tasci, and Antoine Achkoyan. The effect on ASALA's military capability in France was at least as disabling as the arrests had been in July 1982 following Pierre Gulumian's death.

The Birth of ASALA-Revolutionary Movement

The final indignity as part of the fallout from the Orly Airport bombing was that the death knell of Mujahed's ASALA, as it had existed, was, simultaneously, the birth of ASALA-Revolutionary

Movement—ASALA-RM. The new and competing group, led by Monte Melkonian, posed several dangers for Mujahed greater than any he had ever before faced. First, ASALA-RM added to ASALA's recruiting difficulties by competing in the Armenian diaspora for new members. Secondly, the detailed knowledge of former insiders such as Melkonian represented a grave threat to Mujahed's organizational security and personal safety—witness the readiness of ASALA dissidents to execute Aivazian and Havarian. Finally, ASALA-RM could be expected to be the more successful in future fundraising, as Mujahed's ASALA had long since been reduced to outright extortion in the Armenian diaspora.

In a final frenzy of retribution, Mujahed searched for and located a number of ASALA dissidents whom he believed responsible for the 15 and 16 July killings of Aivazian and Havarian. While publicly blaming the CIA and Turkey's MIT, Mujahed traced Garlen Ananian and Aram Vartanian to Damascus, Syria, and, on 16 August, executed both men. Thus, ASALA, which had intentionally "given birth" in Beirut on 20 January 1975 with a bomb explosion, unintentionally announced its death at Orly Airport on 15 July 1983 the same way, with another bomb explosion. While a few attacks were undertaken against Turkish interests in Iran in March and April of 1984 resulting in some deaths and injuries, ASALA never again mounted a sustained series of significant actions.¹⁰²

Notes

1. "G. Yanikian, Whose Assassination of Turkish Diplomats Opened New Era of Political Struggle, Dies at Age 88 in Ca.," *Armenian Reporter*, 8 March 1984, 1.
2. "Hagop Hagopian Assassinated in Athens," *Armenian Weekly*, 7 May 1988, p 1; "Armenian Terrorist Leader Murdered," *Washington Post*, 29 April 1988, sec. A24.
3. "The Reality," (Part VIII) *Armenian Reporter*, 28 February 1985, 12.
4. "Spanish Journalist, Victim of ASALA Bombing, Becomes Expert on Armenian Cause," *Armenian Reporter*, 15 Nov 1984, 2.
5. Bonnie Cordes, "Armenian Terrorism in America," in *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection* (Ankara, Turkey: Ankara University Press, 1984), 156–157; Rouben M. Torossian, *The Contemporary Armenian Nationalist Movement*, (San Diego, CA: United States International University, 1980), 225.
6. *Armenian Reporter*, 8 March 1984, 1.
7. "The Reality," (Part II) *Armenian Reporter*, 17 January 1985, 2.
8. Michael M. Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 82.

74. Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), 244.
75. Gunter, "Transnational Sources," 5. (Quoting Nadim Nasir, "Al-Majallah Visits an Armenian Secret Army Base in Lebanon.")
76. Kurz and Merari, 43.
77. Kurz and Merari, 38.
78. Gunter, "Transnational Sources," 5.
79. Ternon, 217.
80. Gunter, "Transnational Sources," 5.
81. Ternon, 217.
82. Ternon, 222.
83. Judith Perera, "An End to Armed Propaganda?", *Middle East*, September 1983, 18-20.
84. *Armenian Reporter*, 7 February 1985, 10.
85. Kurz and Merari, 42.
86. Sterling, 245.
87. *Armenian Reporter*, 17 January 1985, 2.
88. Judith Perera, "Young Armenians: Armed Struggle is Our Answer," *Middle East*, June 1981, 21-28.
89. "Portrait of a Terrorist-Master," *Le Matin*, 1 October 1985.
90. Kurz and Merari, 43.
91. Ozkoray, 5.
92. *Armenian Reporter*, 31 January 1985, 12.
93. Ternon, 210.
94. Gunter, "Transnational Sources," 26.
95. *Armenian Reporter*, 7 February 1985, 10.
96. Ozkoray, 5.
97. Gunter, "Transnational Sources," 28.
98. Gunter, "Transnational Sources," 29.
99. Kurz and Merari, 49.
100. *Armenian Reporter*, 21 February 1985, 14.
101. Gunter, "The Drug Connection," 120-121.
102. *Armenian Reporter*, 21 February 1985, 14.

6

"Hagop Hagopian"

Much of the story of the recent wave of Armenian terrorism revolves around one person, directly or indirectly. The single most influential individual in modern-day Armenian terrorism must be the person known publicly as "Hagop Hagopian." This is said notwithstanding the catalytic act of Gourgen Yanikian, in killing two Turkish diplomats in 1973.

Hagopian reportedly was an aide to the PLO's Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) at the time that Yanikian assassinated the two Turkish consular officials in 1973. Jose Antonio Gurriaran, Deputy Editor of Madrid's daily "Pueblo," reported that when news of the killings reached Abu Iyad, he summoned his half-Arab aide and the two of them "gave birth" to the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia—ASALA.¹

For several reasons, including operational security and, probably, an attempt to inflate estimates of ASALA's membership, the ASALA leader used a number of operational names. These included Hagop Hagopian (Agop Agopian); Mihran Mihranian, Vahram Vahramian, Bedros Havanassian, Abduh Mohamed Qasim, Henri Titizian (also reported as Tezinyan), Minas Ohanessian, Noubar Hovhanessian, and Haroutioun Takoushian. The appellation he apparently preferred, however, and the one he used inside ASALA, was "Mujahed" (Warrior). It was by this nom de guerre that the members of ASALA knew him.

As is the case with many others involved in terrorism, what is known about Mujahed is a mixture of truth and lies, of parts expounded by the individual and those discovered despite the wishes of the individual. Some of the items concerning Mujahed can be corroborated by two or more sources, and are, therefore, more credible.

Several sources assert that Mujahed was the son of one Armenian parent and one Arab parent.² This is borne out by the passage in "The Reality"³ that other members of ASALA had to translate passages

into Armenian for Mujahed. Press accounts of 1988 reiterated earlier claims that Mujahed was born in Iraq.⁴ Seeming corroboration is found in a February 1982 interview granted Zaki Shihabi of "Al-Hawadith", in which "Hagop Hagopian" spoke in "broken non-Lebanese Arabic."⁵

A number of sources reported that Hagopian, himself, claimed to have engaged in revolutionary activities prior to the first attack committed in the name of ASALA (the bombing of the World Council of Churches facility in Beirut on 20 January 1975). The purpose of these revolutionary activities was to develop his skills as a revolutionary/guerrilla fighter.⁶ In the November/December 1983 issue of the ASALA publication "Armenia", Hagopian relates that he led the 6 February 1974 attack on the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait. None of the group of Palestinian commandos, Hagopian claimed, knew that they were led by an Armenian. The chapter on ASALA contains details of the incident. Hagopian certainly made no attempt to avoid publicity after the inception of attacks under the name ASALA. As much as any other member/leader of a terrorist group of the time, Hagopian, under a variety of names, was a regular contributor to his group's magazine "Armenia." He also participated in radio broadcasts, and gave a number of interviews to journalists from European and Middle Eastern publications. His appetite for publicity, according to another high-ranking ASALA member and author of "The Reality," extended even to taking credit for attacks conducted by other Armenian terrorist groups. His flair for the dramatic was evident even in the manner in which he faked his own death in 1982. Not satisfied to have the group simply issue a statement claiming his demise, Mujahed chose the time during a telephone interview by "Le Matin" in July of 1982, with the sound of Israeli artillery in the background, to have colleagues claim that the Israeli barrage had bestowed "martyrdom" on Mujahed.⁷

Mujahed's leadership style and methods led, over time, to conflicts within ASALA. Covered in detail in the section on "Organization," suffice it to say that many of the problems arose because Mujahed literally personalized ASALA, in that, according to "The Reality," all decisions had to be made by Mujahed. His excessive secretiveness and tyrannical methods alienated even others of those in ASALA's hierarchy. As a measure of the fear he engendered, one of the more startling passages in "The Reality" asserts that members of ASALA, afraid to disobey the orders of Mujahed yet opposed to targeting innocent civilians, constructed explosive devices as directed, but did so in a manner that ensured they would not explode.⁸ The dispute within ASALA finally erupted on 15 July 1983, when the ASALA dissidents

actually carried out assassinations of two ASALA leaders—Khatchig Havarian and Vicken Aivazian—at an ASALA camp in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Predictably, Mujahed's initial reaction was to blame Turkey and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, rather than admit to either personal or organizational failure. Following his hurried return to the area, he and a number of his remaining followers tracked down some of the ASALA dissidents near Damascus and executed them.

Following the schism in ASALA and the creation of ASALA-Revolutionary Movement in 1983-1984, Mujahed, faced with the simultaneous losses of personnel to ASALA-RM and the loss of bases in the Beirut area, apparently allied himself even more closely with the Palestinian organization headed by Sabri Al-Banna (Abu Nidhal). This association, too, may have been made more difficult by the Syrian decision in 1987 to expel Abu Nidhal and his group.

With his ability to remain ensconced in Beirut ended with the forced exodus along with Palestinian comrades in 1982, Mujahed allegedly became a frequent traveler. Reports from a number of sources indicate that Mujahed shuttled between the Middle East, primarily Damascus and the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, with lesser time spent in Libya, and Europe. In Europe, he admitted having been in France in 1983, rebuilding his shattered operational network there, and is reported to have also been in Berlin. Mujahed's favorite place, however, apparently was Greece. In addition to an affiliated political organization, The Popular Movement for ASALA, a number of colleagues from Beirut also were ensconced in Athens. Encouraged by the feeling of relative safety arising from the political climate in the Greece of Andreas Papandreou, Mujahed also reportedly established at least one front firm, Middle East Book Distribution, to handle laundered ASALA funds. He also allegedly enjoyed the nightclubs of the Piraeus district of Athens, in the company of some of his lieutenants and local dance hostesses. In addition to a house in the Glyfada area of Athens and the "Popular Movement" office in the Neos Kosmos District, Mujahed also reportedly had several apartments in the area behind the Acropolis.

Glimmers of suspicion surfaced later over allegations of misappropriation of ASALA funds by Mujahed. The inability to account for almost eleven pounds of gold bullion collected in the Iranian-Armenian communities, and suspicions that it may have financed the purchase of a hotel near Athens, added to the discontent within ASALA.⁹

Finally, on 28 April 1988, elements probably from within the Armenian terrorist movement ended what "The Reality" had termed a reign of terror. At 4:30 AM, a man and a woman emerged from an

apartment building in the Paleo Faliron suburb of Athens and walked toward a nearby car. The man never reached the car, intended to take him to the Athens Airport for a flight to Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Two hooded men emerged from a nearby van, armed with sawed-off shotguns. Seeing them and realizing their intent, the man turned and ran back toward his home. The two men opened fire, knocking their target to the ground, then fired again at close range with the sawed-off shotguns. The two assailants then escaped in the waiting van without harming the woman. In less than five minutes, then, the thirteen-year-long ASALA leadership of Mujahed was ended. The publicity-conscious revolutionary who railed against Turkish colonialism and western imperialism, who had shifted his attention to the more anonymous and mundane matters attendant to running a supermarket, bled to death on a sidewalk in the same manner as had a number of his victims.¹⁰

Notes

1. "Spanish Journalist, Victim of ASALA Bombing, Becomes Expert on Armenian Cause," *Armenian Reporter*, 15 Nov 1984, 2+.
2. "Portrait of a Terrorist Master," *Le Matin*, 1 October 1985.
3. "The Reality," *Armenian Reporter*, 24 January 1985, 8.
4. "Hagop Hagopian Assassinated in Athens," *Armenian Weekly* 7 May 1988, 1.
5. Shihabi, Zaki, *Al-Hawadith*, February 1982.
6. Judith Perera, "Is This Hagopian?" *Middle East*, October 1983, 28.
7. *Le Matin*, 1 October 1985.
8. "The Reality," reported as Part IV in *Armenian Reporter*, 31 January 1985, 12.
9. *Le Matin*, 1 October 1985.
10. "Tercuman Questions Links Between Greece, ASALA," *Istanbul Tercuman* (30 April 1988).

7

The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide/Armenian Revolutionary Army

Beginning not long after the first attack by ASALA in 1975, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) conducted a ten-year series of attacks with a "batting average" that ranks among the highest of any group in the world. In the words of a top-ranking FBI official, "The Justice Commandos were known as a singularly effective group of assassins. When they went to work, somebody usually died."¹ The JCAG was later renamed The Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA), thus is referred to herein as JCAG/ARA.

The JCAG/ARA stands in rather stark contrast to virtually everything about ASALA: The flood of publicity attendant to ASALA; what is known about the two groups' respective command structures; the weapons of choice; the groups' respective preferred targets; and, finally and most of all, the leadership style.

Sources of information concerning the JCAG/ARA include the group's own communiqués issued following attacks, court records from cases wherein a captured JCAG/ARA commando(s) was tried, and revelations by ASALA sparked by the internecine strife that flared up between the two groups. Significantly, however, nothing on the JCAG/ARA was ever printed that would compare to a publication such as "The Reality."

Dashnak Party Sponsorship

The story of the JCAG/ARA is the story of the terrorist arm of The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) (in Armenian: "Hai Heghapokhakanneri Dashnaktsuthiun"), The Dashnak Party. As the "September France" group was to ASALA, JCAG/ARA was to the

Dashnak Party; as "Black September" allowed Yasser Arafat to deny involvement in terrorism, JCAG/ARA served to keep the Dashnak Party's hands publicly unbloodied. Informed opinion, however, including that within the Armenian terrorism movement itself, holds that the JCAG/ARA was created by, and maintained by the Dashnak Party.² Further, the impetus for the appearance of the JCAG/ARA in 1975 is said to have been fear on the part of the Dashnak Party leadership that the flow of young, male recruits to ASALA's ranks would increase in response to ASALA's more militant actions.³ The Dashnak Party leadership, therefore, reportedly created a competing organization that would revive the tradition and the tactics of the post-World-War-I Nemesis organization.

While a JCAG/ARA association is denied by the Central Committee of the Dashnak Party, several key indicators bely the denials.⁴ One such indicator is the great disparity in the amount of coverage given in Dashnak-associated publications to attacks by the JCAG/ARA—frequent, detailed, and sympathetic—versus that accorded to ASALA. Pictured immediately below, for example, is a small "filler" in the 6 January 1987 issue of the "Hairenik Daily," the Boston-area Armenian newspaper associated with the Dashnak Party. The plea is for individuals to write to Hampig "Harry" Sassounian, imprisoned in California for the 28 January 1982 assassination in Los Angeles of Turkish Consul General Kemal Arikian.⁵

**Գրեցէ՛ք
Համբիկին**

**Hampig Sassounian
4-A-12
P.O. BOX C-88440
Tamal, CA 94964**

Similar near glorification can be found in the Dashnak-affiliated press accounts of the assassination of the Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia on 9 March 1983, and the five-man ARA assault on the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal.⁶ It is not only the amount of press coverage, of course, but also what the Dashnak-affiliated/controlled media reports that adds to the suspicion of association with the JCAG/ARA. A frequent item deals with the functions held at Dashnak-associated facilities of various types to raise funds for the legal defense of captured JCAG/ARA commandos. In October 1983, for

example, such a gathering was organized at the Holy Cross Armenian Apostolic Church in Montebello, California, by the Sassounian Defense Committee on behalf of the JCAG assassin of the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles. Of significance is that the evening included a religious service over which the Prelate of the Church's Western Prelacy, Bishop Tabakian, presided. Bishop Tabakian, at the time, was the highest ranking Armenian Church official in the Western U.S. Another example of such gatherings even more revealing of a Dashnak-JCAG/ARA association was one held in January 1984 in New Jersey for the "five heroes" of the assault on the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, on 27 July 1983. After a memorial service in Saints Vartanantz Church, and candle-lighting ceremony during which an Armenian Boy Scout Troop placed the Armenian flag before a picture of each JCAG/ARA commando, the 400 attendees listened to a series of speeches. In one, the representative of the Dashnak-affiliated Armenian Relief Society of North America stated that those in attendance were there to recognize the act of "our five heroic youths." In another, a Dashnak official told the audience, "We should not be grieved by the martyrdom of these boys. . . . Now is the time for sustained struggle."⁷

Finally, in addition to the foregoing, an incident in 1976 served to move the allegation of association between The Dashnak Party and JCAG/ARA from inferential to evidentiary in quality. On 27 May, an explosion destroyed the Dashnak Party Headquarters in Paris and the building in which it was housed, the Armenian Cultural Center. French investigators searching the rubble found, in addition to the body of the Lebanese-Armenian bomb maker, leaflets authored by the JCAG. The leaflets took responsibility not only for two assassinations in France and Austria already carried out by the JCAG, but another attack in Turkey that had not yet occurred.⁸

Political Program

The Dashnak Party was formed in 1890 by the joining together of a number of Armenian groups into a "Federation." The fact that most of the component groups were from Russia, and that two of the early leaders were active members of the Russian revolutionary group Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), accounts for the prominence given socialist principles in the Dashnak program.

In essence, the Dashnak leadership has considered itself to be the government in exile of the nation of Armenia, and the Armenians of the diaspora to be the citizens of that nation. In its manifesto as it came into being, the Party declared a "people's war against the

Turkish Government," saying that Armenians would no longer tolerate the Turkish-and-Kurdish-inspired excesses of 19th Century Turkey. The Armenian, declared The Manifesto, had "resolved to defend his rights, his property, his honor and family." Now, as then, the highest objective of the Dashnak Party is an independent, undivided nation of Armenia.⁹

With little exception, the Dashnak Program, first published in 1892, has remained constant. After an introduction predicting "the ultimate victory of the exploited working class over the exploiting ruling class," and obligatory references to a cooperative comprising government officials, the clergy, "capitalist-usurers," and the nobility, the program becomes more instructive. The explicit purpose of the program is to achieve "the political and economic freedom of Turkish Armenians by means of rebellion." The demands in the program, and the means listed by which it would be effected, illustrate clearly the key role played by Russian-born revolutionaries in drafting the Dashnak Program:

1. The future democratic government of free Armenia, serving the interests of the general public, shall of course be established by the vote of all adults, based on the principle of a free and nondiscriminated electorate. In order to truly protect these rights, the principle of free election must be extended more and more from the central government to the peasants of the remotest province.
2. The strictest provisions for the security of life and labor.
3. Equality of all nationalities and creeds before the law.
4. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly.
5. Give land to those who have none and guarantee the tiller the opportunity to benefit from the land.
6. The amount of all taxes should be decided according to the ability to pay and according to communal principles which for centuries have been deeply rooted in our people.
7. Eliminate all forced and unpaid labor . . .
8. Eliminate the military exemption tax and establish conscription according to the locality and needs of the time.
9. Assist in every manner the intellectual progress of the people. Make education compulsory.
10. Assist the industrial progress of the people by giving them modern methods of production based on the principle of communal enterprise, and assist them in the methods of increasing exports.
11. Assist in strengthening the communal principles of the peasants

and artisans, by advancing those communal establishments and methods which have appeared on the soil of Armenia as a result of local and historic influences. Broaden the area of such communal establishments, from the quarter to the village, to the province, and then to the whole country; in that way, at the same time, safeguard each member of society from the disasters of nature and the mishaps of everyday life.

The setting forth by the Dashnaks of the means by which its affiliated bands would achieve the Program's goals are also instructive; they even include an explicit reference to the Party's intent to "terrorize" segments of society. Specifically, the Dashnaks planned:

1. To propagandize for the principles of the Dashnaktsuthiun and its objectives, based upon an understanding of, and sympathy with, the revolutionary work.
2. To organize fighting bands, to work with them in regard to the above-mentioned problems, and to prepare them for activity.
3. To use every means, by word and deed, to elevate the revolutionary activity, and spirit of the people.
4. To use every means to arm the people.
5. To organize revolutionary committees and establish strong ties among them.
6. To investigate the country and people and supply constant information to the central organ of the Dashnaktsuthiun.
7. To organize financial districts.
8. To stimulate fighting and to terrorize government officials, informers, traitors, usurers, and every kind of exploiter.
9. To protect the peaceful people and the inhabitants against attacks by brigandes.
10. To establish communications for the transportation of men and arms.
11. To expose government establishments to looting and destruction.¹⁰

On one key point, national independence, the Dashnak Party has changed from time to time, to better fit the issue to existing circumstances. At first, somewhat surprisingly given the tone of the Manifesto, the Program, and the methods, the Dashnaks actually did not push for national independence from Turkey, opting instead for economic and political freedom, in order to achieve peace within Turkey. That stance remained unaltered, at least publicly, for almost thirty years.

