

# *An Analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh Problem*

**First Edition**



**Nasrin Suleymanli**

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## *Preface*

Following the demise of the USSR, there emerged a number of unresolved problems in the territory of the former USSR. Many sovereign republics of Eurasia have declared their independence. Therefore, a new geopolitics has emerged such as: area stretching from Eastern Europe to the Chinese border and from Siberia to South Asia.

Added to the political, economic and democratic problems, ethnic conflicts between the involved nations have developed. Unresolved ethnic problems of the former USSR greatly increased after the collapse of the USSR and this has seen as a tragedy of nations. In regard to this, “frozen conflicts” in the Post Soviet territories have emerged. Actually, these conflicts not only demonstrated the failure of Soviet ideology, but also created as big problems within the newly independent states.

The Karabakh conflict began with ethnic problems but attracted interested sides around it in a short time. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the most complicated issue that emerged in the former USSR period. It became complicated because the self-independence of minorities caused aggression in another state. After collapse of the USSR, the Karabakh conflict remained as an international dispute between independent states. One point is that this conflict emerged at such a time and place that attracted regional powers. States that wished were able to establish their superiority in the region and arrived at the resolution process in a different way. This of course prolonged the situation.

This book sees resolution of this conflict on the negotiation table with the initiatives of Minsk Group and through an analysis the interest of the great powers in the region. The Geo-strategy of the region, made the Karabakh conflict a debatable point among great and regional powers. More over, book emphasizes the standpoint of Azerbaijan and Armenia parties in the Karabakh conflict. Despite this, regional powers and great powers also, have their aims over conflict in the region.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict illustrated that to play with the ethnic and national feeling of minorities or nations in the region could establish the intervention of territories from another state.

Experiment in previous years and the position of conflict sides illustrate that, opportunities of the Minsk Group for the resolution process of the Nagorno-Karabakh is not finished. On the contrary, they have to pay effort to solve this conflict. Thus, the mission of the Minsk Group is to adorn their packages and proposals and to adorn mediation process with new elements. The “No peace, no war” position is considered dangerous for both conflict sides and any interested sides in the region and creates under jeopardy for the whole region.

*Nasrin Suleymanli*

## *List of Abbreviations*

<b>CFE</b>	<b>CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE</b>
<b>CIS</b>	<b>COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES</b>
<b>CoE</b>	<b>COUNCIL OF EUROPE</b>
<b>CSCE</b>	<b>COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE</b>
<b>CSP</b>	<b>COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS</b>
<b>ENP</b>	<b>EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY</b>
<b>ENPI</b>	<b>EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD AND PARTNERSHIP INSTRUMENT</b>
<b>EU</b>	<b>EUROPEAN UNION</b>
<b>EUSR</b>	<b>EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE</b>
<b>IDP</b>	<b>INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE</b>
<b>IPAP</b>	<b>INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP ACTION PLAN</b>

<b>NATO</b>	<b>NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION</b>
<b>NGO</b>	<b>NON-GOVREMENTAL ORGANIZATION</b>
<b>NK</b>	<b>NAGORNO-KARABAKH</b>
<b>NKAO</b>	<b>NAGORNO-KARABAKH AUTONOMOUS OBLAST</b>
<b>OSCE</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE</b>
<b>PACE</b>	<b>PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE</b>
<b>PCA</b>	<b>PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT</b>
<b>PfP</b>	<b>PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE</b>
<b>TACIS</b>	<b>TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>UNITED NATIONS</b>

**UNDP**

**UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT  
PROGRAM**

**UNOCHA**

**UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE  
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN  
AFFAIRS**

**UNHCR**

**THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED  
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR  
REFUGEES**

**US**

**UNITED STATES**

**USSR**

**UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST  
EPUBLICS**

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## ***Chapter 1***

### ***Introduction***

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has seen as the first and most bloody conflict to occur in the territory of Post Soviet states. This ethno-political conflict has its specializations. The interested warring parties of both sides and parties involved in the region, demonstrate that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not merely an ethnic conflict.

Its complexity is distinguished from other ethno-political conflicts that till now have remained unresolved. Thus, the “No war, No peace” situation is not only dangerous for warring parties, but also for involved regional powers. If we take the concentration that today energy resources and particularly pipeline routes go through the conflict zone, so the unresolved conflict situation has a negative impact on the EU’s energy security policy in the entire region.

In reality, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has snowballed militarily with huge resources of military equipment having all modern techniques. If this equipment was to be used in a war situation a new catastrophe would develop. Nowadays, the very fact that the military base exists in the region can also creates difficulties.

Many books, journals and articles have been published regarding the conspicuity of conflict, the obstacles, when and why this conflict has emerged. Till now publications have defend subjective positions (not analytical) about the conflicts. That is why it has been very hard to understand and analyze how to resolve the problem.

However, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still looked at approaches from a historical perspective. Until now the mediation process of this conflict, the resolution process at the negotiation table, a peace solution perspective, obstacles in the mediation process, involving the great powers’ policies according to the

resolution process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, have not been investigated in any specific way.

### *Introduction*

Involved sides in this conflict believe in their right approaches to the conflict resolution process. Thus, this position of all involved parties in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict itself has created a difficult situation to clarify the objectives of conflict analytically. In regard to this, international norms are defined to show clarity of situations.

Statements from official people, articles, journals, interviews and internet sources have been used. It takes a great deal of time to read through all the available publications. I found that statements from official people were more reliable source. Many statements, from diverse organizations and officials have been made at different periods in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But we have to accept that official declarations are somewhat limited in terms of information, details of any resolution process are always hidden. Thus, any analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be clarified in all aspects or in a resolution process. On the other hand, we can notice propaganda in all the publication-the analytical solution depending on the position of publisher. Thus, it would be useful to read all the publications and statements then to analyze the conflict according to both involved sides and within international framework.

## *Chapter 2*

### *The Theoretical Debate on the Causality of Ethno-territorial conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh*

The “Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” is one of the longest-standing conflicts among former USSR states. Despite numerous attempts by mediating parties and direct talks between the Armenian and the Azerbaijan Republics, the conflict remains unresolved. The “Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” has been dominated by several major schools of thought regarding what should be theories aims and objectives. Meanwhile, theoretical approaches are a better tool for explaining the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

According to a realist standpoint, the concept of sovereignty is the most important points. With the realist approach, states are the most important actors in the international system<sup>1</sup>. This leads to mistrust between states and is often a cause for war. Realists are often pessimists and see the reasons for war simply as a bad trait in human nature.

Realist theories explain international relations in terms of power. The major focus of the concept of sovereignty relates to ‘monopoly of power’ as it is enjoyed by the central governments within unitary-sovereignty states.<sup>2</sup> The Armenians have never accepted sharing power in Karabakh as in a semi-independent state. Armenian wanted a monopoly of power in Karabakh. There have been solution attempts; however, the mistrust between Armenians and Azeries prevented any kind of peaceful settlement. Exactly, as described in realism, there has been retaliation between them as both sides have spent so much on the military, arming themselves.

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<sup>1</sup> Genest (2006, p.46)

<sup>2</sup> Cini (2007, p.143)

Kenneth Waltz<sup>3</sup> mentions that security for all states is dependent on sustaining a “balance of power” between them. Actually, in the anarchy of the international system, the brake on the power of one state is the power of another state. However, balancing and counter balancing happens on a regular basis in the international system<sup>4</sup> and this maintains the stability of that system. It could consider the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a matter of conflict between two great powers i.e. the US and Russia. In reality, balancing against each other, left behind in the Caucasus with the sudden collapse of the USSR.<sup>5</sup>

Basically, Nagorno-Karabakh is located within the post-Soviet Regional Security Complex and the smaller Caucasus sub complex. The post-Soviet Regional Security Complex is classified as a centered Regional Security Complex where Russia defines the unipolarity of the region. As we understand, besides the conflicting parties Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and one or more of the other great powers can make their influence felt in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In recent years, the US has emerged as a challenger to Russian domination in the Caucasus<sup>6</sup>

In fact, conflict dimension of neorealism can be identified in 3 main elements between the US and Russian relationships over the Caucasus region. The (1) element is the significance of oil in the security policy of both Russia and the US. Russia is the main oil producing country in the world whilst the US, on the other hand, is already the world’s largest consumer of energy resources. Accordingly, 4-6% of the world’s oil resources are located in the Caspian Basin. Oil can be transferred through pipelines, with secure access to the Caspian oil reserves, by Russia and the US. The (2) component is Russia’s hegemony status-domination in the territory of former USSR. Meanwhile, Russia has to defend itself globally.

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<sup>3</sup> Waltz is Emeritus Professor of Political Science at US Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University. He is also a past President of the American Political Science Association and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

<sup>4</sup> Waltz (1979)

<sup>5</sup> Rosenkvist (2005)

<sup>6</sup> Ibid...p.15

Actually, Russia has to maintain its influence within the Commonwealth of

Independent States. With the loss of the Caucasus, Russia could fall down from being a great power to having merely regional power status. Traditionally Moscow had relied on its military power in order to keep an influence over the

Caucasus region as well as in other regions. The (3) element to be considered is US policy. Nowadays, Washington makes no secret of the fact that it wants to avoid the hegemony of Russia over former Soviet Republics. That is why the US tried to build an oil pipeline without involving Russian territory. Also, it can be identified both Turkey and Iran's influence over the region. Both countries have a significant interest in the Caucasus, but at the present moment Turkey and Iran do not have the capability to keep sufficient influence in the region without the support of the US and Russia.<sup>7</sup>

In reality, Azerbaijan and Armenia could solve the dispute to their mutual benefit. A possible solution might help Armenia reconstruct its disturbed economic situation. But first, Armenians have to compromise and obey international law.<sup>8</sup> According to the regional conflict dimension of neorealism approach, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be specified under three key elements. The (1) element is the problematic ethnic geography in Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians constitute to being close to Armenia proper and as result of the 1991-1994 war the two territories are connected through the Lacin corridor. The (2) element is the mutual distrust and fear between Armenians and Azeries. In reality, the Armenians fear economical and political discrimination if they give up their occupied territories before the "Question of Nagorno-Karabakh" status is resolved. On the other hand let me mention that Azeries can never feel secure. However, Armenians occupied not only Nagorno-Karabakh, but also seven other provinces of Azerbaijan. The (3) element is the weak state structure in Azerbaijan. As we know, strong states have the ability to deal with any internal challenges to their territorial integrity. In fact, the government of Baku, as well as that of Yerevan is aware of these options. The other point is that a military solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not achievable in the near future.<sup>9</sup> More over, there is emerged one important question? When the oil revenue begins to flow into Azerbaijan, where will that money go? If conditions in the country do not change considerably, then without a doubt, that money will go into the pockets of the political elite. There is not even a chance that the money will

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid....p.16

<sup>8</sup> Karabağ'da Çözüm Bir Başka Bahara Kaldı

<sup>9</sup> Rosenkvist (2005)

be used to raise a strong army that could retake the occupied provinces. And the necessary changes will not come from one or even two clean elections. When H.

Aliiev came to power in 1993, he restored balance in foreign relation. H. Aliiev also reestablished political and economic control. But the ability of the circles around him engaged to corruption.<sup>10</sup> So there is one key point that the kind of corruption that is flourishing in Azerbaijan is almost completely destructive and almost completely out of control.

Finally, Rosenkvist M. A. came to the conclusion with two hypotheses in regard to neorealist approaches of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, that;

**Hypothesis1.** *The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains unresolved because of a US-Russia system level conflict dimension in the Caucasus*

**Hypothesis2.** *The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains unresolved because of the interplay between a US-Russia system level conflict dimension and an Armenia-Azerbaijan regional level conflict dimension in the Caucasus.*<sup>11</sup>

Nagorno-Karabakh is a part of Azerbaijan that is recognized by UN resolutions. In this regard, Armenians have to agree to share sovereignty on Nagorno-Karabakh. The unstable relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia share ties arising out of their common past. It can be explained through concepts such as: perception, concept of history, social construction and identity. While our world is transforming itself into a global scale, the theoretical analysis explaining everything in Realist approaches.<sup>12</sup> Thus, the values of these states have become apparent as a result of the globalization process, especially after the end of the Cold War.

### **a) Three axes of the Gaultung Conflict triangle in Nagorno-Karabakh case**

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<sup>10</sup> Nicol (2005)

<sup>11</sup> Ibid...p.p. 37/40

<sup>12</sup> Goldstein (2007, p.67)

The other perspective, from a theoretical point of view, is the term “Galtung conflict triangle” which is used by Taleh Ziyadov<sup>13</sup> in his paper-“The Galtung Triangle and Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”. The term “Galtung conflict triangle” or “the violence triangle” refers to a theoretical model developed by the Norwegian researcher J. Galtung, who analyzed the causes of violence in three phases: before violence, during violence and after violence. Taleh as well as Galtung used the three faces of violence, namely: direct violence (behavior), cultural violence and structural violence. Taleh also divided these categories into visible and invisible ones.

According to J. Galtung:

*“The visible effects of direct violence are known: the killed, the wounded, the displaced, the material damage, all hitting the civilians. But the invisible effects may be even more vicious: direct violence reinforces structural and cultural violence”.*<sup>14</sup>



Table 1: J. Galtung Conflict Triangle

Retrieved in December 12, 2008, from <http://them.polylog.org/5/fgj-en.htm>

<sup>13</sup> Taleh Ziyadov is a graduate of Edmund A. Walsh Scholl of Foreign Service, Georgetown University (Washington, US). He specializes in Eurasian affairs with an emphasis on energy, security and geopolitics in the Caspian region.

<sup>14</sup> Galtung (2004)

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has both asymmetric and symmetric aspects. The main point here is that: since the conflict emerged during the days of the Soviet Union both Azerbaijan and Armenia were a part of the USSR. Consequently the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is in asymmetry. We can see other points of asymmetry, namely: the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict emerged between the Armenians of the NK and Azerbaijan. But still there was the central government in Moscow that had direct control or influence over both the republics.

For the asymmetric conflict of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict it can show relationships between the Armenian minority of the Nagorno-Karabakh and the majority represented by the Azerbaijan Republic.

With the demise of the USSR, asymmetric conflict turns into symmetric conflict with the involvement of the Republic of Armenia. Thus, nowadays the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not only a “minority” or “majority” conflict, but also a conflict of two states.<sup>15</sup>

As I am going to analyze Galtung’s ‘structural violence’ in this conflict and as Taleh mentioned, the structural changes that took place before and after collapse of the USSR were important for both states. The current borders of Nagorno-Karabakh came into existence in 1923. Actually, the USSR tried to prevent territorial disputes between the Azerbaijan government and Armenian minorities in Karabakh. Thus, Moscow government named the region as “Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast” (NKAO).

Armenians insisted on the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenian side. But only during the Gorbachev period did they work to strengthen this aim. The USSR did not give much attention to this issue. The unification of the NKAO with Armenia was an attempt to change “the structure” or the status quo. Before Moscow returned the real jurisdiction of the NKAO back to Azerbaijan, clashes between the two communities had already taken place. In 1991, Azerbaijan declared its independence from the USSR and a few months later abolished the autonomous status of the NKAO. Meanwhile, the Armenia Republic declared its independence on September, 1991. However, the NK Armenians announced their separation from Azerbaijan in January 1992. Thus, later in 1992 Azerbaijan and Armenia were recognized by the UN within the borders as during the USSR period. Another point is that none of the UN member states, including the Republic of Armenia has recognized the self-proclaimed republic of Nagorno-

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<sup>15</sup> Ziyadov



Karabakh. Actually, as we understood the structural aspect of the NK conflict involves the issue of territorial integrity versus the right for self-determination.<sup>16</sup>

The other side of the coin of this violence is cultural which I will attempt to analyze using the Taleh view. Taleh has said that Armenians and Turks originally lived in peace, side by side, but the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century were marked with brutality, ethnic cleansing and massacres on both sides: especially during the 1915 “Armenian genocide”. It has gone down in history but no-one can prove what actually happened. However, this event-“Genocide” lives on in the memory of Armenians.

Thus, Armenians who were in the “Armenian Diaspora” and who played a vital role in military support of NK Armenians meant “being a survivor of genocide and therefore a member of a community of sufferers”.<sup>17</sup> Actually, Armenians in Armenia and in the NKAO lived under different circumstances. Therefore, this myth (unification “old territories” of the “Big Armenia”) became reality when the USSR began to collapse. In reality, this was a time when old myths and perceptions began to be visible again. As a result Armenians, after the Karabakh movement in 1988, began to fear that “genocide” would be carried against those Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, we clarified that myths were an inseparable part of the NK conflict.

In the behavior characteristic of the triangle, we can identify that the killing of two Azerbaijani males in Askeran, plus the Khojali massacre were in effect the main triggers that escalated the conflict. However for Armenians the reason was the “Sumgait programs” which led Armenians to believe that their national identity was in danger and Armenians had to fight for survival.<sup>18</sup>

“The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” seems to fit very well into certain established theories. However, it is the task of scholars to use existing theories and adjust them to any kind of conflicts, additionally,

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid...p.5-6

<sup>17</sup> Panossian (2002)

<sup>18</sup> Ziyadov

trying to find models and mechanisms. Particularly in an extremely complicated case like “The Nagorno Karabakh conflict”, it is highly possible that an ultimate solution will include theoretical innovations.

## ***Chapter 3***

### ***The Post-Soviet Transcaucasia within new Geopolitical Framework***

Geopolitical strategy has made the Caucasus what it is over many centuries, on one hand through the Ottoman, Safavids and Russian Empires, on the other through Europe, China, and India. Various Empires control of the trade routes in this region took priority, in both an economical sphere and in military power.

Caucasus underwent its dangers in the 19th century. The Russian Empire, after a long struggle over the region, invaded Caucasus and took over borders with Iran and the Ottoman Empire.

Russia tried to strengthen the defense of its own empire. That is why Russia abolished the khanate in Azerbaijan and the kingdom of Georgia. Instead of these khanates, the Russian empire established Russian provinces in the region. Also, Russia endeavored to change the ethnic population in the region, especially closer to the border. Russia's first move was to settle the Christian population close to the border with the Ottoman Empire.<sup>19</sup>

This area included population both from Iran and from the Ottoman Empire. I think it is very likely that villages and settlements, which were established by Russia, still remain in the territory of Azerbaijan and close to the border. Despite its aggression and empire policy, Russia could not prevent a national movement from the minority groups and the population of South Caucasus wanting independence. After the 1917 revolution Czarism collapsed and there emerged a chance for independence.

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<sup>19</sup> *Doqovori Rossii* (1869, p.p. 58-60)

As a consequence of the collapse of the Czar Empire, three big states (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) became established in Caucasus. The Revolution in 1905 and in 1917 provided the spark for the uprising of these nations. Azeries and  
*Chapter 3*

Georgians lived together at this time. These nations crowded into the provinces during the Czar Empire. But Armenians are unsure about an ethnic claim.

Actually Armenians lived in Tiflis and in Yelizavetpol (its present name is Ganca, at that time Ganca was part of the Karabakh province) and the Armenian centre was situated in a church near Irevan. But actually in no other province, not even in Irevan, could we see that Armenians lived in crowded conditions.<sup>20</sup>

History by itself shows that at the beginning of the 20th century in Caucasus more provinces saw Azeries being crowded, as a population, rather than Armenians. During the First World War the great powers, occupied with dividing up the Ottoman Empire, promised to create an Armenian state in the northern-east part. Accordingly, Armenian national organizations began to activate and to take military action.. These national organizations struggled, along with Russia, against the Ottoman Empire within the Empire and outside Ottoman territory. The main aim of the Armenian National Organization was the break up of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>21</sup>

But according to outcomes of the First World War, Russia was not able to create an Armenian state within the territory of the Ottoman Empire. After the collapse of the Czar Empire, Armenian guardians decided to create their state in the south Caucasus.<sup>22</sup>

### **a) “Ancient ethnic hatred” discourse and historical root of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict**

Armenia primarily, before establishment of an Armenian state, thought about borders. Armenian began to give more attention to the Ecmiezin church, Irevan,

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<sup>20</sup> [www.visitarm.com/YerevanHistory.htm](http://www.visitarm.com/YerevanHistory.htm)

<sup>21</sup> Arutunyan (1971, p.296)

<sup>22</sup> Garabagh (2005, p.40)

Zengezur and Karabakh. As result of thought of the Ecmiezin church, aggression emerged between Armenians and Azeries in these territories. In spite of clashes in Baku and Ganca, the Armenians gave full attention to the Karabakh and Zengezur regions. In 1918 Azerbaijan and Armenia gained their independence but, even so, the situation did not change in these territories (Zengezur, Karabakh). Meanwhile

a newly established Azerbaijan Republic created the Karabakh province. As a consequence of First World War action, English military allies came to Caucasus to maintain peace. General Tomson recognized the Karabakh province and tried to mediate between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the conflict.<sup>23</sup>

In 1920 the Azerbaijan Republic and then in 1921 the Armenian Republic, were invaded by Bolshevik Russia and the conflict remained unsolved. According to Soviet ideology all territories belonged to the USSR. So, it does not mean who is right or not. This situation helped Armenia transfer Zengezur to the Armenian side. But this was not enough for the Armenians. Armenian began to demand Karabakh from the USSR. An important point here is that Karabakh is not border territory and of course it means unification not only for Karabakh, but also unification of border territories of Azerbaijan to Armenia. Even the people in power, who were in the Azerbaijan government (with Armenian and Russian nationality), encouraged this idea. The Azerbaijan side protested strongly. That is why in 1923 on 8<sup>th</sup> October the Caucasus office of the Russian Communist Party gave autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>24</sup>

The foundation of Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous state was considered a triumph of Bolshevik USSR whether it was first step for the future conflict between states. The USSR, in particular, tried to prevent any possible superiority of Turkey over any sphere involving Azeries. For this reason the USSR pressured Azerbaijan more than other state of Caucasus. Central government constantly took it into consideration. So, Moscow sometimes raised the Armenian factor, despite being fully aware of the facts, just to prevent Turkey's national ethnic and religious influence over Azerbaijan. Armenia used this priority to realize their aim. Let us analyze it with historical fact such as with the instigation of Armenians. The USSR signed documents of deportation of Azerbaijanis from the territories of Armenia on 23 December 1947.<sup>25</sup> At the same time Armenian pretension grew in Nagorno-Karabakh.

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<sup>23</sup> Süleymanov (1998, p. 425)

<sup>24</sup> K istorii obrazovaniya Nagorno-Karabaxskoy Avtonomnoy Oblasti Azerbaydjana (1989, p.191)

<sup>25</sup> *On the genocide of Azerbaijanis* (1988, p.54)

Much to the nations regret, communist economical relationships prevented free economical activities. Also, Soviet Communist values over democracy prevented public freedom and liberty of nations. Problems that develop in the public sphere can also establish confrontation between nations. Moscow tries to cover up

problems superficially and to reestablish one, indivisible, Soviet nation. Central government supposed that all nations would transfer to nation without division under communism but had not taken into consideration the national elements of each nation. This, of course, created a source of dissatisfaction.

The matter which arose over Karabakh did not find its solution in the USSR period. Moscow approached this matter unwillingly. That is why, from time to time, this conflict reappears and Armenians wish to unify Karabakh with more endeavors each time.

Turkey was an ally of Germany during the Second World War. However, this situation created rivalry between Turkey and the USSR. The other point is that Turkey shared a border with the USSR and was close to its partner-Azerbaijan. The situation in the USSR was tense. Armenians took advantage of this situation immediately. Armenian guidance insisted that Turkey could intervene in the USSR from the Armenian-Turkish border. They suggested that they should change the Basarkecer district of Armenia with Kelbecer district of Azerbaijan and to create a buffer zone.<sup>26</sup> Irevan suggested that this territory be under their control. Actually, Armenia hoped to unify Kelbecer within their territory and to border Karabakh. In other words, Karabakh would be the centre of gravity of this conflict.

In 1945, the Armenian government again demanded unification of Karabakh. By all possible available means, Armenia tried to pursue the development of this area in order that it belongs to Armenia.<sup>27</sup>

Stalin approached this Armenian proposal seriously and he accepted change of he national border. He saw Azerbaijan territories as being broken into pieces. With the special order of Stalin this issue was charged to Malenkov (Central Committee of the Communist party of the USSR). Melenkov sent a letter to the Azerbaijan government at Stalin's request asking for unification of Karabakh to Armenia. Of course, Azerbaijan rejected the request and stood its ground on this issue. The Azerbaijan side stated that many minorities lived in USSR territories

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<sup>26</sup> Musayev (1999, p.104)

<sup>27</sup> Ibid....p.159

and if the USSR had tried to solve problems like that no conflict would arise between nations. Also the Azerbaijan side indicated that Karabakh had no border with Armenia, so how could Armenia demand unification. They also argued that many Azerbaijanis lived in Armenia. Rather than Karabakh, Azerbaijan would

demand these border territories. Also instead of Karabakh Azerbaijan would demand territories from Georgia. Additionally, Azerbaijan would demand territories in Dagestan. Azerbaijanis lived in all these territories. However, the Azerbaijan government proved that this idea was absurd.<sup>28</sup> After this strong response from the Azerbaijan side USSR gave up his goal.

In 1948 unification of the Karabakh conflict rose again and again Armenians began to demand Karabakh.<sup>29</sup> This issue was again argued in Central government (Moscow). Once again the Azerbaijan side proved that an ethnic problem was not the same as a territorial problem. This was not a right argument.

Last 60 years in the 20th century, Armenia rose again and again. This time Armenians demanded Karabakh from the new politician in the USSR, N. Kursov. They emphasized that development of Karabakh belonged only to Armenia. Again Central government liaised with Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan government demonstrated that unification in such a way would simply raise conflict between the nations and that this was dangerous for the region, and critical for the USSR itself. This argument was considered by Moscow and Kursov sent a message to the Armenians stating that if this situation was not adequate for them, it was possible to deport Armenians from Karabakh to Armenia. In that case, it did not need unification of Karabakh to Armenia.<sup>30</sup>

After Kursov, L. Brejnev came to power, under his new leadership; this issue was brought to his attention. Again, all considerations from each side were discussed. Armenians still hoped that maybe under the new leadership one day their dream would be realized. But Brejnev also rejected unification of Karabakh to Armenia. After the death of Brejnev, Armenians renewed activity over the Karabakh conflict. In a period of depression, democratic reformation in the social sphere, a period of chaos and anarchy, Armenia tried seriously to change the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. I would like to point out that during this period, more Azerbaijanis lived in Armenian territory than Armenians lived in Azerbaijan territory. For some reason, it was not considered by the Azeri minority who lived in

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<sup>28</sup> "Zerkalo" qəzeti (20.09.2003)

<sup>29</sup> Abdullayev (1995, p.75)

<sup>30</sup> Ibid...p.76

Armenian territory. The Armenian factor played a more distinct, important role in Central government.

Earlier the Karabakh problem was a problem shared only by the government, but after 80 years “Karabakh conflict” was shared by the nation and here propaganda played an important role. Armenians began a system of “ethnic cleansing” to achieve their aim. There are a lot of facts available in the archives. In 1984 a small child was brutally killed and a slogan of “ethnic cleansing” of Turks from the territory of Karabakh was propagated.<sup>31</sup>

“Monumental sculpture” which was published in 1984 in Moscow and another publication “Legal aspect of USSR” which was published in 1987 demonstrated Karabakh as Armenian territory.<sup>32</sup>

Later Garbachev came to power and this conflict even found international support. First the Armenian lobby pressured Central government and Garbachev didn’t refuse. On the contrary the Garbachev period brought chaos and during his time in office illegal armed groups emerged especially in the conflict territory. Garbachev attempted to abolish these groups but without success.

Actually Armenians did not just want unification of Karabakh with Armenia; they also took into consideration Azeris leaving the territory. According to 1989 records in the territory of Karabakh the population was 187,800 and just 145400 (77%) were Armenians and 40300 (21, 5%) were Azeris.<sup>33</sup> But after ethnic cleansing no Azeris have lived in Karabakh.

The Karabakh conflict has brought such tragedy into the lives of the people. The damage, including material damage, has been calculated at around 60 billion dollars.<sup>34</sup> The Azerbaijan side has been more affected by both the material and spiritual cost than the Armenians, since the tragedy emerged on Azerbaijan territory.

## **b) Implication of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the local to the global scale**

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<sup>31</sup> Rzayev (1997, p.29)

<sup>32</sup> Pompeyev(1992, p.25)

<sup>33</sup> Garabagh (2005, p.74)

<sup>34</sup> *The beginning of the Garabagh conflict* (2005, p.2)

The Karabakh conflict began with ethnic problems but attracted adequate interested sides around it in a short time. After demise of the USSR, the Karabakh conflict remained as an international dispute between independent states. One point is that this conflict emerged at such a time and place that attracted regional powers. This of course prolonged the situation.

The USSR appreciated the position of South Caucasus and was reluctant to lose both South Caucasus and Azerbaijan. Firstly, Azerbaijan was included in the security band of the USSR. During the USSR years this band was a shield against Turkey and Iran from the Azerbaijan border. At the same time, the central headquarters of Asia and Caucasus headquarters were situated in Baku. Azerbaijan distinguished itself with its economical opportunities from other former USSR states. It assumed adequate importance for the USSR. There were so few republics in the USSR able to provide everything for themselves but Azerbaijan was able to do so. Azerbaijan, with its big economical potential played a leading role in Caucasus. For this reason, to loose Azerbaijan meant to loose all Caucasus and to loose control over USSR's former states.

Garbachev brought renovation. The Economical sphere had not become democratic, also a social-political relationship was under strict supervision and had taken group values from the democratic values. This situation has seen with relationships between nations as in other spheres. Later, this situation established national controversy between former states of the USSR.

The Azerbaijan side realized that its national right was not protected by the USSR and that the USSR tried to defend the Armenians. The USSR tried to destroy the border. Azerbaijan began struggle for independence. Even at this time "Central government" (Moscow) did not make any effort to solve the ethno-territorial problem. On the contrary, Moscow used this situation to bind Azerbaijan and the Armenian side to the "Central government".

That is to say, "Central government" refused to lose South Caucasus. On the contrary, Moscow set this conflict alight. Moscow thought that in this situation both sides would come closer to "Central government" and try to solve their problems with Moscow. "Central government" considered itself to be the key figure for the solution of this dispute.

The unsolved Karabakh dispute established more problems than before. Gradually, the USSR weakened and finally collapsed. The unresolved Karabakh



problem damaged faith in multinational republics and they began to move away from “Central government”. All these states joined in the struggle for independence.

In other words, the Karabakh dispute was a big mistake for “Central government”. Moscow did not appreciate the real situation. Conflict under “ethnic cleansing” and separatism did not improve its direction.

New geopolitical situations had emerged in Caucasus. If earlier, Iran, the USSR and Turkey had played the most important role in the region, after the collapse of the USSR the new independent Caucasus republics began to play an important role. Even great powers searched for a place in this region. The Middle East and Black Sea region states were seen as important players in the region.

Actually, the interests of both west and east met in the Caucasus. This was the point of intersection of great powers in the region. Azerbaijan has a geo-strategy territory linking East with West and South with North. Each state tries to earn collaboration or cooperation with Caucasus states and even to earn strategic routes going through to Asia. Russia, despite the situation tried to strengthen its standing in Caucasus. Also, Eastern countries in ethical-religious cases tried to expand their superiority over Caucasus. Sometimes the interest of these states was not linked. Their interests were distinguished from each-other. Prolonging the Karabakh conflict belonged to the perspective and interest of these states in Caucasus.

Also, after the collapse of the USSR, Caucasus changed the point of intersection to a different political-ideological platform. This platform tried to strengthen in the region and it adversely affected the conflict ideology.

Caucasus is a region rich with world reserves. Following the collapse of the USSR many great powers, even Russian itself, tried to use these reserves. It made the region so attractive. The other important point is to do with reserves of the Caspian base. So, a struggle over the reserves of the region strengthens competition among these states. Meanwhile, relationships between Caucasus states and great powers aiming to use these regional reserves, establishes a different perspective. Later, these diverse interests influenced the national controversy of the Karabakh conflict.

South Caucasus also links the Caspian base with the Black Sea base. The other point is that South Caucasus played an important role as a transit corridor to Europe in the transference of Asian energy reserves. Especially, transportation of

Asian energy reserves, without using the Iranian or Russian route, going through the Caucasus region strengthens the importance of this region. Accordingly, this perspective in South Caucasus is also interesting for Europe. It ensures a secure energy reserves' route for Europe.

The Geo-strategy of the region, made the Karabakh conflict a controversial issue among great and regional powers. It was emphasized the standpoint of Azerbaijan and Armenia parties in the Karabakh conflict. Despite this, regional powers and great powers also, have their aims over conflict in the region.

It can be appreciated the geo-strategic importance of the Karabakh conflict in the South Caucasus from a different perspectives. Such as: 1) with aggression to get superiority over the region, 2) losing their position by giving way to ongoing aggression, 3) to get a position in Caucasus region with the diverse perspective to the conflict.<sup>35</sup>

As a first step, Armenia with the invasion of Karabakh, achieved a new geopolitical sphere. As a second step there was the dread of losing its geopolitical position to Azerbaijan. Invasion of the territories would create a harder situation. As a third step, regional and great powers tried to maintain a neutral position and to demonstrate their diverse perspectives over the Karabakh conflict.

However, events indicated that Azerbaijan played an essential role in the South Caucasus. Economical development makes Azerbaijan stronger and more attractive in the region. Currently, the strengthening of Azerbaijan in the region is dependent on a solution to the Karabakh conflict.

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<sup>35</sup> According to my father's (dr. Mehman Suleymanov) observation

## ***Chapter 4***

### ***Standpoint of the Involved Sides in Regional Conflict Dimension***

Dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict why is so prolonged is debatable; both sides are interested in regional position and there are so many diverse thoughts and wishes. Meanwhile, regional and some of the great powers are in a different relationship with Caucasus states. Outsiders show their curiosity in the South Caucasus.

However, world policy is established in such a way that if a state wants to solve regional conflicts or disputes, it should consider the conception of great or regional powers first for without it, it could not reach a conclusion to the conflict. An International resolution to the Karabakh conflict is in this position. Sometimes the other side brings arguments and it is hard to establish where the truth lies.

The view of interested sides in the conflict also differs. Each side insists on his own honesty, but for many years they have been unable to reach a common consent. An interesting point here is that we could emphasize not only interested sides' approaches but also approaches of third side interest over the region and all of these positions are very important and urgent.

#### **a) Azerbaijan position in the resolution process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict**

The Azerbaijan side has declared that Armenians try to cover their actions in Karabakh under the protection of the self-independence of minorities in Karabakh. In reality, it was a pretext of Armenian on Azerbaijan territories and invasion of those territories by force without declaring war against Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has been a member of the UN since 1992. Therefore Azerbaijan entered the UN with borders during the USSR period and a territory of Karabakh was 86600 kvadrat kilometres.<sup>36</sup>

However, the border of the Azerbaijan republic has been recognized by world states. Actually, the territories of the Republic and the borders of the Azerbaijan republic have been included in the Constitutions. According to Constitution, the territory of Azerbaijan is indivisible.<sup>37</sup> The borders of any other state could change with the referendum. Trying to change the borders of Azerbaijan territories is an infringement on Azerbaijan sovereignty.

Another point is that conflictual territory is included in the territory of Azerbaijan and there is no available border with Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh is situated in the south-west side of Karabakh and this territory began to be called Nagorno-Karabakh in 1923. Before this date, there are no records of NK.

Azerbaijan was invaded by the Russian Empire in the 19th century, during the time of Bolshevik Russia in 1920, Karabakh was included in the territories of the Azerbaijan Republic. Escalation of

conflict between the states occurred with the invasion of seven districts around Karabakh. The invasion of these territories ended in October 1993.<sup>38</sup>

Up to the present date 14176 kvt kilometers have been invaded by the Armenians, this covers approximately 20 % of Azerbaijan territory.<sup>39</sup> The Azerbaijan side sees the resolution process of the conflict as the full guarantee of its own territory. The President of the Azerbaijan republic-I. Aliyev stressed this in his declaration. He also stressed that the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic was not a subject for discussion. It is not possible to discuss the Karabakh conflict within the inviolable sovereignty of Azerbaijan.<sup>40</sup>

First of all, Armenia has to leave Azerbaijan territories before sitting down to any discussion. Generally, Armenia supposes a divisibility of Azerbaijan territories

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<sup>36</sup> *Azerbaijan* (2007, p.36)

<sup>37</sup> Azərbaycan Respublikasının Konstitusiyası (1995, p. 6)

<sup>38</sup> *The beginning of the Garabagh conflict* (2005, p.2)

<sup>39</sup> *Azerbaijan* (2000, p.8)

<sup>40</sup> İlhamla İrelİ (07.07.2008)

under concession. However, Azerbaijan will not sit at the negotiation table before all Armenian soldiers are withdrawn from the invaded territories and all decisions will be discussed within the territorial inviolability of the Azerbaijan Republic.<sup>41</sup>

The Azerbaijan side, despite territorial integration, takes into consideration the security of the Karabakh region. It also states that protection of human rights in this territory must be included at the negotiation table. Armenians have exaggerated the right of minorities in the world arena according to international law. Armenians try to gain superiority regarding their truthfulness, in the division of Karabakh, by using the referendum route for their protection of human rights. However, the Foreign Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, E. Memmedyarov, has declared that the Azerbaijan side recognizes the self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh's fate. This principle of determination was indicated in both the UN proposal and Helsinki acts. He also emphasized that self-determination does not mean invasion of those territories where minorities are settled. If we analyze standards of international law we can see that sovereignty of any state is more important than any other rights.<sup>42</sup>

Azerbaijan recognizes the self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh within its territorial border and even declared this as an adherent that would give the highest autonomy to the Nagorno-Karabakh region in the world.<sup>43</sup>

Consent of the highest autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh by the Azerbaijan side is appreciated as a serious concession. Also, it is essential that self-determination of minorities must be reciprocal. During the USSR period Armenians lived in Azerbaijan territory as minorities and Azerbaijanis lived in Armenian territory as minorities with mutual consent. Armenians got autonomy, but Azerbaijanis were not given autonomy in Armenia. On the contrary, with the escalation of the Karabakh conflict Azerbaijanis were dismissed from Armenian territory. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijan side saw that the Armenians, with good fortune, had chosen their path and created the Armenian Republic. The Azerbaijan Republic could not establish a second state within the territory of Azerbaijan.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid

<sup>42</sup> Panarmenian network (14.09.2007)

<sup>43</sup> İlhamla İrelİ (07.07.2008)

<sup>44</sup> Ibid

The protection of human rights of every minority is the main policy of the Azerbaijan Republic. Even during the USSR period, Azerbaijan created a suitable situation for development in all spheres of the state. Statistics illustrated that averages for development in Nagorno-Karabakh were higher than in other regions of the Azerbaijan Republic.<sup>45</sup>

In the Resolution process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Azerbaijan side directed its other main aim to the return of displaced people to their native land. As it is known, approximately 40,000

Azeris lived in Nagorno-Karabakh. They had all been exposed to “ethnic cleansing”. Nowadays, in this territory, no Azeris live there. Moreover, 700,000 Azeris withdrew from the territories (seven districts) which Armenia invaded around Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>46</sup>

One billion people withdrew from their land. According to the Azerbaijan position, all displaced persons must return to their native land and must re-establish reciprocal relationships.

Also, the Azerbaijan side has indicated that the state would protect the safety of Armenian minorities in Nagorno-Karabakh, as if they were its own people. Protection will be strengthened with the Azerbaijan government and with the guarantee of international organizations.<sup>47</sup> In order to realize this aim, both sides must demonstrate mutual cooperation. Azerbaijan is interested in integration and in the security of Armenian minorities in its territory. Integration of Armenia with Azerbaijan will help integration of the whole region. With the resolution process of conflict, Armenia also can participate in the regional project with Azerbaijan. This integration would help Armenia out of its depression. It is noted that, the Azerbaijan budget will be five times higher than that of Armenia.<sup>48</sup>

The Azerbaijan side is also interested in humanitarian collaboration and in expanding cooperation in other spheres leading to a full solution of the Karabakh

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<sup>45</sup> *Garabagh* (2005, p.75)

<sup>46</sup> *The beginning of the Garabagh conflict* (2005, p.2-3)

<sup>47</sup> *Ermeni Tecavuzu*

<sup>48</sup> *Day.Az Ekonomika* ( 23.09.2008)

conflict. This cooperation will be the foundation of the new collaboration and security in the entire Caucasus. It can be established as the new “Caucasus house” for people who support peace.

## **b) Armenian position in the resolution process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict**

The Armenian position in the Karabakh conflict is distinguished from the Azerbaijan perspective and is totally controversial. Actually, Azerbaijan official representatives have declared that the Armenian position in the Karabakh conflict is against international law norms. Armenia emphasizes continually the self-independence of Armenians in Karabakh and under this aim they hope for the unification of Karabakh with Armenia. It is amazing that Armenians try to show their act to the media and the international world as a whole. Let us not fail to notice that all existing international decisions do not support the Armenian perspective and these agreements indicated territorial inviolability as the main documents. The Helsinki Acts- chapters III and IV of 1975 mentioned that the sovereignty of all states is inviolable. The Helsinki Act III- chapter VI revealed that no one can interfere to the domestic policy of another state. Chapter VIII emphasized that every nation is responsible for its own fate within the border of its state.<sup>49</sup>

In 2008, UN General Assembly Resolutions 62/243 and the EU Parliament Assembly resolution 1614 revealed that the Karabakh conflict should be solved within the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic. In reality, the Karabakh conflict is the territorial pretention of the Armenian side against Azerbaijan. Armenia sees this resolution in the unification of territories of Karabakh and around Karabakh to Armenia.

The Karabakh conflict completely accepted the structure of “Great Armenia” that appeared during the second part of 19th century. Armenia try to hide its true aim under restoration of border “Great Armenia”. According to Armenian sources Karabakh was the fifteenth province of “Great Armenia”<sup>50</sup> and now must belong to the Armenian Republic.

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<sup>49</sup> Day.Az Novosti Armenii (04.11.2008)

<sup>50</sup> Kazaryan. “Great Armenia” border did not change till 66 year before our century. “Great Armenia” divided between Pafiya and Roma. Great Armenian that time collapsed. Armenia left his territories, except Mesopotomiya and Korduyena to Roma and Pafiya. Even Avqust gave this territory to Atropat during first century before our era. That time

Actually, Armenia began to include extensive territories into their “Great Armenia”. In 1918, Armenia introduced a big project sharing interest of territorial integrity of “Great Armenia” to the US Senat. According to this project, the territories listed below should be included:

1. Six territories of North-East Turkey and Kilikya in the south
2. Caucasus Armenia
3. South Azerbaijan which is under control of Iran<sup>51</sup>

When Armenia claimed Caucasus Armenia it meant current day Armenia, part of Georgia, half Azerbaijan i.e (the South of Azerbaijan) that extended to the Caspian Sea. However, Armenia claimed South Azerbaijan-Astara, Erdebil, Qaradag, Tebriz, Xoy, Maku, Selmas and Urmiya.<sup>52</sup>

Nowadays Armenia lays claim to 400 000 kvd kilometers as the territory of “Great Armenia”.<sup>53</sup> Nagorno-Karabakh is also included in this claim. A convenient situation emerged when the USSR collapsed and Armenia immediately used this position for own intentions.

It is not important to prove the existence of Karabakh under the control of “Great Armenia”. The reality is that it seems as insignificant mark on the map which existed before this century. Even that theory is not proven. It is ridiculous that Armenia should try to prove that Nagorno-Karabakh was under control of “Great Armenia”. Actually, it was proven that Nagorno-Karabakh had never been under control of “Great Armenia” both by Azerbaijan and even by Armenian historians.

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according to sources, Albaniya (Current day Azerbaijan territory) was not included territorial integrity of Great Armenia. According to Qriqoryan church, Armenian captured territories of Albanya which they pretended current days. But sources (Pliniyi, Dion, Kassini, Plutrax) showed that time (1-4 century) Armenian was under Roma control and Albaniya was more independent than Great Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh during this time was under control of Ershagidler and then under control of miranidler. Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Albaniya.

<sup>51</sup> Seyidaqa (2002, p.38)

<sup>52</sup> Memmedzade (1927, p.29)

<sup>53</sup> Asadov (1999, p. 140)



According to those Armenian Constitution, “Great Armenia” was divided among states such as: Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the main aim of the Armenian nation was to get all its territories back. Historians suggest that current Armenia, with Nagorno –Karabakh, should be called Eastern Armenia.<sup>54</sup>

Thus, the Armenian position is defined. Armenian wishes for the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh unconditionally. This position, that Armenia supported, was maintained in all debates. In the resolution process of all discussion groups Armenia supported separatism through unification of Karabakh to Armenia and with intervention of Azerbaijan lands.

As a result, the Geo-political situation of the region changed completely. Occupation and aggression gained superiority over peaceful relationships between states in the region. The ignoring international law emerged as a threat in the region.

Armenians are falsely claiming historical monuments in the territories of Karabakh as a way of proof to the world. However, churches in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh have existed from the time of the Albanian Empire. Today, the Qandzasar church which was constructed by the Albanian Knyaz is known as an Armenian Church in the world.<sup>55</sup> Then invasion of Shusha, Arabic calligraphy has been rubbed off the water basin in Shusha and Armenian script inserted.<sup>56</sup>

Meanwhile, Nagorno-Karabakh is also important to Armenia economically. As I mentioned before, the development of Nagorno-Karabakh during the USSR period prevailed. No natural resources existed in Armenia. Armenian sees Nagorno-Karabakh as a main opportunity to increase economy. However, Nagorno-Karabakh is able to realize this.

Therefore, Armenia carried out Azeri “ethnic cleanings” in Karabakh and around Karabakh. By withdrawing Azeries from the region Armenia, aims to be the sole owner of the region. Armenian brutally killed approximately 800 000 Azeries

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<sup>54</sup> *Karabaxskaya problema kak sostavnaya cast Armyanskogo voprosa*

<sup>55</sup> Xelilov (1992, p.11-12)

<sup>56</sup> *Qarabag cozumü* (2006)

from the Karabakh region alone.<sup>57</sup> Even the names of villages in Karabakh were changed.<sup>58</sup>

Nowadays, the Armenian perspective is that Armenia does not agree to allow Azeris back to Nagorno-Karabakh. For Armenia this perspective means a return of territories.<sup>59</sup>

Armenia even considered impossible the returning of territories around Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian government regards all invaded territories as their own and considers returning these territories back as impossible. According to Armenian politician, territories in the north part of Nagorno-Karabakh are closer to Iran and the return of these territories could deprive Nagorno-Karabakh with the border of Iran. Another point is that the border with Azerbaijan can extend an additional 150 km and it can increase military expenditure for Armenia. The Liberation of Kelbecer district was accepted as a real threat both for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia thought that returning Kelbecer to Azerbaijan would improve the military position of the Azerbaijan side in Karabakh.<sup>60</sup>

Nagorno-Karabakh has been seen as a danger zone for the east side of Armenia. Safety of Armenia is the Nagorno-Karabakh, safety of Nagorno-Karabakh is the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenians try to keep these territories under control.<sup>61</sup>

Until now the Armenian position has been addressed to the OCSE in this way. That is why no one can come to a common decision at the negotiation table.

Armenia contends that this conflict emerged only between the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan itself. Here Armenia tries to draw the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to the negotiation table with the Azerbaijan side and so to extend “no war, no peace” situation. But, the Azerbaijan side pointed out that territories of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas were invaded by the Armenian Republic. Only the Armenian Republic is responsible for all the

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<sup>57</sup> *The beginning of the Garabagh conflict* (2005, p.2)

<sup>58</sup> Shaxnazaryan (13.11.08)

<sup>59</sup> “Miacum” trebuet prekratit podrivayushuyu ustoi armyanskoy qosudarstvonnoy politiku ustupok osvobojudeniya territorii

<sup>60</sup> Shaxnazaryan (13.11.08)

<sup>61</sup> Bezapastnost Artsaxa (01.11.2008)

actions. Azerbaijan can negotiate with the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh only after resolution of conflict on technical issues and in the establishment of trust between communities.

In additional, the declaration that Armenia and Azerbaijan signed on 2 November 2008 in Moscow. Nagorno-Karabakh was not included in the negotiations as an equal side.

Today no other states in Caucasus can develop without Azerbaijan support and cooperation in the region. Azerbaijan has a strong position in the region. But Armenia instead of forming a good relationship with Azerbaijan chooses aggression way against Azerbaijan. Accordingly, Armenia is creating disharmony between the states.

Finally it came to the D. C. Pugh's (Norwegian Refugee Council) thought on his approach of nationalism. However, he gave seven rules of nationalism

1. "If an area was ours for 500 years and yours for 50 years, it should belong to us. You are occupiers.
2. If an area was yours for 500 years and ours for 50 years, it should belong to us. Borders must not be changed.
3. If an area belonged to us 500 years ago but never since then, it should belong to us. It is the Cradle of our Nation
4. If majorities of our people live there, it must belong to us; they must enjoy the right of self-determination.
5. If a minority of our people live there, it must belong to us, they must be protected against your oppression
6. All the above rules apply to us but not you
7. Our dream of greatness is Historical Necessity, yours is Fascism.”<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Pugh (01.08.2001)

## *Chapter 5*

### *Strategy and Legal Dimension of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict*

#### **a) Instrumentalization of Nagorno-Karabakh increasing readiness for confrontation: Chronology of Separatism**

Demand for the Azerbaijan territories reappeared in the time of Garbochov. Armenians understood that, finally, they could achieve their aim.

In 1987 Armenia began its separatist action. In the same year, the Karabakh committee was established in Armenia. This committee's main aim was to widen propaganda within and outside Armenia between Armenians. Armenian tried to force the USSR to agree on this issue.

As a result, in 1987 terrorism was committed openly. Aggression in Armenia caused the death of two Azeri males in Armenia.<sup>63</sup>

The struggle over Karabakh has seen the mass deportation of Azerbaijanis from lands. Azerbaijanis, who lived in Mehri and Qafan villages, had seen this happen before in 1988.<sup>64</sup>

In the same year, violence was carried out against Azerbaijanis who lived in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian declared that they did not want to see Azerbaijanis in the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh and they had to abandon these territories.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Süleymanov (1994, p.8)

<sup>64</sup> Traqediya b dlinoyu 2 qoda (1990 , p.3)

<sup>65</sup> Abdullayev (1995, p.88)

As a result, Armenians began their mission in February 1988. Approximately, 3000 Azeris from Khankendi alone were exposed to ethnic cleansing in February 1988. This process was maintained within territories of Armenia.<sup>66</sup>

Strikes and meetings around the Nagorno-Karabakh debate increased to a level not seen before in Karabakh. Usually after such meetings the Armenians tried to get Azeris out of their houses by force.

In 1988 Armenia developed an armed force. "Central government" however did not see this behavior as serious. As a result of this force, in 1988, Armenians fought in the Kerkicahan village in the Khankendi district. Those living here with Azeri nationality finally abandoned this territory.<sup>67</sup>

The Leader of the "Karabakh" committee, ex-president of Armenia L. Ter-Petrosyan declared that if Armenia does not achieve their aims by law, they would try to achieve by force.<sup>68</sup> The idea of the establishment of Armenian self-defense groups in Armenia came from L. Ter-Petrosyan.<sup>69</sup> Armenia planned to send this illegal guardian to the territory of Azerbaijan.

At the end of 1988, separatist groups of this type were ready to attack. Even A. Manucharyan (active leader of this separatist group) in an interview to "Stern" journal announced that Armenian youths

were ready to attack and that they were well-armed. These youths were awaiting the signal. In another interview Manucharyan said that they could only unify Karabakh to Armenia by force.<sup>70</sup>

Even the International press, during this period, began to publish different articles about the armament of Armenians in the region. For instance, a correspondent from the Paris newspaper Klod Mari Vardo said that the "last period military equipment was coming from Livan to Armenia and at the border were unloading all types of equipment under the control of Armenians. For the first time you could not see any Russian soldiers at the border." During the civil war in

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<sup>66</sup> "Pravda" qəzeti (24.02.1988); Xronika NKAO: fevral 1988-fevral 1990 (1990, p.10)

<sup>67</sup> Erməni terrorizmi və cinayətləri Azərbaycanda, Türkiyədə və dünyada (1994, p.43)

<sup>68</sup> "Komsomolskaya pravda" qəzeti (03.01.1989)

<sup>69</sup> "İzvestiya" qəzeti (06.01.1989)

<sup>70</sup> "Komsomolskaya pravda" qəzeti (03.01.1989)

Karabakh, illegal separatist groups began to be seen more than before around Karabakh, around the capital of Azerbaijan and even in Yerevan.<sup>71</sup>

In summer 1989, Armenia established an ammunition depot in all the villages of Nagorno-Karabakh. Approximately 80 illegal terrorist groups began to struggle over the foundation of "Great Armenia".<sup>72</sup> In the second part of 1989 Armenians aged around 17-50, began to join "Armenian national self-defense groups" against Azerbaijanis.<sup>73</sup> During August-December in 1989 Armenians killed 52 people and injured about 166 people.<sup>74</sup> Let us note that the inner army of the USSR during that period was in Nagorno-Karabakh and did not do anything to prevent illegal actions. In other words, the guarantee of Armenian "separatism" was the military force of the USSR. Actually, Armenian attacked military bases of the USSR and took control of much military equipment. The governing body of the USSR just kept quite. For instance, during 1990 Armenians attacked the military bases of the USSR 131 times in Armenia and took away 6179 fire-arms (mortar, machine-gun, rifle, cannon, missile, explosive substances, armoured equipment).<sup>75</sup>

In 1990 attacks to the military bases increased and Armenian took away 2000 guns.<sup>76</sup> In the same year Armenians attacked the air force in Leninakan, later they attacked other air force bases in Armenia and as result of this attack they got away with 19 rockets.<sup>77</sup>

1012 machine-guns, automatic machine, and pistols were stolen from the military bases during the beginning of 1990.<sup>78</sup> During 1990 six big separatist groups already existed in Armenia. The "Armenian National Movement", "National

Destiny Organization", "Susanli David" and "Dashnaksutyun" were more active.<sup>79</sup> Finally Azerbaijan guidance appealed to Moscow to prevent illegal groups in the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic. The president of the USSR

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<sup>71</sup> Pompeyev (1992, p.101)

<sup>72</sup> Sobitiya vokruq NKAO v krivom zerkale falsifikatorov (1989, p.78)

<sup>73</sup> Xronika NKAO: fevral 1988-fevral 1990 (1990, p.32)

<sup>74</sup> "Azərbaycan SSR Ali Sovetinin məlumatı" jurnalı (1990)

<sup>75</sup> *Spravka Komissi Sobeta Nasionalnostey Verxovnoqo Soveta SSSR* (1990, p.p.16-17)

<sup>76</sup> "Krasnaya Zvezda" qəzeti (25.07.1990)

<sup>77</sup> "Leninskaya Znamya" qəzeti (31.08.1990)

<sup>78</sup> "Azərbaycan SSR Ali Sovetinin məlumatı" jurnalı (1990)

<sup>79</sup> "Bakinskiy Raboçiy" qəzeti (14.10.1990)

signed a decree of disarmament in 1990 on 25 July. But, it has not shown any determination to implement this decree. Later, the Armenian Parliament signed another decree about cessation of USSR execution on the territory of Armenia in 1990 on 31 July. Meanwhile, illegal groups still flourished. The leader of the Armenian National Army R. Vasilyan said that only idiots would give up arms and that Armenians would give up arms only when they died.<sup>80</sup>

There were 84 national conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1990. Approximately, 13 people died and 65 were wounded. Also, 280 cases of sabotage had been carried out around Karabakh and close to the Armenian border and 36 people had been killed and 71 people wounded.<sup>81</sup>

2723 guns, 694 explosive substances, 619 grenades, 2741 electro-detonators, 342 mortars and 70824 bullets were seen in Nagorno-Karabakh during 1990.<sup>82</sup> This was only part of the guns that were held in Karabakh at that time.

To prevent aggression of illegal groups in Karabakh and its surrounding, (also closer to Armenia) Azerbaijan appealed to the USSR in 1991 in April. The Azerbaijan side demanded that the USSR be responsible for the safety of Azerbaijan citizens. Because of that the USSR had to firm on its decision.

After this appeal USSR became to reclaim all illegal guns. In the same year around April-May near Khanlar, in Chaykend village the USSR military force carried out a military operation to bring about the disarmament of these illegal groups. Though this proved to be very difficult.

Thus, in 1991 on 30 August the Azerbaijan Parliament declared the “Restoration of Independency of Azerbaijan Republic”. On the same day, the Azerbaijan Parliament accepted a new declaration of establishment of new self-defense forces within the territory of the state.<sup>83</sup> This declaration founded the Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan Republic.

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<sup>80</sup> "Kommunist" qəzeti (31.08.1990)

<sup>81</sup> "Kommunist" qəzeti (10.01.1991)

<sup>82</sup> "Həyat" qəzeti (06.09.1991)

<sup>83</sup> "Xalq Ordusu" qəzeti (07.04.1992)

A weakened USSR could not prevent Armenian illegal groups. As I mentioned before, during USSR collaboration these groups were strengthened and their intent was against Azerbaijan. But the Azerbaijan side hoped that central government would assist them to prevent such illegal groups.

In 1991 in the autumn, a new period started for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This conflict considered USSR problems during this period, but after collaboration with USSR it became to be considered as conflict between two independent states. During all this time the Azerbaijan side hoped for assistance from the USSR but on the contrary, the Armenian side held all the armaments. All weapons and military equipment within the separatist groups were aimed against Azerbaijan. However, after collapse of the USSR Azerbaijan had nothing. There was one way to establish a military force. However the Armenian side already owned illegal groups.

Thus, at the end of 1991 attacks from Armenian separatists had increased around Nagorno-Karabakh, many villages were invaded.

In fact, the Russian military bases helped Armenians in their illegal actions. For instance, in 1992 on 26 February, the Russian 366 regiment assisted in the invasion of Khocali and massacre. Even Russian generals acknowledged this fact.<sup>84</sup> Let us emphasize that one of the commanders of an illegal group in Khocali, Seyran Oqanyan current is the Minister of Defense Ministry of the Armenian Republic.