As noted in an earlier chapter, seizing on the opportunity presented by the geo-political confusion following the defeat of Turkey in World War I, the Dashnaks declared on 28 May 1918 that the Russian portion of "Armenia" was an independent nation. The declaration followed the defeat by a 12,000-man Armenian army of a Turkish force estimated at three times that number. Just over two years later, on 10 August 1920, The Republic of Armenia was one of the signatories, along with Turkey, of the Treaty of Sevres. A total of 40,000 square miles of former Turkish territory from five Armenian areas were declared by President Woodrow Wilson on 22 November 1920 to be part of the new nation of Armenia. Just one week later, with Turkish forces advancing toward the capital city of Yerevan, a Communist revolution also broke out, effectively ending the Dashnak's ability to administer the region. The Dashnaks were forced to accede to two agreements on 2 December 1920. In a humiliating reversal of fortunes, they signed, reportedly at gunpoint, a "peace" treaty with Turkey that annulled the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres. In addition, the Dashnak Party assented to the proclamation by the Soviet Union of the incorporation into the Soviet Union of the Armenian Republic.¹¹ Only six months later, however, the Dashnaks, along with leaders of the Azerbaizhan, Georgian, and Daghestan areas also taken into the USSR, signed a document denouncing the forcible inclusion of the areas in the USSR and again proclaimed their independence. How deep the anti-Soviet hatred ran was evident even thirteen years later. On Christmas Eve, 1933, in full view of the congregation of Holy Cross Armenian Church in New York City, Dashnak assassins stabbed to death the presiding Archbishop. His "crime" had been to express support for the concept of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, anathema to the Dashnaks.¹²

At the Twentieth Party Congress, in 1972 in Vienna, the Dashnaks were finally able to shift the emphasis placed on the long-standing, anti-Soviet "plank" in the Party's platform. The shift was made possible, in part, by the deaths of the former leaders of the Armenian SSR. At that point, having declared Turkey (and, secondarily, the United States) as the primary foe, the stage was set for the 1975 entry of the JCAG/ARA.¹³

JCAG/ARA Organization

A combination of power struggles within the parent ARF and revelations by ASALA in the early to mid 1980s added to what was already known of the workings of the JCAG/ARA, its leadership, and organization.

At the top of the Dashnak organization, since the end of World

War I, has been "The Bureau." This Bureau, of five to eight members, exercises near-total power within the highly centralized Dashnak Party.¹⁴ On a number of occasions, the Bureau has exercised that power through expulsion, and even stronger measures such as the killing of the Archbishop detailed above.

Because Lebanon has been probably the key location in the Armenian diaspora, all of the other members of the Bureau were Lebanese in the time of the JCAG/ARA, except for one member from the Western U.S. and one from Iran.¹⁵ Lebanon's reputation as a haven for peoples persecuted on religious grounds resulted in an Armenian community granted Lebanese citizenship and actually guaranteed representation in the government of Lebanon. Again seizing an opportunity, the Dashnak Party has exerted a high degree of control over the cultural, religious, and political processes within the Lebanese-Armenian community. Since 1953, for example, all parliamentary seats reserved for the Armenian communities have been held solely by Dashnak Party members.¹⁶

The Bureau was, during the time of the JCAG/ARA campaign, headed by Hrair Maroukhian, an Iranian-born Armenian businessman operating out of Athens, Greece. Other known members of The Bureau have included Sarkis Zeitlian, Abraham "Apo" Ashjian, and Sarkis Aznavourian of Lebanon. Ashjian is said to have been the one time head of the Justice Commandos.¹⁷ In another display of the evident willingness of the Dashnak Party to discipline its members, Ashjian, despite his rank and position within the party, reportedly was executed as a result of a disagreement with Maroukhian and Zeitlian over whether to continue anti-Turkish attacks within the U.S. In 1975, there was certainly no internal disagreement discernible in the decision to stem the flow of young males to ASALA.

The Beginnings of JCAG/ARA

Attacks under the JCAG/ARA name began on 22 October 1975, following just nine months after the first attack claimed by ASALA—the 20 January 1975 bombing of the World Council of Churches offices in Beirut.¹⁸ Considering that a certain amount of time must have been consumed in an organizational debate over whether to begin attacks, by the selection and training of the commandos, and by the careful, extensive surveillance of the target that became the hallmark of most of the JCAG/ARA attacks, nine months was not an inordinately long period of time. It should be remembered also that the preparations for a second attack, the assassination of the Turkish Ambassador and his chauffeur on 24 October 1975 in Paris, were simultaneously underway,

evidencing a high degree of organizational capability from the beginning. Including attacks carried out under the name of the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) beginning on 14 July 1983,¹⁹ JCAG/ARA incidents continued until November of 1986, taking the lives of at least twenty Turkish diplomats and family members.

Modus Operandi

In contrast to ASALA, which clearly favored explosive devices in its attacks, JCAG/ARA exhibited a preference for firearms. Although the JCAG/ARA used explosive devices in some of its operations, the hallmark or the "signature" of its attacks was the gunman or gunmen stepping off the curb at an intersection in a large city, firing round after round into a Turkish official and/or family member in an auto. Fully two thirds of the Turkish diplomats assassinated between 1975 and 1982, fourteen of twenty one, were attacked while slowing down at an intersection.²⁰ In a two-man operation, when one commando fired at his victim(s) through the vehicle's windshield, the other usually approached from the side rear, on many occasions getting so close that the victim(s) had powder burns on the clothing and/or skin. Commandos favored handguns with large magazines, or submachineguns, most of which had had the serial numbers removed. When the operation was complete, the commando(s) sometimes placed a small piece of cloth with a JCAG/ARA symbol on or near the victim, generally left the weapon(s) at the scene so as not to be seen with it, and discarded outer garments while running a preplanned escape route.²¹ Some of the clearest examples of this type of attack occurred in the United States and Canada, including the aforementioned assassination in Los Angeles of the Consul General on 28 January 1982 by Hampig Sassounian and Krikor Saliba. This style of attack continued even after the change of name from the JCAG to the ARA, with the first attack claimed under the name of the ARA being the 14 July 1983 assassination of Dursun Aksoy, the Administrative Attache at the Turkish Embassy in Brussels.²²

There were exceptions to the demonstrated preference for firearms. On 8 July 1979, for example, explosive devices were detonated by the JCAG/ARA at the office of the Turkish Labor Attache, the Turkish Bureau of the OECD, and at a Turkish Tourism Information Office, all in Paris.²³ Similarly, the Turkish Consulate in Los Angeles, California, was bombed by the JCAG/ARA on 20 November 1981.²⁴ In June 1984, toward the end of the wave of JCAG/ARA attacks, the Trade and Labor Attache at the Turkish Embassy in Vienna was assassinated by the explosion of probably a remotely controlled

device.²⁵ JCAG/ARA explosive devices were more reliable than those of ASALA, with a clock as a timer, a moderate amount of explosive material, and a switch for arming the device.²⁶

The clearest departure from the style of JCAG/ARA attack typified by the gunman/gunmen with a pistol was the one in which operatives took and held Turkish "territory"—diplomatic representations. The first of this type, almost two years after the 24 September 1981 ASALA takeover of the Turkish Consulate in Paris,²⁷ was the somewhat successful assault by the ARA on the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal on 27 July 1983.²⁸ The five-man commando used one of the three cars they had rented in Lisbon to break through the gate and gain entry to the Turkish compound at 11:00 AM.²⁹ The five then attempted to advance on their primary target, the Chancery building, using submachineguns and carrying grenades. Turkish security guards, tipped off by an alert Portuguese guard who recognized one of the commandos' cars from the previous day when they surveilled the embassy grounds, killed one of the commandos. The remaining four commandos retreated down the driveway and seized the Ambassador's residence, occupied at that point by the wife and children of the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). An explosion occurred at approximately 12:15 PM, blowing the DCM's wife into the courtyard, injuring her so severely that she would later die. The DCM's children were able to escape the residence in the aftermath of the explosion. One of the commandos, apparently spotting a Portuguese security agent entering the DCM's residence at about 1:50 PM, touched off a tremendous explosion that killed all four of the remaining members of the commando unit and the Portuguese security agent. The attack, although it did generate publicity (more of it in the Dashnak-controlled press than in general) probably did not achieve its aims. The commandos obviously intended to take the Turkish Embassy itself, not the DCM's residence to which they were driven in the firefight. The end of the incident was also premature, judging by the two cars filled with food and explosives with which the commandos had entered the compound.³⁰

The second operation of this type and the last attack by the ARA to meet with any success, was carried out against the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, on 12 March 1985. Following an assault conducted in a manner that indicated a fairly significant amount of preparation, a rather confused, somewhat ineptly conducted hostage-and-barricade situation culminated in the surrender of the commandos after four hours. The three commandos used a combination of a rented U-Haul van and a ladder to scale the wrought iron fence of the embassy and gain entry to the grounds. A Canadian Pinkerton contract guard was

killed by the commandos, but first managed to activate alarms that alerted both the embassy staff and Ottawa Police Headquarters. After killing the guard, the three commandos removed the embassy's front door in a manner that bodes ill for Turkish security in the future: in a carbon copy of a police SWAT team, the three emplaced an explosive charge, laid out fuse cord, took cover, and blew the locks off the door. Inside, the commandos continued their SWAT-team-like movements and tactics. They were equipped with hand grenades, pistols, shotguns and ample ammunition; they used the shotguns to remove locks on interior doors blocking their advance; overlapping fields of fire were calculated and arranged; ammunition was placed strategically to aid in more rapid reloading; hand grenades were found placed near stairwells, probably in anticipation of counterterrorist forces' entry routes.³¹

There are several possible motivations for the use of the hostage-and-barricade tactic. First, it may have represented a desire on the part of the JCAG/ARA leadership to at least be perceived to have moved beyond being merely a terrorist group. By using as many as five commandos in an operation, in effect making it a small-unit attack, the JCAG/ARA could claim to have made the transition from terrorism to a form of low-intensity conflict. As a corollary, the five-man JCAG/ARA assault on the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon in July 1983 went ASALA one better than their four-man takeover of the Turkish Consulate in Paris in September 1981, and represented a stark contrast to the vast majority of ASALA attacks. Another factor may have been the desire to use a variety of attacks in order to keep the Turkish counterterrorist apparatus off balance.

Only one other operation is known to have been attempted by commandos suspected of affiliation with the Dashnaks, an abortive one in the building housing the Turkish Consulate General in Melbourne, Australia in November 1986. One of the commandos, Hargob Levonian, was blown to bits trying to place or arm a four-kilo explosive device beneath a recently purchased vehicle. His accomplice, a pizza cook named Levon Demirian who was pre-booked on a flight to Beirut, was arrested later, convicted of complicity in the attempted bombing and sentenced to life in prison. The attack was claimed by the previously unknown Greek-Armenian-Bulgarian Front.³²

Recruitment

Once having taken the step of creating an outlet for the fervent anti-Turkish sentiment among younger Armenians in the diaspora, the ARF, with its roots deep into that diaspora, probably never lacked for

recruits. The worldwide Armenian community is a highly developed network of organizations—cultural, religious, fraternal, social, and humanitarian/ benevolent—providing a rich and continuing supply of potential recruits. In addition, the Armenian nuclear family, particularly the extended family with one or more members who survived the 1915 massacres, is known to have been a source of JCAG/ARA commandos.

If it can be said that Armenian youth wanted to be where the "action" was, the corollary is that the ARF wanted to be where the Armenian youth were. A particularly concentrated source of potential commandos was the Armenian Youth Federation (AYF), a group focused on maintenance of the Armenian cultural identity through sports competition. All five JCAG members convicted of explosives possession in the October 1982 attempt to bomb the Turkish Consulate in Philadelphia are known to have been AYF members.³³ Probably that same California AYF chapter had as a member Hampig Sassounian, now serving a life sentence in California as the convicted JCAG assassin of Turkish Consul Kemal Arikan.³⁴

The period following the 27 July 1983 JCAG/ARA assault on the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, provided additional insight into the role of the family and the community as recruiters. All five of the commandos grew up in the traditional Armenian Quarter of Beirut, Bourj Hammoud. All around them, even the walls of buildings proclaimed and reinforced anti-Turkish hatred—"We will never forget the blood of our martyrs' fatherland;" "Turks, you will account for your crimes." The fathers of two of the commandos, Vatche Daghlian and Setrag Ajemian, illustrate clearly the effect that parental influence can have. Ajemian's father is quoted as saying, "I always told my children all about the Turks. I always encouraged the nationalist feeling in them. I wouldn't object if my other children follow Setrak's example." Daghlian's father, in the same vein, stated, "Even if I knew beforehand what he was doing, I would have kissed him on the forehead and said, 'God bless you, my son'." Ajemian's father is also quoted as claiming that one hundred seventeen members of his family were massacred by Ottoman Turkish forces.³⁵ Finally, the effect on the Armenian Boy Scouts at the memorial service and candle-lighting ceremony for the "Lisbon Five" detailed earlier must have been a vivid, lasting impression. With an environment around them that is "rich" in hatred of Turkey, the true number of active JCAG/ARA commandos, if known, would probably be deemed surprisingly low.

Command and Control

The JCAG/ARA hierarchy faced difficulties identical to ASALA's in command and control, and the available evidence is that they overcame them with identical means: The telephone system, couriers, and personal visits by ARF leaders.

The attempt by a California cell of the JCAG to bomb at least the Turkish Consulate, and possibly the Consul, in Philadelphia in October 1982 was a source of considerable detail on the organization's command and control communications system. Members of the cell regularly used the telephone, even in the hours leading up to the planned attack, the tactical phase of the operation. When the courier and another cell member encountered problems getting the improvised explosive device aboard a commercial airliner at Los Angeles International Airport, they placed a series of telephone calls to the cell leader, Vicken Hovsepien, for further instructions. Earlier, in the planning phase of the operation, FBI wiretaps also revealed calls to an "Armenian activist" in Boston, probably indicative of the use of the telephone system for calls between cells. Boston, it was later discovered, was the first planned stop in the transport of the bomb destined for Philadelphia.³⁶

The investigation into the storming of the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, in July 1983 uncovered a detail on JCAG/ARA communication methods. The five commandos used a public telex in Beirut to make their hotel reservations in Lisbon.³⁷

Finally, a Turkish source claimed that an attempt by ranking ARF Bureau member Hrair Maroukhian to enter England in 1984 was for the purpose of relocating the JCAG organization from Athens to Great Britain.³⁸

Use of Other Names

In connection with three operations, all assassinations, the JCAG/ARA is known to have given a name to the commando unit. Its first attack, the 22 October 1975 assassination of the Turkish Ambassador in Vienna, was proclaimed as an action of the "Boldikian Group;" JCAG/ARA announced that the killings of the wife of the Turkish Ambassador to Spain, a retired Ambassador, and their driver, on 2 June 1978 had been carried out by the "Ohannes Kazandjian" Group; finally, the 12 October 1979 murder of the son of the Turkish Ambassador to The Hague was attributed by the JCAG/ARA to the "Kevork Tchavouche" Group. In no known case, however, did the use of names for the commandos appear meant to confuse investigators as to the authorship of

the attack, as ASALA was wont to do; all were claimed by the JCAG/ARA.

Alliances with Other States and Groups

JCAG/ARA, being merely an extension of the highly centralized, tightly controlled Dashnak Party, was not capable of forming alliances on its own. The Dashnak Party, in its self-proclaimed role as the government in exile of The Republic of Armenia, reached or attempted to reach an accommodation with all of the states in which Armenians settled following the 1915 massacres in Turkey; as detailed earlier, the degree of accommodation was the greatest in Lebanon.

The 1982 execution in Beirut of the reputed former head of JCAG/ARA, Apraham "Apo" Ashjian, was said to have been carried out because Ashjian refused to accede to a reported agreement between the Maroukhian/Zeitlian wing of the Dashnak Party and the U.S. Government. The alleged agreement reportedly guaranteed no more JCAG/ARA attacks against Turkish representatives in the U.S. Why the Dashnak Party agreed to such an agreement was not specified.³⁹ That agreement is not the first alleged to have been made between the Dashnak Party and the U.S. Syrian Police reportedly discovered a Dashnak spy network in 1961, working for the American Embassy in Damascus.⁴⁰ Illustrative of the variety of governments with which the Dashnaks reached some form of accommodation is the case of former ARF Bureau member Vahan Papazian. Papazian, one of the original Bureau members, and who died in Beirut in 1973, was said to have been "compromised" by the knowledge of his collaboration with the Nazis of The Third Reich.⁴¹ The highest irony, though, is found in the fact that the Dashnak Party collaborated closely with the Young Turks in overthrowing the Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1908, and maintained the relationship even after the overthrow and the coming to power of the Young Turk government. Strange bedfellows, indeed.

Financial Support

Simply put, the Dashnak Party funded the JCAG/ARA from monies available to the Party from a variety of sources. Viewed as "business undertakings," the attacks perpetrated by JCAG/ARA commandos were not high-cost operations. Even the five-man assault on the Turkish Embassy in Portugal in 1983 could have been done for under \$20,000, from the planning phase through the day of the attack. Dashnak fund raisers are near legendary in their ability to generate

large amounts of money for favored causes. An October 1983 function, for example, raised over \$30,000 for a politician, and less than two months later, the same community raised almost \$100,000.00 for a Presidential candidate.⁴²

Legal expenses for captured commandos probably represented the single most expensive part of "doing business" as a terrorist group. Even there, however, the Dashnak Party went directly to the thousands of individuals in the Armenian diaspora for the funds, as opposed to the Party coffers. As detailed earlier, in the case of the "Lisbon Five," but also for other JCAG/ARA commandos, "Evenings For _____" repeatedly brought in five-and-six-figure sums. Over a quarter of a million dollars was raised for the legal defense of Hampig Sassounian.

Conclusion

Proving again that "Terrorism is theater," a closer look at the relative effectiveness of JCAG/ARA and ASALA provides an interesting contrast to the images portrayed in the media. Millions of people of many nationalities around the world saw, heard, or read of "Hagop Hagopian"—the leader of ASALA. Probably not even many Armenians know of an obscure, Iranian-born Armenian businessman in Athens named Hrair Maroukhian. As of December 1985, though, by one count JCAG/ARA had assassinated twenty Turkish diplomats and/or family members, while ASALA had managed to kill only eight. The grudging praise of the FBI official, stated above, says it best: "When they went to work, somebody usually died."⁴³

Notes

1. Evan Maxwell, "Bomb on the Loose," *Reader's Digest*, May 1986, 158.
2. "Armenian Terrorist Leader, Hagopian, Interviewed," *Milan Panorama* (1 September 1980), 62-65.
3. "Turkish Ambassador in Vienna Assassinated," Vienna Domestic Service in German, 1300 GMT (22 October 1975). "Overview of Armenian Terrorism," *Istanbul Hurriyet* (20 May 1988), 5,15.
4. Hrair Maroukhian denied any personal association with the JCAG/ARA in November 1984: "Top Dashnag Leader Refused Entry into Britain," *Armenian Reporter*, 29 November 1984; also in *The Christian Science Monitor*, 7 January 1981, 22.
5. *Hairenik*, 6 January 1987, 8.
6. Mona Ziade, "Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?" *Monday Morning*, 8 August 1983, 36-37; also in *The Armenian Weekly*, 11 February 1984, 6-7.

7. Heath W. Lowry, "Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Armenian Terrorism: 'Threads of Continuity,'" in *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection* (Ankara University, 1984), 79–80.
8. Yves Ternon, *The Armenian Cause* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1985), 196–197.
9. Hratch Bedoyan, "The Social, Political and Religious Structure of the Armenian Community in Lebanon," *The Armenian Review* 32, (June 1979): 125.
10. Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1963), 167–168.
11. Rouben M. Torossian, *The Contemporary Armenian Nationalist Movement* (San Diego: The United States International University, 1980), 80–87.
12. Michael M. Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986), 55.
13. Ternon, 194.
14. Ternon, 97.
15. Ternon, 195–196.
16. Bedoyan, 119–130.
17. "Top Dashnag Leader Refused Entry into Britain," *Armenian Reporter*, 29 November 1984, 12.
18. "Turkish Ambassador in Vienna Assassinated," E1. (19) ARA Communique dated 20 June 1984, printed in *The Armenian Weekly*, 14 July 1984, 3.
20. Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 228.
21. Karl A. Seger, ed., *Terrorism 1985 Annual* (Knoxville, Tennessee: Corporate Consultants, 1986), 79; also in "Armenians Attack Ottawa Embassy."
22. Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1985), 72; Gunter, 125.
23. Edward F. Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968–1979* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), 856.
24. John L. Scherer, *Terrorism: An Annual Survey* (Minneapolis, Minn.: J.L. Scherer, 1981), 1: 113.
25. Gunter, 62–63, 69.
26. Seger, 80.
27. Gunter, 69, 107; Kurz and Merari, 27; *Le Matin*, 1 October 1985; "The Reality," reported as Part III in *Armenian Reporter*, 24 January 1985, 4; Andrew Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 82, No. 2065 (August 1982): 31; Gerard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance* (London: Zed Press, 1983), 10; Scherer, 1: 93; Scherer, 2: 8, 145; Seger, 87; "Armenian Guerrilla Group Warns it Will Strike Again," *Washington Post*, 27 September 1981, A32–A33.
28. Kurz and Merari, 72; Gunter, 69; Seger, 80.
29. Gunter, 79.

30. Seger, 80–81.
31. Seger, 81–82.
32. "Car Bomb Blast Damages Turkish Consulate," Melbourne Overseas Service in English, 0230 GMT (23 November 1986). "Group Claims Responsibility," Hong Kong AFP in English, 0149 GMT (23 November 1986). "Police Investigate," Melbourne Overseas Service in English, 0830 GMT (24 November 1986). "Hayden Condemns Bombing," Melbourne Overseas Service in English, 0430 GMT (24 November 1986). "Eight Arrested in Turkish Consulate Bombing," (text), Melbourne Overseas Service in English, 0030 GMT (26 November 1986). "One Charged in Bombing," Melbourne Overseas Service in English, 0830 GMT (26 November 1986). "Consulate Bomber Appears in Sydney Courts," Melbourne Overseas Service in English, 0830 GMT (27 November 1986). "Planned Flight to Lebanon," Hong Kong AFP in English, 0245 GMT (27 November 1986).
33. Gunter, 78.
34. Ternon, 199.
35. Ziade, 36–37.
36. Maxwell, 154–156.
37. Gunter, 79.
38. *Armenian Reporter*, 29 November 1984, 12.
39. Gunter, 61.
40. Ternon, 139.
41. Ternon, 140.
42. Gunter, 102–103.
43. Maxwell, 158.

8

The New Armenian Resistance

With the relatively plentiful data available on the Armenian groups, one claimant remains somewhat of a mystery: The New Armenian Resistance (NAR). One after another, existing works theorize that the group was independent, or that it was allied with either ASALA or the JCAG/ARA. Most theorize, based on communiques, that the NAR was a name used by ASALA when ASALA attacked Soviet targets.

In the introductory section of the appendix on Armenian terrorist attacks, the case is made for the "patient accumulation of data on a terrorist group with the objective of assembling all possible pertinent data" as the foundation underlying any serious attempt to study the group's modus operandi. The NAR presents an excellent case study of the value of concentrating group-related information into a single data collection instrument. The findings presented in this chapter are a result of that process.

The attacks attributed to NAR generally begin with reference to a 1977 explosion in a Moscow subway station. In many of the works, the timeline begins with the hangings of three individuals in 1979 for complicity in the 1977 incident. Following the 1977 incident, the NAR is known to have taken responsibility for a series of fourteen attacks, the last noted of which was in 1982. A closer examination of the situation in the Armenian SSR in the 1970s, combined with activities elsewhere in the Armenian diaspora—particularly France—sheds considerable light on the authorship, structure, identity, and connections of the NAR.

The conclusions reached on the NAR in this chapter are at odds with those of others who have examined the Armenian terrorism topic. That is, the NAR, *as a group*, was independent of ASALA, not just another name under which to attack Soviet targets. Individuals from the milieu out of which the NAR arose probably subsequently joined ASALA, at least for a time.

Soviet Armenian Dissidence

To begin with, Armenian dissidence was no stranger to the USSR. As detailed in the chapter on the JCAG/ARA, although Turkey has been the primary declared enemy of Armenian aspirations, the Soviet Union has come in for a considerable share of criticism since 1920. Along with having to sign a "peace" treaty with their hated Turkish enemy that ended the Republic of Armenia, Armenians simultaneously suffered the incorporation of much of their republic into the USSR. After only six months, it will be recalled, the Dashnak Party had joined other exiled dissidents in denouncing the Armenian SSR and reiterated their proclamation of independence. Finally, the long-lasting nature of the resentment against the USSR was illustrated by the killing of a ranking Armenian Church official for merely expressing his support for the *concept* of the Armenian SSR.

The deep-seated resentment lasted beyond the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s as well. In 1966, for example, ongoing Armenian dissident activity culminated in the establishment of the Unified National Party (UNP), or Organization for the Independence of Armenia. The UNP, which subsequently established contacts with other nationalist movements, was, in its early stages, both anti-Russian and anti-Soviet. From the beginning, the Soviet Government reciprocated, taking a hostile stance toward the UNP. In 1969, for example, the 20-year-old leader of the UNP, Barouyr Ayrikian, was arrested after only one year as the UNP leader and sent to one of the infamous Soviet "camps."¹

Unified National Party-Political Program

The UNP stated that its goal was to reestablish the Republic of Armenia on the lands traditionally held to belong to Armenians. That, in turn, was held to be an intermediate stage in a process of reunifying the then-present Armenian SSR with Armenian lands held by Turkey. The UNP stated its intention to establish relations with Armenians throughout the world-wide diaspora. In what must have been viewed by the Soviets as an extremely alarming development, the UNP claimed the right of self-determination for Armenians in the USSR, a "right" expressed in the Soviet Constitution. The UNP called for United Nations forces to secure the borders of the hoped-for Armenian Republic.

The Soviet Government, on hearing of the aspirations of the UNP and its implied constituency, reacted predictably. The KGB was employed to arrest, oversee the trials of, and to incarcerate in excess of fifty UNP members between 1967 and 1975.² It was that background

that created the conditions for emergence of the NAR, much as ASALA emerged from the Palestinian Movement during the same era.

Unified National Party Actions

In an extremely rare action inside the Soviet Union, unknown perpetrators detonated at least one explosive device in the last car of a Moscow subway train on 8 January 1977, killing or wounding approximately 35 people. An eyewitness reported three explosions, and that some of the injured had had their legs blown off. A caller to the French press agency identified the type of explosive used as "plastic."³ Further reports, by so-called "informed sources," stated that Soviet authorities suspected that the bombing was a reaction to KGB house arrests of, among others, members of Helsinki Human Rights Accord monitoring groups.⁴ The bombing most likely was the work of Armenian citizens of the Soviet Union. Evidence for that was provided by the Soviet news agency Tass in a 30 January 1979 announcement of the hangings of three individuals. The one name announced by Tass was Stepan Zadikian, reportedly a UNP member and dissident. The names of the other two men hanged with Zadikian, Hagop Stepanian and Zaven Baghdassarian, were revealed on 3 February by the Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov. That Sakharov, a non-Armenian, knew the names and revealed them indicates not only that a smoothly functioning underground pipeline of dissident-related news existed in the USSR, it also showed clearly that Armenian dissidents were a part of the larger Soviet dissident community. Three more persons, V. Suratikian, M. Suratikian, and A. Mouradian, were arrested in May 1980 and charged with complicity in the January 1977 subway bombing; again, in a governmental warning "signal" to dissidents in the USSR, a UNP member was among those arrested.⁵

The hangings of Zadikian, Stepanian, and Baghdassarian in January 1977 were the first executions carried out by the Soviet state in the Armenian SSR in many years. If the Soviets had hoped that the hangings would lessen the determination of Armenian dissidents where arrests and imprisonment had failed, that hope would prove futile. Three residents of the Armenian SSR organized a group in April 1977 to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki human rights agreements. As had the UNP before it, the monitoring group notified the Supreme Soviet of its fourteen-point program that included the freedoms of "dissemination of information," "religion," and "reunification." One area included in the reunification theme was the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, a precursor of the uprising of 1988. The Soviet reaction to the monitoring group was the same as it had been

earlier to the UNP: a series of arrests, so-called show trials, and sentences to labor camps. This time, however, the response came from the wider Armenian diaspora.

NAR Operations

The NAR perpetrated its first attack, the bombing of a Turkish tourism office in Paris, on 14 May 1977, just nine weeks after the Moscow Subway incident. The "Youth Action Group" also claimed responsibility for the attack. The building's caretaker was slightly injured.⁶ On 3 January 1978, the NAR placed a bomb in the mail box at the home of the Turkish Embassy's Financial Counselor in Brussels, severely damaging his apartment building.⁷ On the same day, the NAR tried to bomb a Turkish Bank in London; the device did not detonate.⁸ An eleven-month hiatus ensued, until the NAR bombed the Turkish Consulate in Geneva, Switzerland, on 6 December 1978, causing extensive property damage. The device, enhanced with bottled gas cylinders, had been secreted in a briefcase.⁹

Over a year passed before the next NAR attack, the "twin" bombings of the British Airways and El Al offices in Rome on 9 December 1979.¹⁰ After less than two weeks, however, the NAR claimed to have assassinated a Turkish Counselor, Yilmaz Colpan, from the Turkish Embassy in Paris. The JCAG/ARA also claimed to have carried out the 22 December 1979 assassination.¹¹ Also on 22 December, the NAR took responsibility for the bombing of the Turkish Airlines office in Amsterdam.¹²

The NAR focused on Belgium and France again just prior to the next hiatus. On 2 February 1980, the Turkish Airlines office in Brussels was bombed by the NAR. The office of the Soviet Airline, Aeroflot, suffered the same fate on the same day, also in Brussels. In Paris on 2 February, the second Soviet target to be hit in one day, the Soviet Embassy's Information Section, was bombed by the NAR. One more attack by the NAR was recorded before a lengthy period during which the NAR is not known to have conducted any attacks. On 19 April 1980, a municipal employee in Marseille found an unexploded rocket on the grounds of the Turkish Consulate in that city.¹³

While the NAR apparently issued two communiques in October 1980 urging the release of imprisoned ASALA members, it was two years before another attack was claimed by the group. Bombings in the FRG on 24 April 1982, against a Turkish store in Dortmund¹⁴ and a Turkish bank in Cologne,¹⁵ were the last two known attacks claimed by the

NAR, under the slightly altered name of the "New Armenian Resistance for the Independence of Armenia."

NAR Political Program

The NAR issued a communique on 30 January 1980, the date chosen to mark the one-year anniversary of the hangings of the three Soviet-Armenian dissidents for the January 1977 Moscow Subway bombing. The expressed theme of the proclamation was "Neither NATO nor Warsaw Pact—National independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity in a reunified, independent, and socialist Armenia." In a somewhat rambling condemnation of Soviet policies, the NAR declared:

The fundamental enemy of the Armenian people is—we could not forget it—fascist Turkey . . . but we could not ignore the anti-Armenian nature of the repression which strikes the patriots in Soviet Armenia. . . . The fact that the USSR supports certain progressive national liberation movements should not deter us from admitting that within its borders, the Soviet Union respects neither the fundamental democratic liberties nor the rights of the people living within those borders. . . . In the case of Armenia, the USSR's behavior is socialist in words but imperialist in facts. . . . The so-called 'friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union'. . . is a mere mask meant to conceal the reality of the Russian yoke that afflicts our country....Armenia is a zone of tensions but also a zone where the interests of American imperialism and Russian social-imperialism force them to come to terms with each other lest they destroy their respective areas of domination. It would be illusory to think that the building of a reunited, independent, and socialist Armenia could be achieved by negotiations between the two superpowers.. . . The road to national unity goes inevitably through the struggle of the people to drive away all the foreign occupation forces from the Armenian soil and through revolutionary struggle to expel their lackeys and allies from eastern and western Armenia.¹⁶

In issuing the communique, and focusing on Soviet repression of Soviet Armenians, the NAR had publicly placed itself squarely on the side of the UNP and its activities within the Soviet Union.

Modus Operandi

The NAR M.O. exhibits several elements quite like that of ASALA. The individual bits of information that are the pieces forming the NAR mosaic were found in a number of books and articles, and were

gathered following NAR attacks in a number of geographically separate locations.

Location

A number of factors suggest strongly that the NAR was centered in France. First, the UNP had contacts with other nationalist movements in the Soviet Union.¹⁷ It is quite likely that, through those other groups, the UNP's contacts reached to Western Europe. It should be remembered that the Dashnak Party was part of the anti-Soviet dissident circles in Western Europe, dating from 1920. That the French-Armenian community had ready access to news of events taking place inside the USSR is clear. In 1973, for example, the Armenian community in Marseille organized demonstrations at the Cannes Film Festival and at the Soviet Consulate in Marseille to protest the imprisonment of the Ukrainian film-maker, Sergei Paradjanov. Paradjanov produced the film "Pomegranate Color" that portrayed the traditional, Church-centered Armenian society threatened by the repressive measures of the Soviet Government. The Defense Committee of the Armenian Cause organized showings of the film in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille.¹⁸

The locations of NAR attacks, centered roughly on France, also are instructive. Of the thirteen attacks known, the largest group (four) were inside France itself. With the exception of one attack in London and one in Amsterdam, all the other NAR-claimed incidents were in nations contiguous to France: two in the FRG; three in Belgium; one in Switzerland; and two in Italy. Even the Netherlands, of course, is easily reached from France across the small corridor of Belgium.

Bits of the "mosaic" from within the Armenian terrorist movement itself lend credence to the circumstantial geographical considerations above. Following the July 1983 schism within ASALA, the ASALA faction headed by Mujahed accused Ara Toranian, the French-Armenian activist (leader of France's Armenian National Movement and former ASALA ally) of bombing the offices of Aeroflot in Brussels in 1980.¹⁹ The target, the location, and the timing coincide precisely with the 2 February 1980 attack claimed by the NAR. Finally, and also arising out of the schism within ASALA, "The Reality" disclosed that by 1980, some "comrades" in France had "begun to cooperate more closely with ASALA," and that, in 1981, "Comrades from the 'New Armenian Resistance' in France joined ASALA's ranks."²⁰

Weapons

With a single, possible exception, the instrument in all of the known attacks claimed by the NAR was an explosive device. In one case a rocket was used instead of an improvised explosive device. Like ASALA, not all of the NAR's devices detonated as planned. On 3 January 1978, a bomb placed in a Turkish Bank in London failed to detonate; the unexploded rocket found on 19 April 1980 on the grounds of the Turkish Consulate in Marseille represented another "failure" on the part of the NAR; the device discovered in the Turkish Bank in Cologne, FRG, one of the final appearances of the NAR, also did not detonate. In another similarity indicative of "cross-fertilization" of ideas with ASALA, at least one NAR bomb resembled at least one ASALA device. The NAR briefcase left at the Turkish Consulate in Geneva on 6 December 1979 contained an explosive charge that had been enhanced with gas cylinders. The effect of the ASALA bomb that took eight lives and wounded 54 other people at Paris's Orly Airport on 15 July 1983 also had been enhanced with gas cylinders.²¹

The sole assassination reportedly claimed by the NAR²² was that of Turkish Tourism Counselor Yilmaz Colpan on a Paris street on 22 December 1979. In addition to a claim of responsibility by the JCAG "shortly after" the killing, suggesting foreknowledge, the reported use of a submachinegun, and the fact that the incident was an assassination suggest that "news travels fast" in Paris in general.²³ It would seem more likely that news travels fast in the Armenian community in France as well, and that the NAR took advantage of a JCAG attack to add to its own count.

The explicit statement that one NAR attack, on 3 January 1978, took place "before dawn," in conjunction with several other attacks being reported on two successive dates, such as 1 February and 2 February 1980, indicate that the NAR, for the most part, placed its devices at night.

Target Selection

Target selection by NAR also showed similarities to ASALA. Six of the NAR-claimed attacks, almost 43% of the total, were against airlines or "tourism" offices, later a frequent ASALA target. Two NAR attacks, 6 December 1978 in Geneva, 19 April 1980 in Marseille, were aimed at consulates, normally open to the public. Even the one against the Soviet Embassy in Paris on 2 February 1980 was conducted against the facility's "Information Section." Most of the remainder—stores,

banks, a diplomat's home—also were aimed at the relatively "soft" targets in terms of security measures in place.

Conclusions

The various factors detailed above support the following conclusions: First, the original attack, 8 January 1977 in a Moscow subway, was carried out by Soviet-Armenian dissidents, at least some of whom were UNP members, not by the NAR, and certainly not related in any way to ASALA. Following that attack, links to Armenian communities outside the USSR, particularly those in France, were established, then strengthened.

Secondly, an organizational relationship with ASALA is not likely in 1977. It should be remembered that ASALA was relatively quiescent during this period, Mujahed having been wounded in 1976 in the inter-Palestinian strife and out of Lebanon recuperating until some time in 1977. Further, NAR attacks in 1978 and 1979, when superimposed on a chronology of events associated with Soviet-Armenian dissidents, show every evidence of relating to hunger strikes, arrests, and executions rather than to an ASALA-directed agenda. Also, the two attacks on Soviet installations both occurred on 2 February 1980, before a closer association of NAR and ASALA. None were carried out after that date, again indicative of an NAR agenda vice ASALA's use of another name.

It appears, then, that rather than ASALA using the NAR name to attack Soviet targets, the NAR existed in fact, then joined ASALA and submerged its own agenda until dissatisfaction with Mujahed grew in 1982. NAR attacks continued into April 1980, then stopped for two years, until April 1982. Also in 1980, French-Armenians began "cooperating" with ASALA, and the French-Armenian bomb-maker, Pierre Gulumian, joined ASALA after May 1980.

No NAR-claimed attacks are known to have occurred after April 1980, when the closer association with ASALA was formalized, despite the continuation of an anti-Armenian campaign by the Soviet Government, until April 1982 when a renamed NAR surfaced in the FRG. During this period, the ASALA agenda probably was paramount.

Notes

1. Yves Ternon, *The Armenian Cause* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1985), 186–187.
2. Ternon, 187.

3. "Moscow Subway Explosion," Paris AFP in English, 1535 GMT (10 January 1977).
4. "Moscow Subway Bomb May be Reaction to Arrests," Hamburg DPA in German, 1502 GMT (11 January 1977).
5. Ternon, 190.
6. "Unrelated Bombings Reported in Paris, Corsica," Paris Domestic Service in French, 0600 GMT (15 May 1977).
7. Edward F. Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), 767.
8. Ternon, 201.
9. Ternon, 201.
10. Judith Perera, "Young Armenians: 'Armed Struggle is Our Answer,'" *Middle East*, June 1981, 24.
11. "Turkish Embassy Employee Shot in Paris," Paris AFP in English, 1159 GMT (22 December 1979).
12. Ternon, 201.
13. Perera, 24.
14. Ternon, 202.
15. John L. Scherer, *Terrorism: An Annual Survey*, (Minneapolis, Minn.: J.L. Scherer, 1981), 2: 26.
16. Ternon, 202.
17. Ternon, 186.
18. Ternon, 190.
19. Gunter, 52.
20. "The Reality," (Part II) *Armenian Reporter*, 17 February 1985, 2.
21. Erol Ozkoray, "Armenian Terrorism From Yesterday to Today," *Istanbul Hurriyet*, (20 May 1988).
22. Ternon, 201.
23. "Turkish Embassy Employee Shot in Paris."

9

The Prospects

At one time or another, usually when fighting for their lives in reaction to oppression, the Armenian people have found themselves in varying modes of conflict for almost two millenia. In the last 140 years, four waves of conflict involving Armenians have occurred—the 1860s, the 1890s, the 1920s, and 1975–1986. Each wave has appeared in response to perceived oppression and/or the lack of progress in furthering "Hai Tahd," the Armenian Cause.

The "recipe" for previous waves has been a simple one: (1) the non-resolution of the cause; (2) a stimulus, such as in 1915; (3) a catalytic person or group. The key question is whether or not we have seen the last wave.