Firstly, all villages within Nagorno-Karabakh were invaded and exposed to ethnic cleans. Later Armenians carried out the same aggression around Nagorno-Karabakh. There was nowhere safe. In 1993 in October, the invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh ended. However, on 9 May 1992 Shuha, on 18 May 1992 Lachin, on 2 April 1993 Kelbecer, on 23 July 1993 Agdam, on 23 August 1993 Fuzuli, on 23 August 1993 Cebrayil, on 31 August 1993 Qubadli and on 29 October 1993 Zengilan were invaded by Armenians. During this conflict the UN acknowledged four resolutions, one by one. These are below:

822 (on 30 April 1993), 853 (on 29 July 1993), 874(on 12 October 1993) and 884 (on 12 November 1993). All of these resolutions demanded the withdrawing of

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<sup>84</sup> *Activity of armenian terrorist organizations against Azerbaijan* (2005, p.3)



Armenian illegal groups from Azerbaijan land. But these resolutions have not been realized.

As a result of this conflict 20 000 people were killed and 50000 people were wounded. The damage to the Azerbaijan side by Armenia is shown below:

Settlements-890, Houses-150000, Public Buildings-7000, Schools-693, Kindergartens-855, Health Care Facilities-695, Libraries-927, Historical Monuments and Museums-464, Industrial and Agricultural Enterprises-6000 and etc<sup>85</sup>

## **b) Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the side of Legality:**

The legal point of this conflict is going to be analyzed from different perspectives. Firstly, it requires identifying concepts of self-determination and recognition.

Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh have always aimed for self-determination. When we reveal the concept it becomes obvious that it comes from the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century when President W. Wilson stated that each state for all nations, under the 14 Points. During the Soviet Union Armenians in Azerbaijan SSR aimed to separate from Azerbaijan and latter unify with the motherland of Armenian SSR.

Apparently, Azerbaijan and Armenian SSR had their own Constitution and moreover both republics were subject to the USSR Constitution.

One view that comes from the Armenian side is based on the fact that in order to have a right for self-determination members of the community should have a common language, culture, religion, ethnicity and history. In addition, the self-determination process should be applied to inhabitants under 'colonial' or 'alien' domination.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> The Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis (May 2000)

Their theory was also affirmed by the UN Charter – Article 1 (2), and 55<sup>87</sup> - in order to create a peace. However, this view has been completely opposed by the Azerbaijani side. The argument is that South Caucasus is a complicated region, in terms of ethnicity. There are 3 big nations –Armenian, Azerbaijan and Georgia - and they spread over the entire region. If we apply the self-determination right to the region after the break up of the Soviet Union, there should be the establishment of dozens of nation-states, since there are also other ethnic groups. Moreover, the intention of Armenians –to incorporate the region with Armenia in the beginning- was a violation of the USSR Constitution, Article 78 pointed out: “The territory of a Union Republic may not be altered without its consent. The boundaries between Union Republics may be altered by mutual agreement of the Republics concerned, subject to ratification by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”<sup>88</sup>

Since Azerbaijani SSR and the Moscow governments are opposed to the division of previously indicated country’s territorial integrity, the argument becomes invalid and recognition of the so-called ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’ is a violation of international law (in any case the country is not recognized by any state, even Armenia).

In addition to the UN Charter and the Constitution of the USSR, it can be also pointed to the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Under this both Armenia and Azerbaijan are members and are obviously obliged to carry out the principles. Article 3 emphasizes “the inviolability of state borders, the recognition of existing borders and rejection of unlawful territorial annexation”.<sup>89</sup>

From here we can understand that the Charter preserves territorial integrity of member states. In this case Nagorno-Karabakh ought to be under the administration of Baku.

Armenians held a referendum at the end of 1991, which was boycotted by Azerbaijani people and the former declared their independence in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. In addition, in 1994, on April 15, Armenia rejected the CIS Declaration, which was based on to “respect to the sovereignty, territorial

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<sup>87</sup> Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 1, Article 1 and Chapter 9, Article 55

<sup>88</sup> Constitution (Fundamental Law) of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , Article 78 (1977)

<sup>89</sup> Charter of the Commonwealth of the Independent States. Article 3

integrity and inviolability of borders of the participating states”.<sup>90</sup> It is obvious that during the former Soviet Union period, Armenians in Karabakh aimed to unify the region with Armenian SSR. However, this was problematic, both from the de jure side and political- de facto side. But then, when the Union collapsed, Armenians emphasized the principle of self-determination. Washington based analyst, Cornell S., stated that, when the issue comes to self-determination or in this case unification with Armenia, it should be based on democratic form, rather than use of the “ethnic cleansing” method.<sup>91</sup>

In the case of the ethno-territorial Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the concept of recognition started to be put on the agenda of the international arena in 1991. During the demise of the Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan were among the 15 newly established republics. Since both of them satisfied principles of statehood, having permanent population, defined territory, legitimate government and capacity to enter into relationship with other entities, both were recognized to be independent states.

The situation in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh was horrible. From the Armenian side, Armenians were operating raid attacks and civilian bombings. As the international law requires, in order to ‘legalize’ a state, there should be conducted a referendum. And this became a reality by the end of 1991 in Nagorno-Karabakh (at that time Armenia and Azerbaijan were already internationally recognized state). The consequence proved that the populations were recognized as independent. This legalized independence of Nagorno-Karabakh...

However, the process itself was illegal, since it was based on division of a country, Azerbaijan. In addition, there was also a pre-condition to conduct a referendum, which should be carried out in a democratic way.

In general, the use of military force against another country’s territorial integrity prohibits the ways to getting international recognition. The principle found its place under the UN Charter and the Charter of Paris that:

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<sup>90</sup> Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Azerbaijan, Armenian Aggression against Azerbaijan

<sup>91</sup> Cornell (1997, p.21)

“In accordance with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, we renew our pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any State or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles or purposes of those documents. We recall that non-compliance with Obligations under the Charter of the United Nations constitutes a violation of international law”<sup>92</sup>

From here it becomes obvious that, Armenia by use of military force violated the territorial integrity of neighboring Azerbaijan. Even though ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’ became an ‘independent state’ at the end of 1991, it completely lacks international recognition; Armenia still does not recognize it diplomatically or legally.

In addition, the artificially created ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’, after the referendum, the parliamentary election was held, in 1991, and the ‘Republic’ applied for the membership status to the UN, to the CIS and to a number of individual countries. Despite of their efforts to obtain international recognition, nothing has been done so far.<sup>93</sup>

Until 1996, Petrosyan L.T. was the President of Armenia. From the beginning he was considered to be a ‘hardliner’ from the official Baku; but the 1996 OSCE meeting, in Lisbon, changed his strategy. He became a pragmatic and realized that it is almost impossible to integrate the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the occupied adjacent territory with Armenia or to grant international recognition to self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>94</sup> The reason comes from the fact that Azerbaijan at that time officially exported Caspian oil to Novorossiysk, a Russian port, and the economy started to grow. In addition, at that time Armenia was in a blockade situation (as currently): from the western side of Turkey and from the eastern side Azerbaijan closed borders. This had a negative impact on Armenian trade and on other relationships with the rest of the world.

The President of Armenia aimed to return the occupied adjacent territories and relocate Internally Displaced People, who have been scattered through different areas of Azerbaijan, to their homelands. Last, but not least, the status of Nagorno-

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<sup>92</sup> Mollazade(1993)

<sup>93</sup> Avakian (2005)

<sup>94</sup> Cornell (1999, p.p. 125-126)

Karabakh would be recognized afterwards.<sup>95</sup> Unfortunately, a changing international situation did not have an impact on Armenian foreign policy, since a coup was held and obviously Petrosyan L.T. was removed from the government; and nationalist Kocharian R. came to power (before that, he was the leader of the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”, 1991-1997, then PM of Armenia, 1997-98, and after that became the President).

According to Cornell S. the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is also identified from the commonwealth of independent states perspective. He also tries to identify the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as we mentioned above, from the constitution of the USSR and international legal principles.

Armenia and Azerbaijan are members of the CIS. The main principle of the CIS treaty is the inviolability of the borders of the constituent states. However the population in Nagorno-Karabakh declared themselves independent and applied to the CIS as an independent state. However, this was against treaty of the CIS. Thus no member state recognized the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>96</sup>

So far, the conflict was analyzed from the legal perspective. By relying on facts and international law we can conclude that by the end of collapse of the Soviet Union the desire of Armenians in the region accelerated and aimed to be integrated to their mother country, Armenia. However, Armenian policy has changed when the current warring parties became independent. At the same time, when Azerbaijani people happened to be subject to “ethnic cleansing” and Armenians declared independence in the Nagorno-Karabakh. The principal reason from the Armenian side was the right for self-determination, in which they closed their eyes to the use of massive military force against their Azerbaijani compatriots.

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<sup>95</sup> Holliway

<sup>96</sup> Cronell (1997)

## ***Chapter 6***

### ***Politics in the South Caucasian as a Model of the International Involvement***

After demise of the USSR, there emerged a new state in the region and this forced Russia to deal with their options. Newly, independent states became an obstacle in the outlet for water. Apparently, the West looked at their position again. Later those states determined that they owned large resources of energy. But here also appeared new obstacles for the outlet to the West, such as that of Iran or the situation in Afghanistan.

#### **a) Russia's Soft Power Ambitions toward Nagorno-Karabakh conflict**

Many sovereign republics of Eurasia, after break up of USSR, have declared their independence. Therefore, a new geopolitics has emerged such as: area stretching from Eastern Europe to the Chinese border and from Siberia to South Asia. Russia as a successor leader of the former Soviet Union tries to maintain economic and political influence on the former Republics in all spheres. For instance: The conflict in Chechnya, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the conflict in Georgia have all been influenced by Moscow.

Moscow reorganized all the three independent Transcaucasia states: Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. In fact, for a short time Moscow did not demonstrate direct ambitions on them. Meanwhile, both in 1920 and in 1993 after the respective declaration of independence of these states, there emerged control over these states. These periods have similarities and differences. While in 1920 Bolshevik Russia invaded the Caucasian states militarily and incorporated them forcefully into the Soviet Union, Russia later, in 1990 was unable to realize this tactic again. However, Russia used other tactics to get control of Caucasus states as other former Soviet Union states. The other point here differentiates between the North and South Caucasus. As we know, the North Caucasus is part of Russian Federation under International law, whereas the South Caucasus consists of three

independent states. Thus Russia accepted less the independency of the South  
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Caucasus states. Politically, instead until now Moscow is continuing to keep South Caucasus under Russian influence.<sup>97</sup>

Basically, the other point is that a considerable high number of foreign companies in oil, finance and other sectors have been operating in these geostrategic areas since the demise of the Soviet Union.

Russia has two main reasons for being involved in the Caucasus. One is to protect ethnic Russians in the region; another is to maintain access to important resources for Russia.<sup>98</sup> On the other hand, Russia wants to reestablish control over the borders of the CIS (the Commonwealth of Independent States) with Turkey and Iran. Russia wished to send troops to Azerbaijan as did with Armenia and Georgia before. Caucasus is the “Near Abroad” for Russia. Russia plays the card of trying to step up military support for Armenia in order to force Azerbaijan to make concession. In fact Moscow tries to build an economic and security sphere of influence over Azerbaijan. Secondly, Russia tries to get control over the Azerbaijan energy sphere- oil. This perspective had been seen in the process of rejection of the Azerbaijan Caspian oil consortium in 1994.<sup>99</sup>

From the beginning of the founding of the CIS, Azerbaijan as well as Georgia took strict positions and tried to leave the Russian sphere of influence. Since 1991, Russian policy has declined in the region of Caucasus. In reality, independent Caucasian countries and especially Azerbaijan’s reorientation run toward the West. Traditional geopolitical rivalries with great powers such as: Turkey and Iran and competition for Caspian oil were two compelling factors that focused Russian attention on reestablishment dominance over the Caucasus states. With the strong liberation movement in the Baltic States, they took Western support. On the contrary, Azerbaijan and Georgia were left alone in their struggle for independence. Actually, one of the key goals of the Russian occupation of Chechnya and the Caucasus is the control of the “pipeline” that goes from Baku, via Chechen to a Russian Black Sea Port.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Cornell (1999)

<sup>98</sup> Jones (2000, p.12)

<sup>99</sup> Cornell (1997)

<sup>100</sup> Nuriyev (2000, p.142)

In fact, Russia has serious problems and is trying to manage with its own economic and political weaknesses. Thus, until Russia is able to resolve its own problems, it will hardly be a beneficial influence to the republics in the Southern

Tier such as: Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Currently, Russia has not defined his policy over the region, despite other states having well-defined regional foreign policy approaches. Actually, after break up of the USSR Western countries began to express their interest over the region till 1995. Later US secretary of state Strobe Talbot's notified that geography could not change and Russia would maintain influence in the region.<sup>101</sup>

Jones S.A. considers that Russia has played and will continue to play the role of spoiler in the Caucasus. Jones believed that this observation overstates Russian influence in the region as a great power. Author does not see Russia as a partner in the Caucasus region. Actually Russia tries to cooperate. In other hand Jones considers that Russia took the middle path. Meanwhile policies in Russia change very quickly. No other new leaders could determine Russian policy over the region.<sup>102</sup> As we understood, the Russian government does not always speak with a unified voice.

But till today, Russia remains engaged in the region. Russia always tries to compare itself to others-such as East and West. In fact this tendency is part of Russian policy-making.

Nowadays, the US shows a business interest in the Caspian region. So, Russian policy over the region has created tension. Russia could not invest much money in the region. Also Russia has a lack of institutions in the region. If the Russian financial crisis continues to deepen, there will be less money for aid and trade with former republics of the former Soviet Union. Later even Russian influence will weaken over the region. Jones believes that Russia will try to restore domination. In reality, the "hand of Moscow" has been mentioned as a reason for regional conflicts of the former USSR, but here another point is that a complete Russian withdrawal could also have a negative impact on the region. Russia continues to be a key to regional peacemaking.<sup>103</sup> Russian policy over the region has been driven with the increasing influence of other actors in the region. Actually the Russian –Azerbaijan relationship was very cold for 2000 years.

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<sup>101</sup> Jones (2000, p.13)

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.....p.13

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.....p.p. 13, 14



There has been personal dislike between both countries-such as between leaders Yeltsin B. and Alyev H. Thus, after 2001 the two countries came closer on questions such as: Caspian Sea energy resources and the Russian military

campaign in Chechnya. At the same time there were strong relationships between Russia and Armenia in economic and military spheres. Let me point out that Armenia is the only ally of Russia in the Caucasus. In fact, in all cases of conflict in the South Caucasus, Russia has been the only mediator allowed to break cease-fire agreements. Actually, a cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh was mediated in 1994 with the active participation of the Minister of Defense of Russia. Russian influence in Azerbaijan is focused on political factors. As we understand, Azerbaijan does not obtain Russian investment, loans or grants. Generally, Russian capital does not play a major role in the Azerbaijan economy. Experts today consider that Russia today along with other players in the region, is interested in the status quo-such as: “no war, no peace”.<sup>104</sup>

The main Russian intent has been to prevent the extension of Turkey and American influence in the region. In reality, this policy put Russia on a conflictual course with both Turkey and the US in the region.

Also it has led to strong alignment Russia with Iran. Here economic factors began to play an important role. Thus, the US attempts to isolate Iran in world politics. Of course, Iran faces serious problems with its participation in the world economy as well as world politics. The rapprochement with Russia meant Iran would need to throw out its protective role in the Caucasus and Central Asia. But despite this, an alliance with Iran enabled Russia to control Turkish influence over the region. Another point here is that Russia wants to prevent the development of a resource-rich Azerbaijan Republic and Iran shares Russia's intent.<sup>105</sup> The Cold war has ended but still now we can see factors that maintain these situations between the US and Russia in Caucasus as well as in other areas. Russia supplies nuclear reactors and sensitive technology to Iran, sells modern nuclear weapons equipment, military aircraft and warships to China and also pressures Azerbaijan for Russian's control of the Caspian Sea. Of course, the US is against all this action of Russia.<sup>106</sup>

Russia tries to keep Turkey and the US out of the sphere of influence and also tries to build strongly the Russian-Iranian relationship over time. Thus, Russia supports Iran's nuclear and missile technology, and not only in statements.

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<sup>104</sup> Gahramanova (2007)

<sup>105</sup> Freedman (1997,p.94)

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.....p.95

Nevertheless other examples are present. Russian arms delivered to Armenia passed through Iran in 1997. The geographic position shows us that Russia has no

border with Armenia. Consequently, the direct transfers can pass through Georgia. Of course, Georgia was against Russian action in this region. Without the knowledge of Georgia, Russia passed one billion armaments through Armenian territory. Nowadays after the “Georgian crisis” Russia could not continue this. However, there is other opportunity for Russia to pass armaments over the Caspian Sea to Iran and later to pass to Armenia.<sup>107</sup>

Azerbaijan came under pressure from Moscow to allow Russian bases on its territory, but later refused to do it. Nowadays, Moscow still maintains influence over Azerbaijan and its pro-Western leader-Aliyev H., to establish Russian military bases on Azeri territory. There have been numerous pressures to bring the Russian military to the territory. Aliyev tries to balance between Russia, Iran and Turkey. Western politicians thought that Aliyev tried to be closer to Moscow. However, Aliyev took Azerbaijan to back the CIS. He did not get far in a dialogue atmosphere with Russia. Moscow considered Aliyev’s policy too independent.

Thus, Moscow wished to weaken the military and political situation in the region. However, Moscow tried to play a “trump card” against Azerbaijan. It means Russia is going to support not only Karabakh Armenians but also the Lezgin national movement in the north of the country and the Talish one in the south. In fact, unlike homogeneous Armenia (after departure of Azeri minorities) Azerbaijan still remains a multinational state as well as Georgia and this situation is vulnerable to Russian manipulation.<sup>108</sup> Essentially, the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is situated in a possible strategic oil route from the Caspian Sea to Turkey, is the example for this manipulation in the region. In fact some analysts in the US believe that Moscow is manipulating many of the conflicts in the Caucasus to prevent the states in the region from moving out of the Russian orbit. Russia also brings into play the ethnic unrest to block the development of the pipelines to the current Russian network.<sup>109</sup>

Because of its geopolitical location, abundant natural recourses and political circumstances Azerbaijan will be at the centre of international politics and diplomacy for years to come. All of its neighbors maintain a strong interest in

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid.....p.96

<sup>108</sup> Nuriyev (2000, p.149)

<sup>109</sup> Gul (2008)

what happens to Azerbaijan. Russia claims the Caucasus as her legitimate sphere of influence and has concerns about security Caucasus and the possible spread of

Islamic fundamentalism (Iranian influence) and the potential alliance of Turkey and new secular Islamic states in the region. Finally, the Russian are suspicious of US “encroachment” that encourage democracy and development in the “near abroad”. Russia also has economic interests and claims on the energy resources of the Caspian. Russia wished to see these pipelines going through Russian territory.

Actually, what happens in Russia will have a significant impact on Azerbaijan as well as on the other Caucasus states and on the whole New Independent States.<sup>110</sup>

Today Russia benefits from the “frozen instability” in the Caucasus, which efficiently denies independence and economic development to the states in the region. It also delays exporting routes to the oil consortium in the area. Moscow had gone beyond words in establishing its power in the Caucasus. Russia actually, is following a policy of military basing in the Caucasus, which aims to control all future pipelines in the region. Russia wants to guarantee its economic and political influence in the NIS. Natural resources of the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan make it a geopolitically important region, which attracted all interested powers to the region.<sup>111</sup>

Competition between the West and Russia over mediation of the conflict creates serious geopolitical difficulties for stability and development of the region. Russia does not want to see the US as a major arbitrator in the Caucasus. However, Moscow wants to dominate in the region and always keep the Caucasus in its own sphere of influence. So, the solution to the conflict depends not only on the warring parties but also on whether the regional powers can resolve conflict or not.<sup>112</sup>

## **b) The awakening of US interests in the South-Caucasus**

Recently, the United States has become more active in the Southern Tiber. The US’s interest in the region has been indicated as four basic concepts, such as:  
1)strengthening regional economic mechanisms, 2)developing East-West energy

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<sup>110</sup> Nuriyev (2000, p.146)

<sup>111</sup> Ibid....p.147

<sup>112</sup> Ibid....p.145

and 3)transportation processes, nonproliferation and 4)providing support to conflict resolution efforts<sup>113</sup>. Additionally, there are geostrategic objectives for

further involvement of the US to region-like Iran's pressure in the region. The US wished to alter Iranian attitudes and behaviors regarding nuclear development. Thus, the US began to seek Azerbaijan's support. Actually, American appointment is focused mostly on economic goals, democracy promotion<sup>114</sup> and during Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika era; the US focused more on achieving Soviet cooperation on arms control issue. The US wanted to be sure that this position would reduce the Soviet military hazard to the US.<sup>115</sup>

Jones S.A. characterized the US "unofficial policy" as intent or effort to suit its own economic needs. The US would like to reduce its "dependence" on Arab reserves of oil/fuel. Actually, refining Caspian oil would broaden the US's oil-buying options. Thus, till now the US is one of the biggest players in theregion.<sup>116</sup> That's why we can see the US involvement in the conflict-resolution process. Currently, much pressure is applied on both sides to reach an agreement by a US decision-making process.<sup>117</sup> As Vafa Guluzade, foreign policy advisor to the president said: "Oil is politics. Everybody knows that. If we had no oil, all these oil companies that represent so many different countries would not have come here".<sup>118</sup>

There is one key point that Karabakh (unlike Abkhazia or South Ossetia) is not on Russia's border and was not populated by ethnic Russians. So it would be easier for the OSCE to play a major role there without passing over Russia. Thus, "Oil policy" has intensified the international community's desire to see an agreement reached in the conflict area. Also it is clear that oil interests have increasingly

tried to influence U.S policy in the region.<sup>119</sup> Meanwhile oil is not the only reason the United States is interested in the region.

However, oil has even more of a negative than a positive influence over the conflict resolution process. Azerbaijan's oil wealth makes strong the belief in

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid...p.145

<sup>114</sup> Welt (2006)

<sup>115</sup> Himmeireich (2005)

<sup>116</sup> Jones( 2000, p.18)

<sup>117</sup> Sabanadze (2002, p.11)

<sup>118</sup> *Speech of Vafa Guluzade*(1998)

<sup>119</sup> Aivazian (1998)

Baku that time is on its side and that there is less need to compromise because the country's position will improve in the future.<sup>120</sup> Consequently the US policy has gone beyond oil to maintain regional cooperation across the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea through Central Asia.<sup>121</sup>

Questions related to oil supplies, gas reserves and the security of energy supplies are of vital importance to the US's regional policy. Hence, Azerbaijan is an important country in this case. The United States wants to ensure that free access to the Caspian energy reserves is not hindered by rival countries in the region. However, we know that Russia and Iran are major rivals in the region. The United States wants to insure that neither Russia nor Iran controls the pipeline route. Also, the United States wants the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia (former USSR states) to become economically and politically independent, at least from Russia. That would guarantee that Moscow will not have influence over the region. An oil pipeline going from Azerbaijan to Georgia will ensure those two countries do not depend on Russia for their economy or for their security.<sup>122</sup> Being a leading super-power today, the US has become one of Azerbaijan's main partners in the international political arena. Considering the geostrategic location of Azerbaijan Republic, this partnership is a good pioneer for long-term stability and security in the region. More over, being the co chair of the OSCE Minsk Group and having great abilities to influence the positions of the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, nowadays the US can become the guarantor of the just solution of the conflict. Besides the above, the US needs to guarantee free and fair access for all parties to the oil fields of the Caucasus. Of course, here Russian interest, such as- for exportation and transportation of oil and gas to the region must be respected. Russia understands the American policy as an attempt to limit its influence in the Caucasus.<sup>123</sup>

According to Armenian sources US foreign policy is dividing towards the Caucasus into three time periods: 1991-94, 1995-2000, 2001-till now. Let me mention that before and during the Cold War, the Caucasus was not so much important in US bilateral relationships with the USSR, Turkey, Iran and China. Elizabeth Sherwood Randal served as US deputy Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia from 1994 to 1996. As she indicated at that time, "the US

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<sup>120</sup> Seismic shifts in Euroasia (2003)

<sup>121</sup> Cornell (1999)

<sup>122</sup> Raptis (1993)

<sup>123</sup> Nuriyev (2000, p.148)

was preoccupied with the four nuclear successor states, such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. No vital US interests seemed at stake in the region and

the Caucasus was considered to be strategically unimportant”.<sup>124</sup> Later both Georgia and Azerbaijan called for US support against Russian influence in the region. Unfortunately, these calls remained unanswered by the Clinton administration.<sup>125</sup>

Direct involvement of the US in the Nagorno-Karabakh war 1991-1994 was limited with the two specific measures-the Freedom Support Act and the Minsk Process. Let me point out that during these years the Minsk Process was so weak. The Freedom Support Act was a US aid program to help the former Soviet Republics to transform themselves into democracies and market economies. Due to an amendment in the Act (Section 907), the Azerbaijan Republic was prohibited from receiving a US aid program as long as Baku upheld its economic blockade of the Armenia Republic. Today energy has power over foreign policy of the whole world. If you are rich you can manipulate or control the world. Thus, Washington is still “dependent” on the stability and production capacity of oil-rich states such as the Middle East states. This is mainly because the price of oil is set globally, and the US economy is more sensitive to changes in the oil price than most other industrial countries. Being the world’s greatest oil importing country, the US also has an interest in being represented in all major oil provinces in the world.

In 1994 the ‘Deal of the Century’ shared significant US commercial interests over the region. In the years 1995–97 more than \$30 billions were invested in Azerbaijan’s oil sector. Several scholars such as: Khokhar and Wiberg-Jorgensen, Dekmejian and Simonian, and Magnusson argue that the oil companies were instrumental in moving the US foreign policy makers to realize the potential significance of the Azerbaijan side. In November 1999, Congress passed the Silk Road Strategy Act where is formulated a clear US policy for the Caucasus.<sup>126</sup>

*to assist in the development of infrastructure necessary for communications, transportation, education, health, and energy on an East-West axis in order to build strong international relations and commerce between those countries and the stable, democratic, and market-oriented*

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<sup>124</sup> Dekmejian and Simonian (2001)

<sup>125</sup> Ibid

<sup>126</sup> Rosenkvist ( 2005,p.23)

*of the Euro-Atlantic community; and to support United States business interests and investments in the region.*

<http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/regional/silkroad.html> [January 10, 2005]

However, the BTC (Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan) was criticized for being too long, too vulnerable, and too expensive. But there is an important point that it satisfied vital US interests such as: 1) routing the oil away from Russian control, 2) uploading the containment of Iran, 3) providing secure oil transit to Israel, 4) encouraging Turkey with transit revenues, and 5) creating an East-West energy transport corridor linking Central-Asia and the Caucasus to the West states.<sup>127</sup> Thus, we understood that BTC pipeline is a political project.

US support of the Azerbaijan side in the period 1991–94 would be reduced from receiving much needed oil transit revenues. However we can see that the widespread involvement of the foreign oil companies in Azerbaijan has made an effect on the US interest in the region. After the Lisbon Summit, the US shifted its weight from Armenia to Azerbaijan.

In the period 1995–2000 a number of peace-proposals were suggested by the Minsk Group. Most of them were based on the previous principles from the Lisbon Summit and acceptable to Azerbaijan, but not to Armenia.<sup>128</sup>

The September 11 events proved a turning point in the field of International Relations, bringing about significant changes in the US foreign and security priorities. This event increased the importance of the Caucasus and Caspian oil in US foreign policy. Actually, two important reasons involved US in the region. Firstly, the US could no longer depend on the Middle East. The National Energy Policy (2001) states that: “We need to strengthen our trade alliances, to deepen our dialogue with major oil producers, and to work for greater oil production in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, the Caspian, and other regions with abundant oil resources”. Secondly, the geopolitical significance of the Caucasus and cooperation against terrorism in the region. Thus, Azerbaijan became not only vital for access to Caspian oil, but also for supplying US bases in Central Asia. Additionally, a future staging area for US operations in Iran. The US-Azerbaijan

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<sup>127</sup> Cornell (1999)

<sup>128</sup> Ibid

cooperation increased the possibility of permanent US bases on Azerbaijani territories. Despite this, the US did not follow up its involvement in Azerbaijan after 9/11 with a serious effort to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict<sup>129</sup>. In fact the last

serious peace-effort by the US was held prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks – in April 2001 in Florida.

However the Armenia –US linkage is different from Azerbaijan. Let me mention something about Armenia –US cooperation. Actually, Armenian-US are dominated by three factors such as : 1)the lobbying of the US government by an important Diaspora; 2)Washington's desire to advance Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and 3) Armenian wish to hold Iran's influence in the Southern Caucasus.<sup>130</sup> In regard to this, Washington pushes Ankara and Yerevan towards normal relations. Because of this, officials in Washington want economic and strategic integration of the region, a better climate for more NATO cooperation in the Southern Caucasus and stability along the route of the BTC pipeline.