As to whether or not the Armenian Cause has been resolved, essentially nothing has changed since the last wave appeared in 1975:

- Several U.S. Congressional resolutions judged to be pro-Armenian/anti-Turkish have been defeated;
- Western Armenia is still eastern Turkey;
- Eastern Armenia is still the ASSR;
- In a virtual replay of the events leading up to the 1977 Moscow Subway bombing, a Soviet-Armenian dissident, and member of the National Liberation Party of Armenia was flown out of the USSR to Ethiopia under KGB guard on 11 August 1988;
- Efforts to include exhibits on the 1915 Armenian massacres in the Washington, D.C. Holocaust Memorial were defeated.

If anything, the situation is worse:

- Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan have rallied and rioted in response to oppression by the Muslim majority;

- The earthquake in the ASSR devastated the area, leaving as many as half a million Armenian families homeless;
- Armenians in Iran have been persecuted in the Khomeini regime's attempts to create a uniformly Islamic nation;
- The Lebanese Civil War daily threatens the lives of thousands of Lebanese-Armenian families.

As to whether or not the typical modern Armenian person retains the determination of his/her preceding generations, the answer apparently is, "no doubt." The reader will recall from the chapter on the events of 1915 the account of Kerop Bedoukian in "Some of Us Survived." The strongest-willed among the hundreds of thousands, in terms of determination to survive, were the women. Seventy three years later, in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in the ASSR on 7 December 1988, one finds great similarity in the reaction of an Armenian woman trapped for eight days in the rubble with her five-year-old daughter. Without any other liquid to quench the child's thirst, the woman intentionally bled herself to provide moisture to the child. The story proved to be not atypical, as, over and over, people "miraculously" were pulled alive from the rubble. The real miracle is to be found in the age-old determination of the Armenian people to survive.

Beyond implicit circumstantial indications, the explicit words of the author of "The Reality" are available as indicators of the intent of ASALA-RM to carry on:

- "With the birth of ASALA-RM a new era in the yet developing Armenian patriotic struggle has begun."
- "Through understanding the mistakes of the past we can put our future work on stronger foundations, and thus we will be able to surpass it and build the strong national liberation movement needed to realize the patriotic aspirations of our people. It is the intention of the ASALA-RM to do exactly this."
- "It is our intention . . . develop the struggle. . . . we shall approach further military action. . ."

The prospects, then, for the reappearance of Armenian terrorism must be assessed as "probable." In the opinion of this writer, the question is not whether, but where and when the next wave will come. On one side of the equation/dispute is a cultural group that expends an enormous amount of its time, energy, and funds perpetuating hatred of its perceived enemies, demanding reparation and real estate. The group begins instilling a cultural awareness in its preschoolers,

maintains that awareness all through their lives, even tape-recording interviews of survivors of the 1915 massacres so as not to lose the memory. Small, secretive subsets of that cultural group have killed and wounded hundreds of people.

On the other side of the equation, there is no shortage of perceived "enemies." The primary focus of the next wave, surprisingly, might not be Turkey. To the traditionally hated Turk can now be added Iran and the Soviet Union, the latter's pace of reform being too slow for the ASSR. Recent ethnic unrest inside the Soviet Union, particularly in Azerbaijan, could presage a rebirth of the feelings that resulted in the 8 January 1977 Moscow Subway bombing. In fact, an organization calling itself the "Socialist Nationalist Movement" detonated an explosive device in a trash can outside the Soviet Airline office on 18 November 1988, injuring five people. Interestingly, ASALA secreted its bombs in trash cans on at least three occasions: 5 October 1979; 19 July 1981; and 9 July 1982. The 1979 attack also was against an airline office, and both the 1981 and 1982 attacks were explicitly claimed as "protests."

No one need still wonder if the wish for revenge remains strong in the Armenian diaspora. Tens of innocent people were killed in the 1975-1986 wave, and hundreds more were wounded. As Levon Ekmekjian, surviving commando of the Ankara airport massacre, stated, though, "It wasn't enough!" There is little doubt that trained, experienced, dedicated members of the Armenian terrorist movement have every intention of at least trying to revive their struggle.

APPENDIX A

Attacks

Introduction

The mere listing of attacks masquerading as a "data base" has rightly been criticized. The patient accumulation of data on a terrorist group, on the other hand, with the objective of assembling all possible pertinent data, is the foundation underlying any serious attempt to study the group's modus operandi. It is analogous to the artisan's patient placing of one piece after another into a mosaic, until the overall image emerges and is finally clear. It is the essence of the effort characterized widely as "good police work." It is only when a "distillation" of diverse accounts is completed, for example, that a shift in tactics becomes apparent. Similarly, a greater ability to forecast attacks results from an aggregation of the details of previous incidents. Finally, the opportunity, at least, to thwart attacks is present only when counterterrorism organizations achieve a fundamental understanding of the group. The group's actions can serve as an effective starting point.

This appendix contains the details of attacks (as used herein, the term "attacks" includes attempted attacks as well) known or suspected to have been carried out "in connection with" Armenian terrorism. As is the case with violence associated with other ethnic groups, there is a constellation of violence. That is, the attacks were:

1. perpetrated by Armenians against non-Armenian targets
2. perpetrated by Armenians against Armenian targets, either intentionally or unintentionally.
3. perpetrated by a non-Armenian group against those known or suspected to be associated with Armenian terrorism
4. perpetrated by Armenians, as a "favor" to non-Armenians, on a target chosen by non-Armenians
5. perpetrated by non-Armenians, as a "favor" to an Armenian group, on a target chosen by Armenians

In some cases the perpetrating Armenian group clearly wished to assume responsibility for the attack, in an effort to garner publicity for "The Armenian Cause," and so no doubt exists as to the perpetrator(s). In other cases, for a variety of reasons, no claim of responsibility by Armenians is known to have taken place; however, some aspect(s) of the modus operandi indicates Armenian involvement. A somewhat surprising amount of information exists on Armenian terrorist attacks, more than the casual reader would believe at first. A variety of sources pieced together, as can be seen in this appendix, provides a much more complete picture of modus operandi, including details that

the groups would rather keep from the public and from police and security organizations; this includes facts such as members' identities. One outstanding example: it is in the 1988 accounts of Mujahed's death¹ that his involvement in a February 1976 assassination is finally established.

The including of a standard data collection instrument for every attack is an effort to increase the utility of the data. In the cases where not all the desired information is known, the field heading is shown, followed by the blank field; other researchers may then use this work as a springboard, filling in additional data as they become available. The data fields reflect the fundamental journalistic questions—Who, Whom, What, When, Where, How, and Why; the source(s) have been noted in order to aid other researchers, and the "Comments" field is included to draw attention to relevant items.

The attacks are presented in straight chronological order, regardless of the group that carried out the attack. One benefit of this style is that it enables the researcher to see how the operations of one group affected in some way those of another group. Changes in strategy/tactics over time become clearer also. A chronological approach aids in establishing responsibility in the case of attacks not claimed under the name of the two major groups by portraying a pattern(s) in the modus operandi. The date sequence used is year/month/day.

Notes

1. "ASALA Leader Hagop Hagopian's Assassination Still Unclaimed," *Armenian Reporter*, 12 May 1988, 1.

DATE: 21/03/15

TIME: Morning

TARGET COUNTRY: Ottoman Turkey

VICTIM(S): Government: Former Ottoman Minister of Interior Talaat Pasha (Talaat Bey), living in Berlin under pseudonym Ali Salih Bey, killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Germany (pre-FRG)

CITY: Berlin (No. 4 Hardenbergstrasse)

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: Nemesis (Dashnag/Tashnak-sponsored)

COMMANDO(S): Soghomon Tehlirian (survivor of genocide)

WEAPON(S): Pistol

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Arm. Terr. Campaign-Gunter; 19th & 20th-Lowry; Torossian, 227; Corsun-Aug 82, 32; Chaliand, 93; Temon, 100; Laqueur, 228.

COMMENTS: Tehlirian had Talaat under surveillance for two weeks; arrested at the scene—tried by Berlin City Court on 2 & 3 June 1921—Acquitted.

DATE: 21/07/19

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Ottoman Turkey

VICTIM(S): Military: Azerbaijani leader Khan Jihanshir (Intended)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Constantinople

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: Nemesis

COMMANDO(S): Missak Torlakian & Hovanness Amadouni

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Temon, 101

COMMENTS: Attempt was unsuccessful; intended target not able to be located in time.

DATE: 73/././..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY:

VICTIM(S): GOVERNMENT:

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: Front for Armenian Liberation

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 177.

COMMENTS: Attack took place between 73/02/12 recall of Turkish Ambassador and 73/04/08 "Haratch" article denouncing the attacks (see also attack on Turkish Embassy in same period).

DATE: 73/././..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Embassy

PERPETRATING GROUP: Front for Armenian Liberation

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Teargas

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 177.

COMMENTS: Attack took place between 73/02/12 recall of Turkish Ambassador and 73/04/08 article in "Haratch" denouncing the attacks (see also attack on Turkish Airlines Office in same time period).

DATE: 73/04/04

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Government:

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Consulate General

PERPETRATING GROUP:

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Teargas grenade(s)

SOURCE(S): Mickolus 68-79, 382 (#1512).

COMMENTS: See also attack on Turkish Airlines Office in Paris this date.

DATE: 73/04/04

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP:

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Teargas Grenade(s)

SOURCE(S): Mickolus 68-79, 383 (#1513).

COMMENTS: See also attack on Consulate General in Paris this date.

DATE: 73/10/26

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): None

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: US

CITY: New York City

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Information Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: Yanikian Commandos

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Smoke Bomb

SOURCE(S): Mickolus 68-79, 416 (#1705).

COMMENTS: A parcel containing a smoke bomb and a letter addressed to the Turkish Consulate received by the Information Office in New York; bomb did not detonate.

DATE: 74/02/06

TIME: 1030 local

TARGET COUNTRY: Japan

VICTIM(S): Ambassador Ryoko Ishikawa; Consul; First Secretary; Second Secretary; Palestinian Woman Receptionist; others; Total of 16 held hostage

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Kuwait

CITY: Kuwait Capital City

FACILITY TYPE: Embassy

PERPETRATING GROUP: Japanese Red Army/JRA; PFLP; Sons of the Occupied Land

COMMANDO(S): Six, led by Mujahed/Hagop Hagopian (See Nov/Dec 83 "Armenia")

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Kyodo; Reuter; Kuwait Domestic Service; Cairo MENA; Scherer 1981, 181; Mickolus 68-79, 435 (#1816).

COMMENTS: in 83/11/..-83/12/.. issue of "Hayastan" ("Armenia") Magazine, Mujahed claims to have led this action.

DATE: 75/01/20

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY:

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut

FACILITY TYPE: World Council of Churches Offices

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Corsun-Aug 82, 31; Chaliand, 7; Perera-
ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Ternon, 213.COMMENTS: ASALA's first claimed attack as ASALA; Perera says
there was damage.

DATE: 75/02/20

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): None; Property damage

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA-Prisoner Gourgen Yanikian Group

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Mickolus 68-79, 506 (#2232).

COMMENTS:

DATE: 75/10/22

TIME: 1200 Noon

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Ambassador Danis ("Dennis") Tunaligil killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Austria

CITY: Vienna

FACILITY TYPE: Embassy; Ambassador's Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA (Phone call from "Armenian Liberation Organization")

COMMANDO(S): Three—Boldikian Group

WEAPON(S): Firearm

SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10.01; Pursuing—Gunter, 33; Torossian, 233; Corsun—August 1982, 31; Chaliand, 7; Ankara Domestic Service; Perera—ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Scherer Vol. 2 1983, 145; Mickolus 68–79, 554 (#2441); Ternon, 196; Terr. Profiles, 53; Ford—Polit. Murder, 332; Laqueur, 17.

COMMENTS: Probably the first JCAG attack; four suspects arrested; getaway car—gold Mercedes with an FRG license plate (or a Toyota with Greek plate EA4930); also claimed by the Cypriot EOKA; possibly on Greek (Note residence of Hrair Maroukhian is in Greece) Passports—Denis Sakanos/Theodore Lukidis/Panayote Gormas; FBIS 76/02/18 reports ASALA also claimed this attack.

DATE: 75/10/24

TIME: 1300 local

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Ambassador Ismail Erez (Age 53) and driver
Talip/Salih Yener (Age 23) killed

LOCATION: 300–400 meters from Embassy, at bridge

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Ambassador's auto

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S): Three (says Mickolus) or four

WEAPON(S): Firearm: Pistols; (Mickolus says they were
"Machinegunned")SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01; Pursuing–Gunter, 68; Torossian, 233;
Perera–ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Scherer Vol. 2 1983, 145.COMMENTS: Hit men ran to the subway; also in Mickolus 68–79, 556
(#2448); Mickolus says they were on their way back from a
luncheon at the Austrian Embassy on the left bank/as the car
neared the end of Bir Hakeim Bridge, a gunman on the right fired
his machinegun into the car, killing the Ambassador instantly/a
second gunman on the left killed the driver; the assassins escaped
with a third gunman. Also in Ternon, 196; Terr. Profiles, 53; Ford–
Polit. Murder, 332; Laqueur, 17.

DATE: 75/12/18

TIME: Evening

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut

FACILITY TYPE: Embassy

PERPETRATING GROUP: Probably ASALA (Secret Armenian Army)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Rockets

SOURCE(S): Mickolus 68–79, 569 (#2524).

COMMENTS: Date possibly in error—See 75/12/28 attack on Turkish
"Consulate."

DATE: 76/./..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Istanbul

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Army Vehicle

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 214.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 76/./..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Ankara

FACILITY TYPE: Military base

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 214.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 76/05/17

TIME: 0001-0100

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): None; Device failed to detonate

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: FRG

CITY: Essen

FACILITY TYPE: Consulate

PERPETRATING GROUP:

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Molotov Cocktail/Firebomb

SOURCE(S): Ankara General Service.

COMMENTS: See also attacks in Cologne and Frankfurt same date.

DATE: 76/05/17

TIME: 0001-0100

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): None; Material Damage

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: FRG

CITY: Frankfurt

FACILITY TYPE: Consulate

PERPETRATING GROUP:

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Molotov cocktail/firebomb

SOURCE(S): Ankara General Service.

COMMENTS: See also attacks in Cologne and Essen same date; 27-year-old man and 19-year-old woman arrested.

DATE: 76/05/17 TIME: 0001-0100
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): None; Material Damage
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: FRG
 CITY: Cologne
 FACILITY TYPE: Consulate
PERPETRATING GROUP:
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Molotov cocktail/Firebomb
SOURCE(S): Ankara General Service.
COMMENTS: See also attacks in Frankfurt and Essen same date.

DATE: 76/05/27 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Probably Turkey
VICTIM(S): Commando: "Hagop Hagopian" (See comments) killed;
 probable ARF members injured
LOCATION: Rue Bleue
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: Armenian Cultural Center (Dashnak Party
 Headquarters)
PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA (accidentally)
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Bomb; two other devices defused
SOURCE(S): Ternon-Cause, 196-197.
COMMENTS: Flyers threatening Turkish Diplomats, signed by JCAG,
 found inside building; probably preparations under way for
 attack(s); Kevork Papazian arrested; this "Hagop Hagopian" not
 the ASALA leader.

DATE: 76/05/28 TIME: Night
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): None; Much material damage
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Switzerland
 CITY: Zurich
 FACILITY TYPE: Branch of Turkish Garanzi Bank
PERPETRATING GROUP:
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Ankara Domestic Service; Terr. Profiles, 53.
COMMENTS: See also bombing of Consulate/Office of Labor Attache
 same date in Zurich.

DATE: 76/05/28 TIME: Night
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): None
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Switzerland
 CITY: Zurich
 FACILITY TYPE: Office of Labor Attache
PERPETRATING GROUP:
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Ankara Domestic Service; Terr. Profiles, 53.
COMMENTS: See also bombing of Turkish Bank in Zurich same date.

DATE: 77/01/08

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: USSR

VICTIM(S): Unknown number of injured (probably civilians)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: USSR

CITY: Moscow

FACILITY TYPE: Subway

PERPETRATING GROUP: Possibly Unified National Party

COMMANDO(S): Possibly Stepan Zadikian; Hagop Stepanian; Zaven Baghdassarian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Pursuing-Gunter, 73; Perera-ME Mag 81/06/..; Ternon, 189-190.

COMMENTS: Perera and Ternon say perpetrators hanged in 79/01/.. (Announced by TASS 79/01/30) for bombing on 77/01/08; Perera and Ternon say NAR bombed Aeroflot offices in Brussels and Soviet Embassy in Paris on 80/02/02 to commemorate hangings (see also); Ternon says three more arrested in May 1980 for complicity—A. Mouradian/V. Suratikian/M. Suratikian; Ternon says Zadikian was a member of the Unified National Party, a dissident group.

DATE: 77/03/02

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Attempted assassination of Turkish Military Attache

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 214.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 77/05/14 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): Building Caretaker injured (Civilian)
LOCATION: Champs Elysees
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: Tourism Office
PERPETRATING GROUP: New Armenian Resistance (NAR); Also
 claimed by the Youth Action Group
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Perera–ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Mickolus 68–79, 698 (#3165);
 Ternon, 201.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 77/05/29 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): Five killed and 64 injured, between this attack and the
 Yesilkoy Airport in Istanbul same date (probably civilians)
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Turkey
 CITY: Istanbul
 FACILITY TYPE: Sirkeci Railroad Station
PERPETRATING GROUP: 28th of May (Possibly ASALA)
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Mickolus 68–79, 703 (#3103).
COMMENTS: Second of two attacks in Istanbul in May; 28 May = Date on
 which Armenian Republic was declared in 1918.

DATE: 77/05/..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Istanbul

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: Possibly (ASALA) 28th of May Group)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari.

COMMENTS: One of two in Istanbul in May; 28 May = Date on which
Armenian Republic was declared in 1918.

DATE: 77/05/29

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Five killed and sixty-four injured, including an American
woman (Between this attack and the Sirkeci Train Station in
Istanbul same date) (Civilians)

LOCATION: Luggage Storage Room

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Istanbul

FACILITY TYPE: Yesilkoy Airport

PERPETRATING GROUP: Possibly (ASALA) 28th of May Group)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Mickolus 68-79, 703 (#3103)

COMMENTS: Second of two attacks in Istanbul in May; 28 May = Date on
which Armenian Republic was declared in 1918.

DATE: 77/06/09

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Ambassador Taha Carim (Age 62) killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Italy/Vatican

CITY: Rome/Vatican

FACILITY TYPE: Ambassador's Residence

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S): Tall, Thin, Black-haired

WEAPON(S): Firearm

SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01; Pursuing-Gunter, 68; RM Torossian, 234; Perera ME Mag 81/06/.., Scherer Vol 2 1983, 145; Mickolus 68-79, 705 (#3108); Terr. Profiles, 53; Ternon, 197; Ford-Polit. Murder, 332.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 77/08/22 & 23

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Armenians

VICTIM(S): Government:

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Istanbul

FACILITY TYPE: Armenian Patriarchate, Principal Church, Bezdjian College

PERPETRATING GROUP: Turkish backlash at attacks on Turkish people and facilities

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bombs

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 197

COMMENTS:

DATE: 78/01/05 & 06 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Armenians
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Turkey
 CITY: Istanbul
 FACILITY TYPE: Patriarchate & Principal Church
PERPETRATING GROUP: Backlash against attacks on Turkish people &
 facilities
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bombs
SOURCE(S): Ternon, 197.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 78/03/11 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): Government: Attempt on former Prime Minister Ecevit
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Switzerland
 CITY: Bern
 FACILITY TYPE:
PERPETRATING GROUP:
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S):
SOURCE(S): RM Torossian, 234 (quoting Nor Secoond, 1980c).
COMMENTS: Questionable.

DATE: 78/05/24 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: UK
 CITY: London
 FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office
PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Ternon, 197.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 78/06/02 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Retired Ambassador Besir Balcioglu killed; Necla Kunalalp, wife of Ambassador (Zeki Kunalalp) killed; driver killed.
LOCATION: Calle de Fortuny
 COUNTRY: Spain
 CITY: Madrid
 FACILITY TYPE: Ambassador's auto
PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA—Ohannes Kazandjian Group
COMMANDO(S): Three
WEAPON(S): Firearm: including a "9mm"
SOURCE(S): Pursuing—Gunter, 68; RM Torossian, 234; Perera—ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Scherer Vol 2 1983, 145; Mickolus 68–79, 791; Ternon, 197; Terr. Profiles, 53.
COMMENTS: Commandos escaped in a Ford Fiesta, found abandoned nearby.