US rational people in government calculated that Azerbaijan is eager to fight and believe that Azeri generals are ready for war. According to Armenians though, the general staff of two western powers say that in case of any active military action in Karabakh, the Azerbaijani army may well lose their offensive capacity in just three weeks. But president Aliyev I. has declared several times that the military budget of the Azerbaijan Republic is equal to the whole economic budget of the Armenian Republic. Actually, the war position is problematic for Armenia and therefore Armenia will try to knock out Azerbaijan with just two-three blows. If war follows, Azerbaijan will try to strike the nuclear power plant in Metsamor and other vital centers in Armenia. In response, Armenia will destroy oil and gas facilities and oil and gas pipelines in Azerbaijan. In a couple of hours the west will lose 14-16 billion\$. If the Armenian forces try to destroy the oil-gas complex sponsored by the West, it will probably increase tension between regional powers and the US and the West will probably strike Armenian positions. Analysts think that probably this situation will not lead to Russian engagement. Russia as a unique ally of Armenia will interfere only if the Armenian territory is attacked by

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<sup>129</sup> Abbasov

<sup>130</sup> *Armenia: Internal Instability ahead* (2004)



regional powers. However, the US will become involved if Turkish forces interfere in the conflict area.<sup>131</sup>

For the US government, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has two faces: American domestic competition between the Armenian ethnic lobby and the oil companies and security and economic games among regional powers such as: Russia, Iran and Turkey.<sup>132</sup>

### **c) Turkey's strong ally from the beginning**

There are also ambiguous views of other players in this conflict, especially Turkey. After break up of the USSR, Azerbaijan was very open to Turkey's influence, foreign policy and actions. Since independence, President Aliiev H. has cultivated good relations with Turkey but at the same time has tried to balance those relations with other countries, such as: Russia and Iran.<sup>133</sup>

Azerbaijan for a number of reasons remained internationally isolated during the whole conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh. Meanwhile, Russia, Iran and the US pursued policies in the conflict tending towards Armenia. The only country in the region that has expressed its support for Azerbaijan was and still is Turkey. As we understand, Turkey is another important player in this game. Actually, much of the Caspian oil goes through the Bosphorus Straits. Here are economic benefits from the oil lines that could come through its Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Beyond the political and economic interests, the same culture and linguistic ties also link Azerbaijan and Turkey. In fact, Turkey sees Azerbaijan and the new Central Asia countries as its natural allies. But Turkey is presently too weak and this is because of its serious internal economic and political problems that are its main responsibilities in the region. However, its geopolitical location as well as cultural and historical ties with the Turkish societies of the Caucasus represents the hope of neo-Ottomans and great fear of Russians. Russia does not want Turks to be closer to each others –no border with Turkey.<sup>134</sup>

By late 1996, Jones S.A. was stating that Russia was now in a dominant position in it's "near abroad" and that Turkey's economic, political and diplomatic

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<sup>131</sup> Muradyan (2006)

<sup>132</sup> Sari

<sup>133</sup> Solomon (1998)

<sup>134</sup> Nuriyev (2000, p.147)

resources had allowed it to play a major role in the region. Turkish policy toward Azerbaijan has failed to secure direct political influence and economic benefits. For instance, even during the pro-Turkish administration of Azerbaijani president Abulfaz Elchibey, Turkey was unable to secure a regular and stable existence in Azerbaijan.<sup>135</sup>

Upon the dissolution of the USSR, Turkey was used as an example by the Western powers as the developmental model for the Muslim Republics: secular, democratic and market-oriented. In regard to this, Turkish regional policy has received US support. US wished to limit Russian influence and to hold Iranian influence in the Southern Tier.<sup>136</sup>

Domestic economic factors also affect Turkey playing an active role in the former Soviet southern states. Thus, its capital resources are also heavily engaged in the huge Ataturk Dam and Hydroelectric project and an extensive military modernization program. In addition, 30 percent of its expanding military budget goes to hold the Kurds.<sup>137</sup> Turkey also has a high foreign debt weight and an ineffective tax collection system, also privatization has lagged far behind target.<sup>138</sup>

Turkey's geopolitical position-that is linking Asia, Middle East and Europe-prevents concentration in any one area. Turkey also acts in the Balkans, the Aegean and in the Middle East and faces a long-standing Kurdish rebellion at home. Strategic engagement of Turkey cannot desist to concentrate exclusively in Transcaucasia.<sup>139</sup>

Ankara's relations with the Transcaucasia states (especially Azerbaijan) are predicated essentially on Turkey's economic objectives such as: the creation and expansion of markets for Turkish goods and services and the securing of energy resources in the region.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Jones (2000, p.56)

<sup>136</sup> Nation and Mastny (1998, p.p. 97-112)

<sup>137</sup> Jones (2000, p.59)

<sup>138</sup> Economic Intelligence Unit report, Turkey (1999)

<sup>139</sup> Jones (2000, p.59)

<sup>140</sup> Landau (1995)

Another aspect affecting Turkey's strategy in the region is its defense policy. Turkey is undergoing a large-scale, in other words a long –term defense modernization. The military's high status in policy making and violence in Kurdistan and the Transcaucasia are raised to justify this program. The program intends to build a modern force to ensure Turkish security.<sup>141</sup> The post-Soviet strategic vacuum in the Transcaucasia has caused Turkey to develop its regional interests immediately. However, domestic economic factors showed that Turkey cannot afford to conduct an activist regional policy. However, Ankara escapes the fact that efforts to play an active role, will increase tensions with Russia and Iran and this situation could lead to military challenges that it cannot or will not accept: for instance, intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan.

In fact, Turkey's chief objective throughout the Southern Tier apparently is access to economic markets, mainly in the energy sphere. To protect its energy sources from interruptions by Iran, Iraq or Russia, Turkey seeks a permanent pipeline linking it through Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, with Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Nowadays a strategic purpose is a leading position in the transport of Azerbaijani and Central Asia oil and gas to the Western states.<sup>142</sup>

Turkey is an influential actor in the Caucasus and Central Asia due to several reasons. Firstly, because of its geographical position in Asian and European states. Thus, Turkey does not only control important seaways and straits but also has the capacity of influencing economic and military affairs. Turkey takes a dynamic participation in international and regional organizations and considers itself as responsible for the protection of the peace and security in the region. Especially, Turkey played an important role in the organization of national structures of the Caucasus and Central Asian states.

Particular attention has been mentioned on the membership of the UN, OSCE and other international organizations. But despite this Turkey has less impact in the region than other regional powers. Nevertheless, Turkey's geopolitical position gives Turkey a considerable advantage over other players, great powers in region. Turkey as a member of NATO played and continues to play an important role in encouraging the participation of these countries in such NATO programs as the Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership for Cooperation.<sup>143</sup> Regional security has been important for Turkey because it does not want a confrontation

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<sup>141</sup> Jones (2000, p.60)

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.....p.60

<sup>143</sup> Nuriyev (2000)

between NATO and Russia and because Turkey also wants to obtain the economic benefits of access to the new markets. <sup>144</sup>

The change most affecting the scope of Ankara's Caucasus policy is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In 1991, Turkey demonstrated a policy of neutrality, which simultaneously presents itself as a mediator between the warring parties in conflict dispute. In regard to this, Turkish diplomats began to embark on shuttle diplomacy in the conflict zone. Then the Prime Minister Demirel defended his cautious policy by arguing that there was no legal reason for a Turkish intervention and he insisted on the Azeries had never requested such assistance from the Turkish side. <sup>145</sup> A group of Turkish members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council submitted a letter to the chairman of the organization. Essentially, the letter dealt with particular assistantship and asked for sanctions to provide the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azeri lands immediately <sup>146</sup>.

Domestic political quarrels complicated Ankara's early attempt at falsifying a neutral Karabakh policy. Foremost among the government's critics was the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, Alparslan Turkes, who at a very early date argued for Turkish military intervention in the war arguing that "Turkey cannot stand nonchalantly by while Azerbaijan's territory is being occupied". Former prime minister and leader of the Democratic Left Party, Bulent Ecevit argued that Turkey's rush to demonstrate unequivocal support for Azerbaijan might undermine Turkey's prestige in the region. The most significant challenges to the government came from major opposition leader and head of the Motherland Party-Mesut Yilmaz. He insisted on deploying troops along the Armenian border. At a later occasion, Turkey should arrange troops near the Armenian border and Nakhichevan to make precise the seriousness of its opposition-foreign policy to Armenia's behavior. Actually Turkey helped to impose Azerbaijan's economic blockade of Armenia, refusing to allow aid for that country to pass through Turkey. <sup>147</sup> Turkey has refused to establish full diplomatic relations to some extent because of Armenian support for the Karabakh separatists. Here also another point is that, the Armenian government did not recognize its border with Turkey.

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<sup>144</sup> Baran (2002)

<sup>145</sup> Jones (2000, p. 61)

<sup>146</sup> Maharramzade (2006)

<sup>147</sup> Jones(2000, p. 61)

More over, the Foreign Ministry of Turkey issued an official statement that Ankara would close its air space to Armenia. Turkey cut off all the ways of carrying humanitarian assistance to this country through its territory. Thus, Mr. Demirel called the permanent members of the Security Council of the UN to take an active role to stop the separatism and the occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>148</sup>

But on the contrary in 1989, President Ozal was asked by an American journalist about Turkey's position towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He gave an astonishing answer. He argued that being Shiite Muslims, Azeris were closer to Iran than to Turkey. This speech was interesting, illustrating the lack of information held by leading Turkish policy-makers. That time religious relations were more important than ethnic ties.<sup>149</sup> Later President Ozal T. wanted Azerbaijan to approve the Turkish secular structure-Muslim democratic model of government instead of the more conservative- Iranian version. Ex-President Elchibey A. of the Azerbaijan Republic said repeatedly that Turks and Azeri were "one nation, two states".<sup>150</sup>

After Elchibey, Aliyev H. came to power. This was a shifting from Turkish policy to Russian policy. Aliyev's replacing Elchibey was seen as a victory for Moscow. Later Aliyev showed himself as a formidable political player. Aliyev changed policy toward Russia with the joining to the CIS. But he refused to accept the stationing of Russian troops in Azerbaijan with respect for Turkey, it is clear that unlike Elchibey who gave priority to Turkey, Aliyev plays the Turkish card whenever it suits his purpose.<sup>151</sup>

There were also several reasons for keeping away from playing a significant role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As Cornell S. insists there are five factors that constrained Ankara in the formulation and achievement of its policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan.

A first doctrine is the principle of Kemalism. There are two potential exceptions to this doctrine such as: The Turks on Cyprus and perhaps the Mosul area of Northern Iraq (which is considered at the time of Ataturk belonging to Turkey). In the case of Azerbaijan these areas are seen as being an independent and sovereign country. Thus, Turkey should therefore not involve itself in the

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<sup>148</sup> Maharramzade (2006)

<sup>149</sup> Cornell (1999)

<sup>150</sup> Baran (2002)

<sup>151</sup> Jones (2000, p.62)

- conflict. It could take Turkey to face another independent state. In practice, Turkish decision-makers naturally realized that involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could lead to a further destabilization of the Caucasus.

- Secondly, is the Western Alliance. Western countries wanted to stay out of the conflict and with regard to this ideology they began openly to support Armenia. Also they forced Turkey not to involve itself on Azerbaijan's side. Additionally it was believed that Turkish involvement would increase the risk of an escalation of the conflict. Possibly, it would lead to confrontation between Turkey and Russia, also involving Iran. Turkey's relations with Western Europe give western powers a certain amount of influence over Turkey. Actually two aspects in particular ensured Turkey's obedience with the West

1. The first aspect is Turkey's dependence upon US military aid for its war against the Kurdish separatist-PKK organization in south east Anatolia. At that time the US gave his superiority to Armenia. Turkey feared that if they began to support Azerbaijan, the US would retaliate by cutting US military aid to Turkey.

2. The second aspect is Turkey's pursuit for full membership of the EU. In this context, Turkey has been in a negotiation process for a customs union with the EU. On the other hand, Turkish policy in the region- involving a normalization of relations with Armenia, could serve Turkey's importance as a stabilizing factor in the region and could establish a bridge between the Caucasus and Europe.

- Thirdly is Turkey's relation with Russia. This relation can be considered as respect or fear. Relationships with Moscow for political and also economical reasons give Turkey benefits. Indeed, till nowadays the large emerging Russian market has been penetrated by Turkish firms (especially in the construction field). Also, Turkey seems interested in purchasing arms from the Russian Federation for its war in the South-East against the Kurds. Additionally in every incident Turkey tried to involve itself with the Karabakh conflict.

- Fourthly, Ankara mainly puts pressure on Armenia in both a direct and indirect way. Armenians in the US have been active for recognition of the Ottoman persecutions on Armenians. Thus Ankara feared that any Turkish support for Azerbaijan would be inflated by the Armenian Diaspora in the West.

Fifthly, the international reaction which Turkey faced over the North Cyprus issue. In fact, certain equivalents can be drawn between Cyprus and Karabakh. Turkey according to international treaties reserves a guarantor right in Cyprus and the treaties between Turkey and the Soviet Union specify that Turkey must be consulted for an alteration of Nagorno-Karabakh's territorial association.<sup>152</sup>

It is on record that Armenian military forces also attacked Naxcivan in 1992. Turgut Ozal, the ex president of Turkey, insisted on sending Turkish military forces to the Naxcivan border with Armenia according to the arguments on the "Gars Agreement", signed between Turkey and the Soviet Union in 1921. The ex president demanded the Turkish government to send troops to the region. On the other hand, Yevgeniy Shapohnikov, the chief commander of the Union of the Independent States declared that "it could give way to the Third World War with such third party interference".<sup>153</sup> Mr. Shapohnikov's words limited the prospect of interference.

Suleyman Demirel, the former president of the Republic of Turkey, visited Baku in December 1995. It was a visit of great importance. Cooperation between the two countries reached its peak after these meetings and increased attempts to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkish officials declared their active meditative mission in the negotiations process under the Minsk Group after this visit.<sup>154</sup>

Changes in government and a complicated regional environment prevented Turkey from pursuing an activist policy in the region. However, Turkey tried to continue its relations with all involved great powers. The price Turkey had to pay for this was a disappointment over Azerbaijan and a loss of prestige in the Muslim republics of the former USSR. Despite this in the longer term Turkey intends to expand its cooperation with the Southern Tiers republics. There was no hope of replacing Russia as the dominant power in the region. Turkey is interested in expanding economic, cultural and scientific relations with the Transcaucasia states.<sup>155</sup>

Since the break-up of the USSR, Turkey from the beginning gave priority to Azerbaijan in its relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union. Thus

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<sup>152</sup> Cornell (1999)

<sup>153</sup> Maharramzade (2006 )

<sup>154</sup> Ibid

<sup>155</sup> Jones (2000, p.64)

Ankara recognized the independence of Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991. In the framework of their cooperation, Turkey concluded a number of economic and commercial agreements with Azerbaijan. Turkey began to beam Turkish state television channels into Azerbaijan. Further, Turkey has offered assistance in Azerbaijan's transition on the Latin alphabet by sending books and typewriters to Azerbaijan. However in following years, Turkey's image in Azerbaijan largely depended upon its policy and actions with respect to Karabakh.<sup>156</sup>

Suha Bolukbasi has outlined Turkey's foreign policy priorities in Azerbaijan as follows:

1. "Support for Azerbaijan's independence
2. Support for Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh
3. A desire to prevent or limit a Russian comeback in Transcaucasia
4. Participation in the Azerbaijani oil production and export of significant amounts of this oil through Turkey
5. Preserving a friendly, though not necessarily pan-Turkish, government in Baku"<sup>157</sup>

Turkey supports a cooperative environment in the Caucasus region without a stable market economy. Also, Turkey seeks a normalization of its relations with Armenia. Furthermore Turkey seeks to promote its economical influence in Transcaucasia and later to Central Asia. Therefore Turkey nowadays supports the "TRACECA" project.

Recently, Turkey has issued a "proposed platform" which will include Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. "If you have stability in the Caucasus, and added to that if you have trust and confidence, then you have the right climate for economic cooperation," (<http://www.newsweek.com/id/162306> ) Gul said. He mentioned that the region is of key importance in terms of energy resources and safe transportation of energy from the East to the West, as transportation, goes through Turkey. That is why Turkey tries to achieve an atmosphere of dialogue, so there is the right climate to resolve the problems in the region. "Instability in the Caucasus would be a sort of wall between the East and West, if you have

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<sup>156</sup> Cornell (1999)

<sup>157</sup> Bolukbasi (1997)



stability in the region, it could be a gate," he indicated in an interview with Newsweek magazine.<sup>158</sup>

#### **d) IRAN-good or bad neighborhood, historical background of relationships between states**

After demise of the USSR, newly independent states laid down the foundation for new relationships with great powers. In this way, Azerbaijan and Iran relationships became closer in the sphere of security and stability of the whole region.

Two negative concepts are clearly illustrated in Azerbaijan-Iran relationships. One of them is paniranism, or more correctly kesrevicilik. When Iranian scholars research history, they insist on "historical determinism". Paniranist scholars insist that ancient Azerbaijan territory once belonged to Iran. Azeri people once spoke in Azeri language-in the Old Persian language. But after migration of Turkish ancestors to this region their language (spoken now by people who live in the current Azerbaijan territory) was changed. So now, Paniranist want to realize the "Unity of Iran" in the region. As the Paniranist said before centuries "ari" clans lived in the current Azerbaijan territory, which is ancestor of Iranians.<sup>159</sup>

On the contrary after the collapse of the Arab emirates, Azeri monarchs came to power in Iran and were not forced to change their language. For a long time the Persian language dominated. But the Pehlevi regime rejected the existence of an Azerbaijanian national identity.

Another concept of the relationships between states are the religious ties. We can not dismiss the fact that both states are from Shiah branch. In the 16th century Safavids (Azeri monarchs) came to power and declared Shiah as the unique religious branch in the whole region. The aim was for the unification of Iran. Later there was separation from Turk world. Actually the monarch Nadir Efshar tried several times to be reconciled with other faiths.

In the 19th century Russia invaded Azerbaijan khanates de-facto. Two big wars led to the separation of the separated Azerbaijan khanates between Iran and

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<sup>158</sup> Gul: *Stabilized Caucasus Could be gate between east and West* (2008)

<sup>159</sup> Nesibzade (1997, p.p.81-92)

Russia (1804-1813, 1826-1828). But despite this Azeris had been coming and going since Stalin created the iron curtain between the two sides. Also Rza shah was so strict toward minorities in Iran. Paniranism again emerged in his period.<sup>160</sup>

In 1918 on 28 May Azerbaijan became independent. In Iran tension had increased that would affect south Azerbaijan. Independent Azerbaijan sent a declaration of independence to the Iran consulate but Iran refused to recognize this.<sup>161</sup>

In 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference, Iran presented an official memorandum demanding the Azerbaijanian areas of Baki, Derbend, Seki, Samaxi, Gence, Qarabag, Naxcivan and Irevan saying that these areas has belonged to Iranians in ancient times. However, the Iranian request was rejected. The Iranian demand had not been taken seriously.<sup>162</sup>

Later Iran came up with a new request, the unification of Azerbaijan with Iran. They said that in their opinion it would be expedient for both sides. When it was put forward in Baku, during the Paris Peace Conference, the Iranian Foreign Ministry tried to explain that it would be better for both sides.

Iran suggested confederation with Azerbaijan during a difficult time in Azerbaijan diplomacy. At that time the Paris Peace Conference did not rush to recognize the independency of Azerbaijan. Also there was the fear of military invasion from the Russian Empire. Everything had changed with the recognition of the Independency of Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference in 1920. But despite this, relationships between the states had developed<sup>163</sup> besides; we could see the struggle for independence in south Azerbaijan.

In 1920 Azerbaijan was invaded for a second time by Russia. So, Russia began to interfere in the North part of Iran (South Azerbaijan). Russia enjoyed privileges in north Azerbaijan to create the Soviet regime in Gilan. Of course, this policy had an effect on lifestyle in Southern Azerbaijan. During the Rza shah period

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<sup>160</sup>Nesibzade (2000, p.p.132-133)

<sup>161</sup> Azərbaycan Respublikasının Dövlət arxivində fond 894 siyahı 10 iş 31 vərəq 17

<sup>162</sup>Nesibzade (1996, p.p. 192-193)

<sup>163</sup> Azərbaycan Respublikasının Dövlət arxivində, fond 894, siyahı 10, is 139, vərəq 40-41

paniranism ideology increased. “Kesrevicilk” (the foundation of this movement was S. E. Kesrevi) movement got wide coverage in this period.<sup>164</sup>

Moreover Soviet policy was principally like Iranian policy. However Soviet policy in concerning some principles had been lost. In 1937 “Azerbaijan Turks” began to be called Azerbaijanis. The Alphabet had changed twice and the border closed. As we understand, both sides tried to separate North and South Azerbaijan from each-other. The Stalin policy was so strict.<sup>165</sup>

Thus, from the period (1918-1920) we can see that the Azerbaijan Republic devoted in Iran a great negative stereotype-opposite side. The Foundation of this stereotype was the “bias policy” in South Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, Iran considered that the Azerbaijan Republic belonged to them.

After 1989 relationships between Moscow and Tehran intensified. The AXC (Azerbaijan National Republic) party came to power. The Naxcivan branch of the AXC party completely changed the governmental structure. With the demand of economic, cultural and humanitarian aid the Naxcivan branch of AXC organized huge strikes near the Araz River. Later they agreed to remove the Soviet-Iran border. Of course, this was the spark for Russian aggression. The Foreign Minister of the Iran Islamic Republic displayed regret and considered that the period “bloody January” was an inner policy of Russia.<sup>166</sup>

Iran began to worry, when North Azerbaijan got its independence in 1991, but made no haste to recognize the independence of the Azerbaijan Republic. In 1991 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Iran Islamic Republic, Vilayeti discussed Russian confederation over newly independent states against a Western protectorate.<sup>167</sup>

Actually, Iran offered unification of North Azerbaijan to Iran. Therefore, Iran began to pressure South Azerbaijan, to take under its control all sphere of minorities. But Renaissance in North Azerbaijan created tension in Iran side. The Kiril alphabet was changed to the Latin. Iran began to promote the Cyrillic alphabet in North Azerbaijan and criticized the Latin alphabet. Also, Iran

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<sup>164</sup> Nesibzade (1997, p.231)

<sup>165</sup> Hunter (p.p. 10-11)

<sup>166</sup> Window; Rubinshtein and Smolanski (1995, p.96)

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.... p.96

promoted Shiahs (Islamic branch) in North Azerbaijan. Of course, here we have to mention the geopolitical interest of Iran.

- To prevent integration of the Independent Azerbaijan Republic into the world atmosphere, to prevent influence of the Azerbaijan Republic in South Azerbaijan
- To prevent Turkey and US geopolitical influence in the region
- To prevent harmony of the Turks in the world
- To establish an Islamic regime in the region
- To establish export market in Azerbaijan
- Also to influence Muslims situated in the North Caucasus, Middle Asia and over the Volga river<sup>168</sup>

The First president of the Azerbaijan Republic visited Iran. This was his first visit to a foreign country. Azerbaijan lifted its blockade of Naxcivan through the Iran railway. Also, in 1992 the foreign minister of Iran visited Azerbaijan. Later Mutallibov (first president of the Azerbaijan Republic) approached Iran with a new policy; that Azerbaijan would not attempt to influence South Azerbaijan. Mutallibov mentioned this was an Iranian inner policy.<sup>169</sup>

Officially, Tehran made an obligation to play the important role in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict as mediator. Iran was aware of tension in Caucasus, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh, but on the other hand was not interested in the regulation process in the region. Officially Tehran thought that it would be good if Baku was busy with problems around the conflict.

Actually, the mediation process of Iran ended with misfortune for Azerbaijan. In 1992 an armistice had been signed between Azerbaijan-Armenia with mediation process. But later, the Khocali tragedy was brought about by Armenians. Mutallibov retired soon after this tragedy. Onn 7-8 May 1992, an end to hostility was signed between Azerbaijan-Armenia with Iran acting as mediator. Later, the main city of Karabakh was invaded. However, it was as an indicator of Russian aggression that Azerbaijan had searched for a mediator. Meanwhile, Russia also indicated Iran as a negative influence in this region. Iran had given support superiority to Armenia during the mediation process and this also created negative thoughts against Iran.

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<sup>168</sup> Nesibzade (2000,p.p. 142-143)

<sup>169</sup> Avrasiya Dosyasi, cilt 2, sayi 1 (1995, p. 128)

After Mutallibov, Elcibey (chairman of AXC party) was elected in Azerbaijan. Mutallibov had chosen the Iran-Russian line, however Elcibey changed his position. He utilized the Turkey-West line. The Elcibey policy was analyzed in two parts: such as, 1) to reestablish parity between states and 2) to introduce subsistence of an Azerbaijan state in Iran. Despite this Iran tried to protect its superiority over the region.

During the Elcibey period Azerbaijanis rose in South Azerbaijan. In 1993 strikes that happened in Iran were an indicator of an increasing national movement. The strike Slogan was “the war is going on in Karabakh and Tebriz is looking on”. Local press began to write about the Karabakh conflict. The “Azerbaijan Republic” had been begun to be mentioned in the press. Faculty of Azerbaijan literature opened in Tebriz University. A new curriculum for this faculty was chosen.<sup>170</sup>

In 1993, a the Ganca rebellion Elcibey resigned and Aliyev H. came to power and of course aimed his policy towards Iran. We can distinguish Aliyev’s policy from that of Elcibey. Aliyev H. gave a big concession to Iran. Aliyev H. cancelled Elcibey’s “parity principle”. Iran broadcasting began to show programs in Azerbaijan. But suddenly Aliyev’s policy changed to the West-Turkey orientation. Of course, it caused aggression from Iran. This was a return to the Elcibey policy. In 1994 “Esrin muqavilesi” was signed in Baku. Later, Iran and Azerbaijan stepped up to a new era of relationships. Pipeline diplomacy established a new geopolitical policy in the region.<sup>171</sup>

Meanwhile, Iran expanded its relationship with Armenia. Iran began to insist on those “17 Azerbaijan-ancient Iranian lands” and wanted unification of them with Iran.<sup>172</sup> Also Iran pressed on the issue of Caspian status. However Iran kept the Russian position in the utilizing of Caspian reserves. Aliyev H. pretended he was closer to the Iran position, which was a lie.<sup>173</sup> Also, I have to mention in the west especially in the US, Iranian professors have tried to establish a theory against the Azerbaijan Republic-particularly against Azerbaijanis in the region. From, these professors I have to point out Sirin Hanter, Ahmed Aresi and est. their main thesis are that:

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<sup>170</sup> Nesibzade, (2000,p.p. 152-155)

<sup>171</sup> Comhuriye Eslami, 20 dey 1374

<sup>172</sup> Ibid

<sup>173</sup> “Ayna-Zerkalo”(18.04.1997 )or “Azadliq”(11.01.1997)

- “Azerbaijani problems” do not exist in Iran, this is just USSR sabotage.
- An Azerbaijan Republic can not exist; there is no potential for it. This is just an artificial government that will not exist.
- There is no adequate reserve in Caspian itself and the Azerbaijan side blew up the reserves in Caspian.
- Security of this region depends on relationships between the US and Iran.<sup>174</sup>

A relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan is not dependant on government policy or diplomatic maneuver. There is a sensible factor which impacts negatively on relationships between states. Approximately 42 billion Azerbaijanis live in the Southern Azerbaijan-Iranian part. It can be a most sensitive fact between them. The other factor is that Azerbaijan chose a Western strategy in region. Also, the oil factor creates rivalry between Iran and Azerbaijan. Here

emerges the question: Azerbaijanis have the “Karabakh conflict”, so why is the Iranian factor also important for them. Let us analyze it:

- Iran tries to change Western orientation of the Azerbaijan Republic. Both sides try not to see the contradiction between states.
- Azerbaijan is living in a sensitive time. The Economical and political integration affects its government. Azerbaijan tries to determine its borders. On the other hand, Iran also wants to change the Azerbaijan borders. Azerbaijanis must be ready for this crisis.
- Azerbaijan needs an alliance and the best alliance would be with South Azerbaijan.
- Finally, most Azeris live in Iran and Azerbaijan would be strong if they unified.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> Nesibzade (2000,p.p. 157-158)

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.....p.159

## *Chapter 7*

### ***Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on the International Stage- the attitude of International Organizations***

The Caucasus is a region of new states. The great powers are involved in the Caucasus where they tend to complicate the situation in the region. But the absence of real nation-states and democracy are the problems in the region and these are the main obstacles to regional security. Actually, all three states seek security but their sensitivity over security concerns in the region differs greatly. Azerbaijan sees its future security based on regional economic cooperation. But Armenia, because of its specific threat perception and its conflict with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, relies on its relationship with its Russian ally.

Russia, the US, Turkey and Iran as bilateral actors and the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and the Council of Europe (CoE) as multilateral actors have become increasingly active in conflict resolution process. Actually, the main international organizations-UN, NATO and EU have not become involved with the conflict resolution process and have left it to the OSCE Minsk Group.

#### **a) UN-failed mission or blindness of reality? Still Unrealized resolutions towards conflict?**

The UN first paid attention to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1992 after the Armenian offensive. In reality, the UN issued four resolutions to stop the offensive and withdraw all military forces from the occupied territories. However, Western institutions were tolerant of the involvement of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Generally, the UN has realized its assistance programs, such as UNDP, UNHCR, and UNOCHA. The UNHCR has played an important role in managing the

refugee crisis in Azerbaijan. Also, the UNCHR is involved with 570,000 Azeri IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh, 188,000 refugees from Armenia, 10,000

Chechnyians and 50,000 Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan to provide them with aid-food, healthcare, etc<sup>176</sup>.

During 1993 the United Nations Security Council adopted four resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Actually, the Security Council confirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani Republic.

With the Resolution 822 of 1993 the Security Council called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the immediate withdrawal of all forces from Azerbaijan territories.