DATE: 78/10/02

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Two killed (unknown, probably civilian)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Istanbul

FACILITY TYPE: Sirkeci Railroad Station

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb (two pounds of C-4 explosive)

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 214; Terr. Profiles, 34.

COMMENTS: See also other attacks in Istanbul this date.

DATE: 78/10/02

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): One killed and four injured (unknown, probably civilian)

LOCATION: Waiting room

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Istanbul

FACILITY TYPE: Car/passenger ferry landing

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Torossian, 236-237; Terr. Profiles, 34.

COMMENTS: One of three attacks in Istanbul this date.

DATE: 78/10/30

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Istanbul

FACILITY TYPE: Cigarette factory

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): RM Torossian, 237 (quoting Nor Seroond 1980c).

COMMENTS:

DATE: 78/12/06

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): None; property damage only (extensive)

LOCATION: Briefcase

COUNTRY: Switzerland

CITY: Geneva

FACILITY TYPE: Consulate

PERPETRATING GROUP: New Armenian Resistance (NAR)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb in briefcase—bottled gas with detonator connected to explosives

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 201

COMMENTS: Letter sent to a local news agency claiming responsibility—bomb was because of "violations of rights of Armenians in Lebanon;" see also use of bottled gas at Orly Airport 83/07/15.

DATE: 78/12/12

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Switzerland

CITY: Geneva

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Perera – ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Ternon, 214.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/05/06

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): None; property damage only

LOCATION: Restroom for outbound passengers; Turkish Airlines trailer
in front of terminal

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Istanbul

FACILITY TYPE: Airport

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Principal operative = Hagop Darakjian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Two bombs (C-3/C-4 plastique) in cigarette
package with timing device (one bomb in lavatory of transit lounge
and one in bus used to transfer passengers to planes)SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality, Perera - ME Mag 81/06/..,
24; Ternon, 214.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/07/08 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): None: property damage only
LOCATION: Boulevard-Beaumarchais
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: Office of Turkish Labor Attache
PERPETRATING GROUP: Avengers of the Armenian Genocide –
 JCAG/ARA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Mickolus 68-79, 856; Ternon, 197; Terr. Profiles, 53.
COMMENTS: See also three other attacks this date in Paris by JCAG.

DATE: 79/07/08 TIME: Turkey
TARGET COUNTRY: None: property damage only; Ternon says it did not
 detonate
VICTIM(S): Boulevard Malesherbes
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: Paris OECD Turkish Bureau
PERPETRATING GROUP: Avengers of the Armenian Genocide –
 JCAG/ARA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Mickolus 68-79, 856; Ternon, 197–198; Terr. Profiles, 53.
COMMENTS: See also three other attacks this date in Paris by JCAG.

DATE: 79/08/20

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Attempt on Turkish Consul

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Switzerland

CITY: Geneva

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: Possibly ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Torossian, 234 (quoting Nor Seroond, 1980c); Alexander and Myers, 57-58.

COMMENTS: Date possibly in error—see Max Kilnajian's attempt; Note—in Mickolus 68-79, 866, an attack occurred on 79/08/22.

DATE: 79/08/22

TIME: Probably morning

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Three Swiss (one driver, two pedestrians) passerby-civilians injured in an attempt on Turkish Vice-Consul

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Switzerland

CITY: Geneva

FACILITY TYPE: Consulate

PERPETRATING GROUP: "Armenian Liberation Army" (probably ASALA)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Mickolus 68-79; 866.

COMMENTS: Bomb hit consul's car shortly after the Vice Consul had driven away (or, some sources say, "arrived"); date possibly in error—see attack on 79/08/20.

DATE: 79/08/23

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Ankara

FACILITY TYPE: Military installations

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bombs

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 214.

COMMENTS: See also attack on Ataturk statue

DATE: 79/08/27

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): German woman in nearby streetcar injured (civilian)

LOCATION: Air vent grid

COUNTRY: FRG

CITY: Frankfurt

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Police sought two middle-aged men seen driving away

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Perera – ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Mickolus 68-79, 868; Ternon, 214.

COMMENTS: Phone call to Associated Press 20 minutes before—warned a bomb would be detonated at a "Turkish institution."

DATE: 79/09/13

TIME: Probably night

TARGET COUNTRY: FRG

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Lufthansa Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Principal operative - Hagop Darakjian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality, Corsun-Aug. 82, 34;
Chaliand, 10; Ternon, 214-215.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/09/13

TIME: Probably night

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Principal operative - Hagop Darakjian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality; Corsun-Aug. 1982, 34;
Ternon, 214-215

COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/09/13 TIME: Probably night
TARGET COUNTRY: Netherlands
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: KLM Airlines Offices
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S): Principal operative - Hagop Darakjian
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality; Corsun-Aug. 82, 34;
 Chaliand, 10; Ternon, 214-215.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/09/25 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Multiple
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Spain
 CITY: Madrid
 FACILITY TYPE: Five airlines offices
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Four bombs
SOURCE(S): Ternon, 214.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/09/30 TIME: Night of the 29th/early on the 30th
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): None; two bombs defused
LOCATION: Transit Lounge lavatory
 COUNTRY: Turkey
 CITY: Ankara
 FACILITY TYPE: Esenboga Airport
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Two bombs (defused)
SOURCE(S): Perera – ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Ternon, 214.
COMMENTS: "Bad timing"—ASALA called Associated Press in Beirut two hours before time set for detonation, to take responsibility for two bombs going off in the Transit Lounge of Esenboga Airport. The information was passed to the editor of Hurriyet, who alerted Turkish officials, who defused the devices in time.

DATE: 79/10/05 TIME: Night of the 4th/early on the 5th
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): Two injured (unknown, probably civilians)
LOCATION: Litter bin
 COUNTRY: Denmark
 CITY: Copenhagen
 FACILITY TYPE: Probably Turkish Airlines Office
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Two bombs, one undetonated
SOURCE(S): Perera – ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Ternon, 214.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/11/09 TIME: Night of the 8th/early on the 9th
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): None: minor property damage only
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Italy
 CITY: Rome
 FACILITY TYPE: Probably Turkish Airlines Office; travel agency
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Perera - ME Mag 81/06/ .., 24; Ternon, 214.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/11/18 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey; The Netherlands; FRG
VICTIM(S): Police: Three policemen injured
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: Airlines offices
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Three simultaneous bombings
SOURCE(S): Mickolus 68-79, 965 (index entry only); Ternon, 214;
 Gutteridge, 127; Alexander and Myers, 57-58.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/11/25

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: UK

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Tourist office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Principal operative - Hagop Darakjian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality; Alexander and Myers, 57-58.

COMMENTS: Nighttime attack = fewer casualties

DATE: 79/11/25

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: USA, Italy, Belgium, UK

VICTIM(S): Two people slightly injured (unknown, probably civilians)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Spain

CITY: Madrid

FACILITY TYPE: Airlines offices (TWA, Al Italia, Sabena, British Airways)

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Two bombs

SOURCE(S): Mickolus 68-79, 891; Gutteridge, 127; Alexander and Myers, 57-58.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/11/27

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Police: Three French police guards injured

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: Probably ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Mickolus 68-79, 892; Gutteridge, 127; Alexander and Myers, 57-58.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/12/..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): None known

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: UK

CITY: London

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): DOD-Terr. Group Profiles, 34.

COMMENTS: ASALA claimed the attack in solidarity with the revolutionary movements in Northern Ireland in their fight against "British Fascism."

DATE: 79/12/09

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Israel

VICTIM(S): Nine injured (civilians)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Italy

CITY: Rome

FACILITY TYPE: Tourist office (El Al Airlines Offices)

PERPETRATING GROUP: New Armenian Resistance (NAR)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality; Perera - ME Mag 81/06/..,
24; Ternon, 201.

COMMENTS: See also attack on British Airways same date.

DATE: 78/12/09

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Philippines

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Italy

CITY: Rome

FACILITY TYPE: Tourist office (possibly airlines offices)

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Principal operative - Hagop Darakjian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality.

COMMENTS: See also other attacks this date.

DATE: 79/12/09

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: USA

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Italy

CITY: Rome

FACILITY TYPE: Pan Am Airlines Offices

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Principal operative - Hagop Darakjian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality.

COMMENTS: See also other attacks this date.

DATE: 79/12/22

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Italy

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Italy

CITY: Possibly Rome

FACILITY TYPE: "Pensione" housing Armenian immigrants

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Alexander and Myers, 57-58.

COMMENTS: ASALA claimed that the ANCHA (Armenian National Committee for Humanitarian Affairs—private relief agency) effort was an imperialist plot aimed at depleting the Armenian population in the ASSR.

DATE: 79/12/22

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Yilmaz Colpan, Tourism (or press) Counselor at
Embassy killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Firearm

SOURCE(S): Pursuing - Gunter, 68; Torossian, 234; Perera - ME Mag
81/06/..., 24; Scherer Vol. 2 1983, 145; Terr. Profiles, 53.COMMENTS: Torossian says victim was also "chief of the Turkish secret
police"; Ternon says NAR claimed the attack, too; Perera says
ASALA was responsible.

DATE: 79/12/22

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Netherlands

CITY: Amsterdam

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: New Armenian Resistance (NAR)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 201.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 79/12/23

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: USA

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Italy

CITY: Rome

FACILITY TYPE: Tourist office/TWA Airlines Offices

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Principal operative - Hagop Darakjian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality; Perera - ME Mag 81/06/..,
24.

COMMENTS: See also other attack this date.

DATE: 79/12/23

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Italy

CITY: Rome

FACILITY TYPE: Tourist office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Principal operative - Hagop Darakjian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality.

COMMENTS: See also other attack this date.

DATE: 79/12/30 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Turkey
 CITY: Istanbul
 FACILITY TYPE: Yesilkov Airport
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S): Principal operative - Hagop Darakjian
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality; Perera - ME Mag 81/06/..,
 24; Ternon, 215.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 80/01/19 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: USA
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Spain
 CITY: Madrid
 FACILITY TYPE: Tourist office (TWA Airlines Offices)
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Corsun - August 1982, 34.
COMMENTS: Claimed, then later disavowed by JCAG/ARA. See also
 other attacks this date.

DATE: 80/02/01 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Belgium
 CITY: Brussels
 FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Offices
PERPETRATING GROUP: New Armenian Resistance (NAR)
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Ternon, 202.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 80/02/02 TIME: Probably nighttime
TARGET COUNTRY: USSR
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Belgium
 CITY: Brussels
 FACILITY TYPE: Soviet Airlines (Aeroflot) Offices
PERPETRATING GROUP: New Armenian Resistance (NAR)
COMMANDO(S): Possibly ARA Toranian (see also Mardiros Papazian;
 Charles Sansonetti in Pursuing - Gunter, 52
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Perera - ME Mag 81/06/.., 28; Pursuing - Gunter, 52; Ternon,
 202.
COMMENTS: Perera says it was retaliation for hanging of three NAR
 commandos in 79/01/.. for bombing of Moscow subway on 77/01/08;
 Mujahed quoted in "Pursuing" as accusing ARA Toranian of bombing
 the offices of Aeroflot "simply to assert himself"—no location
 given, but this is the only bombing of Aeroflot found; see also NAR
 bombing of USSR Embassy in Paris same date; see also NAR
 bombing of Turkish Airlines in Brussels 80/02/01.

DATE: 80/02/15 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Israel
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Italy
 CITY: Rome
 FACILITY TYPE: El Al Airlines Office/Tourism office
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Ternon, 215.
COMMENTS: See also other attacks this date.

DATE: 80/02/15 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Italy
 CITY: Rome
 FACILITY TYPE: Swissair Airlines Offices/Tourist office
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Ternon, 215.
COMMENTS: See also other attacks this date.

DATE: 80/02/15 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: FRG
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Italy
 CITY: Rome
 FACILITY TYPE: Lufthansa Airlines Offices/Tourist office
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Ternon, 215.
COMMENTS: See also other attacks this date.

DATE: 80/03/10 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): Ten killed (including an American); twelve injured
 (unknown, probably civilian)
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Italy
 CITY: Rome
 FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office and Turkish Tourism and
 Information Office
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Torossian, 239; Perera-ME Mag 81/06/..., 24; Ternon, 215;
 Terr. Profiles, 34.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 80/07/31

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Administrative Attache Galip Ozmen and daughter, Neslihan Ozmen, killed; wife and two sons injured

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Greece

CITY: Athens

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA—Gourgen Yanikian Commando Group
COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Firearm

SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01; The Reality II; Pursuing—Gunter, 68-69; Torossian, 235; Perera—ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Scherer Vol 2 1983, 145.

COMMENTS: Also in Ternon, 215.

DATE: 80/08/05

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Four injured (doorman and three Turkish nationals)
(civilian unknown)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Lyon

FACILITY TYPE: Consulate

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S): Two men

WEAPON(S): Firearm

SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01; Perera—ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Ternon, 215; Gutteridge, 127.

COMMENTS: Unable to find consul, they opened fire at random.

DATE: 80/10/03

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Intended Turkey

VICTIM(S): Commando: Ara Alek Yenikomchian and Suzy Mahseredjian both injured

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Switzerland

CITY: Geneva

FACILITY TYPE: Hotel room

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Ara Alek Yenikomchian; Suzy Mahseredjian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality; Corsun—August 1982, 34; Chaliand 10; Perera—ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Scherer, 4 & 128; Wash. Post 81/09/27, A32-33; Laqueur, 229; Alexander and Myers, 57-58; Rapoport—Inside Terr. Orgs., 229.

COMMENTS: "Scored an own goal"; Suzy and Alek released 81/01/09 and 81/01/12, respectively; Alek lost his sight and his left hand (Perera says right); ASALA carried out 18 bombings in a four-month period worldwide against Switzerland; Perera says Suzy = Syrian-born; Scherer says Suzy resident of Canoga Park, Calif., and Alek = "economist."

DATE: 80/10/05

TIME: Probably night of 4th/5th

TARGET COUNTRY: Italy

VICTIM(S): 12 people injured (civilians)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Spain

CITY: Madrid

FACILITY TYPE: Al Italia Airlines Offices

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Perera—ME Mag 81/06/.., 24.

COMMENTS: ASALA said it was to punish Italy for failure to close ANCHA offices helping Armenians to emigrate to the West.

DATE: 80/10/06

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Consul General Kemal Arikan

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: USA

CITY: Los Angeles (Bel Air)

FACILITY TYPE: Residence

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S): Harout Sassounian (older brother of Hampig/Harry)

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Firebomb

SOURCE(S): Gunter—Arm. Terr. Campaign; Ankara Domestic Service;
Perera—ME Mag 81/06/., 24.COMMENTS: Turkish Consul Arikan later assassinated by Harout's
younger brother, Hampig, and Krikor Saliba on 82/01/28 (see
also).

DATE: 80/10/12

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: USA

CITY: Los Angeles

FACILITY TYPE: Consulate

PERPETRATING GROUP: Possible JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Corsun—August 1982, 34; Terr. Profiles,
53.COMMENTS: Date in Kurz and Merari possibly in error—Torossian and
Corsun say three simultaneous bombings occurred on 80/10/12—in
London, New York City, and Los Angeles.

DATE: 80/10/12

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: UK

CITY: London

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – 3 October Group

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Two bombs

SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01; RM Torossian, 235; Perera–ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Ternon, 219; Terr. Profiles, 53.

COMMENTS: Torossian says this was one of bombings in three cities simultaneously: in the UK, Los Angeles, and New York (quoting Lindgren and Thackrey, 1980); see also attack on Swiss Tourist Office in London this date; to protest 80/10/03 arrests of Alek Yenicomshian and Suzy Mahseredjian.

DATE: 80/10/12

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Five injured (unknown)

LOCATION: In front of Mission

COUNTRY: USA

CITY: New York City

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Mission at the United Nations

PERPETRATING GROUP: Possibly JCAG/ARA (Perera says ASALA – 3 October Group)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb (auto containing six sticks of dynamite)

SOURCE(S): Corsun–August 1982, 34; Perera–ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Terr. Group Profiles, 53.

COMMENTS: One of three simultaneous bombings—London (see Kurz and Merari), New York City, and Los Angeles (see also).

DATE: 80/10/12

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: UK

CITY: London

FACILITY TYPE: Swiss Tourism Office (possible airlines office)

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – 3 October Group

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01; Torossian, 235; Perera–ME Mag
81/06/.., 24; Ternon, 214.COMMENTS: Torossian says this was one of bombings in three cities
simultaneously, in the UK, Los Angeles, and New York (quoting
Lindgren and Thackrey, 1980).

DATE: 80/11/10

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Strasbourg

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Consulate

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA and Kurdish Labor Party (PKK)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Le Matin 85/10/01; Perera–ME Mag
81/06/.., 24; Ternon, 219.COMMENTS: Claimed a joint attack by ASALA and Kurds; Le Matin
gives date as 80/11/09.

DATE: 80/11/11 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Italy
 CITY: Rome
 FACILITY TYPE: Tourist office
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA and Kurdish Labor Party (PKK)
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Le Matin 85/10/01.
COMMENTS: Le Matin says two attacks this date on Via Veneto in
 Rome.

DATE: 80/11/25 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Switzerland
 CITY: Geneva
 FACILITY TYPE: United Bank of Switzerland
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – 3 October Group
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Perera–ME Mag 81/06/.., 24; Temon, 219.
COMMENTS: To protest 80/10/03 arrests of Alek Yenicomchian and Suzy
 Mahseredjian.

DATE: 80/11/25

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Switzerland

CITY: Zurich

FACILITY TYPE: Kloten Airport

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – 3 October Group

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Probably bomb

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 219.

COMMENTS: To protest 80/10/03 arrests of Alek Yenicomchian and Suzy Mahseredjian.

DATE: 80/12/11

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Probably Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Italy

CITY: Rome

FACILITY TYPE: Auto of Turkish Diplomat

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Firearm: Automatic weapons

SOURCE(S): The Reality III; Ternon, 219–220.

COMMENTS: Attempted assassination.

DATE: 80/12/17

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Consul General Sarik Ariyak, and driver/bodyguard
Engin Sever killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Australia

CITY: Sydney

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S): Two-man

WEAPON(S): Firearm: probably

SOURCE(S): Pursuing-Gunter, 69; Corsun-August 1982, 35; Perera-ME
Mag 81/06/., 24; Scherer Vol. 2 1983, 145; Ternon, 198; Terr.
Profiles, 53; Ford-Polit. Murder, 332.

COMMENTS: Woman JCAG member called Australian press to
emphasize that JCAG had no connection to ASALA.

DATE: 80/12/19

TIME: 2200

TARGET COUNTRY: USA

VICTIM(S): Jose Antonio Gurriaran injured (civilian)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Spain

CITY: Madrid

FACILITY TYPE: TWA Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): "Aram" (19-year-old former medical student from
Argentina); unidentified female; unidentified male

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Two bombs

SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01; Chaliand, 10; Arm. Rep. 15 Nov 84.

COMMENTS: Gurriaran = Deputy Editor of "Pueblo"; injured by second
device in telephone booth.

DATE: 80/12/29

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland (and possibly USA)

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Spain

CITY: Madrid

FACILITY TYPE: Offices of Swissair and Transworld (TWA)
Airlines

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – 3 October Group

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 219.

COMMENTS: To protest 80/10/03 arrests of Alek Yenicomchian and Suzy Mahseredjian.

DATE: 81/01/..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Italy

CITY: Milan

FACILITY TYPE: Consulate

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA (probably 3 October Group)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Terr. Profiles, 34.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 81/03/04 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Labor Attache Resat Morali killed and Religious
Affairs Officia Tecelli Ari killed
LOCATION: Boulevard Beaumarchais
COUNTRY: France
CITY: Paris
FACILITY TYPE: Embassy Annex
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – Shahan Natali Commando
COMMANDO(S): A leading role was played by Pierre Gulumian
WEAPON(S): Firearm
SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01; The Reality; Pursuing–Gunter, 69;
Perera–ME Mag 81/06/ .., 24; Scherer Vol. 1 1982, 21; Scherer Vol. 2
1983, 145; Ternon, 220; Terr. Profiles, 34; Ford–Polit, Murder, 332
COMMENTS: Scherer (Vol. 1) date = 81/03/05 (in that source is press,
5th may be pub. date vice attack date).