In Resolution 853 of 29 July 1993 the Security Council criticized the taking of Agdam and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan.

Resolution 874 of 14 October 1993 supports the parties in the conflict to agree to the body able plan drawn up by the CSCE on 28 September 1993.<sup>177</sup>

However, October 4 2007 Azerbaijan declared that the UN Security Council is the only place to find a solution to the long-running Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov in the UN General Assembly indicated that international law and four relevant Security Council resolutions should form the legal basis of a resolution of the conflict. Meanwhile, Mammadyarov rejected the statement from his Armenian counterpart-Vartan Oskanian, who told the General Assembly that a Karabakh solution should be negotiated only through the OSCE.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> Natalie Sabanadze, *International involvement in the South Caucasus*, ECMI working paper No15, European Centre for Minority issue, February 2002

<sup>177</sup> Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, doc. 7182, report on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, 17 October 1994

<sup>178</sup> Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Azerbaijan says UN should solve Karabakh conflict, retrieved in 1 January 2009



In Resolution 884 , 1993, the Security Council "strongly urges the parties concerned to resume promptly and to make effective and permanent the cease-fire established as a result of the direct contacts undertaken with the assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation in support of the CSCE Minsk Group, and to continue to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict within the context of the

CSCE Minsk process and the "Adjusted timetable" as amended by the CSCE Minsk Group meeting in Vienna of 2 to 8 November 1993".<sup>179</sup>

## **b) NATO-indirect involvement in conflict resolution process**

Actually, NATO involved South Caucasus with his Partnership for Peace program and offered its peacekeeping force to be deployed in the conflict zone. This has bought, within the compass of NATO, efforts and activity of twenty-seven countries, from Central Europe going through Ukraine and Russia into Central Asia. Actually, NATO has given greater political meaning to Partnership for Peace by creating a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council that enables its forty-three members to help direct the course of PFP.<sup>180</sup>

In reality, NATO refrained from direct involvement in the conflict resolution process and focused on civil emergency planning, civil-military relations, defense policy and reform. Let me indicate that Armenian cooperation with NATO is limited. This is because of their cooperation with Russia for military assistance.

Actually, the desire for membership was boosted by NATO Secretary-General Robertson who mentioned that NATO's doors 'remain open' for everyone. Of course, Russia developed tensions that lost Georgia and Azerbaijan to NATO. Since 1992, Armenia's policy keeps a balance between Russia and the West. But the post-11 September mood has affected Armenia and its relations with NATO and especially with the US and Russia. Armenian leaders have stressed that Armenia is not seeking NATO membership.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> Ibid

<sup>180</sup>Elkhan E. Nuriyev, *Conflicts , Caspian Oil and NATO* in Gary K. Bertsch, *Crossroads and conflict: Security and foreign policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia* , Routledge Publishing, 2000, pg-150

<sup>181</sup> Bertil Nygren, *The Rebuilding of Greater Russia*,  
<http://books.google.com.tr/books?id= 2EYvr6GpYAC&pg=PA155&lpg=PA155&dq=NA TO+and+Karabakh+war+pdf&source=bl&ots=ElmCwhSr9Y&sig=Xr269DF0NSat->

Actually, the ex-head of Armenia, Robert Kocaryan, declared in his interview with the “Golos Armenia” newspaper that “Armenia is not going to join NATO”. But Kocaryan underlined that they hoped for cooperation with NATO, regarding security issues. However, later the Armenian National Assembly speaker -Artur

Bagdasaryan in his interview with the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine in April indicated that "Armenia's future is the European Union and NATO" and "Russia should not stand in our way to Europe".

Armenia based its national security on the Russian doctrine. Thus, Armenia will not be able to give up neither its political nor its military dependence on Russian policy in Caucasus. It seems that the most important reason is the increasing concern of NATO on the Nagorno Karabakh issue because Azerbaijan, which is in an active cooperation with NATO, tries to maintain the “Guarantor of the Independence of Azerbaijan.” Armenian though is changeable. In regard to this, they say “we are not going to join NATO or the EU”. Armenian is the only ally of Russia in Caucasus.

Now let us consider the situation that in a possible war between Armenia and Azerbaijan Russia is going to give full military support to Armenia and when NATO makes an effort to arrange the peace force for a peacemaking process, Russia and Armenia will not allow NATO to go ahead. In case of a conflict, the attitude of Armenia towards NATO will be limited because of the attitude of Russia and Iran in the region. As we understand it, NATO is losing time with Armenia. Sarkisyan, who pointed out the importance of Russia and Iran during a possible war, stated that he has mentioned that Yerevan’s approving the NATO forces would change the attitude of Russia and Iran which are against the deployment of NATO forces in the region.<sup>182</sup> The fact is that NATO’s official visits to the Caucasus show that their diplomatic mission has shown unequal interests in the three Caucasian states. But in reality, Azerbaijan is seeking a special partnership with NATO.<sup>183</sup>

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[ncHJtKKLccy5ak&hl=tr&sa=X&oi=book\\_result&resnum=5&ct=result#PPA158,M1](http://ncHJtKKLccy5ak&hl=tr&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=5&ct=result#PPA158,M1) ,  
retrieved in 30 December 2008

<sup>182</sup> Kocaryan: *Armenia is not going to join NATO*, Diplomatic Observer:  
[http://www.diplomaticobserver.com/news\\_read.asp?id=1441](http://www.diplomaticobserver.com/news_read.asp?id=1441) , retrieved in 30 December 2008

<sup>183</sup>Elkhan E. Nuriyev, *Conflicts , Casian Oil and NATO* in Gary K. Bertsch, Crossroads and conflict: Security and foreign policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, , Routledge Publishing, 2000, pg-150

Azerbaijan has been taking an active part in both NATO and in the PfP. After the US cancelled its trade restrictions in 2002 on Azerbaijan, Russia has been worried about the Azeri closer relations with the USA and especially with Turkey. In April 2004, President of the Azerbaijan Republic, Aliiev, for the first time officially stated that Azerbaijan would apply for NATO membership. However, in May Aliyev submitted Azerbaijan's IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan)

for future cooperation with NATO. So, from that time NATO began to worry about the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh zone.<sup>184</sup>

### **c) European Council-limited attitudes towards conflict area**

Basically, the EU's policy is limited in conflict areas with the specific programs such as TACIS, PCA and ENP. In reality, the EU has decided not to intervene directly in the negotiation mechanism of the conflict and to leave this to the UN and the OSCE. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries have been concerned over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for several years. Additionally, on 22 December 1991 Armenia applied for special guest status with the Parliamentary Assembly, followed by Azerbaijan on 24 January 1992. The applications that gave Armenia and Azerbaijan special guest status were not dependent on a solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In regard to this, finally on 4 October 1994 the Assembly adopted Recommendation 1247 on the enlargement of the Council of Europe. Thus, the Assembly decided that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are part of the Council of Europe area.<sup>185</sup>

Later, in December 2003 the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy where they recognized the promotion of good governance to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom the EU has close and mutual relations. In this context, finally the EU identified that they should have a more active participation in the problems of the South Caucasus as a neighboring region. Thus, in 2003 a European Union Special Representative was appointed to the region of South Caucasus. In 2006 this mandate was expanded to the "promotion of conflict resolution". Thus, a headquarter was

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<sup>184</sup> Bertil Nygren, *The Rebuilding of Greater Russia*, [http://books.google.com.tr/books?id= 2EYvr6GpYAC&pg=PA155&lpg=PA155&dq=NA TO+and+Karabakh+war+pdf&source=bl&ots=ElmCwhSr9Y&sig=Xr269DF0NSat-ncHJtKKLlcy5ak&hl=tr&sa=X&oi=book\\_result&resnum=5&ct=result#PPA158,M1](http://books.google.com.tr/books?id= 2EYvr6GpYAC&pg=PA155&lpg=PA155&dq=NA TO+and+Karabakh+war+pdf&source=bl&ots=ElmCwhSr9Y&sig=Xr269DF0NSat-ncHJtKKLlcy5ak&hl=tr&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=5&ct=result#PPA158,M1), retrieved in 30 December 2008, , p-152-153

<sup>185</sup> Parliamentary Assembly, Doc.7182, Report on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, 17 October 1994

established in Brussels.<sup>186</sup> Actually, the Council of Europe limits its role for the stipulation of dialogue. PACE adopted Resolutions 1119 (1997), 1690 (2005) and recently 1416 (2005) which gave advice to comply with the UN Security Council

Resolutions 822, 853, 874, 884. The Council of Europe made it clear that it is not going to change the structure or the work principles of the Minsk Group of the OSCE. Later, the Political Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe set up an “ad- hoc”, a sub-commission on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with dialogue between the Parliaments of Armenia and Azerbaijan.<sup>187</sup>

#### **d) Is the EU the next stage in a negotiation process of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?**

The 2004 enlargement policy of the EU came closer to the South Caucasus region. For the first time the EU focused on the conflicts such as: Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their resolutions. Actually, the EU seeks to avoid instability on its borders. That is why; the EU seeks for well-governed countries. Later, the EU became interested in the South Caucasus to guarantee access to Caspian oil and gas, and to develop a transport and communication corridor between Europe and Asia. We know that Russia and the US have their own interests in the region, which at times correspond with the EU as rival in the region.<sup>188</sup>

In the following years, signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with all three countries of Caucasus in 1996, brought them into force in 1999 and implemented Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independence States (TACIS) programs to support them. Thus, the Commission drafted Country Strategy Papers (CSP) for the period 2002-2006, which called on Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to engage in greater regional cooperation. In February 2002, the EU made an effort to play a more active political role in the South Caucasus and to support conflict prevention and resolution. As I mentioned above, in July 2003 the Council appointed an EU Special Representative (EUSR)

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<sup>186</sup> Aytan Gahramanova, *Peace strategies in “frozen” ethno-territorial conflicts: integrating reconciliation into conflict management, the Case of Nagorno-Karabakh*, Universitat Mannheim, Arbeitspapiere, No103, 2007

<sup>187</sup> Ibid

<sup>188</sup> Don Lynch *The EU: Towards a Strategy in The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU*, Chaillot Papers No 65, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2003, p 171-196

for the South Caucasus: the Finnish Ambassador Heikki Talvitie. After the European Security Strategy adoption in December 2003, the Commission thought

to take all three states of South Caucasus to the European Neighborhood Policy group (ENP).<sup>189</sup>

The collapse of the European Constitutional Treaty project in 2005 has damaged the EU's image in the South Caucasus region. In regard to this situation, the EU is trying to identify its role in a new neighborhood position which is neither at war nor at peace. The EU generally is more comfortable with a peace building role.<sup>190</sup>

Until an agreement on the principles of a settlement is signed, the EU remains neutral in the conflict area. Commission staff say "no one has allowed us to do anything in NK...we would do something there if we were asked by the sides". Member states diplomats declared the OSCE Minsk Group French co-chair and the EUSR told them in 2006 it is too early for the EU to begin preparing for increased involvement. The Minsk Group parties also emerge to prefer keeping a monopoly on the peace process.<sup>191</sup>

If international peacekeepers are called upon to provide security guarantees and support achievement of a peace agreement, many consider that the EU would be expected to provide them. The peacekeeping mission is sensitive and the sides to the conflict may accept EU forces as the most politically neutral. Actually, the size of the peacekeeping forces is another problem. The size of peace-keeping forces is approximately 1500 to 2000. But the Armenian side called for 10 000. Actually the deployment of any large ESDP mission in Nagorno-Karabakh would be dependent on EU capabilities<sup>192</sup>.

Despite of all these changes, the EU has limited its mission to promise any innovation in the post-conflict settlement stage. In June 2005 the foreign

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<sup>189</sup> *Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU's role*, International Crisis Group, Europe Report N 173-20 march 2006

<sup>190</sup> Dieter Mahncke, *From Structure to Substance: Has the Constitutional Treaty improved the Chances for a Common Foreign and Security Policy?*, Research Paper in Law, College of Europe, Bruges, 06/2005, p-10

<sup>191</sup> *Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU's role*, International Crisis Group, Europe Report N 173-20 March 2006

<sup>192</sup> *Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace*, Crisis Group Europe Report No 167, 11 October 2005, p-19-20

ministers came to conclusion that it had been better for direct contact between Karabakh Armenians and Azeris to achieve stability.<sup>193</sup> Armenia sees the EU as an increasingly important partner that can play a role in its foreign policy.<sup>194</sup> But Armenia also tries to maintain separate and similar relations with great powers such as Russia, the US and Iran. Azerbaijan analysts understand their country's

foreign policy is balanced between the EU, Russia and the US. Since that time, relations with both the US and Russia are vital to regional as well as national, political and economic development.

In 2005-2006 South Caucasus states-Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia entered dialogues with the EU to prepare country specific Action Plans<sup>195</sup>. The aim was to build a mutual commitment to common values and provide a point of suggestion for future programming under the European neighborhood and Partnership instrument (ENPI). According to its original strategy, the ENP was to "reinforce stability and security and contribution to efforts at conflict resolution" and to strengthen "the EU's contribute to promoting the settlement of regional conflicts".

Armenia asked fro EU to help address some of the consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It called for maintaining and strengthening the regime of ceasefire in the conflict zone and to work towards a peaceful conflict settlement taking into concentration the rights of people of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination. It also suggested that the EU promote regional cooperation and put an end to the transport blockade of the country. Armenia has requested the EU to find any regional project that increases its isolation. It also seeks political support to help resolve its conflicts with Turkey. They try to force Ankara to open the border with Armenia, normalize relations and play a constructive role on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But, generally Azerbaijan has not been insistent

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<sup>193</sup> *Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU's role*, International Crisis Group, Europe Report N 173-20 march 2006

<sup>194</sup> [http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/speeches/000928vo\\_raffi\\_center.html](http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/speeches/000928vo_raffi_center.html)  
retrieved in 02.12.2008

<sup>195</sup> The objective of the ENP is to: share the benefits of the EU's 2004 enlargement with neighboring countries in strengthening stability, security and well being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and to offer then the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation. It can realize with Action Plan tools. ( European Commission, "*European Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper*", Commission Communication COM (2004), 374 final, Brussels, 15 May 2004, p-3

enough in trying to shape the Action Plan to its conflict resolution needs. It did not insist that Nagorno-Karabakh refer to the EU to find a significant, useful solution that respects its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. It has been disappointed for more than decades by the EU by not declaring clearly that Armenia occupies Azerbaijan territory. Thus, the early 2006 version of the Action Plan drafts would not strengthen the EU's role in supporting resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or obligate the warring parties to reach a settlement.<sup>196</sup>

In reality, Armenian officials argue that the EU would more likely isolate the parties rather than encourage partnership. Instead, Armenia sees the EU's assistance improve regional cooperation initiatives in a diversity of fields including the development of transport corridors. Brussels believes that Action Plans will support the South Caucasus governments to establish regional development cooperation as a basis for the peaceful resolution of conflict. Actually, Armenia wants regional cooperation to break out of its isolation but does not consider the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict a proper subject for the Action Plan. On the contrary, Azerbaijan officials will not enhance regional cooperation until there is a lasting solution to this problem.<sup>197</sup>

Also, the EU found NGOs media sources and other public debate on resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This of course, could help the political elites to manipulate opinions. Thus, the EU sponsors independent regional media initiatives.

We heard that the EU regularly speaks out in support of the OSCE Minsk Group negotiation process. But in spite of all this when you ask any diplomats how the EU could increase support for resolving the conflict they answer "it is the OSCE Minsk Group's role".<sup>198</sup> As we understood, the EU could give more support through programs which help create a better environment for the negotiations but do not duplicate them. If negotiation fails and all external actors need to strengthen conflict prevention efforts, the EU should be prepared to act.

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<sup>196</sup> *Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU's role*, International Crisis Group, Europe Report N 173-20 march 2006

<sup>197</sup> Ibid

<sup>198</sup> Don Lynch, *European Union and the South Caucasus: Opportunities for Intensified Engagement*, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, recommendations from policy dialogue seminar, 24-26 May in the Hague, p-25

### **e) CIS or Regional security dilemma: Reestablishment sphere of influence within border of the former USSR**

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia wants to strengthen its strategic significance as a great power in its immediate neighborhood and in the geopolitical setting of the CIS. Moscow knows well enough that the security of Russia is linked to political developments in the former USSR territories. In order to emerge as a great power, Russia concentrates on closer strategic ties with the former USSR Republics. Moscow insists that the newly independent states should not only preserve but also strengthen security arrangements with Russia. The Russian's main intention, with these arrangements, is to make sure these states do not develop security relations with NATO, the West and the US.<sup>199</sup>

Thus, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in 1991. Russia attempted to reintegrate the Post-Soviet space and to preserve a common security and economic space. Actually, the Caucasus states joined the CIS under different conditions. For instance, as we know, Georgia joined the CIS under heavy pressure from the Russian Federation. But at that time, many people believed that the CIS would provide Georgia security and bring economic benefits to the region. But after the crisis in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia left the CIS. Actually, after collapse of the Soviet Union, the intentions of Russia in "near abroad" became clearer and clearer. The Russian Federation intends to reestablish its sphere of influence within the borders of the former USSR.<sup>200</sup> In reality, at the beginning of the foundation of the CIS, Baku and Tbilisi tried to leave the Russian sphere of influence. Although the major orientation in the foreign policies of Azerbaijan and Georgia was toward the West but despite of orientation of Baku and Tbilisi, they did not receive any political support from the Western democracies and were alone in their struggle for independence face by

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<sup>199</sup> Elkhan Nuriyev, *The Post-Soviet Caucasus Within New Geopolitical Framework: Towards Conflict or Peace?*, Centre d'information des Recherches sur la Paix Bonn, No3, 2000

<sup>200</sup> Roy Allison, *The Network of New Security Policy Relations in Eurasia*, in *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p 12-29



face with Russia. Of course, Armenia turned to the only ally of Russia in Caucasus<sup>201</sup>.

However, Elcibey refused to enter the CIS and this resulted in the support of Russian troops to the Armenian forces. Aliyev came to power and Azerbaijan entered the CIS four months later. Aliyev gave 10% to Lukoyl Oil Company from the consortium and determined that for the future Azerbaijan and Russia would use only one of the oil fields from the consortium simultaneously. Aliyev tried to soften Russian aggression toward Azerbaijan. But this position did not change Russian strategy toward Caucasus. Despite Azerbaijan concessions to Russia, territories around Nagorno-Karabakh have been lost (Agdam, Fuzuli, Cebrayil, Qubadli, and Zengilan). Russia keeps insisting on settlement of CIS peacekeeping forces on the border of Azerbaijan and Iran territory. Russia claimed that Azerbaijan was unable to control the common CIS border with Iran. Also Russia

began to demand the backing of the Caspian navy to Russia. Additionally, Russia suggested establishing an air force security system in South Caucasus. Thus, it has understood that it is nonsense to maintain cooperation with Russia<sup>202</sup>. The

CIS has been seen as a tool for the modernization of a unified post-Soviet entity on the territory of the former USSR that will be under Russian domination.<sup>203</sup> Meanwhile Russian policy from the beginning has been determined as “divide and rule”.

This was not only on effort to dominate all CIS member states by Russia, but also of Russia's fear of political uncertainty within Russia and the possible coming to power of more neo-imperialist forces. Finally Russia also fears the disintegration of Russia itself. Nowadays, Russia is uncertain about its own security priorities. However, after creating a collective security treaty within the CIS Russia introduced significant amounts of weaponry to Armenia.

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<sup>201</sup> Elkhon Nuriyev, *The Post-Soviet Caucasus Within New Geopolitical Framework: Towards Conflict or Peace?*, Centre d'information des Recherches sur la Paix Bonn, No3, 2000

<sup>202</sup> Nesib Nesibli, *Azerbaycanin Geopolitikasi ve Neft*, Xezer Universiteti, publication, 2000, p 97-98

<sup>203</sup> Roy Allison, *The Network of New Security Policy Relations in Eurasia*, in *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p 12-29

As Alexandr insisted “It is generally accepted that a small state’s foreign policy is a response to external conditions, such as the degree of competition between great powers and demands made upon small states by great powers”. In the Caucasus the situation includes powerful regional actors such as: Russia, Turkey and Iran. We understand that domestic determinants of foreign policy are salient in this region. (Caucasus states) Domestic instability within the Caucasus creates problems for foreign-policy makers in the region. The national interest, foreign policy and security priorities of small states in the case of Caucasus states have regional rather than global dimensions. But certain regions sometimes attract the attention and interests of world powers. Let me indicate the case with the Caucasus importance to world energy markets and its potential role as a transit route between Europe and Asia. Before if Caucasus was described in geopolitical terms, it is now described in geo-economics term. Historically if we analyze, we will see that the Caucasus states have lost rather than gained positions of importance in global terms.<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Alexander Rondeli, *Regional Security Prospects in the Caucasus* in Gary K. Bertsch, *Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, , Routledge publication, 2000, p-51

## ***Chapter 8***

### ***Long Standing OSCE Minsk Group Mediation Process for Long Term Resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict***

The Caucasus is a region of new states. The great powers are involved in the Caucasus where they tend to complicate the situation in the region. But the absence of real nation-states and democracy are the problems in the region and these are the main obstacles to regional security. Actually, all three states seek security but their sensitivity over security concerns in the region differs greatly. Azerbaijan sees its future security based on regional economic cooperation. But Armenia, because of its specific threat perception and its conflict with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, relies on its relationship with its Russian ally.

Russia, the US, Turkey and Iran as bilateral actors and the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and the Council of Europe (CoE) as multilateral actors have become increasingly active in conflict resolution process. Actually, the main international organizations-UN, NATO and EU have not become involved with the conflict resolution process and have left it to the OSCE Minsk Group.

The international organization OSCE remains leader in the effort of resolution process of conflict. Thus, the OSCE appeared to deal with the Karabakh conflict rather than the United Nations (UN).

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has four objectives from the perspective of the West.

- 1) “Humanitarian outcomes
- 2) To prevent recommencement where cessation of hostilities has occurred

- 3) The process of political transition to open and democratic societies in which individuals and groups are respected, economic transition towards open, free-market economies
- 4) To effect integration into European and global structure of co-operation<sup>205</sup>

However, Armenia and the Karabakh Armenians favored the UN for resolution as its historical ‘friends’ -France and Russia were members of the Security Council. Azerbaijan, for the same reason, favored the involvement of the OSCE. However, the biggest ally- Turkey was a member.<sup>206</sup>

In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Russia worked hard to minimize the role of the international community. Actually, Russia tried to keep Moscow’s influence as mediator and peacekeeper in the territory of the former USSR. These differences led to competition between Russia and the international community for leadership in mediating and in the resolution process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict<sup>207</sup>. Russia began to play a dual role as member of the Minsk Group and as a regional actor. Russia has always had its significant objectives in its ‘near abroad’. This challenge manifested itself in Russia’s competing mediation efforts in the region. However, it was understood that it was Russia, and not the Minsk Group, which brokered the May 1994 ceasefire.<sup>208</sup>

In the spring of 1992, the OSCE jelled into a strategy whose principal elements are given below: Western countries considered that the Karabakh conflict was not a high priority for Western countries and also because of Russian interest in the region. It was understood that the OSCE could intervene only in limited ways in the area of the former USSR. OSCE did not want to provoke a Russian response. One important point is that it was largely agreed that the Western countries involved in this effort should take the role of neutral mediators and should work within the Minsk group. Actually, the Western mediators agreed that they should work closely with Russia and Turkey and keep Iran out of the negotiating process.<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> MacFarlane

<sup>206</sup> Volker (2005)

<sup>207</sup> Maresca (p.70)

<sup>208</sup> Volker (2005)

<sup>209</sup> Maresca (p.p. 73-74)

### **a) International stage in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict-the goal of Minsk Process**

The international involvement in the resolution of this conflict began in 1992. The CSCE (OSCE) became the major organization for the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and remains till now. On March 24 1992 at a Helsinki meeting, a CSCE Council decided to authorize the CSCE Chairman-in-Office to organize a conference on Nagorno Karabakh under the auspices of the CSCE. The processes of the Minsk Group to be dependent on the "Troika" of the OSCE. ("Troika" consists of the former, present and future OSCE Chairman-in-Office). The OSCE's intention was "to provide an ongoing forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis on the basis of the principles, commitments and provisions of the CSCE."<sup>210</sup> This decision was supported by the Minsk Process. (The process is so named after the city of Minsk/Belarus and this place had been selected as the site for the future conference on this conflict resolution.) The goal of the Minsk Process is to provide a suitable framework for conflict resolution, also to support the negotiation process by the Minsk Group. Additionally, in bringing all the interested parties-including Karabakh Armenians to the negotiating table, achieving a cease-fire with OSCE sponsored international monitoring. Later the Minsk Group lifting of all blockades surrounding states, aiding refugees and negotiating on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh with regard to taking consideration of both sides<sup>211</sup> and moreover to encourage the peace process by deploying OSCE multinational peacekeeping forces.<sup>212</sup>

In March 1992 the OSCE decided to bring the warring parties together at an international conference in Minsk. However, Azerbaijan refused to participate until the occupied territories had been returned. The Minsk Group consisted of eleven countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey and the United States.<sup>213</sup> From the beginning of 1992 all negotiation processes have been conducted within the framework of the Minsk Conference. Chronology-the Chairmen of the Minsk Conference were below:

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<sup>210</sup> Maresco (1994, p.4)

<sup>211</sup> Ibid

<sup>212</sup> *Brief synopsis of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict*(2003)

<sup>213</sup> Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc 7182 (1994)

- “Italy in 1992-1993,
- Sweden in 1994,
- Russia, Finland in 1995-1996,
- Russia, USA, France - since 1997 till now”<sup>214</sup>

In 1993 the Minsk Group chairman- Mario Raffaelli gave new suggestions for a peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, including: “The armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh were to withdraw within one month from the different occupied territories and Azerbaijan was to respond by lifting its blockade from: 1) the gas pipeline, 2) then the Idjevan-Kazakh railway, and 3) finally all other lines of communication”<sup>215</sup>.

Armenia agreed with this idea. However, Azerbaijan refused to accept the plan because it did not include lifting of the blockade of the Nakhichevan and Latchin corridor.

In Vienna, on 8 November 1993 at the meeting of the Minsk Group a new peace plan was suggested. Azerbaijan side demanded the withdrawal of troops from the occupied territories and returning the refugees to their homes.<sup>216</sup>

Thus, these negotiations processes passed to the narrowest framework. In 1992, Minsk Group suggested some tactical intent, since the tactical intent of each of the parties had not been addressed. Secondly, Turkey is not acknowledged but instead is included in the group of mediators. Thirdly, Armenia has failed to present openly and clearly its strategy. So Armenia has to classify its aim according to conflict<sup>217</sup>

The Budapest Summit in 1994 adopted a two-stage framework, such as 1) “First stage-elimination of consequences of the armed conflict by implementation of the agreement, full liberation of all occupied territories and ensuring return of IDP’s to their homes. 2) second stage-elaboration and adoption of a comprehensive

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<sup>214</sup> OSCE Minsk Process on the Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan

<sup>215</sup> Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc 7182, (1994)

<sup>216</sup> Ibid

<sup>217</sup> Hewsen (2000)

peace settlement at the Minsk conference.”<sup>218</sup> The summit also adopted a decision on the deployment of the CSCE multinational peacekeeping forces. More over the summit decided on the establishment of the High level Planning Group. The aim of this group is the preparation of the peacekeeping operation.<sup>219</sup>

If we are going to discuss the role of Minsk Group members, we have to give more attention to the Turkish and Russian perspective in the Group. Basically, Turkey’s role in the Minsk process is relevant to the Russia’s position. Turkey is interested in finding a peaceful resolution. However, Russia tried to avoid any solution that did not preserve its influence in the region.

However, the difficulty is that the peacekeeping force aims to help realization of the settlement. Actually, this is a miracle that-for financial, political, and other reasons this force would rapidly leave the area before any stability has been achieved.<sup>220</sup> In reality, after serious disagreement between the OSCE and Russia, the OSCE at the Budapest summit decided to send only 3000 multinational peacekeeping forces to the Nagorno-Karabakh region. However, this was the first time that the OSCE had taken a peacekeeping role in a conflict area.<sup>221</sup> But unfortunately, it was not realized. Actually, the OSCE’s peacekeeping force’s small size and its decentralized command <sup>222</sup> came under suspicion. As we understood, without a force for implementation, the plan is basically unworkable.

Actually, the sovereign status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not recognized by any state, including Armenia. Peter Tomsan, the USA ambassador in Armenia, in his speech at the Lisbon Summit insisted on it and showed that 54 countries of OSCE recognized Karabakh territories of Azerbaijan and it was held in the Lisbon Summit.<sup>223</sup> In his speech Tomsan also mentioned that both sides had to solve this problem through political negotiations and if there is no political negotiations, military tensions would go forward and all process would begin

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<sup>218</sup> <http://www.ocse.org/publications/handbook/handbook.pdf>

<sup>219</sup> Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc 7182 (1994)

<sup>220</sup> Ibid

<sup>221</sup> *Peacekeeping troops may go to Karabakh next year* (1994)

<sup>222</sup> Hewsen (2000)

<sup>223</sup> The Lisbon Summit of the Heads of States and Governments of OSCE participants (since January 1, 1995 the CSCE was transformed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), held on December 2-3, 1996, the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office recommended the principles, which should have been the basis for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

again. In his opinion, political negotiations are the key of problem.<sup>224</sup> Meanwhile, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office at the Lisbon Summit in 1996 made a report with the inclusion of the principles set out below:

- 1) "territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic;
- 2) Legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based on self-determination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan;
- 3) Guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population, including mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all the Parties with the provisions of the settlement."<sup>225</sup> These principles were supported by all 53 OSCE state-participants with the exception of Armenia.

In late May 1997 the US-Russian-French Troika made a new proposal and included the following elements:

- 1) "the withdrawal of Karabakh Armenian forces from seven Azeri regions (including the Lachin district) and from the town of Shusha
- 2) the deployment of OSCE peacekeepers in a jointly de-mined buffer zone, with the task of monitoring the repatriation of IDPs and ensuring road communications through the Lachin corridor
- 3) the leasing of the Lachin corridor from Azerbaijan to Karabakh with the OSCE serving as intermediary
- 4) the lifting of the blockade on Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey
- 5) political self-rule and the status of a free economic zone for NK, within Azeri jurisdiction
- 6) the downsizing of NK forces to a military police force after agreement has been reached on status
- 7) an international inventory and control of NK armaments which will be considered part of Armenian's permitted CFE"<sup>226</sup>

Nagorno-Karabakh rejected these suggestions. In 1997 the Co-Chairmen presented draft which consisted of an Agreement on the cessation of the armed

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<sup>224</sup> Tomsan (1998)

<sup>225</sup> The Armenia Azerbaijan conflict's stages (2008)

<sup>226</sup> Hoye



conflict and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Actually, the Republic of Armenia categorically rejected the "package" approach.<sup>227</sup>

On September 1997, the Co-Chairmen presented new proposals based on the "stage-by-stage" approach to the settlement. Thus, it would be indicated the liberation of six districts, which are outside Nagorno-Karabakh (except Lachin)<sup>228</sup>. Additionally, it indicated the return of civilians and restoration of communication links. In the following stage, solution would be reached on the Lachin and Shusha districts and implementation of the main principles of the status of the Mountainous Karabakh region.

In the same year, in October 1997, in Strasbourg the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia met and discussed statements on the readiness to resume negotiations on the basis the of Co-Chairmen's proposals. In December 1997, in Copenhagen, a report of the Co-Chairs, mentioned the need to continue efforts on settlement of the conflict on the basis of the Lisbon principles and proposals of Co-Chairs.<sup>229</sup>

Later, on November 1998, the Co-Chairs introduced a new proposal based on a Russian-designed concept of "Common state". In regard to this proposal, Nagorno-Karabakh would have the status of a state. Also it would have the status of a recognized territorial unity within the borders of the Azerbaijan Republic. Azerbaijan from the beginning refused to accept this proposal.<sup>230</sup>

Since 1999, the negotiation process has been accomplished at bilateral level. Also, we can see the initiatives of the ex US President Bush towards a resolution of the conflict. In Key West, Florida on 3-6 April 2001 President Bush and the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenian came together. They decided to continue the negotiation process within the OSCE Minsk group.<sup>231</sup> After the Istanbul Summit in April 1999, direct talks between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia on the achievement of a conflict settlement began. However, because of Armenia's destructive position these meetings have not yet led to any agreement. Later, at the OSCE Ministerial Council meetings, which were held on December 2001 in Bucharest and on December 2002 in Porto, came to the decision to call

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<sup>227</sup> Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc 7182 (1994)

<sup>228</sup> Danielyan (2002)

<sup>229</sup> <http://www.Ocse.org/docs/English/1990-1999/mcs/6cope1977e.htm>

<sup>230</sup> OSCE Minsk Process on the Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

<sup>231</sup> International Information Programs of the US Department of State

upon parties to continue the efforts for the settlement of the conflict on the basis of the norms and principles of international law. In March and July 2002 special representatives of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia met in Prague. Later the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries met in Prague on March 2004.<sup>232</sup>

According to a report prepared by the British parliamentarian David Atkinson, presented to the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), "the borders of Azerbaijan were internationally recognized at the time of the country being recognized as an independent state in 1991," and "the territory of Azerbaijan included the Nagorno-Karabakh region." Resolution 1416, adopted by PACE indicated that: "Considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces, and separatist forces are still in control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region".<sup>233</sup> However, on several occasions, Minsk Group recommendations have served as a basis for UN Resolutions, otherwise the UN has not been involved in conflict mediation.

If we analyze the Helsinki Final Act, we can see a little progress has been made through the Minsk Group procedure. Within the framework of the OSCE, each side can perceive in the Helsinki Final Act to emphasize its position: Azerbaijan points to Principle 4- guaranteeing each member's territorial integrity, and the Armenians of Karabakh position to Principle 8-proclaiming the right to self-determination.<sup>234</sup>

Construction of the negotiation process has been enormously difficult. Azerbaijan side refused to discuss conflict with Nagorno-Karabakh as a full party. Azerbaijan demanded instead that the "Nagorno-Karabakh" Republic should negotiate only with Armenia directly. Armenia declared that nothing to do with Nagorno-Karabakh's fight for independence. Thus, there emerged "two plus one" approach to negotiations with the Karabakh Armenians. Meanwhile, in 1997 Stepanakert (the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh) had become a full party to the negotiations just for a while<sup>235</sup>

## **b) Madrid proposal**

The Madrid proposal is based on the idea of 1) the right self-determination and 2) the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity. The Madrid proposal included the following points:

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<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

<sup>233</sup> Aliyev (1998)

<sup>234</sup> Hewsen(2000)

<sup>235</sup> Solomon (1998)

1. "Withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Azerbaijani regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh;
2. Resettlement of these regions with Azerbaijani refugees;
3. Return of Azerbaijani refugees to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh itself;
4. Provision of an overland link connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia through the Lachin corridor;
5. Deployment of peace-keeping forces across the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh;
6. Demilitarization of the territories that have been returned to Azerbaijan;
7. Lifting of the blockade of Armenia's and Karabakh external communications, and reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border;
8. Definition of an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh Republic;
9. Conduct of a referendum on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh at some undefined, future date;
10. Provision of international financial aid for the restoration of the conflict zone."<sup>236</sup>

Foreign Ministers from co chair countries within the OSCE Minsk Group (France, Russia, and the United States) suggested new proposals where they mentioned: "We, the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE Minsk Group's Co-Chair countries – France, Russia, and the United States – call on all the parties to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict to build on the positive momentum established during the meeting of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Moscow on November 2, 2008." The Moscow Declaration, signed that same day, opened a new phase to expand peace in the South Caucasus. In that declaration, the Presidents tried to advance a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict in the framework of the Basic Principles of the Madrid proposal.<sup>237</sup>

Despite the tensions in U.S.-Russian relations over the Georgia crisis, Bryza mentioned that Washington welcomed Moscow's efforts on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The Moscow Declaration committed the two sides to resolving the conflict peacefully, according to international law, and under the auspices of the OSCE's

Minsk Group comprising Russia, France, and the United States. "Basically we have had a situation between Azerbaijan and Armenia that has not changed in 15 years for the most part," According to Sarkisyan "football diplomacy," has its place Sarkisian invited the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, to Yerevan to

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<sup>236</sup> *Disclosed: Madrid principles of Karabakh conflict settlement* (2008)

<sup>237</sup> *OSCE FM statement can facilitate Karabakh process* (2008)

watch an international soccer match between their national teams in September<sup>238</sup>  
Actually, Ankara pays attention to Azerbaijan concerns while developing

relations with Armenia. The only way to manipulate any influence on Armenia is to keep a dialogue channel open.<sup>239</sup>

Nowadays, the OSCE plays a serious mediation and peace keeping role in conflict resolution. Meanwhile, it must develop a reliable structure and more successful procedures which are expected from the Moscow declaration over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

### **c) Last initiatives**

Conflicts that have emerged in South Caucasus have different points, but at the same time they also have similar points. Separatism, control of the region by great powers or the delaying of resolution of these conflicts within the territory of states are the similar conflicts in South Caucasus.

In August 2008, Georgia in order to prevent separatism tried to control South Osetiya and carried out military intervention. This situation resulted in a sharp confrontation between Georgia and Russia. Military forces in Russia ordered the Georgian army to withdraw its army not only from South Osetiya but also from surrounding territories. The Geo-strategic important cities such as Qori and Poti became under control of Russia. The Military operation came close to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the exportation of Azerbaijan oil from Poti had to be postponed. The Military –political and economical situations became very tense.

Trying to prevent ethnic conflict by force in South Osetiya created even more complicated situations in the region. Later, after the Russian military entered Georgia

Russia recognized the independence of South Osetiya and Abkhazia. Thus this situation which started with a separatist background to the ethnic problems ended with the shattered territory of Georgia.

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<sup>238</sup> Whitmore (2008)

<sup>239</sup> Aras and Ozbay (2008)

Interpretation of the Georgian territory was accepted by the West and the US simultaneously. At that time Barak Obama the presidential candidate and the candidate for the post vice-president Bayen J. said that Russia accepted the independence and freedom of Georgia. Bayen J. declared that they were going to prevent a repeat of this situation and forced the US to be responsible for their

actions. Republican Candidate C. Makkeyn responded very strictly to Russian engagement.<sup>240</sup>

Western states also criticized the Russian pressure against Georgia. After Russia, Nicaragua recognized the independence of South Osetiya and Abkhaziya. But the Russian allies-Armenia, Belarusian and Venezuela did not recognize the independence of South Osetiya and Abkhaziya. Russia did not receive support from other states.

Actually, the Georgian crisis changed the stance of the Karabakh conflict. Every one understands that to keep a conflict in frozen state is very dangerous. This state also refers to the Karabakh conflict. Later it could be dangerous for the political-economical safety of the European Union. That is why, after the Georgian crisis, the Karabakh region has been enlivened.

First of all, Western powers accepted that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is under Russian control and to maintain control over the region it tries to freeze this conflict.<sup>241</sup> For this reason Western powers must refer to this conflict seriously and must take over from the monopoly by Russia.

On the other hand, Russia itself after Georgia crisis became more active in the “Karabakh conflict” issue. According to K. Rays (General Secretary of the US) he thought Russia had lost priority among western states.<sup>242</sup> Thus, after the Georgia crisis Russia tried to change its bad image with the peaceful declaration about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhaziya gave a spark to the Armenians. Armenia supposed that if Russia recognized the independence of these illegal organizations so, they could easily recognize the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh. But very soon Russian the government said that the situation in Karabakh is not the same situation as in South Ossetia and Abkhaziya and

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<sup>240</sup> Babayan (2008)

<sup>241</sup> Day.az: Vafa Quluzade (31.10.2008) , Pol Qobl (01.11.2008)

<sup>242</sup> Ibid

Russian is not interested in the recognition issue. Also, the Foreign Minister of Russia S. Lavrov affirmed this fact in the same way. Lavrov visited Armenia and mentioned that the economical block of Armenia relies on the resolution process of Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>243</sup> In other words, Lavrov emphasized that if Armenia wanted to develop it had to improve relationships with its neighbor states.

Armenia considered Russian policy in this way as a betrayal.<sup>244</sup> In reality, after the Georgia crisis Russia became more active in the Karabakh conflict. Russia clearly understood that if Western powers tried to be active in the resolution process of this conflict, finally Russia would lose control over the region. It means after losing Georgia Russia could lose Azerbaijan. Thus Russia is in jeopardy of losing the whole of the Caucasus.

Russia, during this period, tried to resolve this conflict within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. According to expert though, Russia even in these debates tried to find a way to maintain its control over the region. Maybe that is why the Russian press spreads the news that the Russian peace-keeping force would enter the conflict area.<sup>245</sup>

This idea did not get support from either Azerbaijan or Armenia. Actually, Western powers are interested in the resolution process of Karabakh conflict within the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan republic. One of the chairmen of the Minsk group, Metyu Brayza, during a visit to Erevan said that the conflict had to be solved only within the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan republic. According to Brayze, Armenia had to recognize the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic. Metyu Brayze emphasized that: “if we want to solve this conflict firstly we must accept territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic. Then we have to add some other principals.”<sup>246</sup> Metyu Brayze insisted that legally Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to the Azerbaijan republic and Armenia had

to agree with this fact. Of course, here Armenia mentioned another principle according to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But for the resolution process of this conflict the position of both sides must come to closer to each-other.<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>243</sup> <http://www.mitq.org/?l=rus&id=22&news=1153>

<sup>244</sup> Ibid

<sup>245</sup> Day.az: Vafa Quluzade (31.10.2008)

<sup>246</sup> Metyu Brayze (05.11.2008)

<sup>247</sup> Ibid

In fact, principle was not accepted in Armenia. Acceptance of these facts would be accepted as Armenian agreement on the resolution process within the territorial integrity the of Azerbaijan republic. Finally, Armenia had to agree to leave the innovation plan against Nagorno-Karabakh. But the US ambassador in Erevan, Mari Yovanovic, has seen the resolution process of the Karabakh conflict in the getting of territorial integrity and self-independency of minorities simultaneously.<sup>248</sup>

Armenia even considered not only Nagorno-Karabakh but also territories around Karabakh Armenian lands historically. Withdrawing the Armenian military force from Azerbaijan land had been considered as losing historic land by the Armenian side. The Armenian side saw the resolution process of Nagorno-Karabakh in the unification process to Armenia.<sup>249</sup> Armenia considers the return of displaced persons to their “native land” as impossible.

The Vice-President of the US D. Ceyney visited Azerbaijan during the South Caucasus crisis. The Azerbaijan community saw this visit as US support for Azerbaijan integrity and position. Beside the US and Russia, Iran and Turkey also took an active role in the region. In an arduous situation of South Caucasus, representatives from Iran and Turkey negotiated with Moscow, Tbilisi, Baku and Irevan. Turkey gave a proposal for “Stability and cooperation in Caucasus”. These details were not open to the public but it was obvious that negotiations would take place among the three states of Caucasus and Russia with Turkey. This platform suggested, after full integrity of Caucasus, cooperation in the region. The Platform’s main idea according to the Karabakh conflict was for recognition of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan by Armenia. Then, to try to solve conflict within the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic. Later the withdrawal of Armenian military force from Azerbaijan land. After all, the border will be opened with Armenia by the Turkish and Azerbaijan sides.<sup>250</sup> Here also would be given a guaranty of the Armenia Republic.

In fact, both Russia and Azerbaijan are interested in Turkey’s initiatives. Even Armenia is interested and it clearly during the visit of Turkey’s President. Analysis showed that Armenian political circles were worried about this entire situation and especially about Turkey’s initiatives. In other words, Turkey’s initiatives were seen as an intensification of their superiority over the region. That is why the other powers tried to attract Iran to the Turkey initiative-In other words, three Caucasus states and Russia, Iran and Turkey. Armenia thought that

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<sup>248</sup> Ambassador of USA in Armenia(2008)

<sup>249</sup> Sargsyan (2008)

<sup>250</sup> <http://www.mitq.org/?l=rus&id=22&news=1153>

interaction of Iran to the platform must prevent the intensifying force of Turkey in the region.<sup>251</sup>

The Foreign Minister of Iran traveled to Russia and South Caucasus and later declared that Iran had a concrete proposal. Iran declared that it was going to discuss its proposal very soon.<sup>252</sup> This has not been given to the press. The Armenian side insists interest of Iran and Armenia coming together.<sup>253</sup>

During the Georgia crisis the leaders of NATO, OCSE and the UN visited the region and said that they were interested in a quick resolution process.

Despite all these facts, Russia was so active according to the Karabakh conflict. On October 26-28 2008, Russian President D. Medvedev visited Erevan. The main aim of Medvedev's visit was for negotiation around the Karabakh conflict. He suggested meeting with the Azerbaijan and Armenian Presidents in Moscow during his visit to Irevan. Both presidents accepted these meetings.<sup>254</sup>

In 2008 on November 2, the Russian, Azerbaijan and Armenian President met together. Initially the, Azerbaijan and Armenia Presidents discussed perspectives of this conflict separately. The Russian President joined them later. At the end of this encounter the three Presidents signed a declaration.<sup>255</sup>

The Conflict sides, Russian guidance and chairmen of the Minsk group appreciated this declaration. This declaration is the main step in the resolution process of this conflict. The other point is that after the signing of a cease-fire, the

Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia for the first time, eventually signed other documents. The Azerbaijan and Armenian Presidents again proved that the Karabakh conflict is a conflict between these two states. Again it was proved that Nagorno-Karabakh, as an independent state, could not negotiate this conflict in Moscow or in any other place. Actually, Armenia every time tries to prove that this is a struggle of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians over independence. The declaration which was signed in Moscow prevented speculation of this type. The

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<sup>251</sup> Ibid

<sup>252</sup> Rossia jdet ot Irana predlojeniya bezopostnosti na Kavkaze (01.11.2008)

<sup>253</sup> Iran razdelyayet armyanskuyu tocku zreniya na Karabakskiyu konflikt i genosid armyan

<sup>254</sup> Medvedev : Naqornoy karabakh i Erevan (31.10.2008)

<sup>255</sup> Prezidenti Armenii, Rossi i Azerbaycana nodpisali deklaraciyu no Karabakskomu urequlirovaniyu  
(02.11.2008)



Azerbaijan position is like that: Nagorno-Karabakh invaded by Armenia and Azerbaijan could only negotiate just with Armenia.

The Moscow Declaration has five points:

1. According to the declaration both sides must try for stability and security in the region. Both sides must try to solve this conflict according to international norm. They have to establish economical development and cooperation in the region.
2. According to the declaration the OCSE Minsk group mediation process and the Madrid proposal must be taken into concentration. In the future, chairmen of the Minsk group must continue their role in the region.
3. Regulation of this declaration must strengthen.
4. In future the Azerbaijan and Armenia sides, for the regulation of this conflict in the political sphere must keep in contact. Also foreign ministers from both sides must keep in touch with the Minsk group.
5. Finally for the restoration of confidence both sides must do other important points.<sup>256</sup>

In this declaration, how the conflict must be solved according to which principles, has been illustrated. This declaration emphasized that the resolution process of the Karabakh conflict must be realized only by negotiation. The Armenian Foreign Minister said that the declaration had not illustrated the point about territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic. Thus Armenia thought that self-independence minorities would be taken into consideration.<sup>257</sup> On the contrary, the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan indicated that points in the Declaration illustrated that conflict had to be solved according to international norms. As we

know it means that conflict can be solved taking territorial integrity into consideration.<sup>258</sup>

The Ex-president of Armenia L. Ter-Petrosyan said that the declaration mentioned resolution process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic. Without doubt it referred to the

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<sup>256</sup> Grigoryan (2008)

<sup>257</sup> Ustalas Tigrana Balayana (04.11.2008)

<sup>258</sup> Prezidenti Armenii, Rossi i Azerbaycana nodpisali deklaraciyu no Karabakskomu urequirovaniyu (2008)

UN resolution 62/243 and EU Parliament resolution 1614. These documents identify territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic.<sup>259</sup>

The Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev during his visit to Turkey mentioned that this conflict would be resolved within territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic. As Ilham Aliyev mentioned: “this conflict would be solved in a “step by step” way. Then Azerbaijan territories would be exempt. Later displaced persons would return to their homeland. Finally, both sides would come together to identify the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.”<sup>260</sup>

There is no concert about what to do for the future. But the chairmen of the Minsk group will visit conflict sides and begin negotiation between them. Documents will be arranged according to principles. Finally a main agreement will be signed.

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<sup>259</sup> <http://www.armtoday.info/default.asp?lang.....2008/11/08>

<sup>260</sup> Ibid

## *Conclusion*

Conflict around the Nagorno-Karabakh has emphasized that it was a result of the ideological and political crisis of the USSR. Communism ideology tried to prevent a negative process within states and created a sharp confrontation between nations. Nagorno-Karabakh is the main example in these situations. Collaboration of the USSR established such a big conflict in a small Caucasus. Conflicts that emerged within the USSR had similarities and diversity motives. For the resolution of these conflicts firstly, according to international norm and documents we need to analyze the root of these conflict, why they emerged in the region, who is interested in it and who supports them?

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the most complicated issue that emerged in the former USSR period. It became complicated because the self-independence of minorities caused aggression in another state. Investigation of the conflict showed that until today Armenia considers some parts of Azerbaijan territories as territory belonging to “Great Armenia” and usurped by Azerbaijan over a long period. Several times in crisis periods of the USSR, Armenia tried to base invasion of Azerbaijan on their territories. Armenian used different slogans to base their aim. Several times, Armenian politicians insisted on the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Armenian claimed that Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Armenia historically. Later politicians insisted on other slogan. Armenians claim that minorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have the right to determine their destiny and the right to choose where they want to unify. Despite invasion of Azerbaijan lands by Armenians, Armenia still tries to protect the right of self-independence by minorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. But no other international documents confirm this Armenian perspective. For instance, the UN assembly resolution 62/243 in 2008 about “Invaded Azerbaijan Territories” affirmed that Armenia had just invaded Nagorno-Karabakh and territories around Karabakh. This resolution not only recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan but also demands the withdrawal of Armenians from the invaded lands of Azerbaijan. The Parliamentary Assembly of European Union resolution 1614 asserted that Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijan territory historically. Also, UN 822, 853, 874, 884 resolutions demanded the withdrawal of Armenians from all Azerbaijan territories.

Armenia did not obey the law. Nowadays, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem remains unsolved because of not realizing sanctions against Armenians. In other words, Armenia still refuses to recognize the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic and also refuses to obey the international laws. Despite this Armenia hoped for a solution to this conflict on its terms, as it considers “just sentence”- the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.

Analysis has indicated that this disrespectful approach of Armenia to international law or right is not accidental. The Armenian wish of invasion territories around Armenia falls down on one another with the other great powers that try to control geopolitics in the region.

When Russia entered South Osetiya and tried to control this territory and region, the West became tense over this issue. Later the Russian army withdrew from this territory, but western observers had come to South Osetiya. This process is estimable. In Nagorno-Karabakh Armenia destroyed everything, but western states and the world have not reacted to Armenian actions. Realizations of international norms and resolutions have not been demanded from the Armenian side. This considerable situation, stimulates the interest of unification and creation of a” Great Armenia”. Armenia does not hide the fact that Armenian insists on claiming Azerbaijan territories up to the Caspian Sea.

Unconditionally, the unresolved situation in Azerbaijan assists to other great powers to interfere in the region at any time. But the situation in Georgia in 2008 has illustrated to the whole world that any frozen conflict is very dangerous not only for region but also to the whole world. Especially, a conflict of this type is very dangerous for the stability of Europe whose energy guarantee, going through Azerbaijan territory, which is rich with oil in the region.

The most impartial and reliable way of a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict keeps this process under the terms of international norms. But reality shows us that it is very hard to get both sides around a common and unique position. For the resolution process of this conflict is must be seen not only on a local scale but on a global scale.

The Local scale of this conflict illustrates to us the policy that follows the Azerbaijan and Armenian sides. Resolution of this conflict and establishment of stability in South Caucasus and development economically of these states

demands integration of both states in the region. A comprehensive relationship

with Azerbaijan can assist Armenia to get escape the crisis and help in a constant development of the state. At the same time, can be established peace and stability for both sides in region. Unresolved conflict keeps out Armenia from the international projects going through this region , it hampers the economic situation in Armenia.

Nowadays, Armenia is in an economic blockade and distinction of development criteria is increasing day by day between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Currently, the Azerbaijan economic potential is five times stronger than the economic potential of Armenia. The Military budget of the Azerbaijan Republic and the percentage of the military budget of Azerbaijan is more than 60 percent of the economic budget of the Armenia Republic. This economic development in Azerbaijan could bring this conflict to the military confrontation stage. It could realize a more catastrophic disaster in the region. It is possible that Armenia could choose a new position in policy. The new situation might become established in the region.

The Global scale of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must complete the local scale of this conflict. The main aim of the global scale must influence conflict sides and must establish confidence between conflict states. The war in Georgia illustrated to us that to use a frozen conflict just to maintain control over the region could cause a huge disaster in the region. Military operation around Nagorno-Karabakh would cause a clash between interest of great and regional powers.

Experiment in previous years and the position of conflict sides illustrate that, opportunities of the Minsk Group for the resolution process of the Nagorno-Karabakh is not finished. On the contrary, Minsk Group has to effort to solve this conflict. Thus, the mission of the Minsk Group is to adorn their packages and proposals and to adorn mediation process with new elements.

The “No peace, no war” position is considered dangerous for both conflict sides and any interested sides in the region. This position creates under jeopardy for the whole region.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict illustrated that to play with the ethnic and national feeling of minorities or nations in the region could give a chance that had been hidden under self-independency, and could establish the intervention from

territories of another state. Nowadays, a globalized contemporary world demands global integration, reciprocal cooperation and refused the division of society,

especially in an ethnic process. Namely, the stabile future of the whole nation only can rely on useful and reciprocal cooperation.

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# APPENDIX

## *Appendix 1*

### *Armenian and Azerbaijani perceptions on the conflict*

Here Farid will illustrate how the Azerbaijani and Armenians perceive the history of Nagorno-Karabakh present and past events.<sup>261</sup>

ARMENIAN VERSION	AZERBAIJAN VERSION
ANCIENT HISTORY OF KARABAKH	
Karabakh or Arsakh was part of Great Armenia and Armenians long ago lived in that territory. Great Armenia embraced a large portion of the Caucasus, Turkey and Iran.	Karabakh was a part of Caucasian Albania from the very beginning of its existence, i.e. 4 <sup>th</sup> century BC to 8 <sup>th</sup> century AD.
MEDIVIAL HISTORY OF KARABAKH	
Throughout the Middle Ages Armenians lived in Karabakh and formed several small feudal melicates (principalities). Caucasian Albanians had no presence in Karabakh. Armenians Karabakh fought against Arabs and Turks Seljuks and managed	Karabakh was populated and ruled by Caucasian Albanians who were gradually armenized after the Arabs conquest in the 7 <sup>th</sup> century AD. This process was accelerated after the subordination of Albanian Catholicasate to Armenian Echmiadzin in 1836.

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<sup>261</sup> Farid Shafiyev, *Ethnic myths and perceptions as a hurdle to conflict settlement: the Armenian-Azerbaijani case*, World of diplomacy, journal of the ministry of foreign affairs of the republic of Azerbaijan, N 17, 2007, Farid Shafiyev ( M.A in history and law from Baku State University and MPA from Harvard University Kennedy School of Government)

to preserve semi-independence.	
ESTABLISHMENT OF KARABAKH KHANATE	
A certain Panah-Ali was able to capture the main fortresses of Karabakh and proclaim him-self Khan. Then his son Ibrahim took advantage of the continuous strife between the Armenians meliks and gradually subdued the whole of Karabakh.	Karabakh Khanate was founded in 1747 as an independent khanate , the founder of which was Azerbaijani Turk Panah Ali khan from the clam of Javanshir (1693-1761)
RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS, INCLUDING KARABAKH (As a result of Russian-Persian war in the beginning of the 21 century Azerbaijan was divided between Russian and Iran and Russia took control over the South Caucasus)	
The settlement of Armenians has no major implications for demographic composition of Karabakh. As far as Azerbaijan Turks are concerned they are relatively new settlers in the Caucasus (after 13 c). They appeared in Nagorno-Karabakh only in the last third of the eighteenth century and never constituted more than 3 to 4 per cent of the population, right up to the incorporation of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan in 1921. The ethnic classification “Azerbaijanis” appeared only in the 1930s. Prior to this, they were referred to as “Caucasian Tatars” or “Turks” in Russian sources.	Azerbaijanis believe that all problems and tragedies befallen on them started with Russian conquest. The Russian tsar ordered to settle Armenians from Iran and Ottoman Empire on the Caucasus and Azerbaijan lands in particular. This policy was reflected in letters of a renowned Russian diplomat and poet Alexander Griboyedov. In accordance with Russian census in the beginning of the 20 century Azerbaijanis constituted 43% of population of Yerevan-Armenian capital. Armenians installed a memorial in NK in 1978, celebrating 150 <sup>th</sup> anniversary of their settlement there. A relevant inscription on the memorial was destroyed in the beginning of the conflict.