DATE: 81/04/03 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Labor Counselor/Attache Cavit Demur injured
LOCATION:
COUNTRY: Denmark
CITY: Coperhagen
FACILITY TYPE: Residence
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Firearm
SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01; Perera–ME Mag 81/06/ .., 24; Scherer
Vol. 2 1983, 145; Ternon, 198
COMMENTS: Ternon says date was 81/04/02; Demur survived nine
wounds

DATE: Before 81/06/09 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Armenians
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Near Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: Armenian Church
PERPETRATING GROUP: Turkish-Islamic Underground Organization
 (First Heard)
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Scherer 1981, 56.
COMMENTS:

DATE: Before 81/06/09 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): Threat against Turkish Folkloric Ballet; performance
 cancelled
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: USA
 CITY: San Francisco; San Diego; Disneyland
 FACILITY TYPE:
PERPETRATING GROUP:
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): None: Threat
SOURCE(S): Scherer 1981, 56.
COMMENTS: Threat against Turkish Folkloric Ballet; performance
 cancelled; see also bombing in Anaheim, California, one week
 later.

DATE: Before 81/06/09 TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: USA

CITY: Anaheim

FACILITY TYPE: Auditorium

PERPETRATING GROUP:

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Scherer 1981, 56.

COMMENTS: Appearances in San Francisco, San Diego, Disneyland cancelled in week of 81/06/09; to protest appearance of Turkish Folkloric Ballet.

DATE: 81/06/09 TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: US

CITY: Los Angeles

FACILITY TYPE: Swiss Bank Corporation Offices

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – June 9 Organization

COMMANDO(S): Vicken Tcharkutian's fingerprints found on device

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220; Undated "Monitor" from early 1984.

COMMENTS: To Protest 81/06/09 arrest of Mardiros Jamgotchian (see also).

DATE: 81/06/11 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Airlines Office
PERPETRATING GROUP:
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): None; Occupation of premises only
SOURCE(S): Scherer 1981, 57.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 81/06/28 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Iran
 CITY: Tehran
 FACILITY TYPE: Swissair Airlines Offices
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – June 9 Organization
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220.
COMMENTS: To protest 81/06/09 arrest of Mardiros Jamgotchian (see also).

DATE: 81/07/21 TIME: 1815
TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland
VICTIM(S): 26 injured (unknown, probably civilians)
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Switzerland
 CITY: Lausanne
 FACILITY TYPE: Department store
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – June 9 Organization
COMMANDO(S): Unidentified man
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Delayed-action bomb
SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220.
COMMENTS: To protest 81/06/09 arrest of Mardiros Jamgotchian (see also).

DATE: 81/07/21 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Iraq
 CITY: Baghdad
 FACILITY TYPE: Swissair Airlines Offices
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – June 9 Organization
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220.
COMMENTS: To protest 81/06/09 arrest of Mardiros Jamgotchian (see also).

DATE: 81/07/22

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland

VICTIM(S): One killed; four injured (unknown, probably civilians)

LOCATION: Cloakroom storage racks

COUNTRY: Switzerland

CITY: Geneva

FACILITY TYPE: Cornavin Railroad Station

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – June 9 Organization

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Two bombs

SOURCE(S): Scherer 1981, 67; Ternon, 220.

COMMENTS: To protest 81/06/09 arrest of Mardiros Jamgotchian; "The fourth explosion in a major Swiss city since 19 July" (Note: Corsun says there was "a series of 15 bombings.")

DATE: 81/08/11

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland

VICTIM(S): One passerby injured—minor cuts (unknown, probably civilian)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Denmark

CITY: Copenhagen

FACILITY TYPE: Swissair Airlines Office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – June 9 Organization

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Scherer 1981, 76.

COMMENTS: To protest 81/06/09 arrest of Mardiros Jamgotchian (see also).

DATE: 81/09/24

TIME: 1115 am

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Police: Turkish Security Guard Cemal Ozen killed (by Kevork Guzelian); Dipl.: Vice Consul Kaya Inal seriously injured; French Security Guard injured; 56 hostages held for 16/17 hours; Sislian injured in shoulder; four visitors injured (civilians)

LOCATION: Consulate's Visa section at 170 Boulevard Haussmann

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Consulate

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA; Yeghia Keshishian suicide commandos

COMMANDO(S): Vasken Sislian (commando leader); Kevork Guzelian; Anto Basmadjian; Hagop Djulfayan

WEAPON(S): Both/Firearm: Pistols,; Explosive:

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Le Matin 85/10/01; The Reality; Pursuing-Gunter 69, 107; Corsun-Aug 82, 31; Chaliand, 10; Scherer Vol 1 1981, 93; Ternon, 221; Terr. Profiles, 34; Gutteridge, 127.

COMMENTS: ASALA's first hostage-barricade operation; called the "Van" operation; Scherer says names used were Alex Alekian/Raffi Balian/Hagop Tagopian; Zaven Hagopian/leader = Vasken "Sicilian" (sic); Scherer Vol 2 1983, 8 says that ASALA/Beirut announced suspension of the campaign against France because France agreed to a fair trial for the four; also in Scherer Vol 2 1983, 145; and Terrorism 85-86 Annual, 87; 85-86 Annual says they surrendered after talking long distance to Hagopian in Beirut; also in Wash. Post 81/09/27, A32-A33.

DATE: 81/10/03

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION: Main entrance

COUNTRY: Switzerland

CITY: Geneva

FACILITY TYPE: Post office

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – June 9 Organization

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Scherer 1981, 96.

COMMENTS: To protest 81/06/09 Jamgotchian jailing; Note—also anniversary of Alex/Suzy.

DATE: 81/10/03

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION: Access stairs

COUNTRY: Switzerland

CITY: Geneva

FACILITY TYPE: Courthouse

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA – June 9 Organization

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Scherer 1981, 96.

COMMENTS: To protest 81/06/09 Jamgotchian jailing; Note—also anniversary of Alex/Suzy.

DATE: 81/10/20

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: ASALA-Armenians (intragroup attack)

VICTIM(S): Commando: Arsen Vartanian (aka Abu Ammar) killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut (Bourj Hammoud District)

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA (on order of Mujahed)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Firearm: probably

SOURCE(S): Pursuing-Gunter, 47.

COMMENTS: Note same surname as Aram Vartanian (see 83/08/16) and both have "movement" names; Aram = Abu Elias.

DATE: 81/10/23

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY:

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP:

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 81/10/25

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Attempted assassination of Second Secretary
Gokberk Ergenekon

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Italy

CITY: Rome

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Possibly Monte Melkonian

WEAPON(S): Firearm: probably

SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01; The Reality III; Pursuing-Gunter, 82;
Scherer Vol 2 1983, 145; Ternon, 228.

COMMENTS: Ternon: "October shootout in which an advisor of the
Turkish Embassy and an Armenian had wounded each other in the
streets of Rome . . ."

DATE: 81/11/..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION: Rue de l'Observatoire

COUNTRY: France

CITY: (Paris)

FACILITY TYPE: Street

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA-September-France

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Car bomb

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220.

COMMENTS: To protest arrests of Van operation commandos.

DATE: 81/11/.. TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: France
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Roissy
 FACILITY TYPE: Charles de Gaulle Airport
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA–September-France
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220.
COMMENTS: To protest arrests of Van operation commandos.

DATE: 81/11/.. TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: France
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: (Paris)
 FACILITY TYPE: Berlitz Theater
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA–September-France
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220.
COMMENTS: To protest arrest of Van operation commandos.

DATE: 81/11/15 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: France
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: McDonald's Restaurant
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA-Orly Group
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Probably bomb
SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220.
COMMENTS: To protest continued detention of Dimitriu Giorgiu (Monte Melkonian).

DATE: 81/11/15 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: France
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Lebanon
 CITY: Beirut
 FACILITY TYPE: Air France Airlines Offices
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA-Orly Group
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220.
COMMENTS: To protest continued detention of Dimitriu Giorgiu (Monte Melkonian).

DATE: 81/11/15

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut

FACILITY TYPE: Franco-Lebanese Bank

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA-Orly Group

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220.

COMMENTS: To protest continued detention of Dimitriu Giorgiu (Monte Melkonian).

DATE: 81/11/15

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut

FACILITY TYPE: Fransabank UAP

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA-Orly Group

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220

COMMENTS: To protest continued detention of Dimitriu Giorgiu (Monte Melkonian).

DATE: 81/11/16

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION: "Left-luggage" office

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Gare de l'est Railroad Station

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Le Matin 85/10/01; Scherer Vol 2 1983, 8; Ternon, 222.

COMMENTS: Claimed in entry in Scherer (82/01/30); retaliation for holding Monte since 81/11/11.

DATE: 81/11/20

TIME: 1930

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): None: Damage to premises

LOCATION: Outside main entrance

COUNTRY: USA

CITY: Los Angeles (Beverly Hills)

FACILITY TYPE: Consulate on 2nd floor of five-story building at 8730 Wilshire Blvd.

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Scherer 1981, 113.

COMMENTS: Bombing preceded by phone threats; Turkish Ambassador Sukru Elekdag due to visit on 81/11/24; "Three other bombings of Turkish property in Los Angeles have occurred since 1978."

DATE: 81/11/21

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Iran

CITY: Tehran

FACILITY TYPE: Air France Airlines Offices

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA—Orly Group

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Ternon, 220.

COMMENTS: To protest continued detention of Dimitriu Giorgiu (Monte Melkonian).

DATE: 82/01/12

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Switzerland

CITY: Nyon

FACILITY TYPE: Match factory

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA—June 9 Organization

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Middle East Mag., 83/09/..

COMMENTS: Purpose = Release of imprisoned member(s).

DATE: 82/01/14 TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Canada
 CITY: Toronto
 FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Consulate

PERPETRATING GROUP: Claimed by ASALA (in solidarity with Kurds and Turks)

COMMANDO(S): Possibly Vicken Tcharkutian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality IV; Middle East Mag 83/09/..

COMMENTS: ASALA Manifesto claimed attack—"Long live the Armenian, Kurdish and Turkish struggle"; see also "82/../. Spring"—Attack on Turk Consulate in Toronto—possibly two references to same attack.

DATE: 82/01/17 TIME: Early

TARGET COUNTRY: Switzerland

VICTIM(S): None: property damage only

LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Switzerland
 CITY: Geneva
 FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: Possibly ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Scherer Vol 2 1983, 5.

COMMENTS: To demand the release of a jailed comrade.

DATE: 82/01/21

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION: Luggage locker

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris (Orly)

FACILITY TYPE: Airport

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA-Orly Group

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Middle East Mag 83/09/..

COMMENTS: Purpose = Release of imprisoned member(s).

DATE: 82/01/28

TIME: Morning rush hour

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Kemal Arikan Turkish Consul General, Los Angeles
Consulate, killed

LOCATION: City intersection; red light

COUNTRY: USA

CITY: Los Angeles

FACILITY TYPE: Ford Auto

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG

COMMANDO(S): Hampartzoum Hampig/Harry Sassounian, Krikor
(Koko) Saliba (deceased)

WEAPON(S): 9mm pistols; 10 rounds

SOURCE(S): Reader's Digest 86/05/..; Scherer Vol 2 1983, 7 & 145;
Pursuing-Gunter, 82; Ford-Polit. Murder, 332; Terr. Profiles, 53.COMMENTS: Sassounian's older brother bombed Arikan's residence
earlier; Krikor Saliba shot by sniper while changing flat tire in
Beirut, Lebanon; Arikan was the 21st Turkish diplomat killed
(the third in the U.S.); fled scene in a white Chevrolet; Hampig =
19 years old; from Pasadena, Calif.; emigrated to the U.S. from
Lebanon in 1977.

DATE: 82/03/29

TIME: 2130

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S): Five killed; 27 injured (unknown, probably civilian)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: 15 miles northeast of Limoges

FACILITY TYPE: Paris-Toulouse train

PERPETRATING GROUP:

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: bomb

SOURCE(S): Scherer Vol 2 1983, 21.

COMMENTS: Two other bombings have occurred on trains in France since 1980; no claim of responsibility; some speculate that detonation was accidental.

DATE: 82/..../.. Spring

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Canada

CITY: Toronto

FACILITY TYPE: Consulate

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Possibly Vicken Tcharkutian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): The Reality, Part IV.

COMMENTS: Although Tcharkutian resided in California; this attack was a bombing; and the Reality/Part IV says that with Vicken's departure (in May, following the attempted attack on Air Canada at L.A. International) the military potential in North America (not just the U.S.) was almost completely stifled. See also 82/01/14—attack on Turkish Consulate in Toronto—possibly same attack.

DATE: 82/04/07 TIME: 1050 pm
TARGET COUNTRY: USA
VICTIM(S): None: Property damage only
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: FRG
 CITY: West Berlin
 FACILITY TYPE: American Library and American Cultural Center
PERPETRATING GROUP:
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bombs
SOURCE(S): Scherer Vol 2 1983, 23.
COMMENTS: No attribution to a specific group.

DATE: 82/04/08 TIME: Morning (as he left for work)
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Kemalettin "Kani" Gungor, Trade/Commercial
 Counselor of Embassy, seriously injured
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Canada
 CITY: Ottawa
 FACILITY TYPE: His apartment's parking garage
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S): Haroutiun Kevork; Haig Balian; Haig Harakhanian;
 Melkon Karakhanian charged in 84/03/..
WEAPON(S): Firearm: Pistol(s)
SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01; The Reality IV; Pursuing-Gunter, 80;
 Scherer Vol 2 1983, 23 & 145; Ternon, 223; Ford-Polit. Murder, 127.
COMMENTS: In 84/03/.., Haroutiun Kevork, Haig Balian, Haig
 Karakhanian, Melkon Karakhanian arrested for the attack.

DATE: 82/04/25

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): None; bomb discovered

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: FRG

CITY: Cologne

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish Bank

PERPETRATING GROUP: New Armenian Resistance for the
Independence of Armenia (NAR)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb discovered

SOURCE(S): Scherer Vol 2 1983, 26; Ternon, 202.

COMMENTS: Scherer comments that the bomb may reflect German
resentment toward foreigners vice Armenian attack; see also
bombing of Turkish store in Dortmund.

DATE: 82/04/25

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY:

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: FRG

CITY: Dortmund

FACILITY TYPE: Turkish store

PERPETRATING GROUP: New Armenian Resistance for the
Independence of Armenia (NAR)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Scherer Vol 2 1983, 26; Ternon, 202.

COMMENTS: Scherer comments that the attack may reflect German
resentment toward foreigners vice Armenian attack; see also
Turkish Bank in Cologne same date.

DATE: 82/05/30

TIME: 0242

TARGET COUNTRY: Canada

VICTIM(S): None; bomb defused

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: US

CITY: Los Angeles

FACILITY TYPE: Airport

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Vicken Tcharkutian (Iraqi-Armenian; Hratch Kozibioukian; Siranouche Kozibioukian; Varant "Berkev" Chirinian

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality IV; Pursuing-Gunter, 80; Corsun-August 1982, 34; Arm Rep 87/12/17; Scherer Vol 2 1983, 32; Ternon, 223; Terr. Profiles, 34.

COMMENTS: Revenge for arrest on 82/05/18 and 82/05/20 by Toronto police of ASALA members Haroutian Kevork, Haig Balian, Haig Karakhanian, Melkon Karakhanian in Canada for extorting "contributions"; 87/12/15 Tcharkhutian sentenced in Los Angeles to 12 years in prison (Armenian Reporter-87/12/17); Scherer gives ages as—Hratch = 30/Siranouche = 21/Varant = 28.

DATE: 82/06/07

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Administrative (or Commercial) Attache Ekrut Akbay and wife (Nadide) killed (wife injured—died 83/01/10)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Portugal

CITY: Lisbon

FACILITY TYPE: Exiting auto at residence

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Firearm

SOURCE(S): Pursuing-Gunter, 69; Scherer Vol 2 1983, 34; Middle East Mag 83/09/,,; Ternon, 198; Terr. Profiles, 53.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 82/././..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: ASALA–Armenians (intragroup attack)

VICTIM(S): Commando: Sarkis Kiulkhandjian (aka Khomeini) killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: (Beirut)

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Firearm: 9 mm pistol

SOURCE(S): The Reality IV; Gunter–Pursuing, 47.

COMMENTS: Sarkis, about 27 years old, had typed almost all the articles for "Armenia" magazine and radio show—"Voice of the Lebanese Armenians"; was suspected by Mujahed of being a traitor; occurred in June or July.

DATE: 82/././.. (Summer)

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: ASALA–Armenians (intragroup attack)

VICTIM(S): Commando: Nishan killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: (Beirut)

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA (on order of Mujahed)

COMMANDO(S): Vicken Aivazian and "the Chauvinist" (probably Varoujan Garbidian)

WEAPON(S): Firearm: 7.65mm (35 rounds in head, neck, chest)

SOURCE(S): Gunter–Pursuing, 47; The Reality, Parts III and IV.

COMMENTS: Nishan was a blind Iranian-Armenian member, 30 years old; believed by Mujahed to be a traitor.

DATE: 82/08/20 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: France
VICTIM(S):
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: Telephone Terminal
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Le Matin 85/10/01.
COMMENTS: Attack thwarted; bomb found.

DATE: 82/08/27 TIME: Morning commute time
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Col. Atilla Altikat, Embassy Military Attache
 killed
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Canada
 CITY: Ottawa
 FACILITY TYPE: Auto, at red light
PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA
COMMANDO(S): "A man in his thirties"; possibly a driver of the
 shooter
WEAPON(S): Firearm: Browning 9mm pistol (13 rounds)
SOURCE(S): Pursuing—Gunter, 69; Scherer Vol 2 1983, 52 & 145; Ternon,
 198; Terr. Profiles, 53.
COMMENTS: Commando left a car—fired several shots into Altikat—
 fled; the car he left may have been driven by an accomplice.

DATE: 82/09/09

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): None: Planned abduction of Ambassador (Dipl.)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: UK

CITY: London

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S): Zaven Bedros/Bedrosian (from Syria); Grish Gregorian; Judith Gregorian; possibly another

WEAPON(S): Both/Firearm: pistol; Explosive: grenade(s)

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality V, Pursuing—Gunter, 81.

COMMENTS: Attack thwarted—Bedros arrested in hotel room; Bedros arraigned and tried 83/07/..; said he was to take the Turkish Ambassador hostage to exchange for Levon Ekmekjian (see 82/08/07).

DATE: 82/09/09

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Consulate General Administrative Attache Bora Suelkan killed

LOCATION: As he returned home from work

COUNTRY: Bulgaria

CITY: Burgas

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S): "A short man wearing a mask"

WEAPON(S): Firearm: Pistol

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Pursuing—Gunter, 69; Scherer Vol 2 1983, 54 & 146; Ternon, 232.

COMMENTS: First Armenian attack in Eastern Europe .

DATE: 82/10/22

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): None/Dipl.: Karat Arbay, Honorary Turkish Consul in Philadelphia (intended)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: USA

CITY: Los Angeles; Boston; Philadelphia

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S): Steven John Dadaian (20); Dikran Sarkis Berberian (29); Vicken A. Hovsepian (22); Karnik K. Sarkissian (29); Vicken V. Yacoubian (19)

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): The Arm. Terr. Campaign—Gunter; Pursuing—Gunter, 78; Reader's Digest 86/05/..; Scherer Vol. 2 1983, 61.

COMMENTS: All AYF members; V. Archavir Sarkissian Hovsepian—Santa Monica; K. Karlos Sarkissian—Anaheim; Dv. Vaskin Yacoubian—Glendale; Dadaian—Canoga Park (Suzy Mahseredjian, too—see 80/10/03).

DATE: 82/11/05

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: ASALA; Armenians

VICTIM(S): Commando: Noubar Yelemian killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Netherlands

CITY:

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: Allegedly Turks

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Pursuing—Gunter, 126.

COMMENTS: ASALA alleged that Yelemian had been killed by Turkish special units assigned to hunting down and killing Armenian terrorists or ASALA members.

DATE: 83/02/28

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Luxembourg

CITY:

FACILITY TYPE: Diplomat's residence

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari

COMMENTS: Device discovered; attack thwarted; see also attack in Paris this date.

DATE: 83/02/28

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): 25-year-old French secretary killed (civilian)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Tourist office; Marmara Travel Agency

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari

COMMENTS: See also attack in Luxembourg this date.

DATE: 83/03/..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Armenians-ASALA

VICTIM(S): Commando: Garabed Pashabedian killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut

FACILITY TYPE: Residence

PERPETRATING GROUP: Possibly Turkish operatives

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): The Reality VI; Pursuing-Gunter, 126.

COMMENTS: Said to have been named by Levon Ekmekjian as one who introduced him to ASALA; see also killing of Minas Simonian in 82/12/..

DATE: 83/03/09

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Ambassador Galip Balkar and chauffeur, and civilian young Yugoslav student killed; one commando injured

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Yugoslavia

CITY: Belgrade

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S): Harutian Levonian and Raffi Elbekian

WEAPON(S): Firearm: Pistols

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari, Le Matin 85/10/01; Pursuing-Gunter, 69; Scherer Vol 2 1983, 145; Terr. Profiles, 53.

COMMENTS: Levonian and Elbekian sentenced to 20 years; both commandos carried Lebanese passports.

DATE: 83/03/21

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY:

VICTIM(S): None/Commando: Jean-Marc (ARA) Toronian (intended)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris

FACILITY TYPE: Toronian's auto

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Le Matin 85/10/01.

COMMENTS: Device malfunctioned; see 83/12/05 attempt on Toronian by ASALA; Toronian was leader of Armenian National Movement (MNA) in France and head of ASALA-PM until falling out with Mujahed.

DATE: 83/06/16

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Two civilians (one, a 13-year-old boy) killed; 27 injured

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Turkey

CITY: Istanbul

FACILITY TYPE: Bazaar

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA; Levon Ekmekjian suicide commando (see 82/08/07)

COMMANDO(S): Megerditch "Mgo" Magarian/Madarian of Aleppo, Syria

WEAPON(S): Both/Firearm: "Submachinegun"; Explosive: Grenades (at least one of which was only a "stun" or "flash"-type grenade)

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality VI; Pursuing-Gunter, 71; Terrorism 85-86 Annual, 87; Terr. Profiles, 35; Rapoport-Inside Terr. Orgs., 228.

COMMENTS: Mgo Magarian committed suicide with his last grenade; ASALA caller said the attack would keep summer tourists from visiting Turkey.

DATE: 83/07/14

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: Administrative Attache Dursin Aksoy killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Belgium

CITY: Brussels

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: JCAG/ARA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Firearm: Probably

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Pursuing-Gunter, 125.

COMMENTS: "ASALA member arrested in Netherlands for involvement"; first attack claimed by ARA; Aksoy alleged member of a special unit created by Turkish security forces to track down and kill Armenians suspected of fighting for the underground organization (ASALA).

DATE: 83/07/15

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: ASALA

VICTIM(S): Commando: Vicken Aivazian (aka Jan) killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Bekka/Biqa area

FACILITY TYPE: ASALA Training Camp

PERPETRATING GROUP: Dissident ASALA members, soon to form ASALA-RM

COMMANDO(S): Possibly Tavit Tavitian; (Garlen Ananian and Aram Vartanian executed by ASALA for this attack)

WEAPON(S): Firearm

SOURCE(S): The Reality VI; London Al-Majallah 2 Mar 88.

COMMENTS: Khatchig Havarian killed at the same camp the next day; issue = Orly Airport bombing 83/07/15.

DATE: 83/08/..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Iran

CITY: Tehran

FACILITY TYPE: Representations

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari, 49.

COMMENTS: "A series of attacks in July and August 1983."

DATE: 83/08/16

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: ASALA-Armenians (intragroup attack)

VICTIM(S): Commando: Garlen Ananian killed and Aram Vartanian
(aka Abu Elias) killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY:

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA (on order of Mujahed)

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Firearm: Probably

SOURCE(S): Pursuing-Gunter, 51.

COMMENTS: "Executed" for their alleged part in the 83/07/15 and
83/07/16 killings of Viken/Vicken Aivazian and
Khatchik/Khatchig Havarian; note Aram's surname same as
Arsen Vartanian (see 81/10/24), and both have "movement"
names; Arsen = Abu Ammar.

DATE: 83/08/25

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S): One killed and over 20 injured (unknown, including civilians)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: FRG

CITY: West Berlin

FACILITY TYPE: Diplomatic Mission; Cultural Center

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality VII.

COMMENTS: Maison de France; The Reality says that "several factors" indicate that the attack was done as a favor for ASALA by a "non-Armenian force."

DATE: 83/10/..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S):

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: France

CITY: Paris - Marseille

FACILITY TYPE: Express train

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): None: Threat

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari

COMMENTS: See 83/12/31 attack claimed by Carlos.

DATE: 83/10/.. (29) TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): None
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Lebanon
 CITY: Beirut Suburb of Baabda
 FACILITY TYPE: Temporary location of Embassy
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA
COMMANDO(S): Mihran Sarkis "Nishan" Tanielian
WEAPON(S): Both/Firearm: Kalashnikov assault rifle; Explosive:
 Grenades
SOURCE(S): The Reality VII; Pursuing-Gunter, 72.
COMMENTS: Tanielian captured, and faced "life imprisonment with
 forced labor."

DATE: 83/12/05 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY:
VICTIM(S): Commando: Jean-Marc (ARA) Toranian slightly injured
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: Auto
PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA; possibly a non-Armenian ally of
 Mujahed
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; The Reality VII
COMMENTS: Toranian headed Armenian National Movement; see also
 83/03/21 attempt on Toranian by ASALA.

DATE: 84/03/27

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Dipl.: First Secretary injured; Assistant Military Attache
Ismail Pambukcu killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Iran

CITY: Tehran

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Both/Firearm; Explosive

SOURCE(S): Kurz and Merari; Pursuing-Gunter, 69 & 113; Terr.
Profiles, 35.

COMMENTS: Two of five planned attacks were thwarted.

DATE: 84/04/28

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey

VICTIM(S): Turkish businessman Isik Yonder, husband of Turkish
Embassy Secretary, killed (civilian)

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Iran

CITY: Tehran

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Firearm

SOURCE(S): Istanbul "Hurriyet," 20 May 88, 5, 15.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 84/06/24 TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Armenians
VICTIM(S): Minor injuries (unknown, probably civilians)
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: France
 CITY: Paris
 FACILITY TYPE: Marie-Nubar Armenian Student Center
PERPETRATING GROUP: "A Turkish underground group" (possibly
 Armenians)
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S): Explosive: Bomb
SOURCE(S): Pursuing-Gunter, 127.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 84/./../ (Fall) TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY: Turkey
VICTIM(S): None; planned attack on Ambassador thwarted
LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: Iran
 CITY: Probably Tehran
 FACILITY TYPE:
PERPETRATING GROUP: Mesrop Mashdotz Commandos ("an
 underground Armenian group")
COMMANDO(S):
WEAPON(S):
SOURCE(S): Pursuing-Gunter, 114.
COMMENTS:

DATE: 85/04/..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Armenians-ARF

VICTIM(S): ARF: Sarkis Aznavourian killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ARF-RM; either ARF dissidents or alias for
ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S): Firearm

SOURCE(S): Pursuing-Gunter, 61.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 85/07/..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: Armenians-ARF

VICTIM(S): ARF: One ARF leader killed; one ARF leader injured

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ARF-RM; either ARF dissidents or alias for
ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Pursuing-Gunter, 61.

COMMENTS:

DATE: 87/10/29

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S): Military: Three French gendarmes killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA (later denied); Tanyus Shahin Armed Unit

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Radio Monte Carlo/Mideast Review 87/11/02.

COMMENTS: A source "close to" ASALA denied responsibility.

DATE: 87/11/..

TIME:

TARGET COUNTRY: France

VICTIM(S): Government: Richard Gimpel, French engineer, killed

LOCATION:

COUNTRY: Lebanon

CITY: Beirut

FACILITY TYPE:

PERPETRATING GROUP: ASALA

COMMANDO(S):

WEAPON(S):

SOURCE(S): Paris AFP 88/02/04.

COMMENTS: See also 88/02/02 attack on Merrin in Beirut.

APPENDIX B

Quantitative Aspects

Introduction

This appendix illustrates Step Two in the research process on a so-called terrorist group: the manipulation of the collected data, in order to at least begin to counter the group's actions. Long before the number of incidents in the preceding chapter began to approach three hundred, it became necessary to computerize the data to maintain any hope of producing valid, reliable quantitative measures of Armenian terrorist activity in any reasonable amount of time. In this respect, it mirrors the problem of data analysis addressed by the terrorism-related data bases in both the public and private sectors. Such data bases vary in style according to their main use(s): basic research; estimates of the groups' future actions; or in answering specific queries.¹

Also like other terrorism-related data bases, the data items of which this data base are composed are individual, anecdotal items; all of the items are from open-source publications; collectively, they form the "mosaic" mentioned earlier. "Open-source," "hearsay," or "anecdotes," given the nature of the terrorism phenomenon, were not only *not* devalued, they were prized for what they were—often the only information available. The task then became, through multiple, repeated data manipulation, to produce the tables of results that follow.² As could be seen in scanning the appendix on attacks, the amount of information on individual incidents varied greatly; this was especially true of the amount of data available in individual source documents. For most attacks, however, even those that are not claimed, the researcher can expect to know at least the date, the location, the weapon(s), the target (nation, group, individual), and casualties.³

The needs of this study were: to chronicle the recent history of Armenian terrorism, in an effort to portray in detail the individuals and organizations behind the phenomenon; and to gather enough descriptive data to at least form the basis for predictive-type analyses.⁴ The fundamental "Unit of Analysis" in this data base, as it is in some others, is the *Individual Attack*. The choice of the individual attack for a data base on basic research was governed, again, by the nature of the terrorism phenomenon: Just as a study of submarines begins with observations when they are surfaced, the terrorist attack is the "surfacing" of the group. Collectively, the units of analysis form the chronology in the preceding chapter; they are also the basis for the tables that follow, on the groups' weapons use, numbers of attacks, entities targeted, etc.

Structure

The structure of the data base underlying this study was imposed by, or followed from its purpose. What statesmen and politicians express as, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." the researcher expresses as a "problem domain not well formalized."⁵ To impose a degree of formality on the ill-defined domain of Armenian terrorism began with the selection of data elements pertinent to this study. That selection, in turn, was essential to the task of assembling the relationships between the individual data elements. Finally, the patterns that became evident could be translated into "rules" for subsequent searches and manipulations.⁶ As will be seen in the more detailed discussion below of the data collection instrument, the data elements are subsumed in the broader groupings of the *Individual Attack*, *The Group Identification*, and *The Larger Context*, both cultural and political.

The Data Collection Instrument used is shown below; it is the one that presents the data in the appendix on attacks. What began as purely textual data in the source documents was entered into the data collection instrument in the more abbreviated form seen in the chronology. Searches for correlates were aided by standardizing the terms within fields. For example, in Chapter 9, reference was made to putting explosive devices in trash cans. The original source document on the 5 October 1979 attack in Copenhagen stated that the bomb had been placed in a "litter bin." A search on the term "Trash" obviously would not have turned up the 5 October 1979 incident. Other examples of standardization of terms include the multitude of synonyms used for "killing" (murdered, assassinated, terminated), "injuring" (wounded), and place names (Bekaa, Biqa).

Data Collection Instrument:

DATE:	TIME:
TARGET COUNTRY:	
VICTIM(S):	
LOCATION:	
COUNTRY:	
CITY:	
FACILITY TYPE:	
PERPETRATING GROUP:	
COMMANDO(S):	
WEAPON(S):	
SOURCE(S):	
COMMENTS:	

Even the relatively unsophisticated software used was capable of producing, in a single scan, the multi-variable results shown in the preceding appendix. For example, the number of *NAR attacks* against *Soviet targets in Belgium*, is the result of the single query expression:

TARGET COUNTRY: USSR
LOCATION: COUNTRY: Belgium
PERPETRATING GROUP: NAR

Findings

The picture of the Armenian groups produced by this data-basing effort is in accord with the results noted in other studies, on other groups, on the more general phenomenon of "terrorism." As one example, Armenian terrorist groups have essentially no "home" territory from which to operate, and thus, are eternally operating "abroad." In contrast with Latin American separatist groups that operate in their home territory, and that regularly carry out kidnappings for money, groups operating abroad or lacking a local support structure tend to become involved in barricade-and-hostage incidents. The captors seize their hostages in a public place, allowing themselves to become hostages as well; they bargain for escape along with other demands. The incidents on 24 September 1981 (The ASALA operation against the Turkish Consulate in Paris), and 12 March 1985 (The JCAG/ARA operation against the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa) are the best illustrations.⁷ Another illustrative measure of the soundness of these findings is that, among groups in general, actions carried out against airlines are in the "most-likely-to-be-claimed" category, and that is certainly true of the Armenian groups.⁸

Tables

Immediately following is a selected set of descriptive data on the groups, their operating spheres, weapons of choice, members, levels of activity, and other measures. A final note: small differences in counts from one table to another are usually accounted for by, for example, one explosive device damaging several airline offices simultaneously.

Table 2.1
ASALA Targets—Countries, Other Groups, ASALA Members

ARF	3	Kuwait	1
ASALA	9	"Multiple"	1 * *
Belgium	2	Netherlands	2
Canada	1	Philippines	1
France	29 *	Switzerland	25
FRG	3	Turkey	69 +
Israel	1	UK	4
Italy	5	USA	8
Iran	1		

*Includes four attacks against French citizens in Lebanon, some of which ASALA later denied;

**An example would be when a single ASALA explosive device damaged several airline offices clustered together, as they are in many cities;

+Includes incidents in which Pierre Gulumian, Alek Yenicomshian, and Suzy Mahseredjian scored an "own goal," probably in the preparation of an anti-Turkish attack.

Table 2.2
JCAG/ARA Targets—Countries, Other Groups, JCAG/ARA Members

ARF	1
Turkey	31

Geographic Distribution of Incidents

A number of tantalizing clues in the form of "disparities" emerge from the data below, in the sense of several seeming area exclusivities. For example, of the two largest groups, ASALA committed the only known attacks in the FRG, in Greece, in Iran, in Iraq, and in Luxembourg. Similarly, of the two largest groups, the JCAG/ARA carried out the only attacks in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Yugoslavia. To an extent the data may be reflective of local community support structures. One example is in Greece, where the sole remaining friendly ASALA-PM organization was located in Athens, also the country/city that Mujahed selected as a refuge following the ASALA schism.

Table 2.3
Geographic Distribution of Incidents—ASALA

Canada	4	Lebanon	29
Denmark	4	Luxembourg	1
France	36	Spain	8
FRG	3	Switzerland	15
Greece	3	Turkey	19
Iran	8	UK	5
Iraq	1	US	4
Italy	18		

Table 2.4
Geographic Distribution of Incidents—JCAG/ARA

Australia	2	Portugal	2
Austria	2	Spain	1
Belgium	1	Switzerland	1
Bulgaria	1	Turkey	2 *
Canada	2	UK	1
France	6	USA	7
Lebanon	1	Vatican	2
Netherlands	1	Yugoslavia	1

*Includes 78/01/01 Attack by 28 May Group, Possibly ASALA.

Table 2.5
Geographic Distribution of Incidents—NAR

Belgium	3
France	3
FRG	3
Italy	2
Netherlands	1
Switzerland	1
UK	1

Table 2.6
Geographic Distribution of Incidents—Other*

LOCATION	Armenian Red Army	Front for Armenian Liberation	Gourgen Yanikian	Yanikian Commandos	Unident.
France		2			4
FRG					3
Greece					1 **
Lebanon					2 +
Netherlands	1				
Switzerland					6
USA			1	1	1

*Includes Armenian Red Army, The Front for Armenian Liberation, Gourgen Yanikian's act, The Yanikian Commandos, and "Unidentified"—those attacks for which no group claimed responsibility or no attribution can be made at present.

** Represents the 24 April 1988 killing of Mujahed in Athens.

+ Timing and target (France) suggest ASALA.

Table 2.7
Geographic Distribution of Incidents—Total

Australia	2	Lebanon	32
Austria	2	Luxembourg	1
Belgium	4	Netherlands	3
Bulgaria	1	Portugal	2
Canada	6	Spain	9
Denmark	4 *	Switzerland	23
France	51	Turkey	21
FRG	9	UK	7
Greece	4	USA	14
Iran	8 +	Vatican	2
Iraq	1	Yugoslavia	1
Italy	20		

* The fact that all of the known attacks in Denmark were claimed by ASALA, attacks that may have benefitted in some way from a local infrastructure, suggests a possible association of some sort with the so-called "Shoemaker's Gang" in Sweden and Denmark (see ASALA-Funding).

+ The true figure, including a "series" of anti-French attacks in July and August 1983, is somewhat higher than eight.

ASALA and, to a lesser extent, the JCAG/ARA claimed that their objective was to force Turkey to cede Armenian lands back to Armenians and to pay reparations. To achieve those ends, the groups carried out what they described as "armed revolutionary" and "military" actions. A review of the actual targets makes the criticism expressed in "The Reality" seem mild by comparison. Even a cursory review shows that a Turkish diplomat or family member was as likely to be assaulted in a restaurant, including McDonald's, as he or she was to be attacked in an embassy. Above all, it behooved Turkish diplomats (and innocent passersby) to steer a wide path around airline offices (the target in over 42% of ASALA's attacks). Especially in the case of ASALA, the following data show that the US State Department assessment quoted earlier, that ASALA did not make a practice of attacking "hardened" targets, was very accurate.

Table 2.8
Type of Facility Attacked—by Group

TARGET	<i>Number of Attacks</i>				
	ASALA	JCAG/ARA	NAR	Nemesis	Other
Airline Office	57	3	6		3
Tourism Office					
Diplomat, Including Auto & Street	8	16			2
Embassy	4	1	1		1
Consulate	7	3	2		4
Diplomat Residence	2		1		
Mil. Facility	4				
U.N. Building	1	1			
OECD Office		1			
Parliament Building	1				
Courthouse		1			
Unidentified Building	2				
Bridge	1				
Bank	6		2		1

(continues)

Table 2.8—continued

TARGET	ASALA	<i>Number of Attacks</i>			
		JCAG/ARA	NAR	Nemesis	Other
Post Office	1				
Railroad Station	5				
Ferry Landing	1				
Refugee Pensione	1				
Bus	1				
Store			1		
Department Store	1				
Restaurants (incl. McDonald's)	4				
Tour Boats	1				
Cultural Center	2				1
Mosque	1				
Airport	12				
Theater	1				
Match Factory	1				
Cigarette Factory	1				
Telephone Exchange	2				
Statue	1				
Airliner	1				
Train	1				
Bazaar	1				
Watch Company	1				
Oil Refinery		(1)			
* Church Office	1				

*Attack carried out under the name "28 May," attributed by some authors to ASALA.

The claim by the Armenian groups, particularly ASALA, that they were conducting military strikes at the Turkish Government, if true, should have been borne out by the results. As the following data show clearly, ASALA in particular regularly and frequently strayed far wide of the mark. The key figure below is the count of "Civilian" Killed and Injured, the vast majority of whom, of course, were not even Turkish.

Table 2.9
Types of Victims (Killed & Injured)—By Group

VICTIM	ASALA K/I	JCAG/ARA K/I	NAR K/I	Nemesis K/I	Other K/I
Military	3/0*	0/0	0/0	1/0	0/0
Civilian	42/316	1/6	0/10	0/0	5/27
Diplomat	8/10*	23/4	0/0	0/0	5/0
Commando	12/6	9/1	0/0	0/0	3/1
Government	2/0	0/0	0/0	5/0	0/0
Police	1/7	2/1	0/0	0/0	2/0
Competing Group	2/2	1/0	0/0	0/0	0/0

* The distinction between "Military" and "Diplomat" can be a fine one. For example, one of the victims assassinated in Tehran on 27 March 1984 was Ismail Pambukcu, a member of the Turkish Military establishment, serving in the Diplomatic posting of an Assistant Military Attache, and counted under the category of "Diplomat," above.

Table 2.10
Number of Attacks with No Victims—By Group

ASALA	16*
JCAG/ARA	8
NAR	5
Nemesis	0
Other	8

*Includes nighttime attacks intended to garner publicity, times when improvised explosive devices malfunctioned, and one incident in which an ASALA caller telephoned a warning too early, giving officials enough time to find and disarm the device.

Table 2.11
Weapons Use—By Group

GROUP	Explosive	Firearm	Both	Threat	Other
ASALA	124	31	7	1	1
JCAG/ARA	16	18	2		
NAR	13				
Red Armenian					
Army		1			
Nemesis		6			

Table 2.12
Number of Attacks Per Year—By Group

YEAR	ASALA	JCAG/ARA	NAR	Other	Unknown
1973				3	2
1974					
1975	9 *	2			2
1976	6	1			5
1977	5	1	1		
1978	8	3 **	3		
1979	27	6	3		
1980	20	7+	4		
1981	40	1			4 ++
1982	21	8	2	1	5 ***
1983	16 +++	4			
1984	2	3		1	
1985	3	1			
1986	1	1			
1987	2				
1988	1			1 x	

*Includes attacks not claimed until April 1980.