KARABAKH IN 1918-1920	
( After the collapse of Russian Empire in 1917 three new republics-Armenian, Azerbaijan and Georgia emerged in the South Caucasus)	
Nagorno-Karabakh fought for its unification with Armenian and in 1919 the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh signed agreement with Azerbaijani authorities in which the parties agreed that the question of Nagorno-Karabakh must be resolved at the Paris Peace Conference. Armenians temporarily agreed to subordination to Azerbaijani authorities until the Paris Conference.	Nagorno-Karabakh was a part of Azerbaijan in 1918-1920 and Armenian launched a war trying to capture it as well as other Azerbaijani regions. In 1919 the National Assembly of Nagorno-Karabakh recognized the supreme power of Azerbaijan. On 12 January 1920 at the Paris Peace Conference the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers de-facto recognized the independence of Azerbaijan.
MARCH 1918 EVENT	
Armenians were under threat in Baku and any killing occurred due to mutual offensives.	In March 1918 Armenian nationalist group killed thousands of Azerbaijanis in Baku and other regions of Azerbaijan under the banner of Bolshevism.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS	
The Leagues of nation refused to recognize Azerbaijan because of its territorial claims to the Armenian populated Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the lack of efficient state control over its supported territory and inability to ground the legitimacy of the frontiers of this territory.	In April 1920 Azerbaijan was captured by the Soviet Red Army. In time of the submission of the Azerbaijani application to the League of nations in November 1920 Azerbaijan had ceased to exist as independent entity. The League of Nations also refused to recognize Armenia as a state with distinct borders and declined its application in December 1920 (in November Armenian was also conquered by the Red Army)
QUESTION OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH AFTER THE SOVIETIZATION OF THE CAUCASUS IN 1921-1923	

After the arrival of communism in the South Caucasus in 1921 Stalin gave Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. This decision was designed to appease Turkey and its leader Ataturk, as well. Azerbaijan also got Nakhichevan	The 5 July 1921 decision “to retain” (and definitely not “to transfer”) Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan was not taken by Stalin himself, but rather by a collegial body, the Caucasus Bureau of the Russian Communist Party, which was made up of only two Azerbaijanis, several Armenians as well as representatives of other nationalities. At the same time, a big chunk of Azerbaijani lands-namely Zengezur was transferred to Armenia.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH DURING THE SOVIET PERIOD	
Nagorno-Karabakh suffered from discrimination throughout the Soviet period and its population shrank while Azerbaijani population was rose	The economic situation in Nagorno-Karabakh was better than the Azerbaijani average. While Armenians had autonomy in Azerbaijan, thousands of Azerbaijanis in Armenia (in Zangezur particularly) had no status at all.
BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT IN 1988	
Armenian began peaceful demonstrations and petitioned Moscow on the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Azerbaijanis responded with violence	Two young Azerbaijanis, killed on February 24, 1988, were the first victims of the conflict. Armenians were well prepared and armed before the start of the conflict
SUMGAYIT	
Violence in Sumgayit was a response of the Azerbaijanis to the Armenian petition and displayed the attitude of Azerbaijanis towards the Armenians. After the Sumgayit event the Armenians felt unsecured from the rule of the Azerbaijanis.	It was grass root violence caused by the influx of Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia. At the same time several days before the events several Armenian and other television stations had already arrived in Azerbaijan in order to report on the “forthcoming” pogroms, whereas many well-to-do Armenian families residing in



	Sumgayit had left the city well in advance of the events. The three-time convicted felon Armenian Eduard Grigoryan himself murdered five Armenians in Sumgayit.
EXODUS OF ARMENIAN AND AZERBAIJAN POPULATIONS	
About 300,000 Armenians were expelled from Azerbaijan in 1988-1991. expulsion was accompanied by murders in Baku and Ganja	About 200,000 Azerbaijanis were expelled from Armenia. Expulsion was accompanied by murders in Gugark and other settlements
ARMENIAN EARTHQUAKES IN 1988	
Armenians never recalls an accident with a plane carrying Azerbaijan rescue team. Instead they claim that Azerbaijanis tried to get advantage of the situation created in the aftermath of the earthquakes.	Azerbaijan sent a rescue team, and a plane carrying the team crashed nearby Yerevan. Armenians navigators intentionally misled plane crew.
OPERATION "RING"	
In April 1991, the special Azerbaijani and Soviet police detachment forces began the so-called "Ring" operation and ousted Armenians from Chaykend and other villages on Azerbaijani territories.	Armenians band groups terrorized local Azerbaijani population and made raids within Azerbaijan in which 54 people were killed. In response, law-enforcement agencies carried out special operation to gain control in Chaykend and other adjacent districts
DISSOLUTION OF THE USSR AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH	

Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum in 1991 and declared its independence. This region had a right to secession in accordance with a Soviet law of March 1991 on the procedure of secession of Soviet republics which stipulated that if a Soviet republic is to secede from Moscow, its autonomous republics and region may choose to secede from that republic.	Referendum was illegal, as conditions involved armed conflict and the absence of the Azerbaijani population of NK. Azerbaijan attained independence after the dissolution of the USSR and Azerbaijan has never used the procedure contained in a Soviet law of March 1991 on secession of Soviet republics. Therefore, reference to that law is irrelevant. UN Security Council in its relevant resolutions reconfirmed sovereignty of Azerbaijan over NK.
ARMED HOSTILITIES IN 1992-1993	
Armenians was forced to create a buffer/security zone to secure its population from Azerbaijani armed forces.	Armenians began ethnic cleansing Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh and then in several regions outside Nagorno-Karabakh, taking advantage of internal instability in Azerbaijan.
FALL OF SHUSHA	
Shusha was a strategically important city from where Azerbaijani armed forces bombed the surrounding areas and towns.	While Azerbaijani and Armenians leaders negotiated peaceful solution in Tehran under the auspices of Iranian president, Armenian armed forces stormed Shusha and captured it.
FALL OF KHOJALI	
The Khojali event was a conspiracy by the Azerbaijani opposition to overthrow Azerbaijani president Ayaz Mutallibov (1990-1992). Armenians left a corridor to allow Azerbaijani population flee from Khojali. In support of their argument Armenians quote former Azerbaijani president Mutallibov: “the shooting of the	It was genocide committed in order to intimidate Azerbaijanis. They quote the executive director of Human Rights Watch who stated in her letter to Armenian Foreign Minister: “we place direct responsibility for the civilian death with Karabakh Armenians forces. Indeed, neither our report nor that of Memorial includes

Khocali was obviously organized by someone to take control in Azerbaijan”.	any evidence to support the argument that Azerbaijani forces obstructed the flight of fired on Azeri civilians”
<b>ARMENIAN TERRORISM</b>	
Acts committed by individual Armenians should not be linked to the Armenian government. Azerbaijanis also exploded gas pipelines in Georgia that supplied Armenia.	In 1988-1995 Armenian terrorists committed a number of acts in Azerbaijan, particularly in the mass public transport network resulting in death or injuries to 2000 people. Armenia supported terrorism at the state level.
<b>USE OF MERCENARIES</b>	
Azerbaijan invited Afghan mujahiddeens to fight against Armenians	Armenia used Armenian terrorists from the Middle East, Lebanon and Syria particularly
<b>RUSSIAN SUPPORT AND INVOLVEMENT</b>	
Armenian won military campaigns in 1992-1993 because its forces were well trained and united	Russia supplied Armenia heavily with arms and ammunitions and supported it politically. In 1997 Russian MP Lev Rokhlin revealed that one billion dollars worth of Russian arms had been transferred to Armenia.
<b>BLOCKADE</b>	
Azerbaijan imposed a blockade on Armenia. Armenian has a limited access to global routes and suffers economically from it	Armenia blockaded Azerbaijan’s enclave Nakhichevan. Armenia has access through Iran and Georgia.
<b>DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE</b>	
Azerbaijanis destroy Armenians cemeteries and churches on its territory; these include an old Armenian cemetery in Julfa, Nakhichevan.	Armenians destroyed and pillaged numerous Azerbaijani museums, mosques and cemeteries on the occupied territories.
<b>ARMENIAN SETTLEMENT IN OCCUPIED REGIONS</b>	

New Armenian settlers in NK are refugees from Azerbaijan.	Armenia conducts a policy of mass settlements in occupied Azerbaijani territories in order to change demographic situation in the region.
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## *Appendix 2*

**From V.N. Kazimirov ,*The Karabakh conflict: Variants of settlement*, third edition, CA& CC Publishing house, 2006**

### ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE VARIANTS OF POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KARABAKH CONFLICT

#### **More than autonomy but not a state**

Schemes that can be conventionally called “more than autonomy, but not a state” were often proposed in the process of searching for an acceptable solution to the Karabakh problem. Perhaps the first such attempt was the so-called “Willy’s Plan,” which was proposed back in 1919, and envisaged the transformation of NK into some “Special Zone” (SZ) within Azerbaijan under a sort of U.S. protectorate. (One of the clauses of the project believed to have been authored by U.S. Army Colonel William Haskel, read straightforwardly: “security and law and order in the special zone is ensured by the U.S. Army under the command of the consul”). Now this plan is only of historical interest, except perhaps that it reaffirms that the Karabakh problem, despite the claims of many of the nomenclature statesmen of the Soviet period, is not “far-fetched” but existed still at that time.

The Aland Islands are very often cited as another example of a conflict of this kind where the ethnic conflict did not result in bloodshed but was resolved by way of finding a special status within the limits of self-determination.

*The Alands is an archipelago of 8,000 islets situated in the Baltic Sea. The population of these islets were part of the Swedish Kingdom until 1808, and spoke Swedish from time immemorial. At that time Norway and Finland were both part of Sweden. As a result of the 1808-1809 war, Sweden was forced to cede Finland and the Alands to Russia. After a defeat in the Crimean War in 1856, Russia had to recognize the Alands as a de-militarized zone. At the beginning of the 20th century, Norway peacefully seceded from Sweden on the basis of a referendum. In 1917, Russia recognized the independence of Finland. At that time, the Swedish population of the Alands expressed their desire to reunite with their ancient homeland, Sweden, and sent the King of Sweden a petition signed by the entire*

*adult population of the islands. In December 1917, Finland voiced its opposition to the desire of the Alands population and suggested that the terms of self-determination should be coordinated with it. The Alands islanders rejected these suggestions. A conflict was growing, but neither side took up arms.*

*In 1921, the League of Nations passed a resolution: the Aland islands, neutral and demilitarized, were declared to be a territory belonging to Finland. Finland was given the responsibility of guaranteeing to the population of the islands the preservation of the Swedish language, customs and traditions and the development of Swedish culture.*

*Sweden and Finland concluded a Treaty according to which the population of the Alands gained the right to preserve their language, culture and traditions and thus the threat of assimilation was removed. Sweden received guarantees of security for the Swedish population of the islands and the right of unimpeded communication with them.*

*According to the Law of 1922 on self-government, the local parliament-Lagting is entitled to adopt laws on the internal affairs of the islands and on the budget. The Lagting appoints the government. In accordance with the Constitution of Finland, the laws on self-government can be amended by the Parliament of Finland only with the consent of the Lagting of the Alands. The law-making powers of the Lagting are defined in the following spheres: education and culture; public health; economy; transport; communal services; police; postal services; radio and television. In these spheres, the Alands hold the power of a sovereign state. The rest of the legislative powers are the prerogative of Finland: foreign policy; the bulk of the civil code; courts and criminal law; customs and money circulation.*

*To defend the interests of the Aland population, one deputy from the archipelago is elected to the Parliament of Finland. With the consent of the Lagting, the president of Finland appoints the governor of the islands. The powers of the governor are as follows: to head the Council of representatives of the Aland Islands (formed on parity principles); to open and close sessions of the Lagting.*

*In the economic sphere, relations are built according to the following pattern: the government of Finland levies taxes, collects customs and other levies on the islands the same way it does in the rest of the country. The expenses on the archipelago are covered from the state budget. The archipelago receives a proportion of state revenues after the deduction of its share for state debt repayment. It is up to the Lagting to decide how to distribute the remaining sum according to budget items.*

*The laws adopted by the Lagting are sent to the President of Finland who has the right of veto. This veto can be exercised only in two cases: if the Parliament of the islands exceeds its powers or if the adopted law contains a threat to the internal and external security of Finland.*

*The right to live on the islands is equivalent to the right to citizenship. Every child born on the islands has that right on condition that one of his/her parents is a citizen of the Alands. The islanders are simultaneously citizens of Finland. The right of Aland citizenship is granted to any citizen of Finland who has moved to the archipelago and has lived there for five years on the condition that he speaks Swedish.*

*Restrictions on the rights for foreigners regarding the ownership of real estate are explained by the aspiration to secure land for the residents of the Alands. A resident of an island, who has lived for five years outside the Alands, loses his citizenship. A citizen of the Alands is exempted from the duty of serving in the Finnish Army. It is also forbidden to station troops and build fortifications on the islands.*

*The Alanders may directly cooperate with Scandinavian countries. They also take part in the work of the Northern Council.*

*Foreign policy is the prerogative of the Government and Parliament of Finland. But if Finland signs an international treaty that affects the internal affairs of the Alands, then the implementation of the treaty should be coordinated with the Lagting.*

The Alands model was proposed by international intermediaries as a possible future model for relations between NK and the Azerbaijan Republic. A symposium of Azeri, Armenian and NK parliamentarians was held on the Aland Islands on December 21-22, 1993, upon the initiative of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, the Federal Assembly and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. During the symposium, details of the model were presented. However, the authorities of NK consider that the Alands model fails to take into consideration “*the historical basis and psychological consequences of the Karabakh-Azeri conflict and of the war fought for NK’s de facto independence from the Azerbaijan Republic*”. Besides, according to the firm conviction of the Armenian and the Karabakh sides, the Alands model was inapplicable to the conditions of the South Caucasus also for the reason that the question of the status of the mentioned archipelago in the 1920s was not resolved separately, but within the framework of the general issue – the so-called “Sweden problem” in Finland. The Swedes were able to get equal rights not only in the

Alands but also in Finland as a whole where the Swedish language is the second state language.

It is not the only example of a settlement according to the principle “more autonomy, but not a state”. Many statesmen and experts proposed such options as an opportunity for both sides to resolve conflict with dignity, with minimal losses both to their security and self-esteem (which is equally important). Let’s look at one more example of this kind presented by American researchers D. Laitin and R. Suny.

*1. Karabakh de jure must remain within Azerbaijan in conformity with the principle of territorial integrity of a state and the inadmissibility of unilateral alternations of borders by force. The symbolic sovereignty of Azerbaijan over Karabakh could be represented by the Azeri flag waving over the Government House in Karabakh and by the appointment of an Azeri representative in Karabakh who will have to be approved by the Karabakh government. The formal aspect of sovereignty implies Azerbaijan’s representation of Karabakh in the UN and other international organizations.*

*2. The citizens of Karabakh must have proportional representation in the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic in Baku. The Karabakh representatives in the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic must have the powers to stop any proposed law that directly concerns Karabakh.*

*3. The establishment of full self-government of the Republic of Karabakh within the borders of the Azerbaijan Republic, presupposing the formation of their own Parliament with proportional representation of the population, the right of veto on the resolutions of Azerbaijan concerning this republic, sovereign rights of its government in issues of security, education, culture and investments in infrastructure.*

*4. The absence of units of armed forces and the police of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Karabakh Republic on each other’s territories without mutual consent.*

*5. The Armenians and Azeris living in Karabakh would have the right to dual citizenship or full citizenship in either republic with the right of permanent residence in Karabakh.*

Summing up what was stated above, one can note that the variants of settlement like “more than autonomy, but not a state”, “associated state” and “common state” often have characteristics interwoven among themselves and it is difficult to draw a clear distinction among them



## Exchange of territories

As far back as 1988, a group of human rights activists headed by Andrei Sakharov proposed a variant of territorial “separation” of the Armenians and Azeris as a model for the resolution of the conflict. At that time this variant failed to become a subject of discussion.

The first elaborated draft of such a variant was proposed by an American political scientist Paul Goble, a former officer of the U.S. State Department, who stated his viewpoint in the article “Coping with the Nagorno Karabakh Crisis”. Goble argued that the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia were unable to solve this problem themselves. And not a single solution is possible if the sides try to return to the old status quo, to the situation that existed before the start of the conflict in 1988<sup>19</sup>.

The former status quo, Paul Goble said, was maintained thanks to the USSR, which no longer existed. Now the situation has changed and it dictates the necessity to show a new approach to the NK conflict.

Paul Goble thought that *“in principle there are three ways “to solve” the NK problem: to oust or kill all Armenians living there now, to station a great number of foreign forces to move these sides apart or to hand over the NKAR under Armenian control”*. But the author himself felt that all these options were impossible to realize: the first option because of moral considerations, the second because it was not physically possible, and the *“third one is impossible politically since in this case Azerbaijan will become the side unfairly treated both from the viewpoint of loss of territory and the question of water supply to Baku”*. Therefore, he sought the key to the resolution of the problem in the exchange of territories, including the following conditions:

First, handing over a part of the NKAR to Armenia together with the territories of the sources of rivers flowing in the direction of Azerbaijan. Secondly, handing over the Armenian territory connecting the Azerbaijan Republic with Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan’s control.

Evidently Paul Goble understood that in the case of the realization of this variant, Armenia would find itself in a difficult situation because it would lose its connection with Iran, which is of vital importance to Armenia. That is why, in 1996, he introduced some amendments to his plan. In particular, he proposed to create a corridor through the southern region of Armenia, Meghri, to Iran, where some international forces would be stationed.

Later, Goble suggested handing over a part of the NKAR to Armenia in exchange for handing over a part of Armenian territory, namely the Meghri region, to Azerbaijan. This would enable Azerbaijan to have an immediate border with Nakhichevan.

The Goble Plan, for one reason or another, failed to find support first of all from the Republic of Armenia and NK. It is important, however, to note that according to media reports and oppositionists in Armenia, some variant of a territorial swap like the one proposed by Goble was seriously considered during talks between the presidents of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia in 2000-2001. Officially, Yerevan and Baku were refuting these reports and there was not any additional information about this variant, even if it was actually discussed. (see further)

### **Associated state**

Politicians and scholars often pay great attention to the concept of the associated state as one of the variants of solving ethno-political conflicts, including the NK conflict. They usually refer to UN resolutions and declarations, in particular to UN Resolution 2625 adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970 on the “Declaration on the Principles of International Law Pertaining to Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the United Nations Charter”.

The Declaration admits three forms of the realization of the right of nations to self-determination: formation of a new state; association with an already existing independent state or status of a different level if it is approved by the free expression of will of a given people. In this case the variant of free association with an independent state is of interest. This variant is not only a political postulate but is realized in practice. The islands of Cook and Near already have associated statehood with New Zealand, while Puerto Rico, the Marshall Islands and the Federation of Micronesia have associated statehood with the United States. The last two – the Marshall Islands and the Federation of Micronesia – even became members of the United Nations in 1990.

On the basis of this principle, Ambassador John Maresca, a former U.S. representative to the CSCE Minsk Group, worked out and published on July 1, 1994 a plan for the political resolution of the NK conflict. John Maresca’s proposal consisted of eight chapters. In the first chapter, “The Status of Nagorno Karabakh”, it was noted that “*NK must be called the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and must be a completely self-governed legal formation within the sovereign state of the Azerbaijan Republic*”. “*The NKR must be within Azerbaijan and associated with it*”. Maresca proposed the adoption the Basic Law about the status of the

NKR on the basis of which its associated unification with the Azerbaijan Republic would be realized. It was suggested that representative offices should be established in Stepanakert and Baku; the NKR would have the right to have permanent representations in the capitals of states of special importance such as Yerevan and Moscow, and receive corresponding representatives from the same countries. But *“the NKR must not be recognized as a sovereign independent state”*.

According to Maresca’s plan, *“the armed forces of the NKR must be gradually reduced. The NKR may have the right to have local security forces, including self-defense forces, but must not have offensive military forces.”* And the Azerbaijan Republic would gain the right to station in the NKR only local security forces, but no offensive armaments system, including near the NKR.

There are some clauses in John Maresca’s variant about the right of the Republic of Armenia to maintain transit links with the NKR via the Lachin corridor, and the Azerbaijan Republic with Nakhichevan via the territory of Armenia. There are also clauses about the return of refugees to the places of their former residence, about turning the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic, including NK and Nakhichevan, into a free trade zone, about the convocation of a conference of donors for financial support of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia, including NK, etc. And finally, Maresca proposed that the OSCE and the UN Security Council should become guarantors of the implementation of the terms of this document.

The variant of an associated state, though deviating from unconditional demands for the submission of NK to the laws and jurisdiction of the Azerbaijan Republic, nevertheless is based on the principle of non-recognition of the independence of the NKR and views it as part of the Azerbaijan Republic, with the retention of the NKR’s vertical submission to Azerbaijan. This, in the opinion of the Armenian side, absolutely failed to correspond to the internationally acknowledged concept of an “associated state”. In the NK leadership’s opinion, the relations with the Azerbaijan Republic must be based on the principle of full equality, which excludes any vertical ties.

The so-called “synthesis variant” can be considered to be among the varieties of this variant. This variant was put forward in the mid-1990s by the director of the U.S. National Democratic Institute (NDI), Ambassador Nelson Ledsky, who stated his viewpoint in an interview with the “Turkish Daily News” paper (September 1995). In his opinion, in real fact NK must become part of the Republic of Armenia, although possibly, in some form it must be connected with the Azerbaijan Republic. *“There is no doubt,”* N. Ledsky says, *“that the*

*Armenians were a success in this war. And the Azeri side must admit that it has lost something.”*

It would be appropriate to note here that, according to the Azeri side, the constant reference of western analysts to the “military success” and “results of war” hide a hint that a “military solution” to the Karabakh problem is the only possible one.

N. Ledsky expressed that the problem of Nakhichevan, from the point of view of its communication with the Azerbaijan Republic, was an essential part of the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Answering a Turkish reporter’s question: “Do you propose an exchange of NK for Nakhichevan?”, Ledsky replied that *“there must be negotiations, which will provide communications between NK and the Republic of Armenia as well as between Nakhichevan and the Azerbaijan Republic”*.

Although in this chapter we have distinguished the variant of the “Common State” proposed by the Minsk Group co-chairmen in December 1998, it is easy to see that this variant is close enough to the concept of an associated state, and the difference between these two variants is rather conditional. Below we are going to discuss this variant at length.

Let us round up the analysis of this variant by an assessment of the “psychology of fears” of the sides defined by the Azeri politician and scholar Niyazi Mehti.

*“There is no doubt that NK has a chance to actually exist as an independent state with the retention of some political symbols, formally remaining within the Azerbaijan Republic. But the Armenians are afraid of such a prospect. Firstly, because if on the one hand the military-economic strength of today’s opponent increases and its international position stabilises, and if on the other hand the international control over the maintenance of peace is weakened the Azerbaijan Republic could take advantage of its legal right of a sovereign state and would abolish the de facto independence of NK. “The absence of 100% guarantees makes NK afraid of snags of even symbolic attributes of NK’s belonging to Azerbaijan. The other reason is the dynamics of the demographic and migration processes in the Azerbaijan Republic, capable, in the opinion of the Armenians, of leading to a repetition of the Nakhichevan scenario: the alleged peaceful ousting of Armenians by Azeris. Thirdly, the proposed subordination of NK to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan will inevitably encounter the resistance of the Armenians of NK and the Republic of Armenia: official persons state that after so many victories the people themselves will never allow it.*

*“The stand of the Azeri side is conditioned first by the constant presence in the nation’s consciousness that Upper and Lower Karabakh make up an inseparable*

*part with the rest of the country's geography. Karabakh's separation is perceived by this consciousness as a national disaster. Secondly, the systems and principles of international law (inviolability of borders, recognition of the Azerbaijan Republic by the UN and other international organizations within its factual borders etc.) work for Azerbaijan, and to give up these advantages is ludicrous. Thirdly, one cannot exclude the prospects of the state's increased might and as a consequence the possibility of revenge. Fourth, the international law is inclined, especially of late, to accept some precedents which create the situation of automatism and permanence in conflict resolution. At the very first small compromise this automatism turns on the "domino" principle requiring more and more concessions up to NK's secession: for example, the recognition of the Armenians of NK as a party to the negotiations, according to the same principle may become a step on the way towards the recognition of NK's independence."*

### **The Cyprus model**

The idea of the so-called Cyprus variant very often emerges in discussions of the ways to settle the Karabakh conflict and the status of NK.

The point of the "Cyprus model" consists of the fact that this formation (the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) is only officially recognized by Turkey, and only exists and functions de facto. The Cyprus model as applicable to NK means: not to recognize it de jure, but to agree with its existence de facto. It means that NK would not be an integral part of the Azerbaijan Republic or the Republic of Armenia, would not be officially recognized as an independent state, would not be a member of the international community, but would exist and function as an independent state formation.

In the opinion of the Armenian side, the Cyprus model is a compromise one. It may allow the sides to reconcile themselves to the existing state of affairs without the humiliation of the national dignity of all sides involved in the conflict. It would ease tension, grant a respite and, in future, would promote a broader approach to the resolution of the problem. On the other hand, it would promote the normalization of relations between the neighbors – Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Such a model, in the opinion of the Azeri side, has already been working for about a decade, but has not lived up to anybody's expectations.

### **The "Chechen Variant" and the "Prague Process"**

Immediately after the conclusion in 1996 of the Khasavyurt agreements between the leadership of the Russian Federation and the leadership of Chechnya there

appeared another variant for solving the conflict later called the “Chechen variant”. After a year and a half of bloodshed the Russian Federation and Chechnya came to an agreement on stopping the war, establishing peace and postponing the determination of the status of Chechnya for five years. This is the essence of the Chechen model, a sort of “mechanism of a postponed determination of political status.” After the Russian-Chechen agreement, different circles within the Russian Federation, Armenia and the leadership of NK started to talk about the possibility of applying this model in relation to the Karabakh problem.

It is necessary to consider this transition period during which the positions of the parties will be gradually determined. It is thought that if the question of status is delayed, for example for a five year period, during this time a new generation of politicians may emerge, there will be more clarity in the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus as well as in the economy. Possibly, the parties to the conflict would abandon too categorical a tone in negotiations. Thus, it may become possible to move the problem from deadlock.

To sum up, the “Chechen variant” as applied to the problem of NK rests on three principles:

A. Ensuring maximum security for Karabakh and for the residents of the adjacent territories of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic.

B. Establishment of a transitional period for a minimum of five years during which the determination of the political status of NK will be delayed. This will create a breathing space and more favorable political, geopolitical and economic conditions for the settlement of the Karabakh problem.

C. A new generation of politicians, free from the burden of the preceding period and mutual enmity will emerge during this period, and this generation will act in a new atmosphere and in new conditions.

At the same time, it is not difficult to see the following obvious obstacle: this variant presumes broad negotiations with the involvement of “the parties to the conflict”, but this question is not solved even within the framework of the current negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In fact, one variation of the “Chechen variant” is the Dayton Peace Accord (1996) according to which the Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted “a delayed right” of self-determination after nine years. The leadership of NK immediately gave a positive estimation to the possibilities of the “Chechen

variant". The then president of unrecognized NKR, Robert Kocharian, stated on February 27, 1997 in Stepanakert that the "*variant of the resolution of the Karabakh problem in analogy with the Chechen problem is quite acceptable for Karabakh*". He said that as far back as two years ago, the NK leadership suggested departing from the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination, but that suggestion was rejected by the leadership of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, in turn, thought that the "Chechen variant" was incompatible with the situation in NK. There is no one for Chechnya to integrate with, while NK has already widely integrated with the Republic of Armenia and, in another five years, would simply complete this process. Meanwhile, the development of the political situation in Chechnya led to the oblivion of the Khasavyurt agreements, which, however, does not rule out the importance of studying the "Chechen variant" as it is.

The so-called "principle of anomaly" set forth by Niyazi Mehti in his aforementioned article can be presented as a particular variety of the "Chechen variant". We think it important to consider this variant as an example of how, with the presence of goodwill and readiness of the sides, it is possible to overcome stumbling blocks and try to get used to peaceful co-existence gradually arriving at mutually acceptable legal solutions. Here are the main provisions of this principle.

*1. The Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Armenia and the two communities of NK agree that the region of the conflict is an internal Azeri anomaly, which can be settled using exceptional, anomalous methods. After acceptance of this thesis the sides appeal to the international community to regard this situation outside the jurisdiction of international principles, which run counter to the formed situation. Then, the situation is brought to a stalemate situation through a number of mutual agreements.*

*2. Azerbaijan recognizes NK as the NKR sort of recognising its independence. However, the NKR is deprived of the possibility of changing its name or seceding from the Azerbaijan Republic without approval in an all-Azerbaijan referendum (a situation when the Azeri side would mark "NKR" in its official documents in inverted comas is possible).*

*3. The NKR formally has its own army, but this structure is inspected by the Azerbaijan Republic and in actual fact becomes a police force deprived of heavy armaments. This symbolic army should also enlist Azeris living in the territory of NK. The quota of Azeris should be proportional to their number in NK.*

*4. NK has a Parliament to which Azeris are elected according to the quota of the Azeri minority. The Parliament adopts a Constitution on the basis of agreements*

*with the Azeri side within the framework of the basic principles of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic.*

*5. According to a quota, the NKR has its deputies in the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Republic.*

*6. Every five years, the Azeri Parliament raises the question of abolishing the NKR. But the deputies of the NKR have the right of veto in this matter. As soon as this question is brought up for discussion the deputies of the NKR, on the basis of an official document submitted by the NKR Parliament (in order to rule out any pressure on deputies or their "consent" due to corruption), apply their veto. The deputies of the NKR can exercise their right of veto only in connection with this question. (A number of other symbolic questions can be added here).*

*7. Likewise, every five years, the NKR Parliament raises the question of seceding from the Azerbaijan Republic (creation of their own currency, etc.) and the Azeri deputies proceeding from the resolution of the Azeri Parliament impose their veto. This kind of play, meanwhile, must be compulsory because such symbolic procedures remove psychological tension. In due course of time all this will turn into a sort of ritual like some procedures in the political life of monarchic Great Britain. The therapeutic, psychological effect of this procedure on the Armenian-Azeri conflict can be modeled and studied. The number of such symbolic anomalies in world practice is rather great. For example, the Queen of England is the nominal monarch of the whole Commonwealth, but in actual fact she is far from making political decisions in these countries.*

*8. If the Republic of Armenia declares war on the Azerbaijan Republic or any other country the NKR is prevented from automatically entering an alliance with the Republic of Armenia as an independent entity by force of a veto imposed by the Azeri representatives of the Parliament. Similarly, the Azerbaijan Republic, if it declares war on the Republic of Armenia, has no right to draw the NKR into this war due to the veto of the Armenian side.*

*It is important to note here that such "rules of the game" do not hurt the ambitions and dignity of the sides and most of the problems are shifted to the symbolic zone of confrontation, in which the procedure of the stalemate situation simulates progress in resolving painful problems thus removing tension. Of course, all the names, examples and symbols used in the model are conditional and are only presented to explain the general principles. After consultation the sides can change some provisions of the anomalous autonomy and stalemate situations. In the modern situation of confrontation, symbolism has obtained such an acute nature that solution to the conflict must also be connected with symbolic procedures*



In conclusion one should note that, if media reports are accurate, then the present stage of the negotiating process with the participation of Armenia and Azerbaijan called “the Prague Process” represents a variety of “the Chechen variant”. On July 12, 2005, Radio Liberty, quoting reliable diplomatic sources, reported that according to the preliminary arrangement, this process includes the holding of a national referendum in Nagorno Karabakh on its status within 10-15 years, with Azerbaijan recognizing the results of this referendum. This process differs from the “classical” “Chechen” variant, however, by the fact that Armenian military units of the party (Armenia and the NKR) would be required to withdraw from parts of the occupied areas around NK beforehand and would allow the return of Azeri refugees to the region. The realization of other confidence building measures is also planned. The officials involved in the negotiating process, naturally, have neither confirmed, nor denied these reports.