**Includes the 1 January attack carried out in the name of "28 May" that may have been ASALA.

+ Includes a 12 October attack attributed by some authors to ASALA.

++ Includes 11 June & 20 August attacks that are suggestive of ASALA M.O.

*** Includes 8, 13, & 14 March attacks that are suggestive of ASALA M.O.

+++ The true number, including July & August "series" of anti-French attacks in Iran, is higher.

x Represents the 24 April 1988 killing of Mujahed in Athens.

Table 2.13
ASALA Attacks Carried Out Under Other Names

28 May	3 October	9 June	September France	Only
77/05/..				
77/05/29				
77/05/29				
(78/01/01)*				
	80/10/03			
	80/10/12			
	80/10/12			
	(80/10/12)**			
	80/11/25			
	80/11/25			
	80/12/29			
	81/01/..			
	81/01/..			
		81/06/09		
		81/06/28		
		81/07/19		
		81/07/20		
		81/07/21		
		81/07/21		
		81/07/22		
		81/08/11		
		81/08/15		
		(81/08/20)***		
		81/09/16		
		81/10/03		
		81/10/03		
			81/11/..	81/11/12
			81/11/..	81/11/12
			81/11/..	81/11/14
			81/11/..	81/11/15
			81/11/..	81/11/15
			81/11/..	81/11/15
				81/11/15
				(81/11/16)+
				81/11/21
				(continues)

Table 2.13—Continued

28 May	3 October	9 June	September France	Orly
		82/01/13 (82/01/17)++		
				82/01/19
				82/01/21
				(82/01/..)x
				(82/01/30)x
				82/07/20
				82/07/24
				82/07/30
				82/08/08
				(82/08/20)x

*Attributed by some authors to JCAG/ARA.

**Attributed by some authors to JCAG/ARA, by some to ASALA.

***Although not known to have been claimed explicitly as part of the 9 June campaign, the date sequence and the target (a Swiss Watch firm in California) suggest that it was.

+Though not known to have been claimed as part of the Orly campaign, the date sequence and target (France) suggest it was.

++ Following a "9 June"-claimed attack by only four days, and being against a Swiss target suggest 9 June.

x The date sequence and target (France) suggest these attacks were part of the 9 June campaign.

Notes

1. William Warner Fowler, *Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods, and Systems*, A Rand Note, no. N-1503-RC (Santa Monica, Ca.: The Rand Corp., March 1981).

2. Bonnie Cordes, Brian M. Jenkins, and Konrad Kellen, *A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups*, R-3151 (Santa Monica, Ca.; The Rand Corp., June 1985).

3. Cordes, Jenkins, and Kellen, 16–17.

4. Fowler, 8.

5. D. A. Waterman and Brian M. Jenkins, *Heuristic Modeling Using Rule-Based Computer Systems*, A Rand Paper, no. P-5811 (Santa Monica, Ca.: The Rand Corp., March 1977).

6. Waterman and Jenkins, 5.

7. Waterman and Jenkins, 5–6.

8. Cordes, Jenkins, and Kellen, 25.

Bibliography

Books

- Alexander, Yonah and Kenneth A. Myers. *Terrorism in Europe*. London, England: Croom Helm Ltd., 1982.
- Ankara University. *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection*. Ankara, Turkey: Ankara University Press, 1984.
- Bedoukian, Kerop. *Some of Us Survived*. New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1978.
- Chaliand, Gerard, and Yves Ternon. (Translated from the French by Tony Berrett) *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance*. London: Zed Press, 1983.
- Ford, Franklin L. *Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985.
- Gunter, Michael M. *Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986.
- Gurun, Kamuran. *The Armenian File*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
- Gutteridge, William, ed. *Contemporary Terrorism*. New York, Facts on File Publications, 1986.
- Kurz, Anat, and Ariel Merari. *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool*. Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1985.
- Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1987.
- Mickolus, Edward F. *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events 1968-1979*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1980.
- Mirak, Robert. *Torn Between Two Lands*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.
- Nalbandian, Louise. *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963.
- Rapoport, David C. *Inside Terrorist Organizations*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Scherer, John L. *Terrorism: An Annual Survey*, Vol. 2. Minneapolis, Minn.: J. L. Scherer, 1983.
- Scherer, John L. *Terrorism: An Annual Survey*, Vol. 1. Minneapolis, Minn.: J. L. Scherer, 1981.

- Seger, Karl A., Ed. *Terrorism 1985–1986 Annual*. Knoxville, Tenn.: Corporate Consultants, 1986.
- Sterling, Claire. *The Terror Network*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981.
- Ternon, Yves. *The Armenian Cause*. Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1985.
- Torossian, Rouben Manouel. *The Contemporary Armenian Nationalist Movement*. San Diego: United States International University, 1980.

Rand Books and Publications

- Cordes, Bonnie, Brian M. Jenkins, and Konrad Kellen. *A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups*. R-3151. Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corp., June 1985.
- Fowler, William Warner. *Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods, and Systems*. A Rand Note, no., N-1503-RC. Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corp., March 1981.
- Jenkins, Brian M., and Janera Johnson. *International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968–1974*. R-1597-DOS/ARPA. Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corp., March 1975.
- Waterman, D. A., and Brian M. Jenkins. *Heuristic Modeling Using Rule-Based Computer Systems*, A Rand Paper, no. P-5811. Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corp., March 1977.

U.S. Government Publications

- Department of Defense. *Terrorist Group Profiles*. November 1988.
- Department of State. *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986*. January 1988.
- Department of State. *Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981*. August 1982.

Miscellaneous

- "ASALA Releases Statement on Failed Operation." Beirut Aztag in Armenian. (16 October 1984).
- "Car Bomb Blast Damages Turkish Consulate." Melbourne Overseas Service in English, 0230 GMT (23 November 1986).
- "Consulate Bomber Appears in Sydney Court." Melbourne Overseas Service in English, 0830 GMT (27 November 1986).
- "Eight Arrested in Turkish Consulate Bombing." Melbourne Overseas Service in English, 0030 GMT (26 November 1986).

- "Envoy's Assassination to be Investigated." Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish. 1700 GMT. (18 February 1976).
- "EOKA Underground Claims to Have Killed Turkish Diplomats." 28 October 1975.
- "Group Claims Responsibility." Hong Kong AFP in English. 0149 GMT. (23 November 1986).
- Gunter, Michael M. "Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism." Unpublished Paper Prepared for Delivery at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., March 1985.
- "Hayden Condemns Bombing." Melbourne Overseas Service in English. 0430 GMT. (24 November 1986).
- "Moscow Subway Bomb May Be Reaction to Arrests." Hamburg DPA in German. 1502 GMT. (11 January 1977).
- "Moscow Subway Explosion." Paris AFP in English. 1535 GMT. (10 January 1977).
- "One Charged in Bombing." Melbourne Overseas Service in English. 0830 GMT. (26 November 1986).
- "PFLP, Red Army Seize Japanese Embassy in Kuwait." Tokyo Kyodo in English. 0959 GMT. (6 February 1974).
- "Planned Flight to Lebanon." Hong Kong AFP in English. 0245 GMT. (27 November 1986).
- "Police Investigate." Melbourne Overseas Service in English. 0830 GMT (24 November 1986).
- "Turkish Ambassador in Vienna Assassinated." Vienna Domestic Service in German. 1300 GMT (22 October 1975).
- "Turkish Embassy Employee Shot in Paris." Paris AFP in English. 1159 GMT (22 December 1979).
- "Unrelated Bombings Reported in Paris, Corsica." Paris Domestic Service in French. 0600 GMT (15 May 1977).

Periodicals and Journals

- The Armenian Reporter* 8 March 1984; 15, 29 November 1984; 10, 17, 24, 31 January 1985; 7, 14, 21, 28 February 1985; 12 May 1988.
- "Armenian Secret Army Leader Interviewed." *London Al Majallah*, 2 March 1988.
- "Armenian Terrorist Leader, Hagopian, Interviewed." *Milan Panorama* (1 September 1980).
- The Armenian Weekly*. 11 February 1984; 14 July 1984; 7 May 1988.
- "ASALA Identifies Victim as Minas Ohanessian." *Paris AFP*, 29 April 1988.

- Bedoyan, Hratch. "The Social, Political, and Religious Structure of the Armenian Community in Lebanon." *The Armenian Review* 32 (June 1979): 119–130.
- Christian Science Monitor*. 7 January 1981.
- Corsun, Andrew. "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile." *US Department of State Bulletin*, August 1982, 31–35.
- Crenshaw, Martha. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* 13, No. 4 (July 1981): 379–399.
- Gunter, Michael M. "The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey." *Orbis*(Summer 1983): 447–477.
- Gunter, Michael M. "The Historical Origins of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism." *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* IX, No. 1 (Fall 1985): 77–96.
- Hairenik*. 6 January 1987.
- Hayastan*. November/December 1983.
- Istanbul Tercuman*. 30 April 1988.
- Labin, Suzanne. "LARF, ASALA, Action Directe International Ties." *Socialism: La Demagogie du Changement*.
- "*Al Majallah* Visits an Armenian Secret Army Base in Lebanon," September 1982.
- Le Matin* 1 October 1985.
- Maxwell, Evan. "Bomb on the Loose." *Reader's Digest*, May 1986, 154–158.
- "Overview of Armenian Terrorism." *Istanbul Hurriyet* (20 May 1988).
- Ozarkay, Erol. "Armenian Terrorism from Yesterday to Today." *Istanbul Hurriyet* (20 May 1988).
- Perera, Judith. "An End to Armed Propaganda?" *The Middle East*, September 1983, 18–20.
- Perera, Judith. "Is This Hagopian?" *The Middle East* October 1983, 28.
- Perera, Judith. "Young Armenians: Armed Struggle is Our Answer." *The Middle East*, June 1981, 21–28.
- The Washington Post*. 27 September 1981; 29 April 1988.
- Wilkinson, Paul. "Armenian Terrorism." *The World Today* 39, No. 9 (September 1983): 344–350.
- Ziade, Mona. "Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?" *Monday Morning*, 8 August 1983, 36–37.

Index

- Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), 33, 47–48
- Achkoyan, Antoine, 52, 210
- Aivazian, Vicken, 40–41, 52–53, 59, 195, 209, 212
- Ajemian, Setrag, 71
- Akbay, Ekrut, 194
- Aksoy, Dursin, 209
- Altikat, Atilla, 199
- Amadouni, Hovaness, 22, 95
- Ananian, Garlen, 34, 53
- Ananian, Kevork, 41, 193
- Anmar, Mustafa Hassan, 134
- Apetian, Zaven, 163
- Aprahamian, Sarkis, 211
- ARA. *See* JCAG
- Arabian, Mahram, 34, 198
- Arbay, Karat, 201
- Ari, Tecelli, 161
- Arikan, Kemal, 62, 71, 154, 186
- Armenians (as targets), 98, 105, 115–116, 119, 121, 164, 174, 193, 195, 201–203, 206, 209, 211–212, 215, 217–218, 220–222, 225
- ASALA (Armenian Secret Army of Liberation), 21–53, 77, 82, 84, 102, 104, 106, 108, 112, 114, 117, 123–126
- ASALA-PM (Popular Movement), 30, 36, 44
- ASALA-RM (Revolutionary Movement), 52–53
- Ashjian, Abraham, 67, 73, 203
- Assad, Rifaat Al, 49
- Australia, 159, 223
- Austria, 103, 217, 220
- Ayrikian, Barouyr, 78
- Azmi, Djemal, 22, 96–97
- Aznavourian, Sarkis, 67, 222
- Balkar, Galip, 206
- Basmadjian, Anto, 172
- Baydar, Mehmet, 23, 98
- Bakkalbasi, Selcuk, 152
- Balcioglu, Besir, 120
- Balian, Haig, 42–43, 191, 194
- Bedoukian, Kerop, 15–19
- Bedros, Zaven, 34, 45, 51, 200, 210
- Belgium
as location of attack, 118, 146, 209
as target country, 137, 145
- Benler, Ahmet, 134
- Berberian, Sarkis, 201
- Bey, Ali Sayi. *See* Talaat, Pasha
- Boldikian Group, 72
- Bulgaria, 200
- Canada
as location of attack, 184, 190–191, 199, 203, 221
as target country, 194
- Carim, Taha, 115
- Catanassian, Avedis, 52, 210
- Charkhugian, Vicken, 32–33, 43, 165, 170, 184, 190, 194
- Chirinian, Varant, 43, 194
- Cirit, Oktay, 36, 108
- Colpan, Yilmaz, 80, 83, 142
- Cyprus, 219
- Dadaian, Stephen John, 201
- Daghlian, Vatche, 71, 211
- Darakjian, Hagop, 38–40, 45, 105, 108, 122–123, 131–132, 136–137, 139–141, 143–144
- Dashnak Party, 12, 21–25, 61–76, 78, 95–98
- Demir, Bahadir, 23, 98
- Demirer, Kenalettin, 196
- Demirian, Levon, 70, 223
- Demur, Cavit, 162
- Denmark, 133, 162, 169–170
- DerBoghossian, Bedros, 22, 97
- Djulfayan, Hagop, 172

- Dzaghigian, Stepan, 97
- Egypt, 189
- Ekmekjian, Levon, 34, 44–45, 47, 198, 200, 202, 206–207
- Elbekian, Raffi, 206
- Ergenekon, Gokberk, 43, 175
- Ergun, Enver, 220
- Esmail, 104
- Evingulu, Benjamin, 196
- Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
 - as location of attack, 95–96, 109, 130, 191–192, 213–215, 217–218, 220
 - as target country, 143, 175–183, 185–190, 198–199, 215, 223–225
- Front for Armenian Liberation, 99
- Garbidian, Varoujan, 32, 42, 51–52, 195, 210
- Gevorgian, Artashes, 22, 97
- Gimpel, Richard, 224–225
- Giorgiu, Dimitriu. *See* Melkonian, Monte
- Gorman, Panayote, 103
- Goutier, Christian, 223
- Greece, 116, 151, 202, 225
- Gregorian, Grish, 200
- Gregorian, Judith, 200
- Gulumian, Katchadur, 43, 197
- Gulumian, Pierre, 39, 43, 51–52, 84, 161, 194, 196–197, 206, 209, 217, 219–221, 223
- Gunduz, Orhan R., 189, 193
- Gungor, Kemalettin, 43, 191
- Gurriaran, Jose Antonio, 59, 159
- Guzelian, Kevork, 172
- Habash, George, 25, 46
- Haddad, Wadi, 25, 46
- Hagopian, Hagop, 23, 29, 32, 48, 57–60, 74, 101, 105, 225. *See also* Mujahed
- Hagopian, Hagop Der Erez. *See* Natali, Shahan
- Halebian, Bedros, 52, 210
- Havarian, Khatchig, 34, 39–41, 45, 52–53, 59, 209, 211–212
- Hovagim, Melikian, 7
- Hovsepian, Vicken, 72, 201
- Inal, Kaya, 172
- Iran
 - as location of attack, 163, 166, 171, 183, 207, 212, 216, 218
 - as target country, 139
- Iraq, 168
- Ishikawa, Ryoko, 101
- Israel, 140, 148
- Italy
 - as location of attack, 96, 115, 134–135, 139–141, 143, 148–150, 152, 157–158, 160–161, 175, 208, 212–213
 - as target country, 136–137, 140, 152–153, 171
- Iyad, Abu, 51, 57
- Jamgotchian, Mardiros, 39, 42, 47, 163, 165–171, 173
- Japan, 101
- Japanese Red Army, 25
- JCAG/ARA (Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide), 26, 29, 35, 37–38, 46, 61–77, 83, 103, 104, 117, 120, 127–128, 134, 142, 144, 147, 150, 154–155, 159, 186, 189, 193, 194, 199–201, 203, 206, 209, 211, 219–221, 223
- Jihanshir, Khan, 22, 95
- Karakhianian, Haig, 43, 191, 194
- Karakhianian, Melkon, 43, 191, 194
- Kasapian, 33
- Kerjelian, Ara, 211
- Keshishian, Yeghia, 33, 163
- Kevork, Haroutiun, 42–43, 191, 194, 203
- Kevork Tchavouche Group, 72, 134
- Khatib, Zahir Al, 47
- Khutaverdian, Vahe, 50, 202
- Kilnajian, Max. *See* Klindjian
- Kirca (Ambassador), 211
- Kiulkhandjian, Sarkis, 41, 194
- Klindjian, Max Hrair, 129, 147
- Kozibioukian, Hratch, 43
- Kozibioukian, Siranouche, 194
- Kuneralp, Necla, 120
- Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), 48, 157
- Kuwait, 101, 202

- Lebanese Arab Army, 46
 Lebanaon, 102, 104–105, 107–108, 112,
 174, 178–181, 186–189, 193, 195,
 202–203, 206, 209, 211–212, 214,
 221–225
 Levon, 8
 Levonian, Hargob, 70, 223
 Levonian, Harutiun, 206
 Leylekian, Mardiros, 98
 Lukidis, Theodore, 103
 Luxembourg, 205

 Magarian, Megerditch Mgo, 34–35,
 45, 51, 207
 Mahranean. *See* Hagopian, Hagop
 Mahseredjian, Suzy, 39–40, 42, 153,
 155, 157, 160, 201
 Maroukian, Hrair, 67, 72, 74, 203
 Melkonian, Monte, 24, 31, 39, 42, 47,
 51, 53, 175, 178–179
 Merrin, Jacques, 224
 Mihcioglu, Cahide, 211
 Morali, Resat, 162
 Moskovian, Hamo, 41
 Mouradian, A., 79
 Mujahed, 24–26, 30–31, 34, 36, 38–41,
 43–44, 47–48, 51–53, 57–60. *See*
also Hagopian, Hagop

 Natali, Shahan, 21, 162
 Nayir, Soner, 32, 52, 210
 Nazim, 22
 Nemesis, 21–22, 95–97
 Netherlands
 as location of attack, 134, 142, 196,
 210
 as target country, 132, 135
 New Armenian Resistance (NAR),
 77–85, 113, 118, 125, 139–140, 142,
 146–147, 150, 192
 Nishan, 195

 Ohanessian, Minas. *See* Hagopian,
 Hagop
 Ohannes Kazandjian Group, 72
 Organization for the Independence
 of Armenia. *See* UNP
 Orly Group, 31, 35, 43, 178–181
 Ottoman Turkey, 95–97
 Ozen, Cemal, 172
 Ozen, Erdogan, 217

 Ozmen, Galip, 151

 Palestinian Movement, 2–26, 116
 Pambukcu, Ismail, 50, 216
 Papazian, Kevork, 110
 Papazian, Vahan, 73
 Paradjanov, Sergei, 82
 Pasha, Enver, 22, 97
 Pasha, Jemal, 22, 96
 Pasha, Said Halim, 22, 96
 Pashabedian, Garabed, 202, 206
 Patrick Arguello Group, 25
 PFLP (Popular Front for the
 Liberation of Palestine), 25–26,
 46–48, 101
 Philippines, 140
 Portugal, 194, 211

 Qadhafi, 49

 Sakanos, Denis, 103
 Sakharov, Andrei, 79
 Saliba, Krikor, 68, 154, 186
 Sansonetti, Charles, 43, 197
 Sarkissian, Karnik, 201
 Sarkissian, Nishan, 98
 Sarkissian, Zohrab, 44, 198
 Sassounian, Hampig, 62, 68, 71, 74,
 154, 186
 Sassounian, Harout, 154
 Semerci, Ohannes, 52, 154
 September France Group, 42, 175–
 178
 Sever, Engin, 159
 Shirakian, Arshavir, 22, 96
 Shoemaker's Gang, 33
 Simonian, Minas, 34, 198, 202, 206
 Sislian, Vasken, 172
 Sons of the Occupied Land, 26,
 101
 Spain, 120, 132, 137, 144–145, 153–
 160
 Stepanian, Hagop, 79, 112
 Suelkan, Bora, 200
 Suratikian, M., 79
 Suratikian, V., 79
 "Swiss 15," 35, 42, 163
 Switzerland
 as location of attack, 111, 118, 126,
 139, 148, 153, 157–158, 163, 167–
 169, 173, 183–184, 188