### **“Common State”**

For a number of reasons in 1996-1997, the efforts of international mediators in settling the Karabakh problem failed to yield results and were resumed only in December 1998, when the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen advanced a new initiative based on the so-called principle of the “common state”.

It was, in fact, an attempt to find an “unconventional” solution, which could, as much as possible, formally combine the two basic demands: Azerbaijan’s demands about its territorial integrity, and NK’s demands for self-determination. The most important provisions of this variant published in the press are as follows (not in the order cited in the official document of the Minsk Group):

*1. NK is a state and a territorial formation and together with the Azerbaijan Republic make up a single state within its internationally recognized borders.*

*2. NK has its own constitution and laws effective on its territory. The laws of the Azerbaijan Republic are effective on the territory of NK if they do not run counter to the Constitution and laws of the latter.*

*3. NK will have the right to establish direct external relations with foreign states in the spheres of economy, trade, science, education and culture.*

*4. NK will have a National Guard and police forces, but they can not act outside the NK borders.*

*5. The army, security forces and the police of the Azerbaijan Republic are not entitled to enter the territory of NK without the consent of NK authorities.*

However, to all appearances this concept was not fully defined, as there was no consensus even on how to name the concept. Indeed, besides the name “common state” wordings like “single,” “joint” and even “union state” were also used.

It is obvious that there is an essential difference between “single”, “common” and “union” states. In the first case – “single state” – a unitary form of state is meant, within the framework of which there may or may not be limited or “broad” autonomy. And if this is what was offered to the conflicting sides in 1998 by the co-chairmen of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, then it should be acknowledged that there was nothing “new” in their offer. But in the second case – “joint state” – two forms of state order are implied at a time: federation and confederation. Judging by what the then Russian representative Y. A. Yukalov said, the Armenians of the NKR were in fact presented with an offer to become a member of some federation, while it is not clear what sort of vague status the Minsk Group co-chairman offered NK as a member of this hypothetical federation.

But as far as “union state” is concerned, this is already a concrete indication of a federation, which can be symmetric or asymmetric, and its entities may exist on an equal or unequal legal basis and so on.

As to the point of the of the “common state” proposals it should be noted that the matter in this case concerns the concept of federalism in the countries of the South Caucasus, which Russia adhered to in its intermediary mission up until 1995 and only then gave up because of the positions of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Besides, at the stage of the NK conflict settlement under review, this idea was already vaguely advanced by the United States. A study of the text of proposals of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen dated November 1997 gives us reason to believe that the main idea of the Russian Federation, the U.S. and France, which joined it in this question, was the intention to broaden the ordinary notions about the mutual relations between the “federal center” and an “entity of the federation”. For instance, it was presumed that NK, while returning to the state-legal space of Azerbaijan, would nonetheless maintain all the external attributes of independent statehood: the institutions of presidency, parliament, government, constitution, court, army (in the form of a National Guard), police, security forces, emblem, anthem, flag, etc. But as to NK maintaining its communication with the outside world, the following form was proposed: Azerbaijan “rents out” to the OSCE the zone of the Lachin humanitarian corridor and the OSCE establishes its control over it “in cooperation and interaction” with the leadership of NK and using manpower provided by official Stepanakert working jointly with OSCE observers. NK would be deprived of the possibility of implementing an independent foreign policy and having an independent banking and financial system. But at the same time this territory was to be declared a free economic zone with unlimited circulation of any foreign currency.

These and other provisions of the studied peace proposals of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen enable us to conclude that, although terminologically it was to be spoken about the preservation of territorial integrity and a single Azerbaijani state, in terms of the contents the international negotiators, tried to realize a policy aimed at forming a union of states – Azerbaijan and NKR – that is to say a confederation, which, above all, would be an asymmetric one.

NK and the Republic of Armenia stated then that they were ready to accept those proposals of the Minsk Group as a basis for negotiations and this position has remained in force up to now. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, referring to the norms of international law and national interests, turned down this proposal.

### **“Transcaucasian Confederation”**

The idea that the future of the South Caucasus countries lies in their integration, up to the integration on the political level, is not new (suffice it to remember the term “the Caucasian Benelux” coined by Eduard Shevardnadze as far back as the first half of the 1990s). But a group of analysts from the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels, led by Michael Emerson, proposed a very radical variant of such a development, presuming that integration in itself may turn out to be a key to the resolution of both the Karabakh and other conflicts in this region. This “Stability Pact” proposal contained the following elements:

□ · *Readiness of the leaders of the three recognized states of the South Caucasus to take immediate steps towards regional integration; the establishment of the so-called South Caucasus Community.*

□ · *Consent of the EU, Russia and the United States to sponsor such integration.*

□ · *Readiness to realize a six-point plan (“agenda”), three of the points immediately concerning the South Caucasus, three concerning cooperation in a broader region, including the Black sea zone and the South of Russia.* The first three items include:

- Constitutional resolutions for international conflicts, in particular, with the use of modern European models of shared sovereignty as well as interdependency of different levels of governance.

- It is proposed for the major conflicts – Nagorno Karabakh and Abkhazia, to make provisions for a high degree of self-government, exclusive prerogatives, separate constitutions, horizontal and asymmetric relations with state authorities and shared joint powers in such spheres as security, foreign relations and economy.

- Special provisions must be foreseen for peace-keeping and guarantees of security for refugees.

The project also stipulated the possibility of the federalization of Georgia and Azerbaijan proceeding from their cultural-ethnic characteristics so as to avert conflicts in the areas where national minorities reside. All this was to be followed by concrete measures on the establishment of a new South Caucasus Community, presuming compact political and economic integration of all states of the region. Besides the Russian Federation, the EU and the United States, an active participation in this project of other organizations such as the OSCE, was also planned.

The project, as one should have expected, failed to bring any concrete results due to the failure to find any interest among the leaders of the region's states.

Here we can mention a similar model of Emil Agayev which was called the "Transcaucasian Confederation" or "South-Caucasian Union" (SU). According to this concept, the SU could include at first two, and then three, independent states, which after entering confederate relations would retain their sovereignty. On certain conditions (stipulated in each case separately) the autonomous entities of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Ajaria, Nagorno Karabakh (plus Nakhichevan), could also be included as associate members, remaining entities of sovereign republics and gaining the right to participate in solving the stipulated issues of confederate life as a whole on an equal basis with them. Each of them would gain the right to live as it wishes but within certain limits without interfering with others. All this is stipulated by a treaty covering the formation of the confederation. (In the way, this treaty must stipulate that territorial and other claims are handed to the archives once and for good). But then it would be easier to settle many disputed questions, and would be easier for refugees to return to their native places. But the most important thing was that, in the case of the immediate entrance of NK, as well as other autonomies into a confederation, it was easier to put out these "hot spots".

The formation and functioning of the SU, according to Agayev, could be realized with the help and even through the mediation of the world community, otherwise it would be difficult to come to terms.

The possibility of the formation of such a confederation could be considered in the context of the world integration tendencies. The question is whether it is time to form a common political space and how to organize the process of controlled, "predictable" globalization, leaving space for the development of peoples and their cultures.

The empires which have almost gone into non-existence held one advantage: on their vast territories there really was a dialogue of cultures, a meeting of civilizations and interaction of peoples. It would be ridiculous in the 21st century to aspire to the political past, but the projects on the formation of a new type of confederation of countries included in one region could become a subject for discussion. The South Caucasus and the territories of Russia, Turkey, and Iran adjacent to it, as well as the Caspian countries of Central Asia, and some Black Sea countries, are geographically and economically predisposed to integration. All the pluses and minuses of such a political step, in our opinion, deserve critical analysis.

The model proposed in 1996-1998 by the left-wing forces of the Republic of Armenia and NK and supported by the communists of the Russian Federation is, as a matter of fact, another sub-variant of an integration solution. According to this scheme, the path towards the settlement of the conflict could lie through joining the internationally recognized and non-recognized states of the South Caucasus to the Russia-Belarus Union (now a Union state) as separate units. In 1997, more than a million signatures in the Republic of Armenia were collected in favor of this decision, as the leaders of the Communist Party of Armenia and the public organization "Armenian People's Initiative Russia-Belarus-Armenia" claimed. According to some data, NK's authorities also favored this idea. However, the official authorities of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia (as well as of Georgia) showed a negative attitude to it.

### **The "Paris principles"**

We have to mention separately the initiatives known by this name only because they have been circulating since the spring of 2001. The name of these principles is connected with the meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia held in Paris by the mediation of President Jacques Chirac of France (March 5, 2001). The negotiating parties did not publicize what the gist of these "principles" was and it is, in fact, possible that they coincided with some variants described earlier. After the meeting on April 4 -7, 2001 in Key West (USA), these principles also were often called the "Key West" principles.

It is of some interest to note that the then President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, who had previously insisted that there were no "Paris principles", stated in mid-June 2002 that these principles were nothing but a proposal about an exchange of corridors between the sides, i.e. Meghri for Lachin. Armenian President Robert Kocharyan denied these statements, but refused to disclose the essence of these principles<sup>32</sup>. We can only quote the statements of Armenian officials that these principles comprised three basic theses on which Yerevan and Stepanakert insisted: a) exception of the vertical subordination of NK to Azerbaijan; b)

ensuring of permanent communication between NK and Armenia; c) presence of security guarantees for the population of NK<sup>33</sup>.

### **The principle of condominium (or the “Andorra variant”)**

After the Key West meeting, Armenian and Azeri mass media wrote about an allegedly proposed variant of “Andorra status” (condominium) envisaging the participation of “plenipotentiary representatives” of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the government structures of NK and other “attributes” (including the establishment of some kind of international control over the “corridors”). The matter is likely to have concerned a mere touchstone to gauge the political opinions in Azerbaijan, NK and Armenia. In reality, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen could hardly have intended to consider the plan themselves, let alone propose it to the conflicting sides. The thing is that any “Andorried” variant of settlement, logically, must be based on the denial of the right of “new Andorrans” to maintain their own armed forces. As it became clear from the public statements of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen in Stepanakert and Yerevan, and especially by N. Gribkov and P. de Suremain, today the international community is inclined to understand that NK long ago turned into a “big independent factor” of Transcaucasian politics. It is likely to mean that the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group are inclined to distinguish the separate role of NK’s armed forces in this factor. And in the case of “Andorisation” of NK or even one single similar attempt, the U.S., Russia and France would face the task beyond their strength of fully and unconditionally disarming the NK defense army and demilitarizing the territories of not only NK but also of the lands adjacent to it both in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Meanwhile, in Azerbaijan, the co-chairmen pronounced quite different statements, acknowledging that negotiations were conducted exclusively between the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia and that their framework can be broadened after first successes are achieved<sup>34</sup>.

### **METHODS (“TECHNOLOGIES”) FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE KARABAKH CONFLICT**

Whatever the final settlement of the Karabakh conflict may be, the greatest significance will be in the actions that each side will take in order to realize that solution. In reality, any of the above variants of solving the conflict is no more than an abstraction: how to solve the problem in reality (what we might call the “technology” of settlement) is a big problem in itself. Moreover, as it will be shown below, many of the proposed, and perhaps quite realistic, solutions were put aside due to the difficulties of their practical implementation. And the lack of mutual trust turns out to be the key problem.

### **Military solution**

From a purely formal standpoint, this variant of actions of the sides, unfortunately, cannot be ruled out of the list of possible ones. That is, the Azeri side may undertake a military action to liberate the areas of Azerbaijan occupied by the Armenians and eliminate the insurgent enclave of Nagorno Karabakh. The Armenian sides, on the other hand, may, for example, seize new territories of Azerbaijan outside Karabakh, to force Azerbaijan to be more concessive. Formally, all parties to the conflict speak in favor of a peaceful settlement to the conflict, but recently, when the negotiations again came to a deadlock, Azerbaijan stressed that it did not rule out a military solution “for the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity in accordance with the principles of the United Nations”. In the opinion of the Armenian side, such behavior is not unexpected from the country which was defeated in the military operations. But it is also evident that these kinds of statements by official Baku damage the search for compromise most, which, above all, requires an atmosphere of mutual trust. In response, the Azeri side asks the following question: would Armenia be ready to conduct peace talks with Azerbaijan if the latter had, with the aid of Russia, occupied territories of Armenia populated by Azeris and demanded the formation of a new independent Azeri state on them?

### **“Package” solution**

This type of action assumes the achievement of preliminary consent by the sides on all disputable questions, a conclusion of agreements “in a package”, that is taking into account all problems and aspects of future peace and implementation of these activities in the future

Since, as it has been stated above, there has been no consensus on a number of major issues and first of all on the status of Nagorno Karabakh, it is natural that all “package” variants proposed by Russia in 1996 and by the Minsk Group co-chairmen in July 1997 failed to be realized and were put aside, although the current leaders of Armenia state about their adherence to the “package” principles of resolving the conflict

### **Stage-by-stage solution**

The staged scheme of conflict solution was proposed instead of the “package” variant in December 1997(both can be found in the APPENDICES section). It proceeded from the fact that since the sides were unprepared for a complete settlement of the whole conflict, including its core problem, the status of Nagorno Karabakh, it was necessary to do what at least could be agreed by them. Namely, it could be possible to realize a partial withdrawal of Armenian troops from the Azerbaijan territories outside Karabakh (except the Lachin corridor), and also to achieve a stage-by-stage return of refugees to places of their former residence. It is natural that, even in this case, there would remain disputable questions (for example, about the boundaries of the Lachin corridor), which were supposed to

be settled in the course of further negotiations. But in reality, these proposals also remained on paper – because of differences on a number of aspects of the settlement, RA President Levon Ter-Petrosian resigned and his successor Robert Kocharian holds the opinion that the conflict solution may be only a “package” one, for any processes that alter the current status quo without a guarantee of final solution are fraught with the threat of renewed hostilities, because they will break the positional balance that has been established since the establishment of the truce.

It is not difficult to notice that the “stage-by-stage solution” could lead, with a high degree of likelihood, to the aforementioned scheme of a “delayed solution” or the “Chechen scheme”. The sides possibly would not have formalized any agreement about a delay in defining the status of Nagorno Karabakh, but de facto, by mutual tacit agreement, it might turn out to be exactly this way. Renewed hostilities, of course, would not be ruled out either.

Ambassador V. Kazimirov, as a committed supporter of the “stage-by-stage solution” (he calls the “package” solution one that “cannot get off the ground”), in his recent speeches expressed the idea that the proposed variants of the “stage-by-stage solution” so far have not been such in reality. He thinks that the way to resolve the conflict consists in multiple, small, but balanced, steps. “Of course, by “stages” we don’t mean beginning with meeting the demands of one of the sides (even if these are quite legitimate demands) and only then considering the problems concerning the other sides. At each stage small “packages” must be bound so that all the sides will have some of their demands satisfied (possibly even not completely). To begin with, let them not be the main issues. Surely during seven years, a number of problems could have been settled, creating a positive dynamic and a more favorable atmosphere, rather than sitting in a deadlock for years, driving people to despair and forcing them to abandon the country,” the diplomat says.

### **“Backup plan”**

In late 2003 Ambassador V. Kazimirov published proposals, calling them the “backup plan,” of the Karabakh settlement (in case the resumed meetings between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia fail to yield results, hence the name “backup”)<sup>6</sup>. In his opinion, the main problems led the negotiating process to deadlock because of an obvious mutual inability of the sides to even partially meet the opposite side halfway as far as its priority demands are concerned (the Armenians’ demands to recognize in the “package” the independence of Nagorno Karabakh or its joining the Republic of Armenia and the demands of Baku first of all in the stage-by-stage approach for a pullback from the occupied territories). As a result of excessive mutual toughness of the sides, the deadlock in these main problems blocks any progress in the negotiating process and is fraught not only



with the preservation of a situation of “neither war nor peace” but also with an escalation of tensions.

Not to allow it and to gradually relieve tensions, the author offers “to start from little things” – to get down to solving other less important problems slightly opening the way to finding compromises on less significant pragmatic questions. *“The “conceptual nucleus” of the “backup plan” is to bypass the “main barriers” and to subject them to gradual erosion, systematically reducing the tension by means of resolving the easiest particular questions first, which in themselves are quite solvable already, but which remain hostage to the situation when the most difficult problems are unresolved. In the situation of the current stagnation and a compete deadlock, the sides should be given a chance to demonstrate their complete “sanity”, that is, to solve at least some other problems. Only then, slowly but surely, to start “ascending from simple things to intricate ones”*”– he writes. Kazimirov believes that, at the same time, the sides should stop mutual hostile propaganda and specially prepare, or “train,” their societies for compromises beginning with small issues.

Continuing top-level meetings in reasonable cases, the Russian Ambassador suggests that emphasis should be shifted on the conduct of internationally mediated regular (and continuous when necessary) negotiations of plenipotentiary delegations on the responsible level and with the attraction of experts. In his view the delegation of Nagorno Karabakh should also take part in these negotiations (Azerbaijan could consider the authorities of Nagorno Karabakh to be temporary or “de facto”). It is better to conduct negotiations in a flexible format: issues concerning all the three parties should be discussed with the participation of all delegations and the rest of the issues should be discussed between Azerbaijan and Armenia, or between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh (in these cases the third party is an observer). The agenda should be open. None of the questions should be excluded so that the sides and the mediators could prepare “exchanges” in any cases, sometimes even asymmetrically.

As for the role of the leaders, the author writes, “the most valuable contribution of the leaders would be such a manifestation of foresight and political courage as a declaration (jointly or independently) of the policy of overcoming disputes and achieving historic reconciliation between the Armenians and Azeris. Perhaps they would do it not at once, but progressively, in two or three public statements.”

In his other article V. Kazimirov specified that regular negotiations should be started in three “tracks”: 1) on the status of Nagorno Karabakh for the transition period and elements of its final status; 2) on the order of leaving territories, withdrawing external forces, return of displaced persons and refugees; 3) on the immediate measures to reduce tension and normalize relations.

Taking into consideration the obvious difficulties of the first two “tracks”, one should provide advanced rates at the third “track”, clearing up the general atmosphere of talks.

### **Integration approaches**

The above-mentioned “Stability Pact” document proposed by Emerson has something in common with the top-level discussion in 1998-2002 about ways to establish a collective security system in the Caucasus, since the Stability Pact for the South Caucasus was actually based on a unified approach to the restoration of mutual trust in the region and the creation of a system of mutual security guarantees. The formula “3+3+2” (i.e. the internationally recognized states of the South Caucasus, regional powers – the Russian Federation, Iran and Turkey – as well as the U.S. and the European Union) became the subject of discussion upon Armenia’s initiative. The U.S., the EU and Turkey, in principle, did not object to this approach, and even took a number of steps for the initiation of corresponding discussions in the South Caucasus’ capitals. However, the Russian Federation and Iran were categorically against this formula and were in favor of the “3+2” formula without the U.S., the EU and Turkey

The integration approaches were intensively discussed at international conferences in Lorkkum (Germany) and Berlin in 2001, with the participation of representatives from all sides of the South Caucasus. During the Berlin conference, M. Emerson specified, and to some extent, altered some parts of his concept, but it failed to help to make the “Stability Pact” any more appealing to the political elites of the South Caucasus.

### **External coercion or the “Dayton schemes”**

One possible way to settle the conflict could be achieved with the aid of external coercion by the world powers, which can be conventionally called the “Dayton Principle”. This solution can be compared with any of the above-mentioned variants. For example, the head of the analytical group “Image”, Rasim Agayev, thinks it possible – on the basis of the tendencies observed after 9/11 – to introduce an operation of “superpowers”, the aim of which, according to the author’s logic, must be the restoration of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno Karabakh. Here are the main points of his proposal.

The inability of Azerbaijan and Armenia to find an acceptable solution to the territorial dispute creates an urgent need to find an internationally accepted system of coercive measures that would be directed at the elimination of conflicts which threaten the existence of whole regions and are capable of causing full-scale international crises. The legal basis of this model is the provisions of the UN Charter “The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes” and “Actions in Relation to the Threat of Peace, Violation of Peace and Acts of Aggression”, the agreements about the inviolability of borders in conditions of globalization, and the consent

of all UN-member states to recognize the priority of the principle of territorial integrity over arbitrarily interpreted provisions of UN documents pertaining to the right of nations to self-determination.

As far as the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh is concerned, the following system of measures aimed at separating the sides and restoring the status quo on the basis of the principles of international law appears to be possible to apply:

1. A Plenipotentiary Council of state-guarantors of peace and combat against international terrorism is set up (or the Azerbaijan Republic has the US Security Council consider the correspondence of the Karabakh Armenians' demands for self-determination to international law in the context of the territorial integrity of UN-member states).
2. A resolution with strict demands on the self-declared republic and the central government to define the principles of autonomy within the framework of a single state is adopted.
3. In case of disagreement by one of the sides, the UN introduces strict sanctions of a compulsory character against the violator (like in South Africa and Iraq).
4. Combined military forces are brought to the conflict zone to control the implementation of the sanctions.
5. On the expiry of the period of sanctions, the UN is entitled to form supra-national bodies of control in the area, which coordinate their actions with the central authorities of Azerbaijan.
6. As to the forces and persons who sabotage the resolutions of the Council, the latter considers extradition measures or brings them to the international court (as was the case with Yugoslavia).
7. Conditions for the return of refugees and the establishment of peaceful life are gradually created.

Similarly, Emerson and Tocci consider as possible a scenario according to which the international community may use the "Dayton Method" to force the principles of "integration settlement" of conflicts in the South Caucasus which was proposed earlier by the same authors (see above). All these proposals remain purely speculative, since they have not been supported in any way by the political leadership of any country or international organization.

### **“The Dartmouth variant”**

This variant is called to remove the contradiction between the “package” and “stage-by-stage” principles, which during recent years was one of the serious obstacles to progress in the negotiations. It has much in common with “the Backup plan variant” which was described above, but is favorably compared to it as it contains a more detailed and concrete list of measures that can be undertaken at an early stage of the peace process basically aimed at strengthening mutual confidence between the parties to the conflict.

One more important feature of this variant is, so to say, its “informal authorship”. Unlike the other variants, “the Dartmouth variant” is a result of a long collective effort of public representatives of the parties to the conflict, in the true sense of the word, a fruit of “grassroots diplomacy”. This factor can become important in the matter of its possible realization/application in practice.

The basic thesis of “the Dartmouth variant” is the initiation of an all-round peace process, as a process of “continuous interaction at all public levels and in many spheres of social, political and economic life”.

The following basic principles are pinpointed:

- 1. All parties to the armed conflict confirm their adherence to the currently observed cease-fire regime.*
- 2. All parties declare their obligation to refuse to use force or threat by force and to resolve disagreements by peaceful means.*
- 3. All parties are ready to solve any conflicts and problems between them by negotiations in bilateral and multilateral formats. They confirm their adherence to the Minsk process and international participation.*
- 4. All the parties, whose participation in the peace process is necessary for the implementation of reached agreements, will participate in the negotiations and become signatories to the concluded agreements.*
- 5. All parties agree that strengthening of mutual confidence between the participants of the peace process requires the termination of hostile activities and especially propaganda.*
- 6. Not only agreements elaborated during negotiations, but also the cooperation of all residents of this region are necessary for the establishment of a comprehensive, fair, and lasting peace.*

*7. All parties are interested in the development of such peaceful relations between them that will allow them to keep and develop their identity, to define their way of life and secure future.*

*8. All parties assume the obligation to secure the rights and needs of refugees and internally displaced persons with the participation of international organizations.*

The document also contains a section entitled “the Explanation of the Logic of the Peace Process”. The following clauses are stated in it:

*1. The logic of the peace process consists in offering new thinking in the field of the establishment of peace. This new thinking envisages that until the relations between the conflicting peoples change, the governments have no consent of these peoples to achieve agreements by means of negotiations. The peace process should change these relations with the aid of some interconnected agreements achieved in negotiations. Careful implementation of each agreement creates conditions for negotiations on the next agreement. Implementation of agreements will create new starting points for negotiations and will raise the level of trust in the peace process as a whole.*

*2. The first round of negotiations could define, for example, a complex of interactive steps for the resolution of such a major problem that can be solved in the interests of all the parties at this stage. Further steps will push the resolution of this problem forward.*

*3. The participation of plenipotentiaries from Nagorno Karabakh in the negotiations, as a party signing the agreements, assuming the obligations to implement the agreements, to form normal relations with its neighbors and mutual obligations on non-interference into the internal affairs of each other will create conditions that will be considered as the intermediate status of Nagorno Karabakh. Agreements reached and implemented by Nagorno Karabakh will actually constitute the recognition of this status.*

*4. Representatives of Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh negotiate the mechanisms of the definition and legal registration of the final status of Nagorno Karabakh.*

*5. A full and final settlement of the problem of Nagorno Karabakh implies the resolution of all the aspects making the essence of the problem and disputed questions that emerged on its basis. The comprehensive settlement of the conflict also supposes the realization of the reached arrangements and their development extended in time.*

According to the idea of the document, the plenipotentiaries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, according to the format of the Minsk conference, would conclude agreements on a number of issues. Those who assume obligations for their realization would be participants of the negotiations and signatories to agreements.

An important feature of the offered scheme is that it is proposed to negotiate in two stages. *“The first phase of negotiations should be concluded by intermediate steps which are confidence-building measures implying equivalent concessions of the parties in coordinated spheres. These measures should demonstrate the achievement of progress on the way to peace and create prerequisites for the resolution of final questions. At this stage of intermediate steps it is necessary to exclude questions concerning the final agreement,”* the document states. And in the concluding phase of negotiations, questions that have not yet been solved will be discussed.

The document suggests the following list of questions to be discussed in negotiations:

- 1. Restoration of communications, economic and cultural cooperation synchronized with the course of the peace process.*
- 2. The question of territories and borders. By mutual consent of the parties the withdrawal of troops from the controlled territories may be implemented in a manner synchronized with the course of the peace process, as well as their demilitarization at the level determined during negotiations and secured coordinated measures.*
- 3. The question on refugees and forcibly displaced persons. Within the framework of the peace process the return of refugees and displaced persons to the territories upon which the parties will agree will be coordinated. At the same time, international participation in their reconstruction, rights of minorities are provided.*
- 4. A question on a legally formulated final status of Nagorno Karabakh and the conclusion of a peace treaty.*
- 5. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.*

Lastly, this variant, as well as the “back up plan”, supposes that the peace process should not be limited only to negotiations between officials. They require “mutually supporting steps both on the part of authorities and on the part of the residents to strengthen mutual trust and to make possible all-round implementation of the concluded agreements”.

## Appendix 3

**Table 1. Official Positions (intractability chart):**

→ - perceived support, int-l – international, Arm. –Armenian

Interested in cooperation and peaceful resolution	US EU NATO ↓	OSCE local and int-l NGOs	France Russia Iran ↓
Indifferent or neutral	BP & Co., Georgia ↓		
Non-interested in cooperation and peaceful resolution	Azeri gov-t Azeri IDP/refugees Azri Public Azeri business Azeri intellectuals Turkey	Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian gov-t Arm. Refugees Arm. Diaspora Arm. Public Arm. Business Arm. intellectuals	

**Table 2: Interests (resolution chart):**

Interested in cooperation and peaceful resolution (give peace a chance)	US, EU, NATO, NGOs, BP & Co., Georgia, majority of refugees and IDPs	
Have economic and security interest, but political and psychological obstacles in cooperation and peaceful resolution	Turkey Armenian gov-t, Arm. Public, Arm. Business Azeri gov-t, Azri Public, Azeri business	
Indifferent	France	
Non-interested in cooperation and peaceful resolution (give war a chance)	Azeri intellectuals (mainstream)	Nagorno-Karabakh Arm. Diaspora Arm. Intellectuals (mainstream) Russia Iran

INTRACTABILITY OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT:  
A MYTH OR A REALITY?

Philip Gamaghelyan

## *Appendix 4*



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[http://www.levantinecenter.org/files/images/bufferzone.img\\_assist\\_custom.jpg](http://www.levantinecenter.org/files/images/bufferzone.img_assist_custom.jpg)